Western Front Breakthroughs

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The German Offensive of spring 1918 in the West.

After the brilliant results in Venetia and the Russian debacle, the German G.H.Q. believed the time had come to force a decision on the West Front. Victory must be secured before the new strength of the United States could make itself felt. 'To this end speed was essential.

As early as November 1917 the German G.H.Q. was considering; proposals as to these operations. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria favored an offensive against the English in Flanders. The Headquarters of the German Crown Prince believed that the French strength could best be broken by a double attack against Verdun-from the Argonnes southeast and from St. Mihiel west. Ludendorff decided for the offensive against the English. The plan involved a major effort at breakthrough between Arras, St. Quentin, and La Fere, by 63 divisions of the Seventeenth, Second, and Eighteenth Armies. Following this the mass of the assault group under Crown Prince Rupprecht (Seventeenth and Second Armies), supporting its left flank on the Somme, was to swing northwest to roll up the British front to the north into the sea. Dreams were being indulged in of guns of long range which were then to bombard the English coast. The Eighteenth Army was to secure the crossings of the Somme, split the English from the French, and protect the entire operation toward the south.

The German G.H.Q. did not seem to feel certain of the success of these operations for it prepared other offensives; for example, one in Flanders against Hazebrouck. In case the breakthrough failed, it planned to demolish the front by repeated blows. Thus not everything was risked on the one attempt. Reserves were kept behind the other points of attack as well. This was not to be without its consequences. Furthermore, the disposition of forces for the great breakthrough was not a happy one. The Seventeenth Army had 17 divisions and 1900 guns; the Second Army had 18 divisions and 1800 guns; while the Eighteenth Army, whose mission was really merely secondary, was the strongest, with 24 divisions and 2500 guns.

On 21 March 1918 the attack commenced. It was the most colossal undertaking that had ever been assigned to any army.

Source: THE STRATEGIC BREAKTHROUGH. Military Review. Sep 1933.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more........................................

The German Offensive of spring 1918 in the West.

On the flrst day the forward enemy positions were taken at practically every point. But then the advance of the Seventeenth Army and of the right wing of the Second Army was brought to a halt. The Eighteenth Army and the left wing of the Second Army which had found a weak point in the enemy's front, continued to advance victoriously: The center of gravity had moved to the south. On the third day the question confronted the German G.H.Q. whether to hold up the Eighteenth Army in order to strengthen the Seventeenth Army by surplus units of the former. This would have meant loss of time. It was therefore decided not to hinder the victorious advance of the Eighteenth Army. In fact, nine additional divisions were alloted to it in order to defeat the French north wing as well. The Second Army received one division and the Seventeenth Army received several divisions in order to extend the attack to the north bank of the Scarpe. However, the attack on Arras proceeded slowly. The Eighteenth Army gained ground to the west and southwest. The directions of advance were now spreading apart like rays.

The most important strategical objective which was now to be taken was. Amiens, where a valuable strategic lateral road crossed the Somme. To this end the Eighteenth Army was in fact held up to await the advance of the Second. But on the 30th the enemy resistance stiffened everywhere. The attack was delayed temporarily and then taken up anew on 4 April with the employment of fresh forces. But these efforts were unsuccessful. The gap which had existed in the enemy front had now been closed. The attack on Amiens had to be stopped fifteen kilometers from the city.

The Germans had attained a tactical success. On the south wing they had advanced 60 km and captured 90,000 prisoners. But meanwhile 90 German divisions had been employed. Strategically, however, the results were not satisfactory. For Amiens, where the swing to the north was to commence, had not been reached. Furthermore, the new
front was now 55 km longer than the original front had been, and now the flanks were open for envelopment by the enemy. The cause of these unsatisfactory results is to be sought in the erroneous disposition of forces. The center of gravity should have been kept in the Second Army which had been sent toward Amiens. The majority of the additional divisions should have been assigned to it. The German G.H.Q. neglected to secure Austro-Hungarian aid. Ten divisions, for example, would readily have been granted in return for the services of the German Fourteenth Army in the Fall of 1917.

After the strategic failure of the March offensive the German G.H.Q. undertook the secondary measure of delivering a series of separate blows on the enemy front. Armentieres, Soissons, and Reims were successively the objectives and in each attack ground was gained. This resulted in lengthening the front by 100 km. However, the strength of the German armies was constantly getting less. The divisions brought from the East did not compensate for the casualties. Meanwhile the Allies were getting American reinforcements and on 18 July they initiated a counteroffensive, putting the Germans on the defensive. This was the beginning of a bitter end.

Source: THE STRATEGIC BREAKTHROUGH. Military Review. Sep 1933.

Cheers. Raúl M .