Brusilov offensive
-
- Member
- Posts: 23
- Joined: 30 Jun 2003, 14:15
- Location: Zagreb,Croatia
Brusilov offensive
Was it the most sucessfull Entante offensive until 1918?I've read that 400000Austro-Hungarians were captured,and even Budapest was endangered from the East
-
- Member
- Posts: 23
- Joined: 30 Jun 2003, 14:15
- Location: Zagreb,Croatia
Tactically, it was indeed a victory, of course Russian suffered heavy casualities, but not 1 million, it was half million, Russian's offensive were not contained until they already advanced hundreds of miles. however, eventually, this offensive went to nowhere, it failed to knocked the Austria out of war, and Russian army were both material and moral exhuasted, then you know what happened to Russia army afterward.
on the Strategy point of view, this Russa offensive achieved:
1. Forced German to transfer troops from west front to east, so that German had to finally halt the Verdun offensive
2.Austria also had to transfer troops from Italy front, so that after recently defeat, Italian could managed to stablized their front.
3. Persuave Romanian to declare war to Germany and Austira
on the Strategy point of view, this Russa offensive achieved:
1. Forced German to transfer troops from west front to east, so that German had to finally halt the Verdun offensive
2.Austria also had to transfer troops from Italy front, so that after recently defeat, Italian could managed to stablized their front.
3. Persuave Romanian to declare war to Germany and Austira
Re: Brusilov offensive
Hello to all ; a little complement..........................................
The Brusilov Offensive.
The attack of the Russian Southwest Army in June 1916 was originally to be part of amajor offensive against the Ger~an East front which did not materialize. Due to the clamor by the Italians, hard pressed on the Plateau of the "Sieben Gemeinde," Brussilov wa"s told to expedite his offensive, the preparation of which was, already far advanced.
Brussilov's plan was to attack with all his four armies simultaneously in order to deceive the enemy as to the location qf the main effort, and interfere with the transport of his supply. The Eighth Army, which was to bear the brunt of the effort, was to advance from Olyka through Luck on Kowel.
A cavalry corps was to attempt an advance along the railroad: Sarny-Kowel. To the Eleventh Army was assigned the railway: Tarnapol-Lemberg as a direction of advance. The Seventh Army was to attack across the lower Strypa while the Ninth Army broke through just south of the Dniester. Brussilov had but 2 1/2 infantry divisions as general reserve. A Siberian Corps was being sent to his aid from Riga.
Brussilov laid great stress on thorough preparation for the tactical breakthrough. A method of approach, adopted by the French, was to bring up the assault echelons early, close to the enemy position. Artillery fire for destruction was systematically planned and conducted. Munition supply was adequate.
The attack began on 4 June. In spite of the strength of the enemy defensive works, great success was attained at the very beginning on the north flank, and on both sides of the Dniester. On the evening of the 7th, after the capture of numerous positions, the Russians reached Luck and soon thereafter the west bank of the Styr. On the 9th a gap was torn between the 4th and 1st Austrian Armies. Forty-eight hours later this had grown to a width of 45 km.
The way to Lemberg was open. But the cavalry squadrons of the Eighth Russian Army exhausted themselves in fruitless combat on the lower Styr, and failed to seize the opportunity for a far-reaching envelopment. Brussilov's attention was diverted to the German and Austro-Hungarian reinforcements coming from Kowel. Before the Russian Eighth Army could renew the attack the counterattack of the Central Allies hit them. The gap in the front was closed, and thus was lost the chance for a decisive victory in Volhynia.
Source: THE STRATEGIC BREAKTHROUGH. Military Review. Sep 1933.
Cheers. Raúl M .
The Brusilov Offensive.
The attack of the Russian Southwest Army in June 1916 was originally to be part of amajor offensive against the Ger~an East front which did not materialize. Due to the clamor by the Italians, hard pressed on the Plateau of the "Sieben Gemeinde," Brussilov wa"s told to expedite his offensive, the preparation of which was, already far advanced.
Brussilov's plan was to attack with all his four armies simultaneously in order to deceive the enemy as to the location qf the main effort, and interfere with the transport of his supply. The Eighth Army, which was to bear the brunt of the effort, was to advance from Olyka through Luck on Kowel.
A cavalry corps was to attempt an advance along the railroad: Sarny-Kowel. To the Eleventh Army was assigned the railway: Tarnapol-Lemberg as a direction of advance. The Seventh Army was to attack across the lower Strypa while the Ninth Army broke through just south of the Dniester. Brussilov had but 2 1/2 infantry divisions as general reserve. A Siberian Corps was being sent to his aid from Riga.
Brussilov laid great stress on thorough preparation for the tactical breakthrough. A method of approach, adopted by the French, was to bring up the assault echelons early, close to the enemy position. Artillery fire for destruction was systematically planned and conducted. Munition supply was adequate.
The attack began on 4 June. In spite of the strength of the enemy defensive works, great success was attained at the very beginning on the north flank, and on both sides of the Dniester. On the evening of the 7th, after the capture of numerous positions, the Russians reached Luck and soon thereafter the west bank of the Styr. On the 9th a gap was torn between the 4th and 1st Austrian Armies. Forty-eight hours later this had grown to a width of 45 km.
The way to Lemberg was open. But the cavalry squadrons of the Eighth Russian Army exhausted themselves in fruitless combat on the lower Styr, and failed to seize the opportunity for a far-reaching envelopment. Brussilov's attention was diverted to the German and Austro-Hungarian reinforcements coming from Kowel. Before the Russian Eighth Army could renew the attack the counterattack of the Central Allies hit them. The gap in the front was closed, and thus was lost the chance for a decisive victory in Volhynia.
Source: THE STRATEGIC BREAKTHROUGH. Military Review. Sep 1933.
Cheers. Raúl M .
Re: Brusilov offensive
Hello to all ; more.........................................
The Brusilov Offensive.
Still greater were the Russian successes of the summer offensive in the Bukowina. After initial victories the Ninth Army broke through the Bessarabian front of Pflanzer-Baltin on 10 June. The right wing of his army had to be withdrawn behind the Pruth, while the remnants of the center-fortunately not closely pursued-withdrew to the west between the Dniester and the Pruth. Yet the Russians did not exploit the success of the moment. Four days went by before the Commander of the Ninth Army came to the decision of an eccentric attack against the Pruth front.
The consideraple cavalry forces could have taken up the attack by a blow in the direction of Stanislau and thus have relieved the South Army. But this was not done. For the Austro-Hungarian troops pursuit at this time would have been more critical and deadly than in Volhynia. Yet here, as well, the Russians were incapable of forcing a decision.
Brussilov's central idea was to deliver a series of heavy hammer blows at a number of points on the enemy's front. Thus it was that he stressed the tactical aspect rather than the strategical one, and really attained considerable local success. Yet he did not know how to profit by these actual breakthroughs, the extent of which surprised him.
The two reasons were: first, he was not prepared in training and spirit to cope with such opportunities; second, he lacked a major strategic objective (e.g. Lemberg). If he had done as the Chief of the General Staff, General Alexejew, enjoined him to do on the eve of the offensive - viz., to place all his force at the critical point for a breakthrough, and then at once exploit it - he would perhaps have been the victor on the Eastern Front.
Source: THE STRATEGIC BREAKTHROUGH. Military Review. Sep 1933.
Cheers. Raúl M .
The Brusilov Offensive.
Still greater were the Russian successes of the summer offensive in the Bukowina. After initial victories the Ninth Army broke through the Bessarabian front of Pflanzer-Baltin on 10 June. The right wing of his army had to be withdrawn behind the Pruth, while the remnants of the center-fortunately not closely pursued-withdrew to the west between the Dniester and the Pruth. Yet the Russians did not exploit the success of the moment. Four days went by before the Commander of the Ninth Army came to the decision of an eccentric attack against the Pruth front.
The consideraple cavalry forces could have taken up the attack by a blow in the direction of Stanislau and thus have relieved the South Army. But this was not done. For the Austro-Hungarian troops pursuit at this time would have been more critical and deadly than in Volhynia. Yet here, as well, the Russians were incapable of forcing a decision.
Brussilov's central idea was to deliver a series of heavy hammer blows at a number of points on the enemy's front. Thus it was that he stressed the tactical aspect rather than the strategical one, and really attained considerable local success. Yet he did not know how to profit by these actual breakthroughs, the extent of which surprised him.
The two reasons were: first, he was not prepared in training and spirit to cope with such opportunities; second, he lacked a major strategic objective (e.g. Lemberg). If he had done as the Chief of the General Staff, General Alexejew, enjoined him to do on the eve of the offensive - viz., to place all his force at the critical point for a breakthrough, and then at once exploit it - he would perhaps have been the victor on the Eastern Front.
Source: THE STRATEGIC BREAKTHROUGH. Military Review. Sep 1933.
Cheers. Raúl M .