Best Allied PTO strategy?

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
HMan
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Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby HMan » 12 Apr 2018 01:30

In your view, what was the best Allied PTO strategy and why?

Was it:

A) The historic 2 prong drive in SW and Central Pacific
B) SW Pacific only
C) Central Pacific only

or

D) another strategy


Also, how did the historic strategy get developed? Most accounts I have
seen have been short, saying it was a product of Army / Navy compromises.

At least 2 sources I have seen give another story for at least certain points in time.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_21.htm

says that the Luzon Versus Formosa was more a Wash. DC vs. field COs in the PTO.



There was a conference in Jan. 1944 between Nimitz, Halsey, and MacArthur
representatives.

Strategic planning for coalition warfare, 1943-1944 by Maurice Matloff p. 455-57

had: "Most surprising feature was the general feeling that greater
emphasis should be placed upon naval / amphib ops along the New Guinea
axis to the Philippines rather than those across the Central Pacific."

So it implies that the USN COs in the PTO supported SW Pacific drive only,
at least at that point.

South
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby South » 12 Apr 2018 09:50

Good morning HMan,

I can reply but not adequately answer your 2 questions; what was the best...how was it developed.

"B" was the Dutch petroleum fields.
"C" was the Territory of Hawaii.

The main features of the US national objective and strategy did not - directly - involve the US War Department's Reorganization of 1942. Review the Rainbow Plans.

There really is no "best" strategy; it's political compromises well above the military level.

At this lower military level, Army Air Forces General Arnold has the quote: "that our air power's part may fairly be called decisive". Admiral King is quoted "Japan lost the war because she lost command of the sea...". Even earlier, in 1939, FDR was convinced of the other arguments by Alexander Sachs and Albert Einstein. In December, 1941 (recall the date of Pearl Harbor), the Office of Scientific Research, run by Dr Vannevar Bush, was assigned to develop ordnance from atomic energy. At its height, the Office employed 125,000 people and and spent 2 Billion dollars.

Returning to the actual question as to the best PTO strategy, recall the post WWII question, during the Cold War: "Who Lost China?" Japan had to be destroyed for the Atlantic Alliance to regain control of Asia and the Pacific and there were many competing interests and demands.

Are there answers when "B" above also encompasses the Dominions ?

If you narrow your question(s), I pledge to reply in some sort. My rambling above will generate many obligations for me to respond anyway !

~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

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Kingfish
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby Kingfish » 12 Apr 2018 10:28

South wrote:Good morning HMan,

I can reply but not adequately answer your 2 questions; what was the best...how was it developed.

"B" was the Dutch petroleum fields.
"C" was the Territory of Hawaii.


My understanding of "B" was developed out of reactions to Japanese moves in the SWPac theater, namely the campaign against Port Moresby and the occupations of Guadacanal / Tulagi.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby South » 12 Apr 2018 19:57

Good afternoon Kingfish,

Yes; concur. Addressing the Japanese presence at Port Moresby was the military reaction. The strategic view was addressing the oil fields.

The 22 April 44 major allied invasion of Dutch New Guinea was the successful Allied reaction.

The prior 17-21 Aug 43 Wewek, New Guinea campaign already weakened the Japanese position.

The Oct / Nov 42 Guadalcanal campaigns starts the destruction of the Japanese fleet.

Naval / amphib campaigns can't really allow for forecasts. Economic / resource warfare, such as denial of bunker fuel, can.

The strategists sought to deny fuel to the IJN.


~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

HMan
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby HMan » 19 May 2018 21:46

I'd thought I'd wait to weigh in a while to see if there was fresh thought
before "polluting" with my own thoughts.

IMO, the best strategy would have been an all out blitz against Japanese
Merchant Shipping (JMS). Historically, that was a very low priority.

Lousy torpedoes that weren't fixed for almost 2 years, carrier air
strikes that devoted only 4% vs. JMS, but sank 16%, a very small
number of US subs (less than 300 vs. ~ 2,000 Germans), etc.
showed it just wasn't an Allied priority.

This would be accompanied by shutting down one of the
2 drives to throw more resources vs. JMS. My current thought
is that it would best to do SW Pacific only because it cut
off DEI faster.

I expand further on this, and there is criticism of this idea at:

http://forums.acgmag.com/showthread.php?t=134278

IMO, this is the best discussion of this topic I've found.
If someone knows of a better one, I would be grateful
to see it.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby aghart » 20 May 2018 08:21

We have the age old problem of hindsight once again. Looking at this decades later it's easy to say that the US and it's allies should have been defensive everywhere, just hold the Japanese and tie them down, and then strike in the Central Pacific and head for Japan, bypassing the Philippines altogether. Without the benefit of hindsight you have the problem of what happens if you put all your eggs in one basket and your basket dosen't work as expected? If your attacking on more than one axis and you struggle in one place you can switch your main thrust to where you are doing well. Also In war politics has a big part to play and politics and military strategy do not always sit well together. Putting hindsight to one side, then I would say that the US got it right in the PTO in WWII.

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Takao
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby Takao » 21 May 2018 00:55

HMan wrote:I'd thought I'd wait to weigh in a while to see if there was fresh thought
before "polluting" with my own thoughts.

IMO, the best strategy would have been an all out blitz against Japanese
Merchant Shipping (JMS). Historically, that was a very low priority.

Lousy torpedoes that weren't fixed for almost 2 years, carrier air
strikes that devoted only 4% vs. JMS, but sank 16%, a very small
number of US subs (less than 300 vs. ~ 2,000 Germans), etc.
showed it just wasn't an Allied priority.

This would be accompanied by shutting down one of the
2 drives to throw more resources vs. JMS. My current thought
is that it would best to do SW Pacific only because it cut
off DEI faster.

I expand further on this, and there is criticism of this idea at:

http://forums.acgmag.com/showthread.php?t=134278

IMO, this is the best discussion of this topic I've found.
If someone knows of a better one, I would be grateful
to see it.


Well, HMan, your "strategy" would work in a "perfect" world, but this is not a perfect world is it.

An all out Blitz against the Japanese Merchant Marine in 1942? Yeah, sure, and your next trick will be to pull 500 B-29s, in 1942, out of your hat.

Historically, the "Blitz" against the Japanese Merchant Marine did, and always would, have a high priority. However, you ignore the first and foremost problem(no, it is not the torpedoes)...It is advance bases. The only one was in the Philippines, and that did not last too long. Then, along came the bases in Australia, but they took a while to get up and running, not to mention, building up supplies & spares at those bases. So, all you really have is Pearl with a pitstop at Midway. The Aleutians were looked at, but the weather was simply to miserable, and navigational difficulties abounded in that area. So, really, your Merchant Marine campaign will be rather limited in scope until 1943. Golly gee...about the way it went historically. Not to mention that US submarine commanders essentially had to relearn how to fight, as US peacetime tactics were no way to fight in wartime.

Lousy torpedoes that were not "fixed" for two years...Well, duh! Once the first fix(depth control) was made, it brought to light another major flaw(the magnetic exploder), that was never really "fixed" but it was worked around. This work around(deactivating it) then brought to light the final major problem(the firing pin in the contact exploder) which was then "fixed." So, yeah, about two years, and there is nothing you can do to speed up the "fixes." Not to mention Admiral whats-his-name, who was in charge of US submarines in Australia, who forbade his subs from deactivating the magnetic exploder - that he was a major player in designing, and all of his "work" simply could not be utter garbage.

Carrier Air did not sink a lot of Japanese merchant ships? Thank you, Captain Obvious...Maybe if you ask the Japanese, in 1942 or 1943, really really nicely(and put a cherry on top), to send the bulk of their merchant shipping to Wake Island, so the US carrier forces can easily sink them. Then maybe, just maybe, the Japanese will respond positivly to this request and do so. Other than that, there is simply no way for the US carriers to get into the Southern Resources Area or the Japanese Home waters. There are no advance bases for such a fleet to operate from until about 1944 with the opening of the MAnus or Ulithi. The relatively undamaged Japanese Navy will also pose quite a risk to the US carriers and more importantly, their fleet train. Not to mention the Japanese land-based air that would still be fully operational. These are some of the reasons why the US Carrier Fleet did not venture into the South China Sea until January, 1945. So, how are you planning to reequip the US carriers...Add warp drive, or a Romulan Cloaking Device?

A very small number of US subs compared to German? One, the US subs won their war. Two, the German subs lost theirs.(likely, because the Germans had to sink an insane amount of Allied merchie tonnage to win theirs, and they couldn't do it even with 2,000 U-Boats. Three, the majority of the German submarines were the smaller types(Types II, VII, and XXIII) that would be absolutely useless in the Pacific operating out of Pearl Harbor, and only slightly less useless operating out of Australia(Could Australia support some 1,500 or so small submarines of marginal effectiveness and the US keep them supplied? Why would they?) There are many good reasons the US only dabbled in these small submarines(the early-1930s 2 boat Cachalot Class, and late-1930s singles Mackerel and Marlin), that they were quite useless in the Pacific is but one. Four, Germany, out of her 2,000 U-Boats, only produced some 300 that would be considered effective in the vast Pacific(the long-range XI, XB minelayer, and XXI classes - and only 2 out of some 120 XXIs were operational).

Your going to shut down one the Central Pacific drive to throw more resources at the Japanese Merchant Marine...Hell's Bells, now your talking! Oh, wait...The Central Pacific drive did not start until the invasion of the Gilberts in late November, 1943! That seems quite counter to what you have been talking up...Going balls to the wall right from the get go.

So, it seems to me that your whole idea for refighting the Pacific War is based on ignorance and ahistorical settings.

Sorry if I sound harsh, but these are thing that you would and should have known before you started thinking that you are somehow smarter than the US commanders in the Pacific.

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Kingfish
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby Kingfish » 21 May 2018 22:46

Takao wrote:Sorry if I sound harsh


Oh, I wouldn't worry.
I'm sure the condescending tone of your post is lost in all that geeky data.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb

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Pips
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby Pips » 22 May 2018 01:46

:D I have to say that it is unusual for Takao to be so riled.

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Takao
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby Takao » 23 May 2018 23:57

WRT US submarine construction...

Mare Island Navy Yard did build several submarines, however, their production could not be counted on during wartime, because of ship refits & repairs.

Portsmouth Navy Yard had 4 slips, with a 5th added in 1942, a side-by side construction basin was added in March, 1943, and in April, 1943, their graving dock was utilized for side-by-side submarine construction.

Electric Boat had 4 building slips, 3 were added to the North Yard, as well as, a new South Yard with 4 slips and an erection shed by July, 1941. The USN acquired the Groton Iron Works and turned it into a 10 building slip yard operated by Electric Boat - laying down it's first submarine in July, 1942, and being fully operational by March, 1943.

Manitowac Shipbuilding, in 1940, originally offered to build destroyers for the USN, but the USN told them they needed submarines more. So, Manitowac began building submarines.

The newly reopened Cramp shipyard was also contracted to build submarines for the USN in 1940. However, they were the least successful of all USN sub builders, and several of their boats had to be completed in Portsmouth and Boston. Cramp was assigned to build 22 boats, but only "completed" 8 - 4 were completed in 1944, two were completed post-war, and two were never completed and consigned to being test hulks. To be fair, most of the 10 Tench class assigned to her were cancelled before being laid down, but by then, she already had a bad reputation with the Navy.

The Boston Navy Yard would also build a handful of Balao & Tench class, but as the war wound down, most of those Tenches would be cancelled.


WRT submarine procurement...

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, 73 Gato class had been ordered. Of these only one, USS Drum, had been commissioned, 10 had been launched, and at least 21 had been laid down. On January 1, 1942, 23 more submarines were ordered. Come April, this number had increased to 30, and by the end of the year, another 102 additional boats had been added. Of these 132 new boats, 122 would be completed and 10 would be cancelled in 1944 when it became obvious that they would not be needed. With 1943, and later, budgets, a further 146 submarines would be authorized. Of these 146 boats, only 27-29 would be completed, with the rest being cancelled, and of those completed, only 11 were done so in time to make a war patrol.


So, needless to say, I am very curious, given that most of the boats ordered from FY1943 on were cancelled, as to how HMan is going to rearrange the USN ship building schedule so that he has his submarine hordes are at sea in time to do some good.

It is one thing to say that this is the "best" way to win the war...It is something completely different to actually work it out.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby Takao » 24 May 2018 02:04

WRT using US aircraft carriers against Japanese merchant shipping early in the Pacific War.

As I said earlier there are not a lot of "easy" targets for the US carriers to get at without unduly risking themselves to Japanese aircraft and surface forces.

We have the Lae-Salamaua Raid by USS Lexington and USS Yorktown in March, 1942. The two carriers were originally scheduled to attack Rabaul to cover a US convoy headed for Noumea. Time was critical because the two carrier groups could not be long supported so far from base. Please note...A two carrier strike force could not be long supported so far from base. How long do you presume that a two carrier strike force, travelling many hundreds of miles beyond that, to approach the under-belly of the DEI be supported? The words "Fat Chance" come to mind.

Returning...However, recent intelligence pinpointed a Japanese convoy in the vicinity of Lae, New Guinea, and that the harbor at Rabaul was empty. Thus, the target was switched from Rabaul to Lae. Please note, that good reconnaissance will be key to the success of such a raid...The further you get from Allied airbases, the more a successful strike will depend on luck, rather than planning.

Against Lae the two US carriers threw 104 planes(18 F4F Wildcats, 61 SBDs, and 25 TBDs), and these were followed by 8 US Army B-17s & 8 RAAF Hudsons. The strike was carried out successfully, and of the 16 Japanese ships in the harbor, they claimed 5 transports, 2 heavy cruisers(none were actually present), 1 light cruiser, 1 destroyer, and 1 minesweeper sunk. Reality, however, was some what different...The actual results were 3 transports sunk, and 1 transport, 1 seaplane tender, 1 light cruiser, 1 minelayer, and 2 destroyers damaged.

Now, mind you, this was against an easy, lightly defended target. But, the results were, shall we say, less than spectacular. The US carrier pilots still need to gain some more combat experience.

As such, I can only ponder how HMan will use the US carriers to attack the Japanese merchant marine, that said carriers cannot touch...other than finding the occassional "big" convoy steaming around the fringes of Japan's recent conquests. While at the same time, still fighting the major carrier battles that would begin taking place from May, 1942 on.

Or will he let the Japanese have Port Moresby, Midway, and Guadalcanal, while his is off chasing merchies that may or may not be where he is?

Again, more talk, but little substance.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby HMan » 07 Jun 2018 02:04

Do I think I am somehow smarter than the US commanders in the Pacific?

Um no.

As they always say, "Well the great thing about HMan is he is
almost totally stupid, with just a few small particles of brain."

AFAIK though, PTO strategy was not made by a very smart CO.
It was made through inter-service bureaucratic in-fighting -
essentially a committee. Put the most brilliant people on a
committee, ask them to design a horse, and you'll end up
with a camel. In my view, PTO strategy was a camel, not
a sleek race horse.

Did I ever write that the blitz could have started right off
the bat in 1942? No, that is a classic straw man logic error.
Obviously, it would take time to train, build subs,
establish bases, etc.

But I don't think there is any question that JMS could
have been wiped off the face of the earth much faster
and more completely than historically. This would have
had immensely good consequences. Less Japanese war
machines built, less fuel for them, inability to ship
reinforcements / supplies and more.

Was the campaign against JMS "a high priority".

Not even close. That is, unless it could be shown that
it cost more to build 300 subs than to support one of the
2 prongs of the offensive.

Or take B-29 mining of JMS. B-29s were operational in
the later part of 1944. Yet they only started mining in
a systematic campaign in late Mar. '44. This was probably
the most cost effective aerial campaign ever. It sank
more JMS over the last 4 months of the war than all
other causes combined.

Evidently, it didn't start earlier because the AAF didn't
want to support the USN. It finally started because of
threats that the AAF would lose B-29s to the USN.

Does that sound like JMS was "a very high priority"?
No, it sounds like it was dead last behind, among other
things, inter-service rivalry.


Look, I might be wrong here. But when someone makes
personal attacks, anyone would have to believe
that they think they have a very, very weak case.
Otherwise, why would they have to resort to ad hominem
logic errors?



aghart wrote:We have the age old problem of hindsight once again. Looking at this decades later it's easy to say that the US and it's allies should have been defensive everywhere, just hold the Japanese and tie them down, and then strike in the Central Pacific and head for Japan, bypassing the Philippines altogether. Without the benefit of hindsight you have the problem of what happens if you put all your eggs in one basket and your basket dosen't work as expected? If your attacking on more than one axis and you struggle in one place you can switch your main thrust to where you are doing well. Also In war politics has a big part to play and politics and military strategy do not always sit well together. Putting hindsight to one side, then I would say that the US got it right in the PTO in WWII.


I would be interested in an expansion of your reasons for believing the Central Pacific was best.

Some advantages of each drive I can think of:

Central Pacific:

1) Closer to the US, easier to support logistically.
2) Bomber bases within range of Japan closer to Allied held areas at start of offensive.
3) More open sea than the SW Pacific, less uncharted reef choked seas.
4) Japan closer to Allied held areas at start of offensive.

SW Pacific:

1) Central Pacific had stronger fleet, thus canceling it would free a more
powerful force vs. JMS than vice-versa.

2) Waters to cut off DEI closer to Allied held areas at start of offensive.

3) AFAIK, SW Pacific had less casualties than Central. If true, it might
be partially because the larger islands in SW allowed landings in areas
were the enemy was weak. Smaller islands in the Central such as
Tarawa and Iwo Jima forcee frontal assaults.

4) Australia and NZ closer, easier to get their military there.


Re Philippines:

I have always wondered after looking at maps about this campaign.
Formosa was closer to Japan, so why wasn't it the objective in
Fall '44?

However, the "Luzon Versus Formosa" link in the OP said that
all COs in the PTO thought at least some of the Philippines
needed to be seized.

In addition, the following 2 links make the claim that
basically all the Philippines were needed to logistically
support the invasion of Japan.

https://chicagoboyz.net/archives/36380.html


https://chicagoboyz.net/archives/36378.html


I am mystified at the aversion to questioning PTO strategy.
From reading many ETO threads you'll see enthusiastic
second guessing. I have yet to read ETO CO defenders
state something like "Oh, they are so much more smarter than us,
we cannot question them". Or without the benefit of 20/20
hindsight, it is not kosher to debate their decisions.

So why the difference? Do people think PTO COs were
much better than ETO COs?


Kingfish wrote:Oh, I wouldn't worry.
I'm sure the condescending tone of your post is lost in all that geeky data.


Nastiness? On the internet?? On the INTERNET, of all places???
How is that possible???? How is that even CONCEIVABLE?????

We sigh when we remember our cyberworld's noble traditions
of unfailingly gracious pleasantries ...

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Takao
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby Takao » 07 Jun 2018 17:57

HMan wrote:Do I think I am somehow smarter than the US commanders in the Pacific?

Um no.

As they always say, "Well the great thing about HMan is he is
almost totally stupid, with just a few small particles of brain."

Ironic then, that you continue with
HMan wrote:AFAIK though, PTO strategy was not made by a very smart CO.



HMan wrote:It was made through inter-service bureaucratic in-fighting -
essentially a committee.

Very Good! That committee was called the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

HMan wrote:Put the most brilliant people on a
committee, ask them to design a horse, and you'll end up
with a camel. In my view, PTO strategy was a camel, not
a sleek race horse.

What you end up with is going to depend very much on what job you intend the animal to do and the environment it is going to be in, plus innumerable other variables.

For example if you are working in frigid climes, your probably not going to wind up with a camel, but an Icelandic Horse or a Kazakh Horse. In warmer climes, maybe a camel, maybe an Arabian. If you are planning for the horse to do a lot of heavy work, you certainly won't want a sleek race horse, and you probably won't get a camel, but one of the many breeds of draft horses.

As such, if the PTO Strategy was a camel, then, in all likelihood, a camel is what was needed.


HMan wrote:Did I ever write that the blitz could have started right off
the bat in 1942? No, that is a classic straw man logic error.
Obviously, it would take time to train, build subs,
establish bases, etc.

The logic is that by July, 1944, the USN was cancelling submarines before they were ever laid down, because they were simply not needed.
Hence, the USN had won the Merchant war by Mid-1944.

Now, how is your supposed "all out Blitz" any better than historical? Simply, put, the only way for your "Blitz" to be better is to achieve the same results sooner...If you "blitz" achieves the same results in the same time, it is not "better," it is "second-verse-same-as-the-first." Thus, the only way for you to achieve a "better" result is to start sooner. Do you now see the logic progression?

HMan wrote:But I don't think there is any question that JMS could
have been wiped off the face of the earth much faster
and more completely than historically. This would have
had immensely good consequences. Less Japanese war
machines built, less fuel for them, inability to ship
reinforcements / supplies and more.

How, my friend, for the love of God, HOW?
You say it, but refuse to provide any details on how you plan to make this happen. So I will politely ask you once more: How do you plan to make this happen.


HMan wrote:Was the campaign against JMS "a high priority".

Not even close. That is, unless it could be shown that
it cost more to build 300 subs than to support one of the
2 prongs of the offensive.

Huh? What drugs are you taking?

How does shutting down one prong of the Pacific offensive translate into the campaign against Japanese Merchant shipping being low priority?
Without the advance bases gained by both prongs of the Pacific offensive, you have no advance bases with which to conduct said offensive, be it submarines, surface fleet, or aircraft. Your up the creek without the proverbial paddle operating out of Pearl Harbor and Australia.


HMan wrote:Or take B-29 mining of JMS. B-29s were operational in
the later part of 1944. Yet they only started mining in
a systematic campaign in late Mar. '44. This was probably
the most cost effective aerial campaign ever. It sank
more JMS over the last 4 months of the war than all
other causes combined.

Your really don't know anything about the Pacific War...Do you?

B-29s were operational by mid-1944, but that was only because they were rushed into combat and had many teething problems and operational problems that needed to be worked out. Still, they were carrying out mining operations from China beginning in early August, 1944. The problem with this, is that all of their supplies had to be brought over from the US and flown over "the Hump." Which was no small undertaking, and some of the early missions used "borrowed" British mines.

Operation Starvation was ordered in December, 1944, with training & planning beginning in January, 1945, and the first missions flown in late-March, 1945.

You don't know that, for two years prior, beginning in February, 1943, the RAF, RAAF, and US forces had been prosecuting a mining campaign against Japan's outer areas, and that campaign, utilizing submarines, surface ships, and aircraft, planted some 13,000 mines sank or damaged some 770,000 tons of Japanese shipping.


HMan wrote:Evidently, it didn't start earlier because the AAF didn't
want to support the USN. It finally started because of
threats that the AAF would lose B-29s to the USN.

Your lack of knowledge is quite amazing.

As I have stated earlier, the Allies had been mining Japanese waters since, February, 1943.

The only Air Force General that continued to resist mining was the Fifth Air Force's General Kenny, and that was because his light and medium bombers had become so effective at sinking Japanese ships, mines had little incentive for him. The Fourteenth Air Force took to mining rather quickly, as it proved quite effective at hindering Japanese river resupply routes that the Japanese relied on to keep their troops in China supplied. However, it was only with great difficulty that mines were supplied to the 14thAF.

Op Starvation, did not start earlier, because many of those in XX Bomber Command and XXI Bomber Command saw things differently...Bombing Japanese strategic targets was the way to win the war, they saw mining as inconsequential to the main task of destroying Japanese industry. However, with the early successes of OP Starvation, they quickly became converts.

Finally, the AAF was not going to lose the B-29s to the USN...While the USAAF maintained nominal control, the B-29s were under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not Army or Navy theater commanders.


HMan wrote:Does that sound like JMS was "a very high priority"?
No, it sounds like it was dead last behind, among other
things, inter-service rivalry.

Actually, it sounds as like you don't know what you are talking about...Oh, wait, you don't.



HMan wrote:Look, I might be wrong here. But when someone makes
personal attacks, anyone would have to believe
that they think they have a very, very weak case.
Otherwise, why would they have to resort to ad hominem
logic errors?

Given that you have provided us with...
I'd Blitz Japanese Merchant Shipping with submarines - But provide no details on how, when, and with what you would go about doing so.

I'd Blitz Japanese Merchant Shipping with Carriers - But provide no details on how, when, and with what you would go about doing so.

I'd shut down one prong, the Central Pacific in the PTO to Blitz Japanese Merchant Shipping - Paying no never mind to the fact that this campaign did not start until late-November, 1943. A little late to be worrying about Japanese Merchant shipping.

What am I supposed to think...Other than H-Man has absolutely no clues as to what he is talking about.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby Felix C » 09 Jun 2018 01:02

Concerning the Central Pacific. Assuming CVs were the key, how many could be rendered serviceable to cancel or postpone an offensive? Fortunately no Japanese submarine or patrol bomber was able to score against the fleet carriers as in earlier in the war.

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Takao
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Postby Takao » 09 Jun 2018 01:40

Felix C wrote:Concerning the Central Pacific. Assuming CVs were the key, how many could be rendered serviceable to cancel or postpone an offensive? Fortunately no Japanese submarine or patrol bomber was able to score against the fleet carriers as in earlier in the war.

It would probably vary from invasion to invasion.

For the Gilbert's invasion, there were 6 fleet carriers, 6 light carriers, 8 CVEs, and 12 battleships.

So, several would likely have to be sunk to scrub an invasion.


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