Tanks in WWI

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aghart
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#31

Post by aghart » 20 Aug 2015, 23:35

The Palestine Tank Detatchment 1917. Whilst all eyes were on the Western Front in World War I it is often forgotten that a war against the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) was also being fought. British plans were for a defensive force to guard and hold the Suez Canal against a Turkish attack. The defence held and the Turks were pushed back into the area known today as Gaza. Successful defence usually leads to offensive action to build on the results achieved, and in Palestine this was the course of action taken. There were 3 battles of Gaza, the first battle did not include tanks but the 2nd battle did. The 8, Mk1 tanks were from E Company, Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corps, and were sent to the Middle East in December 1916. The battle started in April 1917 with the tanks spread out supporting three DIVISIONS of infantry. Two or three tanks per Division meant that they had their work cut out for them, they did achieve results but also suffered casualties and were of course a "magnet" for Turkish fire. Three Mk IV tanks were sent as replacements for tanks damaged and put out of action.The war diary for this detachment ended In the Spring of 1918 and it is known that the Tanks were not brought back to the UK and were likely scrapped.

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Re: Tanks in WWI

#32

Post by tigre » 22 Aug 2015, 06:24

Hello to all :D; thanks for those histories Tosun Saral and aghart for that data :wink:. More follows......................

TANK ATTACK AT NIGHT.

GERMAN NIGHT TANK ATTACK (See Sketch No.2)

The 2d Tank Detachment, consisting of 5 heavy "A 7 V" tanks, was engaged with similar units in the battle areas about Soissons and Rheims. At noon, 31 May 1918, the detachment moved in compliance with orders into its position of readiness at Bazancourt. Here it received orders from the 242d Infantry Division at 8:00 PM that it would participate in a contemplated attack on 1 June 1918. In compliance with these new orders the detachment was moved forward to the line of departure in Brimont which was about 11 miles away.

The combat mission directed that the the 2d Tank Detachment in cooperation with the 3d Battalion 476th Infantry Regiment will be engaged in the general direction of Tollhouse (Zollhaus) located at the west exit of Rheims. Along the route, about 300 yards east of the Pierquin Farm it was to silence a machine gun nest located there. The tanks were to support the attack of the 3d Battalion against the northwest edge of Rheims and silence the machine gun nests and strong points located at the road exits and demolish hostile defense works in the outpost area.

Tanks numbers 2 and 5 were to move out in the direction of the road: Brimont -Rheims to silence the machine gun nest 300 yards east of Pierquin Farm and then follow the advance of tanks 1, 3 and 4 in the direction of the attack of the 3d Battalion 476th Infantry Regiment. After passing through the viaduct, tanks 1, 3 and 4 were to follow a southwesterly direction.

Source: Abstracts--Foreign Articles. Dec 1935, Review of Military Literature.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Full line - German Front. Dot and dash - French Front.........................


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tigre
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#33

Post by tigre » 23 Aug 2015, 15:36

Hello to all :D; more follows......................

TANK ATTACK AT NIGHT.

GERMAN NIGHT TANK ATTACK (See Sketch No.2)

Progress of the Attack: The detachment with three tanks, left their line of departure at 7:00 PM, 31 May 1918. Tank number 3 was delayed one hour due to a defective exhaust pipe, tank number 1 was left behind at Bourgogne due to overheated bearings. After filling the grease containers and completing some minor repairs on the water pump it was able to follow along at 9:30 PM.

Between 8:00 PM and 9:00 PM, tanks numbers 2 to 5 passed through the Viaduct. The two leading tanks brushed aside the barriers and cheval de fries.

At 8:20 PM, the three leading tanks when 1200 yards south of the viaduct were suddenly fired upon from the left flank by artillery of medium caliber. The leading tank replied to this fire with its field piece and machine guns but due to gassing and a direct hit from a hidden trench battery, the unwounded members of the crew were compelled to leave the tank. This artillery defense had not been anticipated; apparently the location of the hostile battery was unknown to the division as the division did not notify the tank commander of its existenee.

Only searching fire had been anticipated. The machine gun nest 300 yards east of the Pierquin Farm was only supposed to be occupied by machine guns but it was found that in close proximity to the next was this hidden battery of 4 guns with about 50 to 150 yard intervals. Without doubt these were part of the antitank defense. The location of the machine gun nest and also the battery was known to the German infantry (125th Infantry Regiment) located here. Tank number 5 was also put out of action by a direct hit. Further advance by the remaining tanks over this unfavorable terrain, especially on the road, was impossible due to the direct artillery defense. It was impossible to leave the road because of the flanking ditches which were 7 1/2 feet wide with high banks. The commander ordered the tanks back with instructions to take cover under the viaduct. Here they ran into tank number 1 which had remained behind.

In the meantime a hostile counterattack drove the German infantry past their front lines. Darkness had fallen?? and observation became impossible and the detachment returned to the line of departure.

The attempt to salvage tank number 5 at 11:00 PM was unsuccessful and it was left in the hands of the enemy. The results of this enterprise, in addition to the loss of one tank, was 3 dead, 2 wounded as well as 2 officers and 1 man gassed.

Source: Abstracts--Foreign Articles. Dec 1935, Review of Military Literature.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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The A7V "Baden I" on the move.................
Sturmpanzer A7V. First of the Panzers. Tankograd WWI 1001.
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#34

Post by tigre » 06 Sep 2015, 01:03

Hello to all :D; a little more.........................

TANKS IN THE WORLD WAR.

Source: in the picture.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Tank A7V Nº 525..................................
Sturmpanzer A7V. First of the Panzers. Tankograd WWI 1001.
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#35

Post by tigre » 03 Oct 2015, 15:14

Hello to all :D; some data I've found in this article, any other figures on this?.....................

French tank casualties in the World War.

The author states the French constructed 3,177 light and medium tanks, between September 1917 and November 1918; of these 2,720 were issued to the army and 1,949 participated in the fighting.

The 1,949 tanks participated in 26 battles and skirmishes. It is rather difficult to arrive at conclusions as casualties incurred to tanks in battle because, for example, at Mery-Belloy on 11 June 1918, 162 tanks participated on a 5 1/2 mile front and 73 were destroyed either by cannon fire or trench mortars. Again on 12-13 September 1913 at St. Mihiel, 151 tanks participated on a 4 1/2 mile front and only one tank was hit by shell fire and two were destroyed by mines. The variation of tank casualties was probably due to influence of terrain, defensive measures of the defenders and the fire-support. The width of the sector apparently did not influence the tank casualties.

In all the engagements the French actually lost 748 tanks; of these 657 were destroyed by cannon fire, 16 destroyed by mines, 4 were destroyed by infantry machine-gun fire (and flames), and 71 were destroyed by unknown causes. French reports give the casualties to personnel as 303 killed, 1,459 wounded, and 251 missing.

Source: FRANZOSISCHE TANKVERLUSTE IM WELTKRIEG. [French tank casualties in the World War.] Lieutenant Ehrhardt, Retired. Periodical Articles Catalog. RML. June 1936.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Tanks in WWI

#36

Post by Sheldrake » 03 Oct 2015, 20:26

There are also records showing that in 1918 at least one British tank unit used at least one Renault tank.

https://sites.google.com/site/landships ... ugust-1918

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Re: Tanks in WWI

#37

Post by tigre » 04 Oct 2015, 03:10

Hello Sheldrake :D; thanks for that input :wink:. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Tanks in WWI

#38

Post by tigre » 27 Dec 2015, 17:27

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. Prelude.

The results attained by the Entente powers in the fighting about Soissons convinced their commander-in-chief that the time had come to prepar for a general offensive by a warfare of attrition along the entire front. Naturally, the first attack would be in the region of Amiens where the Entente powers themselves were most threatened.

General Foch ordered the British Fourth Army to attack on 8 August to secure the important road and railroad center of Amiens. The line: Morlancourt-Mericourt-Harbonieres-Hangest, was designated as objective. This was later extended to the Chaulnes-Roye railroad. The army had available for the attack the following troops: north of the Somme, the III Corps of three divisions; between the Somme and the Luce, the Australian Corps of four divisions, the Canadian Corps of four divisions, and the Cavalry Corps composed of three cavalry divisions; and south of the Somme the French XXXI Corps of five divisions. The British divisions were supported by 2,068 guns, 360 heavy tanks, 96 new fast Whippet tanks, 16 armored cars, and 408 airplanes. The French Corps had 616 guns, 90 light Renault tanks, and 60 airplanes. Among the British heavy tanks were two battalions of the new Mark V "Star" tanks, especially designed for crossing wide trenches.

Every precaution was taken to keep the preparations for the attack secret from the Germans. The Canadian Corps, which was Great Britain's best attack unit, was not to reach its line of departure until just before the attack. Some Canadian battalions and numerous tank units were moved to the Flanders front to give the impression that an attack would be launched there.

The British had observed that the German successes of March and April had been gained by pushing forward where resistance was weak, without regard to neighboring units, and then reducing the strong centers by envelopment. The British now practiced this maneuver with tanks and infantry working together. Furthermore, profiting from their experiences at Cambrai, the British had the divisions making the main attack rehearse the attack with the tanks that were to support them; they moved the cavalry closer to the front before the attack, and attached medium tanks to it; and they provided for the forward displacement of the artillery to begin as soon as the first rolling barrage would be completed.

The British aviation was called upon to fulfill a number of missions. Before the attack it was to be used to drown the noise of the tanks going into assembly positions. During the attack it was to support the infantry with machine guns and bombs, paying particular attention to German antitank guns. As the attack progressed the aviation was to attack any German reserves moving forward. Finally, airplanes were to cooperate with the tanks in attacking any hostile elements starting a withdrawal.

The British III Corps, the combat efficiency of whose divisions was low, had only a secondary mission. It was to prevent hostile interference from north of the Somme with the British main attack. The Australian and Canadian Corps, assisted by the Cavalry Corps, were to make the main attack.

Heavy artillery fire was to be put down along the entire front of the British Fourth Army at about 5:20 AM. At the same time the infantry and tanks of the British corps were to move forward. The French XIII Corps did not plan on using its tanks until after the German trench system had been captured on account of their limited terrain-crossing ability. The French infantry, therefore, which had to make its first advance without tanks, was to have the benefit of a 45-minute artillery preparation. Hence its attack would start 45 minutes later than that of the British infantry.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!! :thumbsup:
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German offensives, March-July 1918.....................
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British troops passing tanks in a French village close to Amiens following the German Kaiserschlacht offensive on 21 March 1918. ...............................
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#39

Post by tigre » 30 Dec 2015, 14:35

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. Prelude.

Opposite the British Fourth Army, in order from north to south in the German front line, were: one division of the LIV Corps, the XI Corps with three divisions, and the LI Corps with four divisions. Three divisions in reserve were available on this front, and call could be made on neighboring units for three more reserve divisions. These reserve divisions, however, were exhausted, and besides, two of them had left the bulk of their artillery, and one, most of its machine guns and mortars, in position. Furthermore, some of them were just completing their relief so that on the morning of the attack part of their units were still en route to their rest billets. Of the divisions in line, only two were rated as fully fit for battle.

Then too, the morale of the German soldier was beginning to sink. The German high command had given up its plan for an offensive in Flanders, which allowed doubts to arise over the possibility of a final victory. The tank had become the decisive element in the enemy's attacks. The German soldier had to face the fact that with its aid the enemy had twice made great gains without serious losses and had each time taken a great number of prisoners. An effective defense was no longer possible unless means could be found to destroy this new engine of war, and no such means had been produced. From Berlin too came the disquieting news that the usually docile Reichstag had attacked the high command for having had so few tanks built.

But the value of the German soldier can not be considered by itself; it must be compared with that of the soldiers of the opponents. The British and French soldiers had been brought to the verge of destruction by the attacks in the spring. They were recovering only gradually. Of the sixteen divisions taking part in the attack, only the eight Australian and Canadian divisions could be considered entirely fit for combat. Some of the others had been in line as long as the Germans. But the enemy had this tremendous advantage-they believed that a German attack was no longer possible, and could begin now to plan for a final decisive offensive with confidence. They also had the means at hand with which to make their attacks effective and almost without danger to themselves, a means which the Germans had been unable to check in previous battles.

The German troops in front of Amiens had heard the enemy carrying forward ammunition at various places. They thought also they had heard the noises of tanks, but the higher headquarters ridiculed these reports for they had fallen for the British ruse in Flanders. On 6 August, a German aviator observed about 100 tanks moving towards the front. On 7 August, a chance German shell struck a gasoline tank in an orchard near Villers-Bretonneux and ignited it. Their suspicions aroused by this, the Germans shelled the entire orchard and destroyed 25 tanks with all their equipment. But even this chance discovery did not induce the Germans to take proper countermeasures. They were satisfied with the measures previously taken even though these had proven inadequate against recent attacks.

Some outpost companies had been equipped with two 13 mm antitank rifles. In each division sector from two to four field pieces were assigned to antitank defense. Some of these were held in the vicinity of their batteries where they could be pushed forward promptly into open firing positions; the others were held far to the rear, by platoons, with teams hitched. These so-called antitank guns were certainly too far to the rear to be able to go into action in time to protect the infantry zone.

During the night of 7-8 August, the outposts of the German 27th Division heard tank noises. (See Sketch No. 5) When this report was sent to the rear the artillery put down defensive barrages which; were repeated throughout the night. The outposts of the 108th Division discovered British riflemen leaving their own trenches and digging in behind the German wire entanglements. This report also brought down artillery and trench-mortar fire. About 4:30 AM, the German 41st Division made a raid in the vicinity of ViIlers-Bretonneux, but found the British forward trench unoccupied. The Canadians at that point had not yet come forward in order to keep from revealing their presence. The outposts of the 225th Division also recognized tank noises, but failed to get the information back to their artillery in time. It was just there that a timely barrage Could have caught 28 tanks crossing the Luce on their way forward.

A fog which had descended at midnight became more and more dense toward morning. About 5:20 AM, a hurricane of fire suddenly came down on the entire German front. The hail of shells fell on the German front trenches for a few minutes and then moved on to the east. The German batteries were all taken under fire, even those which had been silent for days and which it was thought had not been discovered. In a short time communications were interrupted, and many guns were put out of action.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!! :thumbsup:
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Men of the 95th Siege Battery RGA loading a 9.2 inch howitzer near Bayencourt during the Battle of Amiens..........................
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#40

Post by tigre » 02 Jan 2016, 17:26

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK NORTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 6).

The Somme valley is wide and marshy. The villages of Morlancourt and Sailly were immediately behind the German main line of resistance. In the sector of the German 27th Division there was no tank obstacle other than the village of Morlancourt. The sector of the German 108th Division, on the other hand, was almost completely closed off for tanks by the Malard Woods. The Hecht and Kanal hills are the highest ground north of the Somme, and offer good observation to the south of the river. For this reason the possession of these hills was important to the British in order that their main attack south of the Somme might not be interfered with. The British final objective for the day included the Kanal hill, and from there bent back to the south edge of Morlancourt. An intermediate objective, which was to be reached by 7:20 AM, included the Malard Woods.

The British 12th Division was not to attack Morlancourt directly, but was to pass around and isolate it. This division received no allotment of tanks. The 18th and 58th Divisions were allotted 24 and 12 tanks, respectively. These two divisions assigned the greater part of their tanks to the first wave and the balance to the second. There was no massing of tanks at any point for the attack.

The German 27th and 108th Divisions held their sectors with regiments abreast. The regiments generally had one battalion on the main line of resistance and the remainder in reserve. The artillery of both divisions was emplaced on the slopes of the Kanal hill.

The visibility, which had been limited to 20 or 30 yards due to fog, was further reduced by smoke shells when the British barrage came down at 5:20 AM. It became impossible to see pyrotechnic signals.

In the German 108th Division, the right regiment met Its fate first. Its main line of resistance was penetrated seven minutes after the artillery bombardment began. The British assault troops pushed forward recklessly behind their tanks, leaving the mopping-up to the waves that followed. The German reserves were attacked before they could take up a defensive position. By 6:20 AM the British attacked the last reserves of the regiment at the northwest corner of the Malard Woods. A short time later the regimental commander sent forward an officer's patrol to find out what was going on: the regiment had disappeared! A few remnants only drifted back later. The main line of resistance of the middle regiment of the division was also overrun rapidly by tanks and infantry, but the tanks were unable to penetrate the Malard Woods. Two tanks attempting to pass around the woods were destroyed with overcharged hand grenades. The British infantry, losing the support of its tanks, did not get possession of the Malard Woods until 8:20 AM.

The British tank attack against the front of the German 27th Division was delayed until about 6:00 AM, probably by the barrages which the German artillery put down during the night. However, within a half-hour after the attack was launched the German front-line infantry had disappeared. By 7:20 AM the British were on their intermediate objective. These attacks again demonstrated the value of the tank. Only where it was supported by tanks was the British infantry able to make progress.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#41

Post by tigre » 06 Jan 2016, 12:00

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK NORTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 6).

The German 27th Division had two reserve battalions just to the east of its artillery area, and three more in rest areas farther to the rear. The 108th Division had a reserve battalion east of the Kanal hill and another northeast of Mericourt. These reserves had been alerted at once when the British bombardment commenced. The two battalions of the 27th Division farthest forward were caught in the British barrage and lost heavily. The two reserve battalions of the 108th Division took up a defensive position in front of the division artillery. When the commander of the German LIV Corps became satisfied that the attack did not extend north of Morlancourt, he gathered together all the available division reserves (9 1/2 battalions of infantry and 3 1/2 batteries) and formed a line from the south edge of Morlancourt to the north slope of the Kanal hill where it connected with the two battalions of the 108th DIvision.

Later in the morning as the fog lifted, the artillery observers on the Kanal hill were able to see, south of the Somme, British columns of infantry moving forward, batteries going into position, and a group of tanks. The guns were at once turned on these objectives. The infantry columns were engaged first and dispersed, then four tanks were destroyed, and finally the batteries were successfully engaged. ln spite of this fire from the north bank, the British attacking south of the Somme made such progress that the left flank of the German 108th Division had to be refused. The division abandoned 7 1/2 batteries in this withdrawal.

The British did not press the attack north of the Somme after arriving at their intermediate objective. In the sector of the German 27th Division part of a British battalion pushed forward to the final objective, but was forced to retire by the German artillery. At the end of the day the final objective had not been attained at any point north of the Somme. Nevertheless the British results here were outstanding. Eight German infantry battalions had been practically wiped out, and 7 1/2 German batteries had been abandoned. The full value of the tank must be estimated by comparing this result with that attained by the German 27th Division on 6 August. We see that British troops, not highly rated, were able to overrun German troops rated as "good."

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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British tanks during the offensive...................
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#42

Post by tigre » 09 Jan 2016, 18:01

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK SOUTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 7).

The terrain between the Somme and the Amiens-Roye highway is characterized by numerous ravines and valleys leading north into the Somme and north and south into the Luce. At many points these ravines constituted tank obstacles. From the Somme south to the sector of the German 41st Division, there were only narrow stretches over which tanks could attack the main line of resistance. Within the sector of the 41st Division, the only tank obstacles were the villages. In the sector of the 117th Division, the woods constituted a tank obstacle, while in that of the 225th Division, the small woods, the Luce, and a deep ravine were all tank obstacles. Only about a quarter of the entire front could be considered suitable for tank attack.

The first objective for the British attack, which was to be reached by about 7:20 AM, was the line: west edge of Cérisy-east edge of Lamotte-east edge of Demuin. Two hours after arriving at the first objective, that is, at about 9:20 AM, the attack was to be carried forward to the second objective which was the line: east edge of Morcourt-west edge of Harbonnieres-north edge of Cayeux-east edge of Mézières. From there the attack was to be pushed to the line: Mericourt-east edge of Harbonnieres-Fresnoy, which was designated as the third objective.

The plan for the Australian Corps was to attack with the 2d and 3d Divisions in the front line. The divisions were to attack with brigades abreast. To each brigade there was assigned a tank company of 12 tanks. The 4th and 5th Divisions were to follow and take up the attack when the leading divisions had arrived upon the first objective. On account of the greater distance over which the divisions of the second wave would have to push the attack, there were given more tanks; the 4th Division received 56, and the 5th Division, 42.

The Canadian Corps was to attack with its 2d, 1st, and 3d Divisions in front line in order from north to south, and its 4th Division in the second wave. The 2d and 1st Divisions were to carry the attack to the final objective, while the 3d Division was to be passed through by the 4th Division on the first objective. Each division received 36 tanks. The 2d and 1st Divisions were to use 12 tanks in the capture of each objective, while the 3d Division was to use its 36 tanks at the start since it had only one objective to take.

On the German side the divisions held their sectors with regiments abreast. In the regimental sectors, one battalion generally held the main line of resistance and the outpost zone, another was held in regimental reserve well forward, while the third was farther to the rear in rest billets. The artillery zone extended west to include the villages of Cérisy, Lamotte, and Demuin. The main line of resistance had been laid out so as to take advantage of commanding ground, and this resulted in the formation of several salients which were vulnerable to flank attacks. The position had not been completely organized anywhere; wire entanglements were not continuous and only a limited number of splinter-proof shelters existed.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#43

Post by tigre » 13 Jan 2016, 18:18

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK SOUTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 7).

The British put down a heavy barrage at about 5:20 AM which forced the defenders to seek shelter in dugouts and holes. The deafening roar of the bursting shells caused all communications to fail. The outposts were overrun without being able to give the alarm to the troops on the main line of resistance. As the troops on the main line of resistance began to be conscious of what was going on, the command posts and reserves were overrun. On parts of the front the visibility was limited to 10 or 20 paces. All along the front the story was the same. As the hostile barrage moved forward motor noises were heard. At first this was thought to be the noise of low-flying airplanes, and eyes were turned skyward. True, here and there hostile airplanes were combing the trenches laterally with machine guns. Then, suddenly, single tanks appeared. The Germans brought a few machine guns into action, but the tanks could not be stopped. They rolled on uninterruptedly. Directly behind them came infantrymen, who threw incendiary bombs and hand grenades into the German infantry shelters, and then hurried on after the monsters. Where the tanks could not negotiate the terrain, the infantry failed to advance too. When the first wave had passed, the defending infantry reappeared in the organized centers and opened fire. But almost as soon it would be fired on from the rear with cannon and machine guns from two or three tanks which had succeeded in outflanking the resistance, and then the battle was quickly over.

In the Australian Corps, the 3d Division attacked the left regiment of the German 108th Division and most of the front of the German 13th Division. The tanks of this division generally were able to surmount the obstacles offered by the terrain. The leading tank platoons were given the mission of breaking through on a narrow front and then striking at deep objectives. The following platoons had the mission of reducing strong German positions, such as villages and woods, by envelopment. Within a few hours after the attack was launched, this Australian division had overrun the German main line of resistance, the regimental command posts, and the regimental reserves. The German front-line regiments were almost completely lost; only insignificant elements found their way to the rear. The Australian 2d Division attacked the right and center regiments of the German 41st Division. By massing its tanks against the center regiment, the Australian division quickly broke through the main line of resistance there, and then reduced the right regiment by envelopment. Both Australian divisions reached the first objective on scheduled time by 7:20 AM. In two hours, these divisions had overpowered the front-line and reserve battalions, had captured ten batteries, and had conquered a strip of ground from 2 to 3.2 kilometers in depth, measured from the German outpost line.

In the Canadian Corps, the 2d Division launched its entire strength against the left regiment of the German 41st Division. The infantry of this division began the attack without the support of tanks, and was repulsed. Shortly afterward, however, the tanks came into action, and then the German front-line and reserve battalion was sealed. The 1st Division attacked the entire front of the German 117th Division. This Canadian
division could only employ tanks on its flanks because of the wooded area in the center of its zone. These woods were not reduced until they had been attacked from the rear by tanks which had enveloped them from both flanks. This delay caused the Canadian 1st Division to arrive on the first objective at 8:15 instead of 7:20 AM. The 3d Canadian Division, which, as was, related above, was to advance only to the first objective, attacked the right and center of the German 225th Division. This division attacked with one brigade north and one south of the Luce. The brigade attacking south of the Luce had attached to it 28 tanks; that is twice as many as were assigned to any other brigade of the first wave. In spite of its large number of tanks the Canadian 3d Division did not arrive on the first objective until 9 :20 AM. This delay was due largely to the fact that the defender had been warned in time by tank noises, and had taken up positions on tank-secure ground. The German artillery on this front put down protective barrages on its own initiative, but the Canadians had passed through before the barrages fell. The Canadian Corps, like the Australian, had destroyed the bulk of the front-line and regimental reserve battalions on its front; it also captured 11 light and 5 medium or heavy batteries, and penetrated the German position to a depth of 4.8 kilometers at the deepest point.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
Attachments
image017.jpg
A tank breaking through an obstruction on the roadside during the Australian attack at Bayonvillers, France, 8 August 1918.........
http://www.ww1westernfront.gov.au/mont-st-quentin/heath-cemetery/advance-to-morcourt-valley.php#
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#44

Post by tigre » 16 Jan 2016, 15:31

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK SOUTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 7).

Advance to the second objective.

Pursuant to orders, the British resumed the attack at 9:20 AM, for the capture of the second objective. They now brought
fresh troops into the battle. Against these the Germanscould only bring their nearest rest battalions. The British attacked as in the first phase, the tank waves moving out ahead, and the infantry following. The fog had now disappeared; and the defender could bring his artillery and machine guns into action. The attacker found himself directly in front of the German batteries which he had not yet captured. These, however, were protected only by a few machine guns.

On the heights southeast of Cérisy, several reserve companies of the German 108th Division, supported by artillery from the north bank of the Somme, held their position until they were outflanked by tanks from the south. In the German 13th Division, a reserve battalion, at about 8:00 AM, had been ordered to occupy a position on the east slope of the ravine southeast of Morcourt. Hostile attack aviation and artillery fire so delayed the march of this battalion that it did not get into position until 9:45 AM. A little later another reserve battalion arrived and extended the position of the first. These two battalions resisted all frontal attacks, but when they were enveloped on both flanks by tanks, the troops fell back in disorder. The retreating infantrymen, were attacked by tanks on the ground and by airplanes from the air, and the two battalions were simply wiped out. The German 41st Division had as reserves: one battalion in the south end of the ravine just mentioned, a half-battalion in the woods just south of the ravine, a battalion (less a company) east of the ravine, and a half-battalion north of Proyart. When the division commander received the report by a carrier pigeon that the main line of resistance had been penetrated in his south regiment, he started the bulk of these reserves towards Bayonvillers. They ran into tanks and fell back in disorder to the east bank of the ravine. A German antiaircraft artillery platoon appeared on the main road at this time and destroyed three tanks. Then British aviators appeared and threw smoke bombs into the ravine. Under cover of the smoke, the tanks enveloped the position which the reserves occupied on the east bank of the ravine, and then all resistance ended. A few energetic leaders, however, did rally enough men to shoot up a British cavalry unit which came up from the south. The German 117th Division had a reserve battalion in Guillaucourt, and two in Harbonnieres. These had been alerted early, and ordered into the draw south of Wiencourt. Their march was delayed by hostile attack aviation and artillery so that they did not get into position until 10:00 AM. They were supported by a battery brought forward from a rest area. The battery was able to put six tanks out of action. With this support, the reserve battalions held until some hostile tanks worked their way through Wiencourt, and enveloped the position from the north, when they feIl back. The German 225th Division attempted a counterattack south of the Luce with its reserves which consisted of only two half-battalions. The division artillery was captured before the counterattack was launched. The action failed, and the elements participating fell back in disorder. By 11:00 AM, the German 225th Division had been almost completely destroyed.

By 12:30 PM, the British were everywhere on their second objective. Most of the tank losses of the day occurred during this phase. This is explained by the fact that during the halt of the British on the first objective, the German batteries which had not been captured moved pieces out in the open where they were able to take the British tanks under direct fire when they resumed their advance.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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image002.jpg
Traffic on the Amiens-Roye Road. German prisoners carry Canadian wounded soldier to the rear..........................
http://www.warmuseum.ca/firstworldwar/objects-and-photos/photographs/battles-and-fighting-photographs/traffic-on-the-amiens-roye-road/?back=158
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Re: Tanks in WWI

#45

Post by Sheldrake » 17 Jan 2016, 16:28

This is super stuff.

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