Gallipoli Wars

Discussions on all aspects of the First World War not covered in the other sections. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
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Ruhrpottpreusse
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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by Ruhrpottpreusse » 30 Jun 2013 07:21

Hello or Salem!
I´d like to thank everyone for writing posts about this theatre! I´m very interested in the Gallipoli battles!
I´d like to add something:
If you want to play a game about those battles, I recommend:
http://www.fanen.com/magazine/p-487_572 ... ed-ed.html

Here is a list about the artillery (I hope it´s correct)
Bosporus:
2x 35,5cm l/35
2x 28cm l/26
10x 24cm l/22
14x 24cm l/35

Dardanelles:

european bank:
Ertrogul: 2x 24cm l/35
sed ul bahr: 2x 28cm l/22 ; 2x 26cm l/22 ; 2x 24cm l/22
rumeli medschidje: 4x 24cm l/35 ; 2x 28cm l/22
rumeli hamidje: 2x 35cm l/35 ; 7x 24cm l/35
namasie: 2x 24cm l/35 ; 2x 26cm l/22 ; 5x 24cm l/22 ; 1x 21cm l/22
degurmen burnu: 6x 24cm l/22 ; 1x 21cm l/22
kilid-bahr: 2x 24cm l/35
eski hisarlik: 6x 12cm haubitze
tenker: 8x 21cm mörser ; 12x 15cm haubitze ; 4x 15cm haubitze
sogandere: 4x 12cm l/? ; 8x 8,8cm l/30
baykus: 4x 7,5cm l/? ; 3x 15cm l/45
kum burlun: 4x 12cm l/?
Havuzlar: 4x 12cm l/? ; 6x 8,7cm l/?
Yildiz: 6x 15cm l/26
kilyatepe: 2x 7,5cm l/?
Bogli: 2x 5,7cm l/?


asian bank:
Orhanje: 2x 24cm l/35 (1x 24cm l/35)
kum kale: 2x 28cm l/22 ; 2x 26cm l/22 ; 2x 24cm l/22 ; 1x 21cm l/22 ; 1x 15cm l/26
anatoli hamidje: 2x 35,5cm l/35 ; 7x 24cm l/35
anatoli medschidje: 3x 28cm l/22 ; 3x 26cm l/22 ; 3x 24cm l/22 ; 1x 21cm l/22
tschimenlik: 1x 35,5cm l/35 ; 1x 35,5cm l/22 ; 1x 24cm l/22 ; 1x 21cm l/22
nagara: 1x 26cm l/22 ; 1x 24cm l/22
usedom: 3x 8,8cm l/45
ali: 8x 15cm haubitze
intepe ii: 8x 12cm l/30
intepe: 2x 21cm l/22
yavuz: 1x 15cm l/45
cakaltepe: 4x 15cm l/40
erenkoy ii: 12x 15cm habitze
erenkoy: 4x 12cm l/?
Karantina: 2x 12cm haubitze
dardanos ii: 8x 15cm l/26
dardanos i: 5x 18cm l/?
Mesudiye: 2x 12cm habitze
kepez: 3x 5,7cm l/? ; 4x 8m7cm feldgeschütz

Finally I want to show you the breech of a german 24cm L/22 gun (Krupp), that was used by turkish units. Thanks a lot again to Demir to translate the ottoman script. It means: Friedrich Krupp Essen. The number is the weight. 14736kg
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tigre
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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 17 Oct 2015 13:26

Hello to all :D; an interesting complement on this subject........................

THE LANDING AT ANZAC.

On 24 March 1915, Enver Pasha, the Turkish war minister, placed the defense of the Dardanelles under the German General von Sanders. This officer estimated that the main landings would be attempted at Bulair on the European side, and Besika Bay on the Asiatic shore. Thus for the defense of the western coast of the Gallipoli peninsula, from Suvla to Sedd el Bahr, some twenty miles in length, only one division (9th) was allotted.*

At Ari Burnu, where the Australian and New Zealand Corps eventually landed, two front-line company sectors (27th Infantry) joined, each of these companies being responsible for the defense of about a mile and a half of coast line. The reserve company was about a mile east of Gaba Tepe. One mountain battery was in a position on 400 plateau (see sketch), and guarding the coast at Gaba Tepe were two 120-mm. guns, while two 150-mm. guns were a little inland from that point.

Although the coast was weakly defended, reserves were well situated to oppose a deep penetration. The two battalions forming the reserve of the 27th Infantry were four miles from Ari Burnu in the direction of Maidos, and the general reserve of eight battalions (19th Division), with artillery, was located at Boghali, about four miles east of the landing place.

Concerning this portion of the front, it was thought at British general headquarters that two or even more divisions might be available for the defense of this western shore of the peninsula. The lack of accurate information about the enemy was attributable to the shortage of aircraft. This shortage was to be felt in many ways. By the first week in April 1915 no photographs had been taken over the enemy lines owing to a shortage of cameras. Bombing missions, however, were carried out and a certain amount of information collected. It is interesting to note that on 23 April the reserve battalions of the 27th Infantry were bombed out of the village of Maidos, but unfortunately moved into bivouacs 1 1/2 miles nearer Gaba Tepe. At this stage, and particularly in this type of operation; air photographs would have been invaluable in checking the many inaccuracies in the maps provided. Adequate reconnaissance of the terrain over which the first battle has to be fought must always have priority when landing on a little known enemy coast.

The area into which the Anzac Corps was to advance may be described as a tangle of nullas, ravines, precipices, and small plateaus. In addition to these difficulties of terrain, the high ground on the north flank of the operation was for the most part covered with a low brush. This could be seen from the see, but the resisting nature of that brush was never suspected before the operations began. Standing some three feet high and interspersed with prickly dwarf oak, its stubborn bushes are often so close together, and so thorny, that even a strong man has difficulty in forcing his way, through. In the attack therefore, it is a serious obstacle to movement while it has the further disadvantage that men lying down in it are unable to see their neighbors on either flank. But for snipers; or for infantry delaying a hostile advance, the cover that it affords is almost Ideal.

* The Turkish 9th Division consisted of three regiments of infantry, three batteries of field artillery, and two mountain batteries, A regiment consisted of three battalions and a machine-gun company. Each battalion had four companies.

Source: Review of Military Literature. Sep 1936.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 19 Oct 2015 01:55

Hello to all :D; more on this........................

THE LANDING AT ANZAC.

The task allotted to the Anzac Corps was to land north of Gaba Tepe and cut the Turkish communications between Gallipoli and Sedd el Bahr. The covering force was to be the Australian 3d Infantry Brigade, which had orders to capture the guns on 400 Plateau and occupy Gun Ridge, their left resting on Chunuk Bair. On the right, troops were to clear Gaba Tepe and disable any guns found there. This gave the brigade a respansibility for about 6,000 yards of frontage.

The 2d Brigade, which was to land immediately after the covering force, had instructions to extend the front northwards to the highest point of the third ridge, Hill 971, a mile northeast of Chunuk Bair, and protect the left flank by holding a line between there and Fisherman’s Hut. The 1st Brigade formed the reserve for the Australian 1st Division. Arrangements were made for the Indian 7th Mountain Brigade to be landed as early as possible in the morning and to be attached to the covering force on arrival.

The orders by the commander of the covering force were for the 9th Battalion, to land on the right, two companies to clear Gaba Tepe, and the remaining two to make for Anderson's Knoll; this battalion would therefore operate on a frontage of 3,000 yards. The 10th Battalion was to land in the center, capture the guns on 400 Plateau, and occupy Scrubby Knoll, on Gun Ridge, while the 11th Battalion was to seize the northern end of this ridge and Chunuk Bair. The remaining battalion (12th), was in brigade reserve. The mountain guns, on arrival, were to go to 400 Plateau.

Naval support was arranged as follows:

(1) The covering force commander was to ask for ships' fire by signal.

(2) The fleet was to fire by observation on any Turkish troops or guns, definitely seen.

(3) On each flank an artillery officer was to act as an observer for the ships. Messages to the beach by telephone, thence by radio to the flagship.

It should be noted that in the actual operation, no ship fired till 5:00 PM, largely owing to the difficulties of communication. Probably some form of timed program would have been better.

The time the leading troops were to reach the shore depended on the hour of the moon's setting; on 25 April this was at 2:57 AM. This meant that the first tows could not be landed before 4:30 AM, which was half an hour after first light. General Birdwood considered that a night landing was the best means of obtaining surprise, but the danger of ships being silhouetted against the moonlit sky made this not quite possible.

Corps orders laid down that wounded were not to be evacuated to ships till the infantry of the Australian 1st Division was ashore. The order of this division did not sufficiently emphasize this. It read: "The navy launches equipped as hospital boats will begin to ply from shore to ship after the infantry of the division is landed." Disobedience of the spirit of this order was a contributory cause of the program for the landing getting nearly four hours behind schedule.

Source: Review of Military Literature. Sep 1936.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by Tosun Saral » 19 Oct 2015 07:26

The last issue of periodical Çanakkale 1915, September 2015 Nr:25 that we write articles abaoyt Gallipoli in Turkish language, puplished by Mr. Yetkin İşçen
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tigre
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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 19 Oct 2015 11:36

Hello to all :D; more on this........................

THE LANDING AT ANZAC.

At 1:00 AM, on 25 April, the battleships had reached their rendezvous and boats were being lowered. At 2:35 AM all tows were ready, and when the moon had sunk behind Imbros, the three battleships, with 1,500 men on board, destroyers carrying the remainder of the covering force, steamed slowly towards the peninsula. At 3:30 AM the battleships anchored within 2 1/2 miles of the shore, and 48 cutters, in 12 parallel columns, were being towed ashore by steam launches.

The landing was a complete surprise. Owing to an error in navigation, the boats were beached a mile farther north than had been intended, but the original place selected had been better prepared by the Turks. At Ari Burnu there was only one sentry group, which opened fire, and a few small posts overlooking the beach. Without waiting to reorganize, the troops pushed rapidly inland.

The effect of the error in navigation was that the first tow landed on a very narrow front and units became confused from the start. The troops had been told to expect a low sandy bank skirting the beach, but they must have disappeared into the ravines before new orders could be given to them. It is improbable that the junior officers did not realize what had happened until it was broad daylight.

At 5:00 AM the situation was roughly as follows: The 9th Battalion was very scattered. About 100 men, under an officer, were being led across Shrapnel Gully to the north end of 400 Plateau. The 11th Battalion was reorganizing in a gully forking northeast from Shrapnel Gully, just east of Plugge's Plateau. Some were still near the beach, pinned down by machine-gun fire from Fisherman's Hut. In the meantime the 12th Battalion landed from the destroyers, but instead of remaining reserve, they got caught up in the advance. Parties of this battalion reached 400 Plateau ahead of the battleship parties and captured the guns there.

The commander of the Australian 3d Brigade arrived at the southern end of Plugge's Plateau about 4 :40 AM. Owing to the brush and the ravines which hid the troops, he was unable to estimate the situation. He knew there were no troops between him and Gaba Tepe, but the volume of the enemy's fire was negligible and there were no signs of any further enemy approaching. He decided to advise the commander of the 2d Brigade that his troops should be employed on his right instead on his left. The wisdom of this decision seems doubtful, since the points of tactical importance were on the left flank, namely Chunuk Bair and Baby 700.

About this time the commander-in-chief appeared in Queen Elizabeth, and received the report that the troops were a mile inland. Presumably this was the report from General Birdwood as of 6:39 AM in which the capture of 400 Plateau was reported, although the British Official History records the fact that at 6:00 AM the commander-in-chief headed south for the toe of the peninsula. It would appear that general headquarters still thought that the thrust from Helles was to be the decisive blow. Possibly had the commander-in-chief remained a little longer and learned the real situation at Anzac, a brigade might have been diverted from Helles and employed where there was obviously a tactical advantage worth exploiting. Gaba Tepe is two miles nearer the heights overlooking the narrows than Helles, and it is surprising that so much importance should have been attributed by general headquarters to the southern landing. In the light of after knowledge, one organized brigade to hold some sort of covering position, behind which the Australians might have reorganized, would have turned the scale easily in the attacker's favor.

Source: Review of Military Literature. Sep 1936.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 24 Oct 2015 19:52

Hello to all :D; more on this........................

THE LANDING AT ANZAC.

At Maidos the commander of the Turkish 27th Infantry heard of the landing an hour after that event. Its troops, however, were not ready to move until 7:30 AM, and it was not until 9:00 AM that they were seen by the Australians filing up Gun Ridge from the south. At this hour, therefore, the Turks opposing the advance could not have been numerous, and already 8,000 Australians had landed, although in the original orders it had been hoped to have landed more by this time. The delays and their cause will be referred to later.

The real trouble, however, was to begin when the Turkish 19th Division, under Mustapha Kemal, was ordered to detach one battalion towards Chunuk Bair to watch the right. This officer quickly grasped the threat to the Turkish communications and ordered a whole regiment to move as quickly as possible. He himself rode forward with a company to gain first-hand information. At 10:00 AM this company came in contact with Australian troops on Baby 700 and to the northeast of it. Later in the afternoon, counterattacks here seriously threatened the Australian's hold on this part of the peninsula. A Turkish force moving south from Baby 700 to Russell's Top could outflank a position on 400 Plateau or even take it in reverse. Chunuk Bair and Baby 700 were of considerable tactical importance, and had they been strongly held by the first troops to land, the Turkish reserves would not have interfered to such purpose as to cause talk of evacuation.

In the meantime, at 7:00 AM, an officer and two scouts reached Scrubby Knoll and scattered groups of men were in possession of Pine Ridge. These forward elements remained unsupported owing to delays in landing the 1st and 2d Brigades and to a decision by the commander of the 3d Brigade to entrench 400 Plateau instead of supporting troops in front. Delays in landing at this time were caused by the shelling of the anchorage, which made the transports stand out farther from the shore, and the disregard of orders for the evacuation of wounded. The return of boats for more troops was held up while wounded were being embarked. Added to this there was lack of organization on the beach, no naval or military personnel for this purpose being landed until 10:00 AM. Even when troops were landed the change of orders for the 2d Brigade must have caused further confusion, since the issue of orders under the conditions prevailing at this time must have been difficult.

At 10:45 AM, one and one-half battalions of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier General Walker, were made available. General Bridges, commanding the Australian 1st Division, decided to use them to restore the situation on Baby 700. This situation had been caused by the advance elements of Mustapha Kemal's 19th Division. The New Zealanders started off by way of Walker's Ridge, but General Walker decided that the ground was too difficult and changed the line of advance to that via Plugge's PIateau and Russell's Top. The change of orders caused confusion, and the troops also became involved with the razor edge east of Plugge's Plateau. The result was that not more than one company reached a position west of Baby 700, and then not until 1:00 PM. By 3:00 PM no one seems to have been in command of this left sector. The scattered companies were not coordinated, and no one seems to have known the plan. The troops had done very well, but casualties in officers had brought movements to a standstill.

Source: Review of Military Literature. Sep 1936.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 25 Oct 2015 19:07

Hello to all :D; more on this........................

THE LANDING AT ANZAC.

At 4:00 PM the full weight of the counterattack on Baby 700 was being felt and troops fell back, gaps appearing in the line. Initiative had passed to the enemy. By 5:00 PM the remainder of the New Zealand Brigade and the Australian 4th Brigade had not yet landed, and there were no troops to restore the situation on the left, where the absence of counter - battery work was trying the troops very highly. Enemy batteries from the direction of Chunuk Bair had been troubling the Australians since 1:00 PM.

About this time further delays, were caused at the beach owing to lack of decisions by the division staffs. It could not be decided whether more troops were to be landed or whether evacuation was to be ordered. Lack of orders, the consequent demoralizing rumors, failure of beach organization, resulted in the lack of support to forward troops at a critical time.

During the evening Turkish counterattacks were to add to the general discomfiture by preventing reorganization.

The narrative of events points plainly to several lessons: poor beach organization means grave delays. Delays in this type of operation, where success depends on exploiting any surprise, are absolutely fatal. A tactical surprise had been achieved, but numbers could not be produced quickly enough to take advantage of it. The confusion and difficulties caused by deploying from a narrow front, although this was no fault of a military commander, confirms the wisdom of the original order to land on a frontage of nearly a mile. Overcrowding on the beach is to be avoided, particularly when the beach is narrow.

The influence of terrain on the movements of troops is well illustrated, providing an example also of the need of reconnaissance by all means available so as to avoid being surprised by the terrain. The delaying power of well concealed marksmen in this brush-covered country was most apparent, and snipers took heavy toll of those who put their heads up to reconnoiter.

The operations furnish an example of the need for leadership. Numbers are useless without coordination; this is illustrated by the lack of progress made by 8,000 Australian troops against about 500 of the enemy. The opportunity to make progress after 9:00 AM never reoccurred.

Source: Review of Military Literature. Sep 1936.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 26 Oct 2015 12:22

Hello to all :D; more on this........................

THE LANDING AT ANZAC.

The landing of the Australian 1st Division headquarters three hours after the initial disembarkation might be considered a contributory cause of failure. The decision to employ the 2d Brigade on the right might not have been made had division headquarters been represented on shore. The position of commanders needs careful study in landing operations. The position of the commander-in-chief, confined in Queen Elizabeth at Sedd-el Bahr is open to the gravest criticism. He could not have been fully aware of the situation of the troops at Anzac until very late in the day.

The British Official History states that the ease of the initial landing may have caused a false sense of security. The will to win can never be too highly cultivated, but this must be tempered by a reasoned respect for the enemy. The study of the characteristics of foreign armies might well be deserving of study by officers.

The value of discipline and training is self-evident, but this type of operation calls for the highest form of both. The lack of supporting fire was a handicap to the troops; the ships did not open fire till 12 hours after the landing, and the orders cancelling the landing of the artillery deprived the troops of this moral support. Absence of aircraft was to deprive commanders of the information about the progress made by forward troops and neutralized the presence of naval artillery. The maps issued were of little assistance; in this type of operation good maps are of paramount importance because of the limited reconnaissances possible.

Many other lessons may be deduced from the landing at Anzac. General Callwell, in his Dardanelles Campaign, points out that a maritime descent against the coasts of a well organized enemy with good rail and road communications is a most hazardous and difficult enterprise.

Source: Review of Military Literature. Sep 1936.

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 17 Jan 2016 16:49

Hello to all :D; more on this........................

MINOR CAUSES - MAJOR EFFECTS. BEGINNING OF THE AUGUST 1915 GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

General Kannengieszer commanded the Turkish 9th Division in the defense of the Dardanelles in August of 1915 and in this installment proposes to show how minor incidents had decisive effects on the action starting on the morning of 7 August when the British made their landing at Suvla Bay and initiated a drive, in conjunction with an advance from the area held by the Anzacs, to take the heights commanding the Anafarta Plain.

According to the author, British plans were well laid and the Turks were taken by surprise. The plan was to move up during darkness and assault the heights just before daylight. It was known that they were unoccupied and secret and rapid advances were planned to insure reaching them before any resistance of importance could be set up.

General Ian Hamilton's plan of operations is shown on sketch. A determined attack was to be initiated against the Turkish position in the late afternoon of the 6th and to continue into the night. The object of this attack was to draw reserves and to pin the Turks to their occupied lines.

The author states that this plan achieved its object for his division was called up to restore a portion of the southern section of the Turkish position on the 6th, and had ultimately, as we shall see, to be employed to the north of the Turkish north flank. While this attack was being made, a force of three reinforced brigades, General Godley commanding, was to move to the north along the coast behind the Anzac lines and then to turn east finally in three columns to take the Sari Bahir before daybreak. The columns were to advance up three valleys leading to key points on the crest. The brigades were expressly urged to advance vigorously and without respect to the troops on their flanks. Reconnaissance has been strictly limited in the interests of surprise. The terrain had been studied by a few officers from air photographs and by observation from British ships. In addition to the officers, some Greeks, former residents of the area, were employed as guides for the brigades.

Simultaneously with this advance the British IX Army Corps was to be landed in the Suvla Bay area beginning at 10:00 PM. The individual brigades were to advance as soon as landed and to take the immediate heights - known to be lightly held- and then to advance to take the Kiretsch Tepe, and the Teke Tepe before daybreak (see sketch).

In brief, the plan contemplated a march and a landing under cover of darkness, followed by the seizure of commanding terrain before daylight, made British intentions clear to the enemy.

The advance of the south column, the New Zealand Brigade, started at 11:30 PM, one and one-half hours late because the commander did not wish to encounter the scattered shell fire delivered into the ravines by Turkish batteries. After the march commenced and the turn to the east had been made, the Canterbury Battalion was sent up a parallel draw to unite with the main column later on. This battalion became lost, commands were incorrectly transmitted, and when the moon came out it found itself back on the coast where it turned out of column. The main column reached the rendezvous point, and failing to meet the detached battalion-waited; in spite of the fact that Djonc Bahir, its unoccupied key terrain objective, was only 1,300 yards away!.

Source: [Kleine Ursachen - Grosze Wirkungen. Beginn der agosto Schlacht 1915 auf Gallipoli.] (I) Mayor General Hans Kannengiesser Pascha. Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. RML Nº 75. Dec 1939.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 21 Jan 2016 18:50

Hello to all :D; more on this........................

MINOR CAUSES - MAJOR EFFECTS. BEGINNING OF THE AUGUST 1915 GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

Returning now to the Turkish side, we find General Kannengieszer and his staff preceding their division which had been ordered to move to the north to occupy Djonc Bahir, arriving at that point about 6:00 AM. Reconnaissance was initiated at once because British troops could be seen disembarking from numerous ships in the bay and moving toward the high ground. On this reconnaisance the General found a battery of Turkish pack artillery with a covering detachment of some twenty men in his area. Over their protests he informed them that they were now part of his command. Suddenly, about 7:30 AM, the New Zealanders, coming around a terrain obstacle known as the Pinnacle, appeared about 700 yards away.The General ordered the covering detachment to open fire on them. when a well-placed machine-gun fire was opened on the Turkish position from a more southerly direction. In the meantime the General had secured more troops by the simple expedient of assuming command of two infantry companies which the north-flank division (the 19th, commanded by Mustapha Kemal) of the Turkish forces had sent out as a flank covering force.

Returning again to the British side, we find that the fire of these small forces was described as coming from positions "bristling with rifles". At 8:00 AM the column commander reported that he could not advance without artillery support. In the meantime the troops waited and had breakfast. General Godley did not concur in the column commander's view of the situation and ordered an attack at 10:30, preceded by a 15-minute bombardment by artillery on the coast and on ships. When the attack was started the brigade commander employed only 5 companies although he had 4 1/2 battalions available. But by this time two regiments of General Kannengieszer's division had arrived and gone into position so the attack was easily Stopped. The British were never able to secure Djonc Bahir.

The author points out the following errors to show how mistakes of subordinates caused the well-conceived plan to fail. Poor estimation of the situation caused the brigade commander to credit the enemy with greater strength than he had and led to delaying the attack to such an extent that the Turks were able to bring up forces strong enough to defeat the final assault. There was no determination to push on, the brigades should have advanced without waiting for the flank battalion. A reconnaissance in force sould have been made when the first fire was received, and finally the bulk of the available forces were not employed in the attack that eventually took place.

The remainder of the force, General Cox commanding, consisting of the 4th Australian and the 29th Indian Brigades, moved out, in one column, initially, at the same time as the New Zealanders. The plan called for turning east up a certain valley, and from there the Australians were to turn up a lesser draw to their objective, Kodjadschemen Dagh. The Indian Brigade was to continue on to Hill Q. Both objectives were to be reached by 3:00 AM and ample time was available for accomplishing the task.

The advance was guided by an officer and some of the Greeks previously referred to. Since the column had already lost some time it was decided to try out a short cut which the Greek guides reported existed. This trail was so narrow and difficult that the column, instead of gaining one-half hour as had been hoped, lost three more precious hours. The Australian Brigade then missed the turn-off point, and soon found itself with a flank covering detachment that had been sent farther to the north early in the evening. It is reported that the fact that the troops wore white arm bands and white cloths on their knapsacks is the only thing that prevented the covering force from firing on them. The Australian took up a position extending the covering force and stayed there about 2 1/2 hours (until 6:30 AM), when General Cox directed them to advance on their original objective. The brigade commander argued that the troops were too spent to accomplish this task. General Cox revoked his order.

Source: [Kleine Ursachen - Grosze Wirkungen. Beginn der agosto Schlacht 1915 auf Gallipoli.] (I) Mayor General Hans Kannengiesser Pascha. Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. RML Nº 75. Dec 1939.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 24 Jan 2016 16:22

Hello to all :D; more on this........................

MINOR CAUSES - MAJOR EFFECTS. BEGINNING OF THE AUGUST 1915 GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

The Indian Brigade, which had followed the Australians, continued on up the main valley after the Australians turned away. The Brigade had been landed the day before and found the terrain most unfamiliar and difficult. Communication broke down and it was not long before units became separated in small draws leading from the main valley. A Gurkha regiment finally wound up with the New Zealanders, a Sikh regiment with the Australians and only the remaining Gurkha, the 6th, under an energetic commander continued on toward the objective, getting to within 1,000 yards of it by 9:00 AM. Though they failed to seize their objective, the regiment did take a neighboring hill a few days later only to be forced out the erroneously placed fire of their supporting artillery.

From the actions of these northern columns the author draws the lessons that it is an error to use short-cuts in night marches after suitable routes have been decided upon. Troops in unfamiliar terrain must be especially well provided with guides. A failure to push on vigorously, even though troops are tired and sleepy, generally results in greater losses in-the end. In this case, for example, the next few days of battle cost 12,000 men and the objective was not attained. On the morning of the 7th, the British had only slightly more than two companies between themselves and the vital terrain, and at one stage only some nine members of a division staff.

The author concludes his analysis of the operations of the British forces at Anzac and Suvla Bay beginning 6 August 1915, by discussing the landing and subsequent attacks - through 8 August - of the IX Army Corps. The landing at Suvla Bay was the third major attempt of the British to gain decisive results at Gallipoli. Having gained the heights beyond the Anafarta Plain (see sketch) the troops were to pivot on Sari Bahir and swing to the south, thus cutting off the southern end of the peninsula and opening the entrance to the straits.

Based on the limited information available, the British Navy advised against a landing within Suvla Bay and proposed a landing south of Small Kemikli point. General Hamilton therefore decided to land the IX Corps there at the same time as the advance from the Anzac position, described before. The 11th Division was to start landing at 10 o'clock. It was to protect the beaches at once and then to advance around Salt Lake to the north (see sketch). From there part of the division was to turn south to take the hills in the Anafarta Plain east of the Lake, from the rear and flank, another part was to secure Kiretsch Tepe, and one brigade was to advance rapidly to take Tekke Tepe. The division consisted of 3 brigades of 4 battalions each. The 10th Division (consisting of 2 brigades), which would land about daybreak, was to advance on Great Anafarta and from there to cooperate with the 4th Australian Brigade which, it will be recalled, was advancing from Anzac to seize the highly important Kadjadschemen Dagh.

General Hamilton emphasized the need for speed and secrecy. General Stopford, who had just arrived from service in France, was placed in command of the Corps. He was pessimistic as to the ability of his troops to accomplish the assigned task and numerous conferences concerning the proposed operation were held. During these conferences it was decided to accede to the protestations of Stopford to the extent of landing one brigade within Suvla Bay and to employ the expression, "if possible" in the matter of taking the hills in the Anafarta Plain before daylight. Air photos of these hills were interpreted as showing these hills to be highly organized. As a matter of fact, the trenches were old and unrepaired and what little wire existed was rusted and ineffective. GHQ expected that early successes in the venture would alter Stopford's attitude.

Source: [Kleine Ursachen - Grosze Wirkungen. Beginn der agosto Schlacht 1915 auf Gallipoli.] (I) Mayor General Hans Kannengiesser Pascha. Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. RML Nº 75. Dec 1939.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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tigre
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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 28 Jan 2016 12:48

Hello to all :D; more on this........................

MINOR CAUSES - MAJOR EFFECTS. BEGINNING OF THE AUGUST 1915 GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

The Turkish defenses against the proposed operation were under the command of Major Willmer Bey, a Bavarian Chevauleger. He had been in command since 18 June and had at his disposal 4 battalions of infantry, 2 field and 2 mountain batteries, 3 old field pieces without limbers, and weak detachments of cavalry and engineers. His task was to guard the coast from Edje Liman to the first streamline shown on sketch south of Salt Lake. Machine guns and barbed wire were too sorely needed at points considered more vulnerable to make any available to him.

He was expected to guard 15 miles of coast line to delay any landings in force for from 36 to 48 hours. It is interesting to note that he made his dispositions in accord with our current doctrines. On the Kiretsch Tepe he placed his most trustworthy battalion, the Gallipoli Gendarmes, with three mountain guns attached. Its sector extended from Edje Liman to Great Kemikli. The Brussa Gendarmes battalion and one mountain gun occupied Softa Tepe; it covered the east coast of Suvla Bay.

The 1st Battalion 31st Infantry occupied the hills just west of Salt Lake with outposts as far as Small Kemikli. It had two mountain guns.

The two batteries of field artillery and the three old guns were placed in position in the vicinity of Tekke Tepe from where they could cover the Plain up to the coast.

The 2d Battalion 32d Infantry was held in reserve in the vicinity of Turschunkoi. This battalion was taken from Major Willmer on 6 August and sent to defend the coast west of Sari Babir.

Willmer's plan called for the advance elements to fall back on their battalions and the force as a whole to make its final resistance on the ridge northwest of Great Anafarta. This position was being prepared by the engineers under the protection of the cavalry (some 30 dismounted riflemen) and two mountain guns. The CP was located just east of Great Anafarta.

While the Turks predicted a "great attack" as early as 3 August, the British plans were kept very secret and the landing was a surprise to the Turkish forces.

At 9:45 PM, Major Willmer at his CP, was informed of the landing south of Suvla Bay. He reported to GHQ and requested that his reserve battalion be returned to him. He did not get It.

Source: [Kleine Ursachen - Grosze Wirkungen. Beginn der agosto Schlacht 1915 auf Gallipoli.] (II) Mayor General Hans Kannengiesser Pascha. Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. RML Nº 75. Dec 1939.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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tigre
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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by tigre » 31 Jan 2016 12:53

Hello to all :D; more on this........................

MINOR CAUSES - MAJOR EFFECTS. BEGINNING OF THE AUGUST 1915 GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

The landing took place almost as it had been practiced on Lemnos. Four battalions landed dryshod (the British used a new type steel motor boat with a ramp at one end) at, 10:00 PM. The 11th Division, less one of its three brigades, completed its landing, secured a line from Salt Lake southward to the coast, and seized Lala Baba where it emplaced its artillery. The third brigade which was to land along the northern coast of Suvla Bay encountered artillery and small arm fire when it approached the shore; furthermore, 3 cruisers anchored too far to the south. As a result two of the big landing boats struck shoals and the landing was seriously disorganized and delayed. The defending Brussa Gendarmes delivered a very effective fire on the troops landing on its front. This brigade was the one detailed to take Softa Tepe. Its landing was not completed until about 3:30 AM, when one battalion was finally pushe ahead to take the objective, it seized, by mistake, a small elevation in front of Softa Tepe.

Hence, daylight disclosed virtually the entire 11th Division massed on the strip of land between Salt Lake and the bay. Of its 12 battalions, 7 had made no contact with the enemy.

The landing of the 10th Division was subject to several changes in orders. The net result of which was that part of it landed near the Gahsi Baba and another part south of Small Kemikli. The latter, 5 battalions, was attached to the 11th Division by General Stopford. For the attack on the hills east of Salt Lake, the division ordered these battalions to take part in the advance around the lake which caused a mixing units. Before much of an advance could be made, Softa Tepe had to be taken. In accordance with their plans the Turks withdrew when the British advanced and the hill was occupied by 8:40 AM, 7 August. The senior brigade commander ordered a halt and reported his action. There now resulted a series of orders, conferences, counter-orders and misunderstandings which resulted in delaying the attack until 5:30 PM. The hills were finally taken by 7:00 PM,Turkish artillery fire prevented pursuit by the British of the withdrawing Tukish battalion. Contact with the enemy was lost.

By the same time part of the 10th Division had advanced about halfway up the coast toward Edje Liman.

The night passed quietly. Two brigades were withdrawn to the coast. The next day, 8 August, advances on objectives, short of the final objective shown on sketch, were ordered after a council of brigade commanders had convinced the commander of the 11th Division that the troops needed rest. The commander of the forces advancing along the Kiretsch Tepe reported that he could not dislodge the "strong" (we know they consisted of 3 companies and some mountain guns) forces facing him without more artillery support.

The corps commander eventually ordered that attack be made on Tekke Tepe if it was found to be lightly held.

When General Hamilton heard of the inaction ashore, he decided to land to see what the situation actually was. Trouble with the sailors of his ship delayed him so that he did not land until 6:00 PM. The corps commander assured him that all was well, and that the only things needed were rest and more artillery. He was strongly opposed to a night advance. The commander of the 11th Division also argued against a night advance. General Hamilton was ultimately able to have one brigade ordered to advance on Great Anafarta and to extract a promise that at least one battalion would be on Tekke Tepe by daylight of 9 August. These advances did not get under way until about 3:30 AM, 8 August, because messengers were delayed in finding the battalions and getting orders to them.

By this time, however, Turkish forces dispatched to the heights around the plain, were already on their way from Bulair. The delay occasioned by the events mentioned above, enabled the Turks to reach the heights first and thus to rout the British advancing on the Tekke Tepe and Anafarta.

Source: [Kleine Ursachen - Grosze Wirkungen. Beginn der agosto Schlacht 1915 auf Gallipoli.] (II) Mayor General Hans Kannengiesser Pascha. Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. RML Nº 75. Dec 1939.

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

John Crowe
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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by John Crowe » 05 Mar 2017 19:04

Dear Kaan, may I make contact with you by e mail, please? johncrowe@uwclub.net

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Terry Duncan
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Re: Gallipoli Wars

Post by Terry Duncan » 05 Mar 2017 19:29

John Crowe wrote:Dear Kaan, may I make contact with you by e mail, please? johncrowe@uwclub.net
You can certainly try this, but Kaan has not posted here since 2011 so I am not sure you will have too much luck.

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