Didn't stop the French in Indochina, however.
And going down fighting in 1942 didn't do much for the Dutch in what became Indonesia in 1945 and afterwards...
Didn't stop the French in Indochina, however.
Good points, A completed Kota Tinggi line would I hope have been accompanied by a previously planned fighting withdrawal with choke points etc prepared in advance, and no Matador. The outcome I envisage would be a slower Japanese advance, a delay at Kota Tinggi, allowing 18th Div. 7th Armoured Bde, 6th& 7th Australian Div's to arrive. As I have indicated a completed Kota Tinggi line alone would lead to the possible outcome you have mentioned.Fatboy Coxy wrote: ↑27 Apr 2020, 17:06If it had existed, the Dobbie or Kota Tinggi line could have been a disaster when Percival was at the stage of withdrawing to the Island. The troops used to defend it would have been well spread out along the line, and the defensive line was just some pill boxes that would have been augmented with earthworks, lacked depth. Once the Japanese pieced the line it would have been a race back to the causeway, with many more cut off. A failing of the Japanese in this campaign was they didn't stop the retreat onto the island, this line would have given them that chance.aghart wrote: ↑25 Apr 2020, 11:23In my opinion the one factor that did the most to doom Malaya was the abandonment of the Dobbie defence line. I understand the change in concept to a "whole of Malaya" forward defence rather than a "hold Johore" defence. However, A fully prepared last line of defence (in case plan A fails) where the reteating forces could make a determined stand and keep the Naval base out of artillery range seems (with hindsight) a basic requirement, especially when the defenders were in insufficient numbers to have any real chance of holding all of Malaya. This especially as the line had been started and funds in place to continue it.
The other thing about the Kota Tinggi line is it lacked strategic depth, the captured airfields at Kluang and Kahang were only 60-70 miles away from Singapore City, giving the RAF no time to respond to any air attacks. At best, the line might have given the British another two weeks respite.
Indonesia did not become Indonesia in 1945 but in 1949 .daveshoup2MD wrote: ↑21 Jun 2020, 08:33Didn't stop the French in Indochina, however.
And going down fighting in 1942 didn't do much for the Dutch in what became Indonesia in 1945 and afterwards...
But the transport problem still would remain: it would take months to transport these aircraft to Malaya .EKB wrote: ↑18 Oct 2020, 04:07The crisis management would have been easier with better resource management.
Before the first shots were fired, there were warning signs that the Defiant, Fulmar, Battle, Barracuda, Roc, Botha and Stirling would not live up to expectations. Building those aircraft was a waste of productive capacity, aero engines and raw materials.
With more urgency from the Air Ministry, Air Staff, Admiralty, captains of industry, the Boulton-Paul, Fairey, Blackburn manufacturing teams could have been re-tooled to build the more useful aircraft needed overseas such as Hurricanes, Spitfires, or Beaufighters. A Whirlwind with Merlins instead of the awful Peregrines would be a step up from the in-house designs at B-P, Blackburns and Fairey. The Stirling was doomed by conflicting government specs and Short Bros. could have instead built multi-engine transports or more Sunderlands.
A navalized Whirlwind or Beaufighter might be possible, with a performance far above what the Fleet Air Arm had at the time. The folding wing Mosquito TR.Mk.33 went to sea in 1946, although the circumstances were different then.
Which first shots? From Dec 1941 or from Sep 39?