Italian volunteers

[Lawrence]

Some questions about the Italian volunteers in Spain:

-When did the first Italian ground troops arrive in Spain? I know they arrived en masse in late December, but were there units there before? I mean ground units.

-Were the first units MVSN only? When did regular Army troops arrive?

-Were they under Nationalist Army command or were they completely independent?

Thanks.

[Maribel-bel]

According to the classic text of Coverdale, before the Nov’36 diplomatic recognition of Franco’s Spain, Italy only sent “some men who should act as instructors or specialists on the battlefield, but it did not commit with large Army battle corps”.
From Dec’36 till Feb’37, it was sent an expeditionary army, despite not been formally recognised so. Until Guadalajara defeat (March’37), this army was autonomous. Since then on it was tightly coordinated with the Francoist general staff.
The first Italians to arrive were about 3000 fascist volunteers (“camicie nere” = “black-shirts”) secretly departing from Gaetta (near Naples) on Dec-18th’36, but few days later started to depart from different Italian harbours many regular army troops plus more volunteers.
According with Coverdale, the Italian figures until Dec-31st’36 (a bit more than 10 thousand) were the following:
- Fascist Militiamen: 7848 (= Troops 7591 + Officers 257)
- Regular Army: 2216 (=Troops 2120 + Officers 96)

Source: John F. Coverdale, “Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War”. Princenton University Press. New Jersey, 1975.

The Spanish professor Ismael Saz is “the other” specialist on this "Italians in SCW" matter, probably better updated than Coverdale (his text is older than 30 years), but his books are not translated, so this is why prefer to refer to prof. Coverdale

[Ironmachine]

To complement what Maribel-bel has told you, here is some more information from the book Las tres batallas de Guadalajara (The three battles of Guadalajara) of Artemio Mortera Pérez (published in 2007):
The first Italians (the 3000 fascist volunteers, as Maribel-bel said) arrived to Cádiz on 22 December 1936 aboard the ship Lombardía. This marked the start of a transport chain that enabled the Italians to have the equivalent to a well-equipped division by the middle of January 1937.
The legionaries arrived organized in companies that, once in Spain were grouped in battalions (called "banderas"), that were then organized into regiments (called "grupos de banderas").
The Italians wanted all their forces to be joined in a separate great unit, and demanded, and obtained, to be under the direct command of Franco, the only higher authority that they allowed. In this way, for example, in the Guadalajara campaign all communications with the Ejército del Norte in which they were "integrated" went through Franco's own High Headquarters. However, after the defeat of Guadalajara things changed and the CTV acted as another corps fully integrated in its respective army.

[Hoss]

In several of the books I have read it has been strongly hinted that the Blackshirt militia were volunteered by press-gangs.
Given the severe lack of Italian martial spirit only a few years later, this makes some sense.

[Maribel-bel]

Yes, Hoss, you're right. Many Italian "volunteers" did not have idea about their destination. Some believed to go into Ethiopia, some others came thinking that they would work in a filmed movie. Others came for a better payment etc... All this missleading really means nothing. The fact is that they came to Spain, and they acted as an army. This is what stands on History

[Ironmachine]

Some believed to go into Ethiopia, some others came thinking that they would work in a filmed movie. Others came for a better payment etc... All this missleading really means nothing. The fact is that they came to Spain, and they acted as an army. This is what stands on History

All this missleading really means something. The fact is that they came to Spain, and they acted as a low quality army in spite of being equipped with can be considered a luxury level of material, at least according to the Spanish standards. Also, the Army unit, even if using the same material, showed a much better standard of action. Now, if you have no military training, and if you are press-ganged, or if you believe that you are going to work in a film and you end in a real war in a foreing country, that would explain the apalling military results of the first Italian land units.

[Maribel-bel]

Just a couple of things.
First, there is one more else credible historian about this topic that I forgot to mention before. He's Morten Heiberg, professor in Copenhagen who few years ago wrote a book called "Franco, Mussolini and the SCW" which was published in Spain as "Emperadores del Mediterráneo" (= "Mediterranean Emperors"). Is a good book. He has written some other books about other SCW's topics.
Second. I don't know too much about military operations, but what I know is that Francoist propaganda always underestimated and despised the role of the Italian Infantry troops in the Spanish war, and this idea has stayed until today. To my view, to say that is to say too much, because this is based on the myths around the Guadalajara defeat, whis we know that was a very short defeat, and whose reasons weren't only on the Italian side. As far as I've read, the military performance of the Italian Infantry was regularly standard along all the other operations where they participated.

[Ironmachine]

Second. I don't know too much about military operations, but what I know is that Francoist propaganda always underestimated and despised the role of the Italian Infantry troops in the Spanish war, and this idea has stayed until today.

It would be quite difficult to underestimate the role of the Italian troops in the Spanish Civil War, because they amounted to 4 or 5 divisions at most, well equiped but not very well trained, so their contribution in the battlefield was by force very limited. Italian material help was very important for Franco, but the contribution in troops was almost negligible.
From the book I cited above:

Las consecuencias de un triunfo italiano (en Guadalajara) hubieran sido imprevisibles para la España nacional, donde no se deseaba que nadie viniera del extranjero a regalarle la victoria. A partir de Guadalajara y hasta el final de la guerra, cada vez que desde Italia se insinuaba la posibilidad de repatriar al C.T.V. la invariable respuesta de Franco era que podía hacerse inmediatamente, siempre y cuando dejaran en España sus armas y equipos; algo que nunca sentó muy bien a Mussolini, que veía como su onerosa -y, por otra parte, generosa- ayuda humana al bando nacional se devaluaba como baza de negociación.

(My emphasis)

To my view, to say that is to say too much, because this is based on the myths around the Guadalajara defeat, whis we know that was a very short defeat, and whose reasons weren't only on the Italian side.

Not only Francoist propaganda despised the role of the Italian troops. The Republicans, even more than the Rebels, used the least opportunity to brand the Italians as cowards and to show their inability to defeat the republican forces. From the same source:

Otro de los aspectos en que incidió con especial empeño la propaganda republicana fue en la cobardía de los italianos, a los que insistentemente describía entregados a repetidas y alocadas desbandadas...

To my view, to say that is to say too much, because this is based on the myths around the Guadalajara defeat, whis we know that was a very short defeat, and whose reasons weren't only on the Italian side.

The defeat at Guadalajara was caused by the difference between Italian military doctrine and Italian equipment. The operation was planned by the Italians, and the reasons for the defeat were on the Italian side.
From the same source:

Por todo ello no deja de causar asombro el que aún hoy en día haya autores que continúen empeñándose en considerar al C.T.V. como una máquina de guerra modernísima y adecuadamente pertrechada que, no obstante lo cual, fue llevada al fracaso por la negligencia, la falta de entusiasmo o, incluso, la cobardía de la gran mayoría de sus efectivos. Hubo, desde luego, mucha improvisación y abundante incompetencia, pero lo cierto es que, con el equipo del que disponían, la guerra celere que pretendían ejecutar se hallaba por completo fuera de sus posibilidades, condenada al fracaso desde un principio. Todo el plan se basaba en que, tras la ruptura del frente y la derrota de las fuerzas que lo guarnecían, garantizada por la superioridad inicial de C.T.V. y la escasa calidad de la 12 División republicana, las columnas motorizadas alcanzaran su objetivo -Guadalajara- prácticamente sin combatir, antes de que el enemigo llevara a la lucha las reservas con que oponérseles. Sin embargo, la falta de reacción del adversario, a la que los italianos debían buena parte de su brillante éxito malagueño, sólo se hubiera vuelto a repetir frente a un enemigo moralmente vencido de antemano, sin voluntad de resistencia, o de una ineptitud absoluta, justamente lo contrario de lo que el Ejército del Centro republicano venía demostrando en los encuentros precedentes. Con toda probabilidad el Cuartel General del Generalísimo les habría informado con el mayor detalle de la auténtica capacidad del enemigo al que iban a enfrentarse si el Mando italiano se hubiera "doblegado" a escuchar sus recomendaciones, pero eso era algo impensable en medio del ambiente altanero en que en aquel momento se desenvolvía.
El paso de la línea de la 2ª División por parte de la 3ª y la marcha motorizada de esta última sobre Guadalajara requerían de esa precisión absoluta que los "imponderables" se encargan habitualmente de desbaratar, especialmente cuando los ejecutantes carecen de los medios adecuados y la experiencia indispensable.

En el aspecto moral, (la derrota de Guadalajara) no causó el menor quebranto entre los nacionales que nunca asumieron el fracaso como propio, a lo que contribuyó en gran medida el afán de independencia operativa de los italianos. Su interés por adjudicarse en exclusiva los laureles del éxito hizo que sólo en ellos recayera la responsabilidad del fracaso

As far as I've read, the military performance of the Italian Infantry was regularly standard along all the other operations where they participated.

Yes, the Italians behaved in a regular way after Guadalajara, when the worst elements returned to Italy (for example, of the divisional commanders only Bergonzoli remained) and the C.T.V. remained somewhat reduced in size but with much better cohesion and effectiveness, being highly integrated with the rest of the National Army.
The problem is that everybody expected far more than that from the Italians. An "expeditionary corps" of (on paper) highly motivated volunteers and highly trained professionals, with TO&Es that were a dream for the Spanish forces, was supposed to behave much better than it did.

[Maribel-bel]

All right, Ironmachine.
I partially agree, and partially disagree with the points that you're bringing here from Artemio Mortera. Anyway, I don't like to much the historical method to analyse facts based on further knowledge about what happenend after such facts. I use to call that "forward read History"
In addition, I would kindly appreciate if you (and others) avoid to quote every half sentence,and then comment and re-comment, and re-re-comment. I'm get used to express myself in a more conceptual manner.

[Ironmachine]

Well, in my opinion:
1) While it is very important to note the facts that were really known at the historical moment, there is no other way to advance in our knowledge of history than to analyse facts based on all the information available at the present moment. On the other hand, all the facts stated by Mortera could have been easily taken into account by the Italians had they not been blinded by their own pride and vast superiority complex.
2) I found quotation an easy way not to overlook any stated point, though it sometimes can get very boring to read. Anyway, I would try to write in a way more suited to your tastes, at least while aswering your posts.

[Kurt_Steiner]

The defeat at Guadalajara was caused by the difference between Italian military doctrine and Italian equipment. The operation was planned by the Italians, and the reasons for the defeat were on the Italian side.

To this I would add the overconfidence that the Italians had after his brilliant campaign in Malaga.

El paso de la línea de la 2ª División por parte de la 3ª y la marcha motorizada de esta última sobre Guadalajara requerían de esa precisión absoluta que los "imponderables" se encargan habitualmente de desbaratar, especialmente cuando los ejecutantes carecen de los medios adecuados y la experiencia indispensable.

The problem of the battle was that the Italian HQ did not consider that they were going to face any serious resistance by the Republican army. Add to this that they were badly equipped -colonial uniforms suitable for Africa in rainy cold weather- and the lack of courage of the volunteers. Bear in mind that the Littorio, a profesional unit, doesn't go down as fast as the volunteers. Also, the guerra celere was out of their reach, indeed.

Roatta wasn't quite inspired when, instead of digging where they were he ordered to replaced the tired front divisions with the two at the back. Attempted that movement under terrible conditions, with the front soldiers tired of the war and willing just to escape from the war, it isn't a surprise that it failed as it did.

[Ironmachine]

...and the lack of courage of the volunteers. Bear in mind that the Littorio, a profesional unit, doesn't go down as fast as the volunteers.

There was no lack of courage in the three "Blackshirt" divisions. As stated before, it was the Republican propaganda which tried to portrait the Italians as cowards, running at the sight of the enemy. The reality was different: there was no lack of individual courage, but the officers and chiefs were utterly incompetent, and once deprived of command and control, the soldiers had only two options: they could remain in their positions without support, or they could withdraw. Logically, they did the second, but there was no massive panic in the Italian ranks as the Republican propaganda tried to show.
The difference with the "Littorio", more a "unit composed of professionals" than a "professional unit", was in leadership. Army officers in the "Littorio" knew what they had to do, and the subunits remained cohesive, allowing the divisions to defend itself better. But still, they could not prevent the defeat.

[Kurt_Belarus]

Is there any information about dynamics of quantity of Italian troops in Spain during the war?

Some historians mention also mixed Italian-Spanish units. How were they organised? Were they a part of CTV?

[Maribel-bel]

The Freccie Nere (Black Arrows) were Mixed Brigades originally made made of 80% Spanish soldiers & 30% Spanish Officcers (inverse percentages for Italians) NOT belonging to the CTV. They actually were the only "mixed" brigades (in the sense of mixed nationalities) in the Francoist army. Later on, in 1938, from Aragón until the end of the war, the percentage of Italian soldiers was reduced up to just 5%.
Concerning the dyachronic evolution of the ground troops, the figures are published. I'll check them later for you.

[Kurt_Belarus]

Thank you!