Gwynn Compton wrote:From John Keegan's
The First World War
Yet the irrevocable did not yet seem done. The Tsar still hoped, on the strength of a telegram from the Kaiser begging him not to violate the German frontier, that war could be averted. The Kaiser, meanwhile, had fixed on the belief that the British would remain neutral if France were not attacked and was ordering Moltke to cancel the Schlieffen Plan and direct the army eastward. Moltke was aghast, explained that the paperwork would take a year, but was ordered to canvel the invasion of Luxembourg, which was the Schlieffen Plan's necessary preliminary. In London this Sunday 1 August, the French ambassador, Paul Cambon, was thrown into despair by the British refusal to declare their position. Britain had, throughout the crisis, pursued the idea that, as so often before, direct talks between the involved parties would dissolve the difficulties.
Were the leaders of the nations powerless to stop their military leaders taking them to war? As soon as mobilisation was issued, was it too late to avert the war? This would seem to suggest that it largely was.
Thoughts?
Gwynn
The Russian reaction was probably more inevitable than the German. The military there may well have turned on the Tsar if he showed weakness in his resolve. German generals would not be so overt and would surely follow a strong lead, even if it meant abandoning the Schlieffen Plan.
I personally feel that William II showed his true colors most clearly at this juncture. His true personality was that of a constitutional monarch, much like his cousin George V. He knew in his heart that he was not the decisive leader he would have had himself be, but his ego (and, to be fair, his sense of duty) would not allow anyone else to assume the role of true leader, though he consistently shirked the tough decisions. The fact that Moltke would tell his Kaiser that it was "impossible" to alter the Schlieffen Plan shows at once that William had failed to win the respect of his generals as a leader. His passive-agressive response to Moltke, "Your uncle would have given me a different answer," confirms it further. The Kaiser himself did not take responsibility for the power that was truly his. In responding in this way, he shifts full responsibility straight onto Moltke's shoulders, which the General was not expecting. I believe Moltke fully expected to be rebuked for whining about a change in plans, but the rebuke was not forthcoming. There was thus a vacuum in leadership in the most critical place at the most critical time in the history of Western Civilization, which allowed the momentum of previously laid plans to carry the West down the path of suicide for the next thirty-one years.
Moltke and William were both thoroughly decent fellows, but neither had any business making such fateful decisions. Moltke was not a particularly deep thinker, as is revealed in this:
Helmuth von Moltke, memorandum sent to Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (July 1914)
Unless Germany means to break her word and allow her ally to succumb to Russian superior strength, she must also mobilize. That will lead to the mobilization of the remaining Russian military districts. Russia will then be able to say, "I am being attacked by Germany" and that will make her sure of the support of France who is bound by treaty to go to war if her ally Russia is attacked. The Franco-Russian agreement, so often praised as a purely defensive alliance brought about only to meet German plans of aggression, comes thereby into operation and the civilized states of Europe will begin to tear one another to pieces.
Germany does not want to bring about this terrible war. But the German Government knows that it would fatally wound the deeply rooted sentiment of allied loyalty, one of the finest traits of the German spirit, and place itself at variance with all the feelings of its people, if it were unwilling to go the help of its ally at a moment which must decide that ally's fate, Germany therefore, if the clash between Austria and Russia is inevitable, must mobilize and prepare to wage war on two fronts.
Honorable, but foolish. Moltke's mind was so focused upon military ways of thinking that he discounted the possibility of diplomats at higher levels seeing things differently, and things he believed inevitable were not so. Unfortunately, by default, this military mindset was allowed to decide the ultimate fate of Germany and the West.
My answer to your question, Gwynn, is a resounding
yes at many levels. (I will stop before this turns into a book, however.)