Antony Beevor is a controversial historian inspiring dislike amongst at least some of those interested in the SCW.
In The Battle for Spain he reviewed vast amounts of material in Spanish, Russian and German.
He offered a coherent explanation for the failure of the Republic to win the war despite Soviet help. He blamed the Communist commanders and their advisers for launching a series of showcase offensives for propaganda rather than military reasons, and for then being unable to decide on militarily sensible withdrawals from captured territory because they believed their own propaganda.
He blamed Stalin for purging the Soviet officer corps of military talent and claims that this had a negative impact on Soviet ability to support the Republican war effort. Particularly in tank warfare, the early war experiments in tank manouevers were abandoned because the Soviet strategist in charge of armoured strategy had been executed in the USSR. Thereafter tanks became little more than mobile artillery pieces.
He blamed the Communists for taking control of the admiistration of promotions within the Republican armed services and for setting a glass ceiling so that no-one could be promoted beyond the rank of major unless they joined the Communist party.
He blamed this policy for promoting communists beyond their ability and (IIRC) charges that at during the offensive at Brunete, communist commanders lied about the state of their advance by claiming that Brunete was surrounded, when in fact it was not and the nationalists were able to reinforce and resupply.
This thread is for people to attack and defend Beevor's history of the SCW, giving reasoned arguments, and preferably with page references when dispute arises. Why is he so good / why is he so bad?
Personally I liked The Battle for Spain and felt that it was too short. The Spanish language edition is several hundred pages longer and one day I intend to find the time to purchase and read it.
Antony Beevor & The Battle for Spain
Re: Antony Beevor & The Battle for Spain
All of what you (and Beevor) said about the Party is pretty hard to dispute.
As far as what Beevor's biggest shortcoming is, well, its obvious - he's not Spanish (wink,wink).
As far as what Beevor's biggest shortcoming is, well, its obvious - he's not Spanish (wink,wink).
Re: Antony Beevor & The Battle for Spain
Do you mind if I move slightly off topic and talk about Anthony Beevor as historian of the SCW, and not just the Battle for Spain book?
This is because I have the first edition of his book, but haven't yet seen a copy of the new one. I am waiting till a reasonably priced one turns up in a bookshop.
Lately I have been reading Michael Alpert's book on the Ejercito Popular. He is more positive about the Communists than Beevor, but the book is concerned mainly with the internal workings of the Republican Army and not the role of the Communists in the bigger strategic decisions about the offensives.
Alpert points out that the Republican side was very short on junior officers and NCOs, most of whom went over to the Nationalists or were otherwise considered unreliable by the Republican side. They had to train new officers from scratch to command the units, and very quickly. The training given was often dated and impractical and did not make the most of the abilities of the men. Many middle class officer candidates were unenthusiastic/indifferent about serving in the Republican Army, having been put off by the revolutionary period following the rising, before Dr. Negrin came to power.
He also states that the Republicans were shorter of reasonable quality artillery and small arms, because the Nationalists had more of the better quality weapons at the start of the rising, the militias lost a lot of good small arms early on by throwing them away when retreating, and lots of the artillery equipment supplied by the Soviet Union and bought on the open market was of poor qualtity and (given that lots of the pieces given to the Nationalists by the Italians and Germans were also old and poor quality) most significantly, short of ammunition.
Alpert does not discuss this point, but I noticed that the Republicans did not seem to manufacture much war material either, though at the start of the war most of the main factories were in their hands. I don't know why this was, if they could not buy raw material possibly etc.
At Brunete and elsewhere, I have read comments by some Republican generals that a significant problem was the shortage of competent officers and NCOs , which handicapped the Republican forces at many levels, and made it difficult to exploit the initial success effectively.
Beevor's comments about the Soviet military aid and the possibility of imaginative use of armour winning the war for the Republic seem relatively bizarre, because the Republicans, like the Nationalists, never had many tanks operational at any one time, and didn't have the other resources necessary to conduct this type of operation.(e.g. motorised infantry and artillery, experienced cadres, the necessary communication equipment to sustain that kind of fast paced battled and ensure good air-ground liason etc.) I have read that it was doubtful that even before the purges the Soviet Army would have been capable of implementing it's extremely elaborate and ambitious armoured warfare theories in practice.
Alpert has a lot to say about the Communist officers, but I will have to reread those bits before I write any more.
I thought of another few ideas about why the Republicans lost that are apparently not mentioned by Beevor (in no particular order, it's too late at night):
The Republican zone lacked the unity which was imposed on the Nationalist one. Parts of it became detached from control and coordinated action with the centre e.g. in the North and in the South, and factions fighting with each other as opposed to the Nationalists wasted effort and time. The Republican navy lost control of the seas to the Nationalists early on. A larger number of the people who before the war had been responsible for 'running' Spain were Nationalist supporters, open or covert, and in the Nationalist zone their authority was strengthened by the Generals' movement. In the Republican zone, much of this had to be improvised and learned from scratch by people who did not have the same level of previous experience. They were also trying to implement a social revolution at the same time as run a state at war etc. Mussolini was more generous and consistent with his support than Stalin wanted, or was able to be.
If the summary you gave of why Beevor believes the Republic lost the war is typical of his book, I can see why he is attacked by some other SCW historians. Some recent books give a much more positive account of the Communist contribution.
Sorry if what I write is incoherent...am tired.
This is because I have the first edition of his book, but haven't yet seen a copy of the new one. I am waiting till a reasonably priced one turns up in a bookshop.
Lately I have been reading Michael Alpert's book on the Ejercito Popular. He is more positive about the Communists than Beevor, but the book is concerned mainly with the internal workings of the Republican Army and not the role of the Communists in the bigger strategic decisions about the offensives.
Alpert points out that the Republican side was very short on junior officers and NCOs, most of whom went over to the Nationalists or were otherwise considered unreliable by the Republican side. They had to train new officers from scratch to command the units, and very quickly. The training given was often dated and impractical and did not make the most of the abilities of the men. Many middle class officer candidates were unenthusiastic/indifferent about serving in the Republican Army, having been put off by the revolutionary period following the rising, before Dr. Negrin came to power.
He also states that the Republicans were shorter of reasonable quality artillery and small arms, because the Nationalists had more of the better quality weapons at the start of the rising, the militias lost a lot of good small arms early on by throwing them away when retreating, and lots of the artillery equipment supplied by the Soviet Union and bought on the open market was of poor qualtity and (given that lots of the pieces given to the Nationalists by the Italians and Germans were also old and poor quality) most significantly, short of ammunition.
Alpert does not discuss this point, but I noticed that the Republicans did not seem to manufacture much war material either, though at the start of the war most of the main factories were in their hands. I don't know why this was, if they could not buy raw material possibly etc.
At Brunete and elsewhere, I have read comments by some Republican generals that a significant problem was the shortage of competent officers and NCOs , which handicapped the Republican forces at many levels, and made it difficult to exploit the initial success effectively.
Beevor's comments about the Soviet military aid and the possibility of imaginative use of armour winning the war for the Republic seem relatively bizarre, because the Republicans, like the Nationalists, never had many tanks operational at any one time, and didn't have the other resources necessary to conduct this type of operation.(e.g. motorised infantry and artillery, experienced cadres, the necessary communication equipment to sustain that kind of fast paced battled and ensure good air-ground liason etc.) I have read that it was doubtful that even before the purges the Soviet Army would have been capable of implementing it's extremely elaborate and ambitious armoured warfare theories in practice.
Alpert has a lot to say about the Communist officers, but I will have to reread those bits before I write any more.
I thought of another few ideas about why the Republicans lost that are apparently not mentioned by Beevor (in no particular order, it's too late at night):
The Republican zone lacked the unity which was imposed on the Nationalist one. Parts of it became detached from control and coordinated action with the centre e.g. in the North and in the South, and factions fighting with each other as opposed to the Nationalists wasted effort and time. The Republican navy lost control of the seas to the Nationalists early on. A larger number of the people who before the war had been responsible for 'running' Spain were Nationalist supporters, open or covert, and in the Nationalist zone their authority was strengthened by the Generals' movement. In the Republican zone, much of this had to be improvised and learned from scratch by people who did not have the same level of previous experience. They were also trying to implement a social revolution at the same time as run a state at war etc. Mussolini was more generous and consistent with his support than Stalin wanted, or was able to be.
If the summary you gave of why Beevor believes the Republic lost the war is typical of his book, I can see why he is attacked by some other SCW historians. Some recent books give a much more positive account of the Communist contribution.
Sorry if what I write is incoherent...am tired.
Re: Antony Beevor & The Battle for Spain
In my other post, I didn't write much about this point, but...He offered a coherent explanation for the failure of the Republic to win the war despite Soviet help. He blamed the Communist commanders and their advisers for launching a series of showcase offensives for propaganda rather than military reasons, and for then being unable to decide on militarily sensible withdrawals from captured territory because they believed their own propaganda.
One possible explanation for the Republican offensives is that offered by General Rojo (I think this is where I am taking this from, but it's a while since I read about it). Early in the war, the Republican militias had their biggest successes when they were on the defensive, because the improvised nature of the forces was more suited to this kind of warfare. The challenge to the Republican commanders was to create an army that could move onto the offensive, and stand a good chance of carrying the war to the Nationalists. But this would take a certain amount of time. In the meantime, it was preferable to carry out offensives with more limited goals, which aught to have been within the capabilities of the Ejercito Popular at the time they were carried out. The scope of these offensives was therefore, as closely as possible, dictated by what the Republican commanders realistically believed they could acheive with the forces they had.
It would be interesting to see what alternative strategy Beevor believes would have been more effective.
Michael Alpert notes that there were a lot of Communists in high ranks in the Army, because lots of the pre-war Army officers loyal to the Republic joined the party, and many of the newer officers were also attracted to it. He also notes that the Communist attitudes were better adapted to the kind of hierarchical/conventional military force the Republic was trying to build, which is another explanation of why there were lots of Communist party members in important military positions, and fewer anarchists.
Re: Antony Beevor & The Battle for Spain
Gerald Brennan remarks in The Spanish Labyrinth that since the Communists were opposed to the social revolution, the PCE & PSUC were havens for anyone in the Republican zone who stood to lose from it.Michael Alpert notes that there were a lot of Communists in high ranks in the Army, because lots of the pre-war Army officers loyal to the Republic joined the party, and many of the newer officers were also attracted to it.
Re Beevor's strategic analysis: his argument is that the Republic should had concentrated on defending its territory rather than expanding it, & gives the example of the Nationalist assault on the XYZ line being the most cost-effective battle of the war, for the Republic.
Re: Antony Beevor & The Battle for Spain
From what I have read, some of the Republican offensives were launched as a way of defending it's territory from Nationalist build up, e.g. Teruel, partly launched to deal with what the Republican generals thought was a dangerous conentration of Nationalist forces north of Madrid, by disrupting any possible Nationalist offensive.Re Beevor's strategic analysis: his argument is that the Republic should had concentrated on defending its territory rather than expanding it, & gives the example of the Nationalist assault on the XYZ line being the most cost-effective battle of the war, for the Republic.
Leaving the strategic intitative in the totally in the hands of the Nationalists could have been dangerous, because even if the battles were costly in terms of casualties, if the Nationalists still managed to win them they would still win.
I haven't read Gerald Brennan's book. I think it is quite old though, from the 40s? One quote I saw in another text likened the Communists to the Spanish inquistion, which seemed to me slightly strange.Gerald Brennan remarks in The Spanish Labyrinth that since the Communists were opposed to the social revolution, the PCE & PSUC were havens for anyone in the Republican zone who stood to lose from it.
Re: Antony Beevor & The Battle for Spain
Brennan's book is excellent, a concise but dense piece of reading.
I'm not sure that I've read that comment although both communists and Inquisition had a sophisticated apparatus of secret police.
IIRC he compared the communists to Jesuits in their opportunism in achieving their ends. So they would pursue one policy and then discard it for an opposite policy as the situation demanded, with little regard for any principle other than that of achieving power and control.
So for example the communists adopted a revolutionary stance in Asturias in 1934 and gained kudos and support for it, whereas during the SCW the manual working classes were mainly loyal to the CNT and UGT. So the PCE positioned themselves as anti-revolutionary and acquired a ready constituency of supporters partly because of that, and partly because they were more energetic than any of the other Spanish parties, and were able to secure jobs for their supporters. According to Brennan.
I'm not sure that I've read that comment although both communists and Inquisition had a sophisticated apparatus of secret police.
IIRC he compared the communists to Jesuits in their opportunism in achieving their ends. So they would pursue one policy and then discard it for an opposite policy as the situation demanded, with little regard for any principle other than that of achieving power and control.
So for example the communists adopted a revolutionary stance in Asturias in 1934 and gained kudos and support for it, whereas during the SCW the manual working classes were mainly loyal to the CNT and UGT. So the PCE positioned themselves as anti-revolutionary and acquired a ready constituency of supporters partly because of that, and partly because they were more energetic than any of the other Spanish parties, and were able to secure jobs for their supporters. According to Brennan.
Re: Antony Beevor & The Battle for Spain
Communist parties the world over have always been shamelessly opportunistic. The most shining example from the 30s would have to be the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact of August 1939. Suddenly the Russian communist party, which had been raving about the evils of fascism for a decade, does and about face and makes a deal with the devil when no other strategic guarantees are forthcoming from the Western Allies.
Re: Antony Beevor & The Battle for Spain
Reading the book, although the theme is familiar. Probably the big picture and big lines are correctly in Beevor´s book. However he fails to be precise in some details. For example what he writes about the airwar reveals that he knows little about it. There are wrong type identifications (like "Iljushin" SB-2, which in fact was Tupolev design) and odd remarks (I-16 fighter defined "clumsy" when in reality it was very nimble and manouverable plane). As little as these kind of things are, they nevertheless make me to trust less in the writer. If the writer does not bother to check things properly in one aspect, it makes me to suspect that he has failed to check out details in other aspects too. And if he has not the details right, then also his overall assessment of things may have flaws.
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Ironmachine
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Re: Antony Beevor & The Battle for Spain
Nothing unexpected, as the book (as most books about the SCW are) is just a political story of the war with the military aspects given in broad strokes. When it goes into military details it is prone to mistakes, like IIRC saying that BT-5s were employed in the Battle of Guadalajara or that the Italian cruiser Taranto was given to the National Navy, just to give a pair of examples.