Iwo Jima 1945 One of the fiercest and bloodiest of the Pacific War

[sandeepmukherjee196]

As someone mentioned, 12,000 tons of nerve gas was produced. I have no idea how much damage that could do or not do. Anyway, US forces on Iwo Jima or Okinawa didn't need Nerve Gas, Mustard Gas or Lewisite would've done just as well. The Japanese were dug in underground and in occupied fortified caves. Bad ventiliation and very vulernable to gas attacks since Mustard Gas and Lewisite is heavier than air and lays on the ground giving off fumes. During WW 1, Trenches and shell holes that had been hit with large concentrations of mustard gas were impassible for days.

Anyway, the Politiicans, FDR and perhaps Stimson, would never have approved our use of Gas warfare except as retaliation.

FDR wouldn't have approved?

[rcocean]

FDR wouldn't have approved?

You're right. That sentence should read DID NOT approve. If I remember correctly from reading Marine Corps history online: (https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_ ... 0/sec7.htm)

There is considerable evidence that the Joint Chiefs considered the use of poison gas during the Iwo Jima planning phase. Neither Japan nor the United States had signed the international moratorium, there were no civilians on the island, the Americans had stockpiles of mustard gas shells in the Pacific theater. But President Roosevelt scotched these considerations quickly. America, he declared, would never make first use of poison gas.

[Carl Schwamberger]

My training in this was four decades ago, but I recall Mustard Gas was a relatively heavy & dense aerosol that settled quickly. The guidance in the technical documents indicated it would not be very useful against deeply fortified soldiers. That is delivered in aircraft bombs and artillery projectiles it would mostly settle on open surfaces & very little would drift into gun embrasures, observation ports, air intakes, ect...

Spraying it into openings would have some utility, tho unless there is a lot of airflow in a enclosed structure it will settle before it drifts very far through passageways or adjacent rooms.

The other problem which was clear in the tactical use guidance is it contaminates the ground for many hours or several days. Advancing into a area just attacked by Mustard Gas is liable to produce noticeable casualties. Kicking up contaminated dust, crawling across the ground, or touching any vegetation or structures contaminated produces casualties.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

My training in this was four decades ago, but I recall Mustard Gas was a relatively heavy & dense aerosol that settled quickly. The guidance in the technical documents indicated it would not be very useful against deeply fortified soldiers. That is delivered in aircraft bombs and artillery projectiles it would mostly settle on open surfaces & very little would drift into gun embrasures, observation ports, air intakes, ect...

Spraying it into openings would have some utility, tho unless there is a lot of airflow in a enclosed structure it will settle before it drifts very far through passageways or adjacent rooms.

The other problem which was clear in the tactical use guidance is it contaminates the ground for many hours or several days. Advancing into a area just attacked by Mustard Gas is liable to produce noticeable casualties. Kicking up contaminated dust, crawling across the ground, or touching any vegetation or structures contaminated produces casualties.

This was exactly the experience in the trenches of WWI , France and Belgium.
After a gas attack, newbies are advised not to seek shelter in shell holes during an artillery barrage .. though normally these craters were in favor.

Cheers
Sandeep

[Linkagain]

US Casualty lsitings:
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/U ... a-III.html

Even without the addition of Caombat faitgue cases
the ratio of KIA/DOW/MIA [deceased] of 1 for WIA 3 is still quite high.....remember Iwo Jima Was part of Japan Proper////Just how high the US/Allies would have had to pay the price for an Invasion of Japanese mainland....

[Delta Tank]

From this site: https://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/W ... andHopping

“The perceived need to take Iwo Jima, however, represented what can only be termed a fixation on the Bonins, based on a pre-war idea put forth by Admiral Husband Kimmel while still CINCPAC. As previously stated, Navy planning for a possible Pacific war had always envisioned the climactic fleet engagement. At various times, there were proposals put forth to deliberately draw out the Japanese fleet to this end. In early 1941, Admiral Richmond Turner, Director of the Navy War Plans Division (OP-12), told British military emissaries “that the Navy was considering deep probes beyond the fleet’s operating frontier.” [14]

Captain Charles “Savvy” Cooke, on Turner’s staff in OP-12, told Kimmel that Rainbow Five was elastic enough to sanction such strikes. Kimmel and his War Plans officer, Captain Charles McMorris, were taken with the idea and proposed sweeps in force to raid the Marianas and Bonins. “Consideration is being given to making the initial major offensive operation a sweep far to the westward of Midway instead of a raid on the Marshalls.” [15] This was intended to not only turn the northern flank of the MLR, but also to draw out the Japanese fleet for decisive battle. This was too much for OpNav, which forbade heavy-duty operations west of the Marshalls.

Other than the fact that they sat at the northern end of the second defense zone, the Bonins were of no value. Iwo Jima had no anchorage to use for subsequent operations against the home islands, even if such were to be needed. Even had the Japanese manned the airfields on the island, they posed little threat by the end of 1944.

As Marine Captain Robert Burrell clearly demonstrated in his 2010 article Worth the Cost? Justification for the Iwo Jima Invasion, the objective of seizing Iwo Jima actually derived from U.S. Army Air Forces strategy. The intent was to safeguard the B-29 Superfortresses by providing fighter escort support from Iwo Jima. “Almost every book, journal article, encyclopedia entry, and Web site that addresses the battle justifies the nearly seven thousand American dead with the “emergency landing” theory. Essentially, the theory argues that 2,251 B-29 Superfortresses landed on Iwo Jima and each carried eleven crewmen; accordingly, Operation Detachment saved the lives of 24,761 Americans.” [16]

“In the strategy approved by the Joint War Planners, the justifications for the Bonin Islands operation were:

a. Providing fighter cover for the application of our air effort against Japan.
b. Denying these strategic outposts to the enemy.
c. Furnishing air defense bases for our positions in the Marianas.
d. Providing fields for staging heavy bombers (B-24 Liberators) against Japan.
e. Precipitating a decisive naval engagement. “ [17]

Nothing whatever was said about any need for an emergency landing field for B-29s. However, presume for a moment that such was actually anticipated and needed. Just like with Tarawa in the Gilberts, there were other islands in the Bonin group that were either defended lightly or not at all. Chichi Jima Island, where George H.W. Bush was rescued, lies 145 NM northeast of Iwo Jima. At the time of Pearl Harbor, it housed no more than 3,800 Japanese Army troops. By the end of 1944, the majority of these had been brought as reinforcements to Iwo Jima.

Iwo Jima never fulfilled any of the purposes for which it was taken, yet it was the costliest battle in Marine Corps history.”

Mike

[LineDoggie]

Interesting viewpoint.. Many have also wondered why Hitler -the monster- didn't use Sarin and Tabun agnst the Americans sitting on the Elbe! Americans considered using poison gas (civilians were of no consequence to them, ever) against the almost defeated Japanese..then why wouldn't Hitler use nerve gas to save Germany from being overrun?

Maybe it was a racial thing. He didn't want to use WMD against his racial cousins in England? And the US troops in the west were certified by Goebbels as "more like us" than the Volksdeutsche refugees coming in from the east.

It's a riddle really. Considering that the accepted narrative has Hitler wanting to destroy Germany in defeat, anyway. So why would he be reticent on grounds of allied retaliation on Germany if nerve gas was used!

Cheers
Sandeep

Hitler didnt use battlefield gases on enemy formations because Hitler had been gassed himself in 1918 and had a morbid fear of it.

[Delta Tank]

LineDoggie

[/quote]Hitler didnt use battlefield gases on enemy formations because Hitler had been gassed himself in 1918 and had a morbid fear of it.
[/quote]

IIRC he was also told by his military advisers that the Western Allies had plenty of poison gas stockpiled in England which they would retaliate in kind and that the cities of Germany could not be defended against such an attack.

Mike

[rcocean]

IIRC he was also told by his military advisers that the Western Allies had plenty of poison gas stockpiled in England which they would retaliate in kind and that the cities of Germany could not be defended against such an attack.

Mike

I think thats part of it. In 1942 Hitler thought he could win with conventional weapons. And continued to believe that till the Fall of 1943. He wanted to use Gas against the USSR in Fall of 43, but he was told by head of Germany's Chemical Warfare that the neccessary Gas supply and German Gas protection couldn't be shipped to the Eastern Front for at least 4 months.

Later, Hitler wanted to create a "Poison Gas Curtain" on the Vistula. But never pulled the trigger.

[rcocean]

Bottom line is there were plenty of good reasons to invade Iwo Jima. It vastly increased the effectiveness of our Air offensive against Japan. You can make the case that it ended up saving more lives than it lost, but the JCS never approved an invasion based on the premise that it "will save more lives than it cost".

They simply didn't think that way. Marshall in fact, stated in December 1942, that his preferred plan of action was an invasion of Brest Peninsula in the Spring of 1943. He stated that it would probably fail, but the risk was worth it.
Later, he wanted Ike to take more risks and land Airborne troops far behind the German lines before D-Day. Again, gambling that the sacrifice of the Airborne troops would ensure the Normandy Beachhead.

Winning the war quickly meant more than "saving lives". And if they wanted to "Save lives" the easiest way to get rid of "Unconditional Surrender" and make a compromise peace. But no one favored that.

[rcocean]

That is delivered in aircraft bombs and artillery projectiles it would mostly settle on open surfaces & very little would drift into gun embrasures, observation ports, air intakes, ect...

The Japanese on Iwo Jima were not all sheltered in "Deep Bunkers". And the planners for using Gas had already factored in the need to delay an attack to avoid contamination. The Japanese on Iwo had no facilities for treating gas causualites. Nor could rotate troops out of a Gassed area. As was common in WWi.

[Delta Tank]

They simply didn't think that way. Marshall in fact, stated in December 1942, that his preferred plan of action was an invasion of Brest Peninsula in the Spring of 1943. He stated that it would probably fail, but the risk was worth it.

Source?

Mike

[Delta Tank]

rcocean,

IIRC, Marshall wanted to invade the Cotentin Peninsula in the Fall of 1942 if it appeared that the USSR was about to collapse. In the Spring of 1943 Marshall wanted to do Operation Roundup which was the invasion of France, which occurred in 1944 called Operation Overlord.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sledgehammer
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Roundup_(1942)

Mike

[rcocean]

Sorry. January 1943. from Marshall Papers Volume 3:

The final preconference meeting between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their commander in chief took place in the White House on the afternoon of January 7, two days before the chiefs were scheduled to leave. Roosevelt asked Marshall if the military were united in agreement to advocate a cross-Channel operation. Marshall replied that they were not, especially the planning staff. The minutes record the chief of staff as saying that he “regarded an operation in the north more favorably than one in the Mediterranean but the question was still an open one.” Further, of the two most likely Mediterranean operations—Sardinia and Sicily—the latter, while more difficult, was more desirable. “He said that he personally favored an operation against the Brest peninsula. The losses there will be in troops, but he said that, to state it cruelly, we could replace troops whereas a heavy loss in shipping, which would result from the BRIMSTONE Operation, might completely destroy any opportunity for successful operations against the enemy in the near future.” While ROUNDUP would also entail losses, Marshall said, there would be “no narrow straits on our lines of communications, and we could operate with fighter protection from the United Kingdom.” When the North African operation was completed, the president noted, the Allies would have a half million surplus troops there; where were they to be employed? Marshall “pointed out that we were already training divisions for the BRIMSTONE Operation in case a decision was made to mount it.” (Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, pp. 509-10, 512. The minutes of the January 7 meeting and of all the formal J.C.S. and C.C.S. meetings at the Casablanca Conference are printed in this volume. The army history of the conference is Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, a volume in the United States Army in World War II [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 18-42.)

[Delta Tank]

rcocean,

Thank you very much. I don’t believe I ever heard of this proposed operation. You have now earned the title “Keeper of Odd Knowledge”!

Mike