Tanks in WWI
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Kurt_Steiner
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Carlos Marighela
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Re: Tanks in WWI
Hello to all 
; a little complement.........................
GERMAN TANK UNITS IN THE WORLD WAR.
[Die deutsche Kampfwagentruppe im Weltkriege.]
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMFTRUPPE. By Captain H.N. Hartness, Infantry. July 1937.
REASON FOR AND CONSTRUCTION OF GERMAN TANKS. -It is well known today that the Germans employed tanks in the World War, but less known what types and how many were employed and what these units accomplished. This article has as its object the presentation of the German tank in the war and what it accomplished.
In 1916 the Allies introduced the tank as a new combat means. The great capabilities exhibited by the tank in the first attack led to the building by the Allies of masses of tanks. The tank combat in the vicinity of Cambrai in November 1917, delivered the proof of the effectiveness of the tank as a combat weapon.
Initially, the Germans delayed the construction of tanks because the initial success of the German troops in defending against hostile tanks was so great (numbers of them lay destroyed between the lines) that it was believed that a brave defender with his means would be able to defend against the tank attack. However, the number of hostile tanks became greater and the defensive power of the German Army against them became less, this lessening of the defensive power being the direct result of insufficient defensive weapons and the necessary ammunition.
Consequently, the German High Command desired to build its own tanks once the tremendous worth of this means of attack was recognized. Many difficulties lay in the way, the greatest being lack of material; a lesser, a lack of suitable models.
As a result of the various delays, German tanks were first available and were first employed in the great spring offensive of 1918.
THE GERMAN TANK MATERIEL. -In November 1916, the war ministry had decided upon the construction of tanks, but at this time the technical bases and models of construction and types were not at hand. It was through the capability and energy of Chief Engineer Vollmer and his assistants that the necessary preliminary matters were prepared and construction could be begun.
On the side of the Allies a number of types of tanks were employed. The Germans employed only one German type tank, the A7V tank; they did, however, make use of a number of captured Mark IV British tanks.
On the German A7V, tank the tank track was protected by armor plating, whereas the tracks of the British heavy and the French light Renault tanks were not protected. The German tank was provided with two 100 horsepower motors, one driving each track; this gave to the tank a maximum speed of 16 kilometers per hour. This speed was essentially greater than that of the heavy British and that of the French Renault, each of which could travel about 8 kilometers per hour. The armament of the A7V consisted of a 57-mm cannon and six heavy machine guns with a crew of 26 men. Normally the tank commander was an officer. The construction of the tracks on the German tank provided it with less terrain mobility, less ditch and trench crossing capability, than that of the French and British tanks. This necessitated an especially thorough reconnaissance of the terrain of attack, which did not, however, work to a disadvantage except in a very small number of instances.
The armament (armor) was quite strong -at the most vulnerable areas, 30-mm; on the sides, 16-mm: and in rear, 20-mm. By oblique construction the penetrating effectiveness of hostile bullets was still further diminished. An example is cited in which a tank was struck by a 75-mm projectile, the result being merely a denting of the armor plating.
The German A7V tank was 22 ¾ feet long, 11 ½ feet wide, and 10 feet high. The vehicle had three compartments: the forward with the 57-mm cannon and two machine guns; the rear with four machine guns and signal personnel; and the tower in which the commander of the tank and the driver sat. The two compartments were joined together by two passageways. The ammunition boxes were used as seats for the crew. The tank could cross a trench eight feet wide.
As a result of the very good German defense, a great number of British tanks fell into their hands. Those that were only slightly damaged or not at all damaged were repaired and renewed in a large repair shop in Charleroi. In this manner the Germans had at their disposal a number of these captured British tanks. Although it is well known that in England during the war there were built five heavy types of tanks, Mark I to Mark V inclusive, the type Mark IV is the one primarily employed by the Germans, the reason being that the Mark IV had such slow speed (its greatest speed being 8 kilometers in the hour) that they fell comparatively easy prey to the German defense and consequently into German hands.
Source: Periodical Articles-Catalog. March, 1938, Review of Military Literature.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M
.
; a little complement.........................GERMAN TANK UNITS IN THE WORLD WAR.
[Die deutsche Kampfwagentruppe im Weltkriege.]
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMFTRUPPE. By Captain H.N. Hartness, Infantry. July 1937.
REASON FOR AND CONSTRUCTION OF GERMAN TANKS. -It is well known today that the Germans employed tanks in the World War, but less known what types and how many were employed and what these units accomplished. This article has as its object the presentation of the German tank in the war and what it accomplished.
In 1916 the Allies introduced the tank as a new combat means. The great capabilities exhibited by the tank in the first attack led to the building by the Allies of masses of tanks. The tank combat in the vicinity of Cambrai in November 1917, delivered the proof of the effectiveness of the tank as a combat weapon.
Initially, the Germans delayed the construction of tanks because the initial success of the German troops in defending against hostile tanks was so great (numbers of them lay destroyed between the lines) that it was believed that a brave defender with his means would be able to defend against the tank attack. However, the number of hostile tanks became greater and the defensive power of the German Army against them became less, this lessening of the defensive power being the direct result of insufficient defensive weapons and the necessary ammunition.
Consequently, the German High Command desired to build its own tanks once the tremendous worth of this means of attack was recognized. Many difficulties lay in the way, the greatest being lack of material; a lesser, a lack of suitable models.
As a result of the various delays, German tanks were first available and were first employed in the great spring offensive of 1918.
THE GERMAN TANK MATERIEL. -In November 1916, the war ministry had decided upon the construction of tanks, but at this time the technical bases and models of construction and types were not at hand. It was through the capability and energy of Chief Engineer Vollmer and his assistants that the necessary preliminary matters were prepared and construction could be begun.
On the side of the Allies a number of types of tanks were employed. The Germans employed only one German type tank, the A7V tank; they did, however, make use of a number of captured Mark IV British tanks.
On the German A7V, tank the tank track was protected by armor plating, whereas the tracks of the British heavy and the French light Renault tanks were not protected. The German tank was provided with two 100 horsepower motors, one driving each track; this gave to the tank a maximum speed of 16 kilometers per hour. This speed was essentially greater than that of the heavy British and that of the French Renault, each of which could travel about 8 kilometers per hour. The armament of the A7V consisted of a 57-mm cannon and six heavy machine guns with a crew of 26 men. Normally the tank commander was an officer. The construction of the tracks on the German tank provided it with less terrain mobility, less ditch and trench crossing capability, than that of the French and British tanks. This necessitated an especially thorough reconnaissance of the terrain of attack, which did not, however, work to a disadvantage except in a very small number of instances.
The armament (armor) was quite strong -at the most vulnerable areas, 30-mm; on the sides, 16-mm: and in rear, 20-mm. By oblique construction the penetrating effectiveness of hostile bullets was still further diminished. An example is cited in which a tank was struck by a 75-mm projectile, the result being merely a denting of the armor plating.
The German A7V tank was 22 ¾ feet long, 11 ½ feet wide, and 10 feet high. The vehicle had three compartments: the forward with the 57-mm cannon and two machine guns; the rear with four machine guns and signal personnel; and the tower in which the commander of the tank and the driver sat. The two compartments were joined together by two passageways. The ammunition boxes were used as seats for the crew. The tank could cross a trench eight feet wide.
As a result of the very good German defense, a great number of British tanks fell into their hands. Those that were only slightly damaged or not at all damaged were repaired and renewed in a large repair shop in Charleroi. In this manner the Germans had at their disposal a number of these captured British tanks. Although it is well known that in England during the war there were built five heavy types of tanks, Mark I to Mark V inclusive, the type Mark IV is the one primarily employed by the Germans, the reason being that the Mark IV had such slow speed (its greatest speed being 8 kilometers in the hour) that they fell comparatively easy prey to the German defense and consequently into German hands.
Source: Periodical Articles-Catalog. March, 1938, Review of Military Literature.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M
.Re: Tanks in WWI
Hello to all ; more follows.........................
GERMAN TANK UNITS IN THE WORLD WAR.
[Die deutsche Kampfwagentruppe im Weltkriege.]
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMFTRUPPE. By Captain H.N. Hartness, Infantry. July 1937.
THE GERMAN TANK MATERIEL (follows). -The slowness and difficulty of maneuver of the heavy tanks led the French and British to decide upon the construction of lighter tanks. Germany likewise intended to concentrate its construction upon the lighter type. The lighter type offered, in addition to the great advantage of more rapid movement and better maneuverability, the fact that the lighter models required less material and were less costly. Moreover, at this stage the Germans, through their experience, had come,to the conclusion that Success could be achieved only by the mass employment of tanks.
Therefore, there came into being the light tanks LK I, LK II. These two models had the following capabilities and characteristics: a 50 horsepower motor providing a speed of 18 kilometers per hour. The armament consisted of two machine guns or one machine gun and a small cannon, and
the crew of a commander, a driver, and a gunner, the armor plate between 8-mm and 14-mm, weight 17 tons. The tracks were constructed similarly to those of the French and British tanks.
It is worthy of note that a type LK III was built, a sort of compromise solution, since the material required for the LK I and the LK II was not to be had in the quantities necessary.
The High Command decided in May 1917, after the first A7V tank had been demonstrated, to build a still large tank, the so-called "Great Tank". This tank was to have two motors, each of 600 horsepower. Its greatest speed should be 7 ½ kilometers per hour; it should be 42 feet long, 10 ½ feet wide and 9 feet high. Its armament was to consist of four 77-mm field pieces and two machine guns, with a crew of 22 men, an armor plating of 32 mm and a weight of 150 tons. Since it would not be possible to transport this vehicle in one piece, it was provided to construct it so that it could be transported in loads of 15 to 20 tons each. In the tank, electrical signal apparatus was constructed so that communication between all parts of the tank and all members of the crew could be quickly accomplished. By the end of 1918 two of these vehicles had been constructed, but their suitability and capabilities could not be tested. The constructor requested that a test run be made; the Allied commission would not permit this, and both tanks were destroyed.
It is obvious that Germany constructed and tried out several different types of tanks, but the only one actually employed at the front and that at
the beginning of the year 1918 was the A7V.
Originally it was intended to build 100 heavy A7V tanks. As a result, however, of the lack of the necessary armor, only 20 were constructed. The
other 80 were finished as chassis without armor and were employed primarily for the transportation of ammunition and materiel in the front areas, particularly for the delivery of ammunition to the foremost battery positions.
Source: Periodical Articles-Catalog. March, 1938, Review of Military Literature.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows.........................GERMAN TANK UNITS IN THE WORLD WAR.
[Die deutsche Kampfwagentruppe im Weltkriege.]
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMFTRUPPE. By Captain H.N. Hartness, Infantry. July 1937.
THE GERMAN TANK MATERIEL (follows). -The slowness and difficulty of maneuver of the heavy tanks led the French and British to decide upon the construction of lighter tanks. Germany likewise intended to concentrate its construction upon the lighter type. The lighter type offered, in addition to the great advantage of more rapid movement and better maneuverability, the fact that the lighter models required less material and were less costly. Moreover, at this stage the Germans, through their experience, had come,to the conclusion that Success could be achieved only by the mass employment of tanks.
Therefore, there came into being the light tanks LK I, LK II. These two models had the following capabilities and characteristics: a 50 horsepower motor providing a speed of 18 kilometers per hour. The armament consisted of two machine guns or one machine gun and a small cannon, and
the crew of a commander, a driver, and a gunner, the armor plate between 8-mm and 14-mm, weight 17 tons. The tracks were constructed similarly to those of the French and British tanks.
It is worthy of note that a type LK III was built, a sort of compromise solution, since the material required for the LK I and the LK II was not to be had in the quantities necessary.
The High Command decided in May 1917, after the first A7V tank had been demonstrated, to build a still large tank, the so-called "Great Tank". This tank was to have two motors, each of 600 horsepower. Its greatest speed should be 7 ½ kilometers per hour; it should be 42 feet long, 10 ½ feet wide and 9 feet high. Its armament was to consist of four 77-mm field pieces and two machine guns, with a crew of 22 men, an armor plating of 32 mm and a weight of 150 tons. Since it would not be possible to transport this vehicle in one piece, it was provided to construct it so that it could be transported in loads of 15 to 20 tons each. In the tank, electrical signal apparatus was constructed so that communication between all parts of the tank and all members of the crew could be quickly accomplished. By the end of 1918 two of these vehicles had been constructed, but their suitability and capabilities could not be tested. The constructor requested that a test run be made; the Allied commission would not permit this, and both tanks were destroyed.
It is obvious that Germany constructed and tried out several different types of tanks, but the only one actually employed at the front and that at
the beginning of the year 1918 was the A7V.
Originally it was intended to build 100 heavy A7V tanks. As a result, however, of the lack of the necessary armor, only 20 were constructed. The
other 80 were finished as chassis without armor and were employed primarily for the transportation of ammunition and materiel in the front areas, particularly for the delivery of ammunition to the foremost battery positions.
Source: Periodical Articles-Catalog. March, 1938, Review of Military Literature.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M
.Re: Tanks in WWI
Hello to all ; more follows.........................
GERMAN TANK UNITS IN THE WORLD WAR.
[Die deutsche Kampfwagentruppe im Weltkriege.]
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMFTRUPPE. By Captain H.N. Hartness, Infantry. July 1937.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN TANK UNITS. -In February 1918, there came into existence the first German tank unit, designated "the
first assault armored vehicle detachment." Later the tank units were designated as "heavy tank detachments" or, in so far as they were equipped with captured British Mark IV tanks, "captured (beute) tank" detachments.
At the head of the German detachments was the "Commander of Tank Detachments" who was under the chief of the field motor transportation units. The permanent headquarters of the detachments were in and around Charleroi, Belgium. Each detachment consisted of two echelons: the first, the combat echelon, consisting, as a rule, of five heavy tanks, one to two motor cars, one motorcycle and the repair and materiel truck. The remainder of the detachment formed the second echelon, which carried gasoline, oil, ammunition, replacements, rations and repair units. Each detachment consisted in reality, in combat strength, of five heavy tanks. In April 1918, there were three German and two "captured tank" detachments. By the middle of May, two additional "captured tank" detachments were ready for employment. By the end of the war the German tank units numbered three German and six "captured tank" detachments. That means that as a maximum at one time there were available for employment 45 tanks, in comparison to the enemy, an extremely small number. This fact is all the more notable when we consider the amount of success achieved by this small number.
After employment in combat, it was generally necessary to withdraw the tanks for repair and reconditioning. Since there existed but one suitable
repair shop, the Bavarian Army motor park No. 20 (Bayrischen Armee-Kraftwagen-Park 20), in Charleroi, we find here the answer to the question, "why was the headquarters of all detachments in Charleroi?" Replacements in personnel were obtained through volunteers; therefore this personnel was excellent. In the autumn of 1918, based upon battle experiences and upon the fact that the enemy was experimenting with a new organization, the Germans concluded that the detachment as a unit of five tanks was too weak. Therefore, the former three German detachments were formed into one detachment. Because the war ended, the formation of further large detachments was not effected. The plan existed to organize the light tanks under construction into battalions of three companies each, thirty tanks in each company. This organization would have provided the battalion with approximately 100 tanks, including the commander's tank and a reserve. The execution of such a plan would have provided Germany, at the beginning of 1919, with a tank mass; its consummation was not realized.
Source: Periodical Articles-Catalog. March, 1938, Review of Military Literature.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows.........................GERMAN TANK UNITS IN THE WORLD WAR.
[Die deutsche Kampfwagentruppe im Weltkriege.]
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMFTRUPPE. By Captain H.N. Hartness, Infantry. July 1937.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN TANK UNITS. -In February 1918, there came into existence the first German tank unit, designated "the
first assault armored vehicle detachment." Later the tank units were designated as "heavy tank detachments" or, in so far as they were equipped with captured British Mark IV tanks, "captured (beute) tank" detachments.
At the head of the German detachments was the "Commander of Tank Detachments" who was under the chief of the field motor transportation units. The permanent headquarters of the detachments were in and around Charleroi, Belgium. Each detachment consisted of two echelons: the first, the combat echelon, consisting, as a rule, of five heavy tanks, one to two motor cars, one motorcycle and the repair and materiel truck. The remainder of the detachment formed the second echelon, which carried gasoline, oil, ammunition, replacements, rations and repair units. Each detachment consisted in reality, in combat strength, of five heavy tanks. In April 1918, there were three German and two "captured tank" detachments. By the middle of May, two additional "captured tank" detachments were ready for employment. By the end of the war the German tank units numbered three German and six "captured tank" detachments. That means that as a maximum at one time there were available for employment 45 tanks, in comparison to the enemy, an extremely small number. This fact is all the more notable when we consider the amount of success achieved by this small number.
After employment in combat, it was generally necessary to withdraw the tanks for repair and reconditioning. Since there existed but one suitable
repair shop, the Bavarian Army motor park No. 20 (Bayrischen Armee-Kraftwagen-Park 20), in Charleroi, we find here the answer to the question, "why was the headquarters of all detachments in Charleroi?" Replacements in personnel were obtained through volunteers; therefore this personnel was excellent. In the autumn of 1918, based upon battle experiences and upon the fact that the enemy was experimenting with a new organization, the Germans concluded that the detachment as a unit of five tanks was too weak. Therefore, the former three German detachments were formed into one detachment. Because the war ended, the formation of further large detachments was not effected. The plan existed to organize the light tanks under construction into battalions of three companies each, thirty tanks in each company. This organization would have provided the battalion with approximately 100 tanks, including the commander's tank and a reserve. The execution of such a plan would have provided Germany, at the beginning of 1919, with a tank mass; its consummation was not realized.
Source: Periodical Articles-Catalog. March, 1938, Review of Military Literature.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M
.Re: Tanks in WWI
Hello to all ; more follows.........................
GERMAN TANK UNITS IN THE WORLD WAR.
[Die deutsche Kampfwagentruppe im Weltkriege.]
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMFTRUPPE. By Captain H.N. Hartness, Infantry. July 1937.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF GERMAN TANKS IN THE WAR. -German tank detachments participated in important offensive operations and also defensive operations. Their employment resulted in considerable successes and particularly in help to the infantry. Sometimes their employment was a decisive factor in the course of the battle.
The first employment of German tanks took place on 21 March 1918, in the great spring offensive near St. Quentin. For disposal in this offensive there were one German and one "captured tank" detachments. Each detachment was assigned to an assault division. The mission prescribed crossing the hostile trenches and beating down the machine-gun nests and nests of resistance in cooperation with the "storm battalion Rohr" with which these tank detachments had already practiced. The new arm moved into combat without experience and even though no effective far-reaching results were obtainable, this first small employment brought a noteworthy success and the first practical battle experience. Several, especially the captured tanks, were unable fully to fulfill their missions because of technical difficulties. The enemy was completely surprised. Favored by the fog, the moral success was great and provided an effective support for the infantry attack. The German losses were extremely small; the tanks on the other hand captured a number of prisoners. This initial baptism under fire was successful.
A second contemplated employment at the beginning of April by the Sixth Army was not carried through since a stream constituted a hindrance which was not overcome by the early construction of a bridge.
On 9 April, in the vicinity of st. Gobain, tank employment was ordered, but because the enemy evacuated his position, in a surprise move while the tank units were still approaching, this attack was not executed.
In the vicinity of Villers-Bretonneux (not far from Amiens) the first large and very successful employment of tanks was made. Three German detachments, consisting of 14 German A7V tanks, which advanced in three groups, were employed in the zones of the XI and XIV Army Corps, in support of the infantry attack against Villers-Bretonneux, the Hangard Woods, and Cachy. Preliminary reconnaissances indicated favorable employment. Very great success attended this undertaking. The British fled, almost panic stricken, in the face of the heavy fire of these 14 tanks; the tank employment was materially aided by a heavy fog which did not permit the British defense guns to fire effectively. The loss to the German infantry was slight and can be attributed to the fact that the tanks soon reached their initial objective and were able to return and accompany their infantry forward. The mass of the hostile areas of resistance was destroyed. The infantry secured a great number of prisoners.
British and German tanks were opposed in this battle for the first time. The German was the victor. The loss to the Germans was one tank, one officer and 8 noncommissioned officers and men killed; 3 officers, 48 noncommissioned officers and men wounded; and one man unaccounted for.
On 27 May the "captured tank" detachments Nos. 11 to 14 were employed by the Seventh Army in support of the infantry attack against Soissons. In this attack the tanks reached the designated objective.
On 1 June the first tank detachment had the mission of attacking Fort Pompelle. The terrain for this attack was extremely unfavorable. In the first place, the tanks had to cross the very broad and badly blown up trench system of their own lines, the terrain of attack sloped toward Rheims, and this terrain was easily visible from the heights in rear of Rheims so that the French artillery had very favorable firing positions and observation. Consequently after a short time several of the tanks were brought to a standstill. One tank was destroyed by artillery fire. Although this tank attack was not successful as a tank attack, it did produce a situation in which the hostile infantry attention was centered on the tanks and the German infantry was thereby assisted in reaching the assigned objective.
Source: Periodical Articles-Catalog. March, 1938, Review of Military Literature.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows.........................GERMAN TANK UNITS IN THE WORLD WAR.
[Die deutsche Kampfwagentruppe im Weltkriege.]
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMFTRUPPE. By Captain H.N. Hartness, Infantry. July 1937.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF GERMAN TANKS IN THE WAR. -German tank detachments participated in important offensive operations and also defensive operations. Their employment resulted in considerable successes and particularly in help to the infantry. Sometimes their employment was a decisive factor in the course of the battle.
The first employment of German tanks took place on 21 March 1918, in the great spring offensive near St. Quentin. For disposal in this offensive there were one German and one "captured tank" detachments. Each detachment was assigned to an assault division. The mission prescribed crossing the hostile trenches and beating down the machine-gun nests and nests of resistance in cooperation with the "storm battalion Rohr" with which these tank detachments had already practiced. The new arm moved into combat without experience and even though no effective far-reaching results were obtainable, this first small employment brought a noteworthy success and the first practical battle experience. Several, especially the captured tanks, were unable fully to fulfill their missions because of technical difficulties. The enemy was completely surprised. Favored by the fog, the moral success was great and provided an effective support for the infantry attack. The German losses were extremely small; the tanks on the other hand captured a number of prisoners. This initial baptism under fire was successful.
A second contemplated employment at the beginning of April by the Sixth Army was not carried through since a stream constituted a hindrance which was not overcome by the early construction of a bridge.
On 9 April, in the vicinity of st. Gobain, tank employment was ordered, but because the enemy evacuated his position, in a surprise move while the tank units were still approaching, this attack was not executed.
In the vicinity of Villers-Bretonneux (not far from Amiens) the first large and very successful employment of tanks was made. Three German detachments, consisting of 14 German A7V tanks, which advanced in three groups, were employed in the zones of the XI and XIV Army Corps, in support of the infantry attack against Villers-Bretonneux, the Hangard Woods, and Cachy. Preliminary reconnaissances indicated favorable employment. Very great success attended this undertaking. The British fled, almost panic stricken, in the face of the heavy fire of these 14 tanks; the tank employment was materially aided by a heavy fog which did not permit the British defense guns to fire effectively. The loss to the German infantry was slight and can be attributed to the fact that the tanks soon reached their initial objective and were able to return and accompany their infantry forward. The mass of the hostile areas of resistance was destroyed. The infantry secured a great number of prisoners.
British and German tanks were opposed in this battle for the first time. The German was the victor. The loss to the Germans was one tank, one officer and 8 noncommissioned officers and men killed; 3 officers, 48 noncommissioned officers and men wounded; and one man unaccounted for.
On 27 May the "captured tank" detachments Nos. 11 to 14 were employed by the Seventh Army in support of the infantry attack against Soissons. In this attack the tanks reached the designated objective.
On 1 June the first tank detachment had the mission of attacking Fort Pompelle. The terrain for this attack was extremely unfavorable. In the first place, the tanks had to cross the very broad and badly blown up trench system of their own lines, the terrain of attack sloped toward Rheims, and this terrain was easily visible from the heights in rear of Rheims so that the French artillery had very favorable firing positions and observation. Consequently after a short time several of the tanks were brought to a standstill. One tank was destroyed by artillery fire. Although this tank attack was not successful as a tank attack, it did produce a situation in which the hostile infantry attention was centered on the tanks and the German infantry was thereby assisted in reaching the assigned objective.
Source: Periodical Articles-Catalog. March, 1938, Review of Military Literature.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M
.Re: Tanks in WWI
I'm wondering if anyone has ever gone through all possible German unit histories looking for information / photos about tanks? In my small collection of histories there are some that have one or two pictures of knocked out tanks. An example would be from the history for Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 9. I can't upload the photo, so it can be viewed at this link:
https://www.flickr.com/photos/39766556@N07/15823193713/
If it's of use to anyone I can post more information.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/39766556@N07/15823193713/
If it's of use to anyone I can post more information.
Re: Tanks in WWI
I think virtually anything about the German view on tanks in the Great War is contained in von Zezschwitz's "Der Panzerkampf", Munich and Berlin 1938 (J.F. Lehmanns Verlag). This is actually vol. III of "Heigl's Taschenbuch der Tanks."
This volume also covers French tanks, armored cars (of both sides), procurement of tanks and some obscure inter-war stuff like 'Panzerverwendung im Gran Chako-Krieg'.
As far as I know there is no English translation available though.
This volume also covers French tanks, armored cars (of both sides), procurement of tanks and some obscure inter-war stuff like 'Panzerverwendung im Gran Chako-Krieg'.
As far as I know there is no English translation available though.
Re: Tanks in WWI
Hello to all ; more follows.........................
GERMAN TANK UNITS IN THE WORLD WAR.
[Die deutsche Kampfwagentruppe im Weltkriege.]
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMFTRUPPE. By Captain H.N. Hartness, Infantry. July 1937.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF GERMAN TANKS IN THE WAR. -The German detachments 1 and 2, and the "captured tank" detachment No. 13, were successfully employed on 15 July by the Eighteenth and Seventh Armies on the Marne.
On 31 August two detachments (10 tanks) were successfully employed, on small missions by the Seventeenth Army. In the withdrawal of the entire German front to its organized rearward positions, tanks were employed on the important mission of counterattacking and driving back the enemy who had penetrated or partially penetrated the lines of the withdrawing troops. The execution of this mission by the tanks was a contributing factor in carrying through the planned withdrawal.
On 7 October, tank detachment No.3 was employed in the vicinity of St. Etiennes; on 8 October the "captured tank" detachments 11, 15 and 16 successfully participated in the defense south of Cambrai by the Seventeenth Army.
The most successful of all these offensive employments in the defense took place on 11 October 1918, in the area north of Cambrai. By the end of September, detachments 1 and 13 had already assembled near the regiments which should execute the counterattack. But this counterattack was unnecessary since the enemy did not penetrate the position and therefore the contemplated tank employment was not executed. This employment to eject an enemy who had penetrated the lines took place on 11 October, against the British. The hostile barrage fire began about 10:00 AM. A short while later a strong hostile attack was launched against the weak German infantry which was unable to maintain its position. In fact, the British, fully believing that they had accomplished a breakthrough, had employed their cavalry. The combat was now taking place in rear of the German position and German trenches. It was at this time that the tanks were employed in counterattack and they were successful in throwing back the enemy beyond the former German line and were successful in winning terrain in several areas which had, before the British attack, been in British hands. Several tanks advanced as far as 8 kilometers behind the British lines and created considerable disorder and losses among the British reserves. The losses of the British were very great because the effectiveness of the tank weapons, capable as they were of shooting in all directions, were able to engage hostile targets both to the front and flanks. It is worthy of note that in reality detachment No.1 alone took part in this counterattack since technical trouble and damages to the individual tanks prevented participation by "captured tank" detachment 13.
The last employment of German tank units (the 12th, 13th, and 14th detachments) took place on 1 October near Valenciennes. This last attack and its results were similar in every respect to those at Villers-Bretonneux. The German tank elements had not only proven themselves in the attack but also in the counterattack.
Source: Periodical Articles-Catalog. March, 1938, Review of Military Literature.
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows.........................GERMAN TANK UNITS IN THE WORLD WAR.
[Die deutsche Kampfwagentruppe im Weltkriege.]
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMFTRUPPE. By Captain H.N. Hartness, Infantry. July 1937.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF GERMAN TANKS IN THE WAR. -The German detachments 1 and 2, and the "captured tank" detachment No. 13, were successfully employed on 15 July by the Eighteenth and Seventh Armies on the Marne.
On 31 August two detachments (10 tanks) were successfully employed, on small missions by the Seventeenth Army. In the withdrawal of the entire German front to its organized rearward positions, tanks were employed on the important mission of counterattacking and driving back the enemy who had penetrated or partially penetrated the lines of the withdrawing troops. The execution of this mission by the tanks was a contributing factor in carrying through the planned withdrawal.
On 7 October, tank detachment No.3 was employed in the vicinity of St. Etiennes; on 8 October the "captured tank" detachments 11, 15 and 16 successfully participated in the defense south of Cambrai by the Seventeenth Army.
The most successful of all these offensive employments in the defense took place on 11 October 1918, in the area north of Cambrai. By the end of September, detachments 1 and 13 had already assembled near the regiments which should execute the counterattack. But this counterattack was unnecessary since the enemy did not penetrate the position and therefore the contemplated tank employment was not executed. This employment to eject an enemy who had penetrated the lines took place on 11 October, against the British. The hostile barrage fire began about 10:00 AM. A short while later a strong hostile attack was launched against the weak German infantry which was unable to maintain its position. In fact, the British, fully believing that they had accomplished a breakthrough, had employed their cavalry. The combat was now taking place in rear of the German position and German trenches. It was at this time that the tanks were employed in counterattack and they were successful in throwing back the enemy beyond the former German line and were successful in winning terrain in several areas which had, before the British attack, been in British hands. Several tanks advanced as far as 8 kilometers behind the British lines and created considerable disorder and losses among the British reserves. The losses of the British were very great because the effectiveness of the tank weapons, capable as they were of shooting in all directions, were able to engage hostile targets both to the front and flanks. It is worthy of note that in reality detachment No.1 alone took part in this counterattack since technical trouble and damages to the individual tanks prevented participation by "captured tank" detachment 13.
The last employment of German tank units (the 12th, 13th, and 14th detachments) took place on 1 October near Valenciennes. This last attack and its results were similar in every respect to those at Villers-Bretonneux. The German tank elements had not only proven themselves in the attack but also in the counterattack.
Source: Periodical Articles-Catalog. March, 1938, Review of Military Literature.
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M
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TANKS VERSUS TANKS IN THE WORLD WAR.
The official war records have established the fact that there was a tank battle fought between German and British tanks on 24 April, 1918, at Villers-Bretonneux.
The German Account.
(See Sketch No. 2.)
The 2d Tank Section had the mission of attacking Cachy, advancing from the northern point of the Hangard Woods. This attack was in conjunction with and in the area of the 77th Reserve Division which was attacking with four other German divisions. As soon as the leading tanks reached their objective, all those which had not arrived at the east and south edge of Cachy were to turn back to the jumping-off place at Wiencourt.
The official German reports of the attack of two tanks is repeated since the remainder did not encounter any hostile tanks.
Tank No.2 moved as ordered on Cachy and there reduced several machine-gun nests which had been holding up German infantry for one hour. It then moved on Cachy, a distance of 700 yards, and shot up the British positions and engaged in a battle with eight suddenly appearing British tanks. One of these was disabled by artillery fire while another was forced to retire. Shortly thereafter, Tank No.2 was disabled by a direct hit. The armor had been pierced by a projectile from a 5.7-cm. caliber cannon. The vehicle later received a second direct hit in the right front and, a third in the oil tank. In spite of these hits it was possible to bring it within the first German infantry positions where preparations were made to demolish it since it was badly shot up. (Later it was possible to salvage it).
The report of Lieutenant Biltz, the commander of this tank, reads as folIows: At about 12:00 noon, on 24 April, 1918, I found myself 700 to 800 yards northeast of Cachy in combat with the British forces in position on the outskirts of the village, as a number of hostile tanks approached rapidly from the Aquenne Woods. That there were eight of the hostile tanks was later reported to me by the infantry which was in position in my rear. Of the three leading tanks of the common British type, the most advanced opened fire into my side with its right weapon. I turned my bow toward it and silenced this one by a direct hit from my cannon. One tank was brought to a standstill while the remainder withdrew to the vicinity of Cachy. As the first retiring tank went from Cachy to the north my gunner got a direct hit, putting it out of action as it tried to cross a ditch. Shortly thereafter my tank received a direct hit near our cannon opening (perhaps 6-cm. caliber) which killed one man, fatally wounded two, and slightly wounded two others. The remainder of the crew dismounted and observed from the outside the effects of the succeeding direct hits. With the help of drivers found in the vicinity, it was possible to move the tank and the remainder of my crew back to a salvage point. At the same time the infantry which had followed my advance began to retire. The radiator and oil tank were leaking, but in spite of this it was possible to move to the rear for a distance of 1 1/2 miles when both motors failed.
On account of hostile counterattacks during the night the infantry had to withdraw to a line on which my tank lay. Since further salvage was impossible, the equipment of the tank was made available to the infantry and preparations were made to demolish the tank in case of further withdrawal.
In abandoning the tank the two dead remained, the badly wounded man was turned over to the medical personnel, but he died in the dressing station. The slightly wounded walked back to the dressing station.
Source: Abstracts--Foreign Articles. Sep 1935, Review of Military Literature.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M.
; something more.........................TANKS VERSUS TANKS IN THE WORLD WAR.
The official war records have established the fact that there was a tank battle fought between German and British tanks on 24 April, 1918, at Villers-Bretonneux.
The German Account.
(See Sketch No. 2.)
The 2d Tank Section had the mission of attacking Cachy, advancing from the northern point of the Hangard Woods. This attack was in conjunction with and in the area of the 77th Reserve Division which was attacking with four other German divisions. As soon as the leading tanks reached their objective, all those which had not arrived at the east and south edge of Cachy were to turn back to the jumping-off place at Wiencourt.
The official German reports of the attack of two tanks is repeated since the remainder did not encounter any hostile tanks.
Tank No.2 moved as ordered on Cachy and there reduced several machine-gun nests which had been holding up German infantry for one hour. It then moved on Cachy, a distance of 700 yards, and shot up the British positions and engaged in a battle with eight suddenly appearing British tanks. One of these was disabled by artillery fire while another was forced to retire. Shortly thereafter, Tank No.2 was disabled by a direct hit. The armor had been pierced by a projectile from a 5.7-cm. caliber cannon. The vehicle later received a second direct hit in the right front and, a third in the oil tank. In spite of these hits it was possible to bring it within the first German infantry positions where preparations were made to demolish it since it was badly shot up. (Later it was possible to salvage it).
The report of Lieutenant Biltz, the commander of this tank, reads as folIows: At about 12:00 noon, on 24 April, 1918, I found myself 700 to 800 yards northeast of Cachy in combat with the British forces in position on the outskirts of the village, as a number of hostile tanks approached rapidly from the Aquenne Woods. That there were eight of the hostile tanks was later reported to me by the infantry which was in position in my rear. Of the three leading tanks of the common British type, the most advanced opened fire into my side with its right weapon. I turned my bow toward it and silenced this one by a direct hit from my cannon. One tank was brought to a standstill while the remainder withdrew to the vicinity of Cachy. As the first retiring tank went from Cachy to the north my gunner got a direct hit, putting it out of action as it tried to cross a ditch. Shortly thereafter my tank received a direct hit near our cannon opening (perhaps 6-cm. caliber) which killed one man, fatally wounded two, and slightly wounded two others. The remainder of the crew dismounted and observed from the outside the effects of the succeeding direct hits. With the help of drivers found in the vicinity, it was possible to move the tank and the remainder of my crew back to a salvage point. At the same time the infantry which had followed my advance began to retire. The radiator and oil tank were leaking, but in spite of this it was possible to move to the rear for a distance of 1 1/2 miles when both motors failed.
On account of hostile counterattacks during the night the infantry had to withdraw to a line on which my tank lay. Since further salvage was impossible, the equipment of the tank was made available to the infantry and preparations were made to demolish the tank in case of further withdrawal.
In abandoning the tank the two dead remained, the badly wounded man was turned over to the medical personnel, but he died in the dressing station. The slightly wounded walked back to the dressing station.
Source: Abstracts--Foreign Articles. Sep 1935, Review of Military Literature.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M
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Re: Tanks in WWI
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TANKS VERSUS TANKS IN THE WORLD WAR.
The official war records have established the fact that there was a tank battle fought between German and British tanks on 24 April, 1918, at Villers-Bretonneux.
The German Account.
Tank No.4 reduced additional machine-gun nests in its advance on Cachy.
The forces entrenched in a 200-yard trench were partly destroyed by flanking fire while the remainder fled. At about 12:30 PM the commander noticed the infantry retiring in front of Cachy. He turned to the north, brought the infantry to a halt, and then advanced in the direction of Cachy. From a position about 800 yards from this location seven British tanks suddenly appeared. Two 'were set on fire through shelling; a third was disabled. The remainder were heavily shelled and soon took to flight. The cannon of Tank No. 4 became unserviceable because of spring breakage. The retiring British tanks were engaged with machine-gun fire up to 200 yards of Cachy; the northern limit of the town was likewise taken under fire. After a series of fruitful encounters, the tank turned back to the assembly point at 3:45 PM.
The report of Lieutenant Bitter, the commander of the tanks, further states: At 12:30 PM, Tank No. 525 was located about 1 1/2 miles southeast of Cachy when I noted the retirement of our infantry on a broad front at Cachy. I drove at full speed to the north and there received orders from the battalion commander to move west by all means toward Cachy and check the infantry. It was then possible for me to arrive within 3/4 mile of Cachy, and the infantry followed hesitatingly. Suddenly a section of seven British tanks moved upon my position from Cachy. The first tanks went to the northeast of our right flank; the others maneuvered frontally and to the southeast with great speed. I turned my vehicle to a half-right direction and opened fire on the tank farthest to the right which had rapidly closed to a distance of 200 yards. The first shot (with armor cap) hit the drive caterpillar track; hostile tanks returned machine-gun fire. The second shot was a direct hit, and a thin flame arose from the armored chamber. Confused turning about and changes of direction of the remaining tanks followed. In the meantime my position was changed by circling in a wide semicircle, and fire was opened on the hostile tank farthest to the left at a range of 700 yards. The first shot was a direct hit; a broad high flame was the result. My cannon now failed due to a breakage of the bolt spring. The tank was next maneuvered to engage the second hostile tank approaching from the left flank, and fire was opened with machine guns in accordance with the change of the situation. (Two of the hostile tank machine guns had been destroyed during the morning.) The crew left the British tank which had turned on its side. The four remaining tanks at once took flight at high speed toward Cachy, and I followed with well-aimed machine-gun fire to within a range of 150 yards of Cachy. The German tank then took the position on the east edge of Cachy under fire until our infantry had worked its way up to within 400 yards of the village. Hostile tanks did not again appear after 3:45 PM. Duration of tank combat: 20 to 25 minutes. Tank observations: It appeared that the British tanks had been improved with a four-cornered body placed in the center of the vehicle. Speed: 10 to 15 miles per hour. Armament: Could not be identified definitely by the commander. Crew in rear was operating a revolving or automatic cannon.
Conclusions.
The fact has been established that there were two German tanks engaged with British tanks as follows: Tank No. 2 (commander, Lieutenant Biltz) engaged with one heavy British tank, a Mark V. Tank No. 4 (commander, Lieutenant Bitter) engaged with seven medium British Whippet tanks.
Contrary to the British account which stated that the other German tanks turned and fled before the British tanks, two out of three accounts mention the fact that the other German tanks were not opposed by hostile tanks and carried out their assigned missions to the north and south of the Villers-Bretonneux sector without hostile tank interference even though they perhaps were not seen by the British tank observers.
Source: Abstracts--Foreign Articles. Sep 1935, Review of Military Literature.
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M.
; something more.........................TANKS VERSUS TANKS IN THE WORLD WAR.
The official war records have established the fact that there was a tank battle fought between German and British tanks on 24 April, 1918, at Villers-Bretonneux.
The German Account.
Tank No.4 reduced additional machine-gun nests in its advance on Cachy.
The forces entrenched in a 200-yard trench were partly destroyed by flanking fire while the remainder fled. At about 12:30 PM the commander noticed the infantry retiring in front of Cachy. He turned to the north, brought the infantry to a halt, and then advanced in the direction of Cachy. From a position about 800 yards from this location seven British tanks suddenly appeared. Two 'were set on fire through shelling; a third was disabled. The remainder were heavily shelled and soon took to flight. The cannon of Tank No. 4 became unserviceable because of spring breakage. The retiring British tanks were engaged with machine-gun fire up to 200 yards of Cachy; the northern limit of the town was likewise taken under fire. After a series of fruitful encounters, the tank turned back to the assembly point at 3:45 PM.
The report of Lieutenant Bitter, the commander of the tanks, further states: At 12:30 PM, Tank No. 525 was located about 1 1/2 miles southeast of Cachy when I noted the retirement of our infantry on a broad front at Cachy. I drove at full speed to the north and there received orders from the battalion commander to move west by all means toward Cachy and check the infantry. It was then possible for me to arrive within 3/4 mile of Cachy, and the infantry followed hesitatingly. Suddenly a section of seven British tanks moved upon my position from Cachy. The first tanks went to the northeast of our right flank; the others maneuvered frontally and to the southeast with great speed. I turned my vehicle to a half-right direction and opened fire on the tank farthest to the right which had rapidly closed to a distance of 200 yards. The first shot (with armor cap) hit the drive caterpillar track; hostile tanks returned machine-gun fire. The second shot was a direct hit, and a thin flame arose from the armored chamber. Confused turning about and changes of direction of the remaining tanks followed. In the meantime my position was changed by circling in a wide semicircle, and fire was opened on the hostile tank farthest to the left at a range of 700 yards. The first shot was a direct hit; a broad high flame was the result. My cannon now failed due to a breakage of the bolt spring. The tank was next maneuvered to engage the second hostile tank approaching from the left flank, and fire was opened with machine guns in accordance with the change of the situation. (Two of the hostile tank machine guns had been destroyed during the morning.) The crew left the British tank which had turned on its side. The four remaining tanks at once took flight at high speed toward Cachy, and I followed with well-aimed machine-gun fire to within a range of 150 yards of Cachy. The German tank then took the position on the east edge of Cachy under fire until our infantry had worked its way up to within 400 yards of the village. Hostile tanks did not again appear after 3:45 PM. Duration of tank combat: 20 to 25 minutes. Tank observations: It appeared that the British tanks had been improved with a four-cornered body placed in the center of the vehicle. Speed: 10 to 15 miles per hour. Armament: Could not be identified definitely by the commander. Crew in rear was operating a revolving or automatic cannon.
Conclusions.
The fact has been established that there were two German tanks engaged with British tanks as follows: Tank No. 2 (commander, Lieutenant Biltz) engaged with one heavy British tank, a Mark V. Tank No. 4 (commander, Lieutenant Bitter) engaged with seven medium British Whippet tanks.
Contrary to the British account which stated that the other German tanks turned and fled before the British tanks, two out of three accounts mention the fact that the other German tanks were not opposed by hostile tanks and carried out their assigned missions to the north and south of the Villers-Bretonneux sector without hostile tank interference even though they perhaps were not seen by the British tank observers.
Source: Abstracts--Foreign Articles. Sep 1935, Review of Military Literature.
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M
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Re: Tanks in WWI
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TANK ATTACKS AT NIGHT.
The following narration describes two night tank attacks conducted during the World War both of which were unsuccessful and their failure can be traced to their lack of preparation.
BRITISH NIGHT TANK ATTACK.
(See Sketch No.1)
Plan of Attack: On 10 August 1918 the British tank commander received instructions that his tank platoon, cooperating with the Australian 10th Infantry Brigade, would attack along the road Amiens-St. Quentin that night. The operation had been so hurriedly arranged that no written orders were available. Staff officers were intoxicated with the great success of tanks at the beginning of the drive on 8 August and felt there was no limit to their devastating effect on the enemy. Under cover of darkness, about 10:00 PM, the tank platoon was to conduct the Australian 37th Infantry Battalion against Proyart with the object of adjusting an inter-corps boundary. A second battalion of Australian infantry accompanied by another section of tanks was to move up in reserve. The starting place where the tanks were to pick up the infantry was a place marked on the map as "Hospital." Instead of making a frontal attack on Proyart the plan was to penetrate the enemy line about one mile farther south where it crossed the Amiens-St. Quentin road. This was believed to be La Flaque. After proceeding along the highway for 3/4 mile the column was to turn north at a prescribed crossroads and by an encirclIng movement attack Proyart from the rear.
Formation for Attack: The advance was in spearhead formation-one flank on the road and one 50 yards on either flank, the infantry following on the road. As soon as the whole column had turned north, fast armored cars, with glaring headlights, were to dash along the Amiens-St. Quentin road. The idea was to deceive the enemy into thinking that the attack was in that direction.
The participants of this novel operation realized its risks for tanks had never been used at night in this manner. Much had to be left to chance, for owing to the shortage of time, none of the normal work in preparation or precautions had been done. None of the members had the slightest idea of the nature of the terrain. To the restricted vision of the terrain from within the tank was added the necessity of darkness within the tank. There was also the danger in case of an engagement of the tank gunners mistaking their own infantrymen and firing on them. The tanks and infantry had to remain close together to prevent this. The danger of being ditched also was very great. And it was certain that the enemy, from his previous experiences with British and French tanks, would organize a tank defense with artillery, antitank rifles and armor piercing bullets, especially where his line crossed.
Note: The tank used for this main mission was the Mark V British heavy tank with a crew of 1 officer and 5 men with a maximum speed of 7 to 8 miles per hour.
Source: Abstracts--Foreign Articles. Dec 1935, Review of Military Literature.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; something more.........................TANK ATTACKS AT NIGHT.
The following narration describes two night tank attacks conducted during the World War both of which were unsuccessful and their failure can be traced to their lack of preparation.
BRITISH NIGHT TANK ATTACK.
(See Sketch No.1)
Plan of Attack: On 10 August 1918 the British tank commander received instructions that his tank platoon, cooperating with the Australian 10th Infantry Brigade, would attack along the road Amiens-St. Quentin that night. The operation had been so hurriedly arranged that no written orders were available. Staff officers were intoxicated with the great success of tanks at the beginning of the drive on 8 August and felt there was no limit to their devastating effect on the enemy. Under cover of darkness, about 10:00 PM, the tank platoon was to conduct the Australian 37th Infantry Battalion against Proyart with the object of adjusting an inter-corps boundary. A second battalion of Australian infantry accompanied by another section of tanks was to move up in reserve. The starting place where the tanks were to pick up the infantry was a place marked on the map as "Hospital." Instead of making a frontal attack on Proyart the plan was to penetrate the enemy line about one mile farther south where it crossed the Amiens-St. Quentin road. This was believed to be La Flaque. After proceeding along the highway for 3/4 mile the column was to turn north at a prescribed crossroads and by an encirclIng movement attack Proyart from the rear.
Formation for Attack: The advance was in spearhead formation-one flank on the road and one 50 yards on either flank, the infantry following on the road. As soon as the whole column had turned north, fast armored cars, with glaring headlights, were to dash along the Amiens-St. Quentin road. The idea was to deceive the enemy into thinking that the attack was in that direction.
The participants of this novel operation realized its risks for tanks had never been used at night in this manner. Much had to be left to chance, for owing to the shortage of time, none of the normal work in preparation or precautions had been done. None of the members had the slightest idea of the nature of the terrain. To the restricted vision of the terrain from within the tank was added the necessity of darkness within the tank. There was also the danger in case of an engagement of the tank gunners mistaking their own infantrymen and firing on them. The tanks and infantry had to remain close together to prevent this. The danger of being ditched also was very great. And it was certain that the enemy, from his previous experiences with British and French tanks, would organize a tank defense with artillery, antitank rifles and armor piercing bullets, especially where his line crossed.
Note: The tank used for this main mission was the Mark V British heavy tank with a crew of 1 officer and 5 men with a maximum speed of 7 to 8 miles per hour.
Source: Abstracts--Foreign Articles. Dec 1935, Review of Military Literature.
Cheers. Raúl M
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Re: Tanks in WWI
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TANK ATTACK AT NIGHT.
The following narration describes a night tank attack conducted during the World War which was unsuccessful and its failure can be traced to lack of preparation.
BRITISH NIGHT TANK ATTACK.
(See Sketch No.1)
Events as they occurred: At the time the orders were received the tanks were carefully camouflaged in a hedge in the ruined village of Bayonvillers, about 2 1/2 miles from the "Hospital." On the way up while crossing the terrain, a hostile plane appeared to the left. Cover was taken by some trees in the hope that the plane had not spotted them as it was still broad daylight. Reaching the rendezvous at 8:00 PM, the tank commander reported to the commander of the 37th Battalion. Here he was informed that the zero hour had been changed to 10:00 PM.
At the appointed hour the 3 tanks moved· forward in the twilight at the head of the infantry which followed in single file. It soon became apparent that the tanks could not move along the flanks as planned as the flanks were covered with dumps and old earthworks. It was decided that all three tanks should keep to the road. An infantry reconnaissance officer was responsible for the direction, especially for the exact point where the whole column was to turn north after piercing the enemy line. The tank commander was directed to accompany the infantry commander to be at hand if he wished to give any particular orders for the tanks.
The crossroads at La Flaque were reached as darkness fell. Opposition was anticipated at this point. To their surprise no opposition was met. This gave way to the feeling that the enemy had withdrawn his lines to a point farther back or that the tanks had been observed moving up in the daylight and that a trap awaited them. The night sky in front appeared peaceful and calm. If the enemy was in the vicinity he certainly heard the clatter and noise of the approaching tanks in this stillness. About a quarter of a mile from La Flaque the roar of an airplane was heard overhead, a downward whizz, a blinding flash and a terrific explosion. The unditching beam from the rear tank was blown high into the air and crashed back. Other bombs fell; this was the exact point where the enemy held his line. Flares immediately made the night as bright as day. Then hell broke loose, withering machine-gun fire opened on the tanks, causing the infantry which had been following close behind, to seek cover in the ditches.
The tanks replied with their 6-pounders and machine guns but without effect, for no targets could be seen. The peculiar feature was the lack of flashes to fire at. The accompanying infantry advanced by rushes. The hostile artillery now started to register on the tanks with shells exploding on the road and to the side of it. Due to the severity of the fire the tanks had halted and after a half-hour there was a short lull, except for desultory firing. The commander of one of the tanks reported to the tank detachment commander that the enemy had riddled his tank using antitank guns and armor-piercing ammunition. He was badly wounded and had stepped out of the tank to keep in touch with the infantry since nothing could be seen from within the tank.
The tanks started to move again and immediately were met by violent machine-gun fire causing the infantry to take cover again. Suddenly a runner came up with the message that the tanks were returning. No order had been issued for their return. This had to be countermanded by the tank platoon commander who had great difficulty in transmitting these orders to the tanks without being crushed as they were so close together. The colonel commanding the infantry battalion was killed and so was the commander of one of the tank while walking alongside his tank in an effort to keep in touch with the infantry. All but two of the crew had been wounded by the armor-piercing bullets which had perforated the tank. The second driver who assumed command has turned his tank to engage what appeared to him to be a strong point. This was the maneuver which gave the impression that the tanks were returning. The other tank also suffered and was now in charge of a corporal with most of the crew wounded.
As soon as the tanks again moved against the enemy the adjutant of the infantry battalion informed the tank commander that due to the heavy losses the infantry would have to retire in extended order. Reluctantly the tank commander gave orders for the tanks to face about for the return. This maneuver was quite difficult and every move started a fusilade of bullets.
After moving back about 150 yards the tank platoon leader was confronted by an officer from the 2d Battalion who brandished a revolver in his face, mistaking him for the enemy. So great had been the noise that the approach of the reserve tanks had not been observed. There was a hurried consultation with the reserve commanders, and it was decided to halt and await orders from the brigade commander. In the meantime the tank platoon covered the withdrawal of the infantry. Instructions were issued for the tanks to remain silent until the infantry had been withdrawn, then to return to their line.
The report of the tank platoon commander to the brigade commander admitted that the use of the tanks was a hindrance to the infantry who lost 900 of the 1,000 men in the battalion, incIuding the commander. Incidentally the friendly infantry along the line threatened to shoot the tank crew if they moved the tanks, as these vehicles were drawing so much hostile fire.
Source: Abstracts--Foreign Articles. Dec 1935, Review of Military Literature.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; something more.........................TANK ATTACK AT NIGHT.
The following narration describes a night tank attack conducted during the World War which was unsuccessful and its failure can be traced to lack of preparation.
BRITISH NIGHT TANK ATTACK.
(See Sketch No.1)
Events as they occurred: At the time the orders were received the tanks were carefully camouflaged in a hedge in the ruined village of Bayonvillers, about 2 1/2 miles from the "Hospital." On the way up while crossing the terrain, a hostile plane appeared to the left. Cover was taken by some trees in the hope that the plane had not spotted them as it was still broad daylight. Reaching the rendezvous at 8:00 PM, the tank commander reported to the commander of the 37th Battalion. Here he was informed that the zero hour had been changed to 10:00 PM.
At the appointed hour the 3 tanks moved· forward in the twilight at the head of the infantry which followed in single file. It soon became apparent that the tanks could not move along the flanks as planned as the flanks were covered with dumps and old earthworks. It was decided that all three tanks should keep to the road. An infantry reconnaissance officer was responsible for the direction, especially for the exact point where the whole column was to turn north after piercing the enemy line. The tank commander was directed to accompany the infantry commander to be at hand if he wished to give any particular orders for the tanks.
The crossroads at La Flaque were reached as darkness fell. Opposition was anticipated at this point. To their surprise no opposition was met. This gave way to the feeling that the enemy had withdrawn his lines to a point farther back or that the tanks had been observed moving up in the daylight and that a trap awaited them. The night sky in front appeared peaceful and calm. If the enemy was in the vicinity he certainly heard the clatter and noise of the approaching tanks in this stillness. About a quarter of a mile from La Flaque the roar of an airplane was heard overhead, a downward whizz, a blinding flash and a terrific explosion. The unditching beam from the rear tank was blown high into the air and crashed back. Other bombs fell; this was the exact point where the enemy held his line. Flares immediately made the night as bright as day. Then hell broke loose, withering machine-gun fire opened on the tanks, causing the infantry which had been following close behind, to seek cover in the ditches.
The tanks replied with their 6-pounders and machine guns but without effect, for no targets could be seen. The peculiar feature was the lack of flashes to fire at. The accompanying infantry advanced by rushes. The hostile artillery now started to register on the tanks with shells exploding on the road and to the side of it. Due to the severity of the fire the tanks had halted and after a half-hour there was a short lull, except for desultory firing. The commander of one of the tanks reported to the tank detachment commander that the enemy had riddled his tank using antitank guns and armor-piercing ammunition. He was badly wounded and had stepped out of the tank to keep in touch with the infantry since nothing could be seen from within the tank.
The tanks started to move again and immediately were met by violent machine-gun fire causing the infantry to take cover again. Suddenly a runner came up with the message that the tanks were returning. No order had been issued for their return. This had to be countermanded by the tank platoon commander who had great difficulty in transmitting these orders to the tanks without being crushed as they were so close together. The colonel commanding the infantry battalion was killed and so was the commander of one of the tank while walking alongside his tank in an effort to keep in touch with the infantry. All but two of the crew had been wounded by the armor-piercing bullets which had perforated the tank. The second driver who assumed command has turned his tank to engage what appeared to him to be a strong point. This was the maneuver which gave the impression that the tanks were returning. The other tank also suffered and was now in charge of a corporal with most of the crew wounded.
As soon as the tanks again moved against the enemy the adjutant of the infantry battalion informed the tank commander that due to the heavy losses the infantry would have to retire in extended order. Reluctantly the tank commander gave orders for the tanks to face about for the return. This maneuver was quite difficult and every move started a fusilade of bullets.
After moving back about 150 yards the tank platoon leader was confronted by an officer from the 2d Battalion who brandished a revolver in his face, mistaking him for the enemy. So great had been the noise that the approach of the reserve tanks had not been observed. There was a hurried consultation with the reserve commanders, and it was decided to halt and await orders from the brigade commander. In the meantime the tank platoon covered the withdrawal of the infantry. Instructions were issued for the tanks to remain silent until the infantry had been withdrawn, then to return to their line.
The report of the tank platoon commander to the brigade commander admitted that the use of the tanks was a hindrance to the infantry who lost 900 of the 1,000 men in the battalion, incIuding the commander. Incidentally the friendly infantry along the line threatened to shoot the tank crew if they moved the tanks, as these vehicles were drawing so much hostile fire.
Source: Abstracts--Foreign Articles. Dec 1935, Review of Military Literature.
Cheers. Raúl M
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Re: Tanks in WWI
Reserve Lt.Falih Rifki (Atay)(writer, novalist, publisher, Journalist) was privat secratery of Cemal Pasha. he wrote his memories in his famous book: Zeytindağı (Ölberg, Olivehill)
Zeytindağı is a place in Jerusalem where there was a German Hospital which became HQ of Cemal Pasha during War. In p.158 he tells about a tank:
"Have you ever seen a dead tank? How sad is the cadaver of things that are produced to kill. One of them is fallen infront of our trenches. It made a barrier with its huge, empty and broken body. During the night our soldiers guarded infront of this tank to prevent a sudden umbush. One night a guard noticed an English soldier aproaching slowly. He waited inside the tank. If he would fire and kill him all the fire of the enemy would be on him. If he would kill him with his bayonet he would lost the 5 gold Turkish Liras awarded for every alive English. So he decided a third possibility to catch him alive. he slowly wore off his socks which he didnt washed since many months and hit strongly on the head of English from behind. Immediately he put the socks in his mouth to stop him shouting. The poor English fainted. After a while as he come to himself he claimed that the Turk used poison which was againts all human behaviour."
Zeytindağı is a place in Jerusalem where there was a German Hospital which became HQ of Cemal Pasha during War. In p.158 he tells about a tank:
"Have you ever seen a dead tank? How sad is the cadaver of things that are produced to kill. One of them is fallen infront of our trenches. It made a barrier with its huge, empty and broken body. During the night our soldiers guarded infront of this tank to prevent a sudden umbush. One night a guard noticed an English soldier aproaching slowly. He waited inside the tank. If he would fire and kill him all the fire of the enemy would be on him. If he would kill him with his bayonet he would lost the 5 gold Turkish Liras awarded for every alive English. So he decided a third possibility to catch him alive. he slowly wore off his socks which he didnt washed since many months and hit strongly on the head of English from behind. Immediately he put the socks in his mouth to stop him shouting. The poor English fainted. After a while as he come to himself he claimed that the Turk used poison which was againts all human behaviour."
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Tosun Saral
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- Location: Ankara/Turkey
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Re: Tanks in WWI
British tank assaults according to Offical Turkish History Book of Turkish General Staff's Military History Department in Ankara.
source: Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, IV ncü Cilt 1 nci Kısım, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Harbin Başından İkinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar. Ankara 1979
(Turkish War in WW1 vol.4, 1st chapter, Sinai-Palastine Front, From the beginning of WW to the end of 2nd Gazze battle.)
p.613
on April 19th 1917 the English began a heavy assault at 05:00 supported by a heavy preparatory artillary fire....at 12:00 the company defending the Great Sand Hill withdrawed to the back according to the order given by 3rd Div. At 12:20 an English Tank moved over Great Sand Hill and aproached to our barbed wires. Againts this tank and enemy infantries our soldiers didnt left their positions.This English tank and infanty was stopped by Turkish artillary fire. The tank reteated back leaving his infantry men behind.
p.614
As the battle on Great Sand Hill and Seyhaclin was going on, English directed their most heavy assaoult to the trenches of 32nd Regiment on Hill 265. English fired heavly at Hill 265. At 10:30 the English reached to the Hill some 300 meters. A Tank which was with the infantry over ride the barbed wires and reached to the back of our trenches. The English infantry following this tank at its back also entered into the left wing of our Trenches.The Turkish infanry men defending this trenches withdraved back. But the Turks at the right of this trench defended their positions. Thus some part of the trenches was at the hand of English some Turkish. The tank which ride at the back of turkish defence line reteated a time later. The Turkish artillary collected all their fires on this tank and English infantry. The tank got some shells and stayed still. The English burned the tank.
p.617
The AC gave the following information to 3rd and 16th div.s " At the front of 53th Div. an English tank is destroyed by our artillary fire. This tank had 5 MG.
p.621
According to information given by POWs the English had 8 tanks.(2 of the were damaged by our fire) 3 of the tanks got 5 MG and the others had 3 MG and 2 guns.
p.633-624
At 11:00 the division commander received this information from the right wing commander the 48th Reg."The English assaoulted our front with a tank and 4 armoured automobiles. They were beaten back. We are watching English officers from our trenches hitting their soldiers with their swords who are running back . That made our morale exellent. A Tank wich was moving towards Vadiibeha was destroyed by our obüs (howitzer) battaries. 3 armoured mobiles run back.
p.630-631
Situation on the night of April 19th
For the first time ever the English used tanks againts us. We counted 8 tanks infront our front. The tanks surprized our soldiers at first. Later all began to fight againts tanks and armoured cars with their MG and artillary. 3 of Those "very new targets" were destroyed by our fire. The remaining 5 returned back. But soon they were defected and stayed on the battle field still."
source: Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, IV ncü Cilt 1 nci Kısım, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Harbin Başından İkinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar. Ankara 1979
(Turkish War in WW1 vol.4, 1st chapter, Sinai-Palastine Front, From the beginning of WW to the end of 2nd Gazze battle.)
p.613
on April 19th 1917 the English began a heavy assault at 05:00 supported by a heavy preparatory artillary fire....at 12:00 the company defending the Great Sand Hill withdrawed to the back according to the order given by 3rd Div. At 12:20 an English Tank moved over Great Sand Hill and aproached to our barbed wires. Againts this tank and enemy infantries our soldiers didnt left their positions.This English tank and infanty was stopped by Turkish artillary fire. The tank reteated back leaving his infantry men behind.
p.614
As the battle on Great Sand Hill and Seyhaclin was going on, English directed their most heavy assaoult to the trenches of 32nd Regiment on Hill 265. English fired heavly at Hill 265. At 10:30 the English reached to the Hill some 300 meters. A Tank which was with the infantry over ride the barbed wires and reached to the back of our trenches. The English infantry following this tank at its back also entered into the left wing of our Trenches.The Turkish infanry men defending this trenches withdraved back. But the Turks at the right of this trench defended their positions. Thus some part of the trenches was at the hand of English some Turkish. The tank which ride at the back of turkish defence line reteated a time later. The Turkish artillary collected all their fires on this tank and English infantry. The tank got some shells and stayed still. The English burned the tank.
p.617
The AC gave the following information to 3rd and 16th div.s " At the front of 53th Div. an English tank is destroyed by our artillary fire. This tank had 5 MG.
p.621
According to information given by POWs the English had 8 tanks.(2 of the were damaged by our fire) 3 of the tanks got 5 MG and the others had 3 MG and 2 guns.
p.633-624
At 11:00 the division commander received this information from the right wing commander the 48th Reg."The English assaoulted our front with a tank and 4 armoured automobiles. They were beaten back. We are watching English officers from our trenches hitting their soldiers with their swords who are running back . That made our morale exellent. A Tank wich was moving towards Vadiibeha was destroyed by our obüs (howitzer) battaries. 3 armoured mobiles run back.
p.630-631
Situation on the night of April 19th
For the first time ever the English used tanks againts us. We counted 8 tanks infront our front. The tanks surprized our soldiers at first. Later all began to fight againts tanks and armoured cars with their MG and artillary. 3 of Those "very new targets" were destroyed by our fire. The remaining 5 returned back. But soon they were defected and stayed on the battle field still."