Not really. Rainbow 5 was the plan that was in effect on Dec. 7th 1941. As you know, no plan survives first contact with the enemy.. ..
You're using a CIA link on this issue? Anyway, I'm guessing you still have not read Toland's discussion on the Japanese peace feelers. As Toland documents, it is incorrect to say they had no high-level backing and/or that no top leaders were aware of them. And you forgot to mention that after Dulles was approached about one of the peace feelers, he spoke with Henry Stimson.R Leonard wrote: ↑27 Apr 2019 01:37Once again, Mike, you only tell but 25% of the story.
Oh, yes, certain Japanese embassy type functionaries were talking to people in Switzerland, who then, in turn, spoke to someone else who, then, spoke to Dulles of the OSS; there was no direct contact. And, yes, still other functionaries were talking to the Vatican.
So, there’s your 25%. Also, you forgot to mention Portugal. Really, none of this is some great mystery, it’s just that your sources apparently don’t like the rest of the story as it doesn’t fit their narrative.
And don’t ever forget, the Allies were reading the Japanese mail between embassies and the homeland, even with regard to these unofficial, unsanctioned contacts; not unlike the comedy in Sweden.
But you seem to wish to pass over that none, none, of these “discussions” were with the full weight and authority of the Japanese Government speaking officially to the Swiss Government or, even, the Pope. It was only after the Japanese Government officially decided to throw in the towel, long about 10 August 1945 that any OFFICIAL, government authority to government authority, messages were exchanged.
You may wish, though I doubt it, to peruse the US analysis of these contacts. May I suggest the link below where it is quite clear, regardless of what various Japanese functionaries were saying, that the US was aware that these discussions were unsanctioned. And as for Dulles talking to Simpson and Simpson to the President at Potsdam, you may wish to scroll down to starting at the memorandum of 13 July 1945. If you read, you quickly see that the Japanese were talking to a Swedish gent, in Switzerland, who was relaying discussion through some intermediary hence to Dulles. Hardly sounds like an official approach to a US representative with authority to take any action (and Dulles did not).
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... p_0001.htm
So, no, there were no official, sanctioned, or, even, credible, discussions going on in the Vatican, Switzerland, or Portugal.
You seem to forget that bitter, hard learned, experience, from before Pearl Harbor to the intercepted messages showing what was being said being said in various arenas, had taught the powers that were in the United States that the Japanese were not to be trusted in any way, shape or form. Unsanctioned discussions, belied by the Japanese’s own message traffic, simply added fuel to that fire. Why do you think the carriers of the 2d Fast Carrier Task Force were kept off shore during the period of the Japanese surrender? And that huge flyover? All those planes were armed to the teeth.
Operations officers for the 2d Fast Carrier Task Force . . . one of them later wrote in a missive, a copy of which is in my possession, to an author researching the days of the end of the war:
“To begin I’ll account for my whereabouts in the days of your interest. I was a brand-new fighter pilot in January 1941. Based on YORKTOWN CV-5 in June ’41, I put in a year on that ship until her sinking at Midway in Jun ’42. Chased German subs in the summer and fall of ’41 then went west after 7 Dec. Flew combat in various CV raids, Mandates, New Guinea etc. More combat in Coral Sea battle and Midway. Joined a new fighter squadron, VF-11, in Aug ’42; went to Guadalcanal for more combat. Returned stateside in the summer ’43 to help train and ready up new fighter squadrons for new carriers. In Nov ’44 was sent back to combat with orders to VAdm McCain’s staff. Remained in that assignment until Nov 1945.
“My assignment in VAdm McCain’s staff was air operations assistant to Capt John S Thach who was the operations boss running Task Force 38, the main combat element of Adm W F Halsey’s Third Fleet. My main job was to write up the operations orders that assigned and apportioned air missions and tasks to several - as many as five - task groups that made up the force. I worked with Thach on many other operations related tasks some of the most important being organizing air defenses, developing fighter employment and tactics to meet the Kamikaze threat. Also, there were new usages of our attack resources, switching away from warship targets to other objectives requiring dive bombing accuracy. For example, we were busy in July off Hokkaido working over steel plants, railroad ferries and dockside facilities.
“McCain’s flagship in the summer of ’45 was SHANGRI-LA CV-38 stationed with 3 - 4 other carriers in Task Group 38.1. Stationed also in this task group was Adm Halsey’s flagship, MISSOURI BB-63.
“This juxtaposition of the Fleet and Force flagships was important in that it permitted the two admirals to ‘talk’ to one another in a private way using a shielded signal lamp or by semaphore operated by trusted signalmen under the close scrutiny of each admiral’s ‘flag lieutenant,’ whose title really means something as far back in time as our Navy goes. This digression into the world of flag signals is made to afford understanding if how readily top commanders could speak and exchange ideas with some degree of privacy. It also explains why much of this type traffic never went into communications logs unless so directed. A pity because some of it was witty, informative, revealing and, in some cases, highly pertinent to the daily events. My admiral, McCain, was free in discussing such exchanges he considered useful to us operators, but we well understood that there was much we would never know. We knew we had his confidence by his every act, but we also were aware of his obligation to maintain Halsey’s privacy where affected.
“It was from just this type of exchange that I was alerted to the impending atomic bombing of Hiroshima. We had received normal radio notification of a special exercise (?) event (?) test (?) the heavy bombers had in prospect and adjusted our activities to keep our aircraft out of the proscribed areas. As we waited for something to happen, the Flag circuit was busy but unrevealing except for queries such as, ‘heard anything unusual yet?’ Both Halsey’s and McCain’s staffs had communications intelligence cells - experts who combed the radio spectrum for anything useful. Their targets were Japanese plain language radio programs as well as military tactical traffic and simple encryptions. The ‘real-time’ aspect of their ‘take’ was most useful to 3rd Fleet and fast carriers as we were at this time in a day to day employment trying to stifle Jap air capability and level any objectives that posed a threat to the Olympic invasion operations planned for the near future.
“In hindsight I readily believe that Halsey and McCain were aware of the Manhattan effort and were thinking it was about time for a product to issue. So, with the unusual orders to keep clear of several Japanese cities they were following the radio chatter intently. Thus, contrary to what others may have written, the carrier admirals were not taken by complete surprise, at least not the ones nearest to me in Task Force 38 when ‘the balloon went up’ that day in August 1945.
“Those were perilous times. Even though the war seemed to be winding down elsewhere, it was a real and savage thing the closer we came to the Japanese home islands. The nature of our employment forced increased exposure of ships and air people to the desperate defenders. A guided missile par excellance, the Kamikaze was breaking into our defenses; we were scrambling to counteract this smart bomb and were wildly extended as we came in close. Our best defense lay in attacking Kamikaze bases where we were fairly successful, but one escapee could give us fits and fatalities. To do our job we had to stand and take it. Worst of all it looked as though the Japanese were equipped and willing to go on indefinitely. The Japanese Navy has ceased to be a military factor, so we could concentrate on softening up the enemy for the final acts of the war. But this softening, a dangerous but unglamorous affair was costly, especially in flight-leader losses.
“I mentioned the warnings and restricted area orders incident to the Hiroshima bombing. I vaguely remember similar orders, or maybe one order covering all, when the time came for Nagasaki. There were instructions issued to us to also keep clear of Kyoto, a shrine city, though for no memorable reason. Anyway, the fast carriers were not likely to go urban unless specifically ordered. The one example of that specific I clearly recall was in a CINCPAC order which forwarded intelligence on electronics plants in the Tokyo area. There were photos and descriptions of plants suitable for and best attacked with dive bomber accuracy rather than B-29 area blasting. Some familiar names: Shibaura, Hitachi, Matsushita, Toshiba, I can remember. It was my job to develop and send the objective folders with rationale out to the task groups. We do this job in good heart as these plants were producing radar and electronic controls that had been increasing our flak losses. In the end, this campaign was to be OBE, but we felt good about it.
“Army Air and fast carriers coordinated their campaigns enough to avoid interference. Our objectives were usually outside their areas and vice versa. I cannot remember any hurt feelings. I have no strong recollections of geographic restrictions being onerous. They were something like the weather - you just planned around it and eventually things would clear up. The significant differences between B-29 operations and fast carriers helped to keep interference a small factor. In the Philippines where we had to coordinate with TacAir the possibilities for friction were greater but that did not apply over Japan in the summer of ’45.
“The account I have given here comes as that of a carrier fighter pilot in the summer of 1945 serving on the staff of CTF-38. My duty did not permit flying over hostile terrain at that time there was solace in having much to do with throwing the book at the Japs as my admiral applied his force to defeat them and end the war.
“The staff was not very large - Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, 2 captains, 2 commanders, 5 lieutenant commanders (I was the senior of them), some 8 to 9 lieutenants, maybe 10-12 lower ranks. As far as I know one of the commanders and I are the only ones left who were career navy - he USNA ’35 and I USNA ’38. We both had about the same amount of air experience, I joined the staff in November 1944 and he - now Adm Noel A M Gayler USN (Ret) - joined in April 1945.
“TF-38 operations attending the 2 September signing of the instruments of surrender on board USS MISSOURI - For reasons of prudence it was decided to have the fast carriers remain off shore fully operational during the uncertain period of this event. A photograph I have of the ceremony signed by Adm Nimitz shows clearly the many attendees. There are all the senior officers of the TF-38 staff - McCain, Towers, Baker, Gingrich, Thach, and Hearn. At the same time there was Task Force 38 off shore operating as usual. We launched 450 of our battle proven planes to fly formation over the ceremony, over Tokyo, and back to sea. The task force in the absence of its leaders carried on. Later that wondrous day, when Noel and I had a chance to think and talk, we found ourselves abashed yet proud in the realization that our admirals had left us with the big stick, the exercise of the main military power at the scene should it have been needed. For us, two fighter pilots who had been in action from the earliest days it was a rousing way to end that fight.”
Perhaps you should post more like this one...mikegriffith1 wrote: ↑15 Jul 2019 22:12For those who might be interested, I've uploaded an article on Truman's decision to nuke Japan.
(Note: I make no money off the article. It is available free of charge. And, I do not have advertising on my website, and I get no compensation from anyone for my website.)
Togo Shigenori's The Cause of Japan is a good read on that. Togo was 外務大臣 (Gaimu Daijin) in Dec. 1941, and again in August 1946.
The contents of certain of these papers [Japanese messages and memos about the peace feelers] were known to United States officials in Washington, however, as early as July 13 (see Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries(New York, 1951), page 74; cf. pages 75–76) and information on Japanese peace maneuvers was received by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson at Babelsberg on July 16 (see volume II, document No. 1236, footnote 4). It has also been determined that a series of messages of Japanese origin on this subject was received by the United States Delegation during the course of the Berlin Conference and that these messages were circulated at Babelsberg to some members of the President’s party. Furthermore, in a conference on January 24, 1956, between Truman and members of his staff and Department of State historians, Truman supplied the information that he was familiar with the contents of the first Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the proposal contained in document No. 582) before Stalin mentioned it to him at Babelsberg (see volume II, page 87) and that he was familiar with the contents of the second Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the approach reported in document No. 1234) before Stalin brought it to the attention of Truman and Attlee at the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference on July 28 (see volume II, page 460).
One thing I have always wondered about, if there was no atomic bomb, why not just besiege Japan?