Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

[Tom from Cornwall]

It also highlights the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence's opinion that Japan was not even contemplating an attack on Singapore.

Was he wrong to hold that opinion given what was known in July 1941?

It has to be one of the greatest ironies of the Second World War that Winston Churchill, the arch imperialist, preferred to send British armaments to the Soviet Union than to ensure the safety of the Empire.

"The arch imperialist..."?

Have you read the relevant Chiefs of Staff meeting minutes? Their priorities are pretty clear, as shown in this signal to the UK commanders in the Far East sent on 21 Jul 41.

Priority = current operations.

What advice was Churchill receiving regarding sending aircraft to Malaya in July 1941? This from a Joint Planning Staff paper of the same date:

Not much evidence there of his military advisors finding fault with Churchill's opinion that in July 1941 it was better to prioritise operational theatres rather than the uncertain threat in the Far East.

Regards

Tom

[daveshoup2MD]

The IJA had 10-12 infantry divisions, enough shipping to move and land half of them at once, 2,000+ combat aircraft

Want to know what is your source for these figures.

Multiple, but "Strategy and Command: The First Two Years" (by Louis Morton et al, published 1961, Office of the Chief of Military History) of the "War in the Pacific" volumes of the US Army in World War II series, lists the following 10 IJA infantry divisions for the initial operations (Guards, 2nd, 5th, 16th, 18th, 21st, 33rd, 48th, 55th, 56th) along with the brigade-sized South Seas Detachment (for Guam); in addition, the 38th Division was available after Hong Kong, and the 65th Brigade followed up in Luzon; add corps and army level troops (two separate armored brigades, the SNLF, etc.) and that's 12 division equivalents, easily.

The initial assault forces that landed in the PI, Thailand, Malaya, etc. amounted to half that (call it six divisions); the Army's 3rd and 5th air groups had some 700 first line aircraft, and the IJN's land-based and carrier-based aircraft another 1300. The IJN had six fleet carriers, two light carriers, and 10 capital ships, plus the requisite cruisers, destroyers, escorts, submarines, etc.

The British had a grand total of five divisions worth the name in theater, and split between Burma and Malaya, and including the 18th Division, which was actually at sea in the Indian Ocean the fourth quarter of 1941, and - maybe - 200+ combat aircraft worth considering as such, of which the Brewster Buffalo had the highest performance. The RN had two capital ships in the theater; no carriers.

Given the above realities, the best the British could hope for was to die gallantly; deploying Force Z and the British 18th and Australian 8th into the theater after the Japanese took over French Indochina (in September, 1940) was nuts.

[daveshoup2MD]

The IJA had 10-12 infantry divisions, enough shipping to move and land half of them at once, 2,000+ combat aircraft

Want to know what is your source for these figures.

He uses figures that include forces allocated to the DEI, the Philippines and PNG and ignores US and Dutch forces that the UK could expect to help and be helped by.

Did the British know the Japanese forces allocated to the DEI, Philippines, and PNG? The answer, of course, is no.

Did the British know the Japanese were going to attack the US? The answer, of course, is also no.

Did the British know that Japan posed a threat to the British position in China and SE Asia? Yes. And that threat was significantly strengthened by Japan's takeover of French Indochina? Also, yes.

Given the above, and the reality the Axis powers had gone out of their way to avoid hostilities with the US in 1939-41, for obvious reasons, a realistic strategic appraisal by the British would have been the Japanese could have attacked British positions across the Western Pacific/China/SE Asia with their entire available force, destroyed whatever the British had in theater, and then fallen on the NEI at their leisure - carefully avoiding any attack on US interests, for the British to make the decisions they made in 1941 with regards to the theater was idiotic.

And, as far as it goes, the NEI (other than Borneo) was not attacked until after US air and sea power in the PI was overwhelmed, and even if the Japanese attacked the US, landings on Mindanao and air strikes from Taiwan would have been enough to bottle up what was left of the USAFFE on Luzon.

[daveshoup2MD]

I really don't think they could mount simultaneously, amphibious operations for 5 divisions worth of troops. Only 1 Regt of 18th Div was landed at Kota Bharu, while I think the 5th Div had 2 Regts land at Singora (Songkhla) and another at Pattani. Gen Yamashita chose not to include the Japanese 56th Div in his initial order of battle, so the shipping could be used to provide more supplies. Not having enough shipping was a major headache for the Japanese, everything had to be done in waves.

Various sources breaks it down as - roughly - five brigade group/RCT equivalents in the assault elements for Malaya; one for Borneo; seven for the Philippines; and one for Guam; that totals 14 IJA brigade group/RCT equivalents, and by including various SNLF elements, the BCT that went to Bangkok by sea; etc., call it 15 RCT-equivalents in total, which comes out (roughly) to five triangular divisional equivalents, or near enough for this level of comparison.

[daveshoup2MD]

I thought it nicely highlights the intricacies of coalitions, the need to consult the Dominions, the importance of understanding the "American situation", the uncertainty over what the Japanese would do, the uncertainty over what the Americans would do, the dilemma of the 'short-term' over the 'long-term', the need to consider documents and decisions 'in the light of the present strengths and situation' rather than with the benefit of hindsight, etc, etc.

It also highlights the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence's opinion that Japan was not even contemplating an attack on Singapore.

It has to be one of the greatest ironies of the Second World War that Winston Churchill, the arch imperialist, preferred to send British armaments to the Soviet Union than to ensure the safety of the Empire.

UK Lend-Lease shipped to the Soviet Union in 1941 alone included over 600 aircraft, mainly Hurricanes, and 450 tanks, Valentines and Matildas.
You have to figure that just a third of that would be enough to save Singapore and Malaya from Japanese conquest.

When in 1941 does the above get sent, though, and in what ships? It took the USN to get the 18th Division into the eastern Indian Ocean in the fourth quarter of 1941, historically.

And fighter squadrons need pilots, ground crew, command staff, and logisticians (plus a supply line for avgas, ammunition, spares, etc.), while armored battalions need tank crews, ordnance and supply staff, command staff, and logisticians (plus a supply line for POL, ammunition, spares, etc.). More to it than shipping equipment and spares, obviously, which is what the British were sending to Murmansk...

[daveshoup2MD]

It also highlights the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence's opinion that Japan was not even contemplating an attack on Singapore.

Was he wrong to hold that opinion given what was known in July 1941?

It has to be one of the greatest ironies of the Second World War that Winston Churchill, the arch imperialist, preferred to send British armaments to the Soviet Union than to ensure the safety of the Empire.

"The arch imperialist..."?

Have you read the relevant Chiefs of Staff meeting minutes? Their priorities are pretty clear, as shown in this signal to the UK commanders in the Far East sent on 21 Jul 41.

CAB79-13 - COS Mtg 21 Jul 41 - Signal to C-in-C's Far East.JPG

Priority = current operations.

What advice was Churchill receiving regarding sending aircraft to Malaya in July 1941? This from a Joint Planning Staff paper of the same date:

CAB79-13 - COS Mtg 21 Jul 41 - JPS - Air Defence in Far East.JPG

Not much evidence there of his military advisors finding fault with Churchill's opinion that in July 1941 it was better to prioritise operational theatres rather than the uncertain threat in the Far East.

Regards

Tom

So, realistically: four fighter squadrons with Buffaloes in Malaya and one in Burma; four light bomber squadrons with Blenheims (reads like three in Malaya and one in Burma); two squadrons of Hudsons and one of Catalinas (theater-wide). Twelve squadrons of (marginally) modern aircraft, from Borneo to Burma, with - being charitable - 20 a/c per squadron, perhaps? The IJAAF alone had 700 in greater SE Asia for the 1941-42 offensives; add in the IJAAF land-based and carrier-based air, and it's 9-1 odds.

[EwenS]

I’m not sure that the use of 6 USN transports plus USN escort to South Africa that you keep referring to affects very much in the FE in late 1941. There was a shortage of troop shipping. But the real need for more arose from Churchill’s desire to move 2 divisions from Britain to the ME. He requested help from FDR at the beginning of Sept 1941 intending to use them for 2 trips, and FDR agreed on 6 Sept (there was only one eventually). But the use of these 6 vessels became part of a more complicated ballet to maximise troop shipping capacity to the ME.

18th Div sailed from the U.K. to Halifax in 8 British troopships in convoy CT5. There the troops were transferred to the 6 USN vessels for transport to South Africa, and then onwards, as convoy WS12X. That process took 10 days. Meanwhile the British ships loaded 5th Cdn Armoured Div for the return journey to Britain where it remained until sent to the Med in Nov 1943. 7 of those ships then joined WS14, forming about 25% of that convoy, which sailed on 8 Dec 1941. But the bulk of the personnel in WS14 were not in organised units but as drafts to existing units in various theatres (19,000 for ME, 12,000 Bombay and Iraq and 3,000 Malaya) with the rest being from 2 infantry battalions and 3 AA artillery regiments bound for India.

So it seems Britain did have the troop shipping to take 18th div east had it wanted. But that of course requires the foresight to know that war with Japan would break out in Dec. And it could possibly have arrived earlier (WS12X arrived in Bombay on 27 Dec 1941). Would an extra 10 days of that division in Singapore have made a difference? But as with everything there would have been sacrifices elsewhere. Delaying the arrival of 5th Cdn Armoured div in Britain would not however have been a huge loss given its subsequent 2 years of inactivity.

[EwenS]

The delays to the aircraft deliveries was unfortunate.

90 Beauforts from the Australian production line intended as Vildebeest replacements and ordered in July 1939. The first aircraft didn’t come off the production line until Oct 1941 with the last in Aug 1942.

I only recently came across the intention to use Baltimores in the FE. An order for 400 was placed in May 1940. Production didn’t start until June 1941 (Maryland production had ceased in April), with trials aircraft arriving in Britain in Oct and deliveries to the OTU squadron in Egypt in Jan 1942, becoming operational in May. Only 146 built in 1941 (all but 25 in the last quarter) with the rest of the order completed by end of June 1942. This of course coincides with Martin ramping up B-26 production for the USAAF (that started Feb 1941). Plans of course changed and all the Baltimores from this and subsequent orders were retained for use in the ME.

[Gooner1]

Was he wrong to hold that opinion given what was known in July 1941?

Have you read the relevant Chiefs of Staff meeting minutes? Their priorities are pretty clear, as shown in this signal to the UK commanders in the Far East sent on 21 Jul 41.

CAB79-13 - COS Mtg 21 Jul 41 - Signal to C-in-C's Far East.JPG

Priority = current operations.

What advice was Churchill receiving regarding sending aircraft to Malaya in July 1941? This from a Joint Planning Staff paper of the same date:

CAB79-13 - COS Mtg 21 Jul 41 - JPS - Air Defence in Far East.JPG

Not much evidence there of his military advisors finding fault with Churchill's opinion that in July 1941 it was better to prioritise operational theatres rather than the uncertain threat in the Far East.

Regards

Tom

Tom, I am sure you have read cab/66/11/42 'Future Strategy: Appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff Committee' of September 4th 1940

"14. Japan, like Russia, sees in the war an opportunity to pursue her
Imperialist aims while the going is good. How far she means to go we do not
know; the uncertain reactions of the United States and of Russia, her
uncertainty of the extent to which we ourselves are prepared to make concessions
and of our future attitude if we defeat Germany, and the continuing heavy drain
of the China war are factors which may deter her from pressing her claims too
far. The new Japanese Government is, however, likely to be increasingly
pro-Axis; and the least we can assume is that Japan's attitude will continue to
be menacing, and that her sympathies will be with our enemies.

157. The retention of Malaya is vital to our security in the Far East as,
so long as we can retain Singapore, it remains a potential base for a fleet in being
and so restrict Japan's naval action. It is also most important to hold Singapore
for the exercise of economic pressure and for the control of commodities essential
to our own economic structure. Finally, Malaya forms a footing from which,
eventually, we can retrieve the damage to our interests when stronger forces
become available. To hold Singapore entails holding the whole of Malaya and
air bases in Borneo, a task for which the present garrison is quite insufficient.
In view of the menacing attitude of Japan, the reinforcement of Malaya is a
matter of urgency.

243. The garrison of Malaya has at present only one of the three divisions
considered necessary for security. In view of the attitude of Japan, it is proposed
to make a further two divisions available during the coming winter.

261. Our defence policy in the Far East * in the absence of an adequate
fleet, must rely primarily on air power. The existing total air strength is only
88 aircraft (including three Australian Squadrons). The minimum requirements
for the security of Malaya, Borneo and co-operation with the Navy in the control
of sea comunications in this area is a total of 336 first line aircraft."

Appendix VI Overseas Garrisons adds 'Garrison at present considered necessary' for the Far East at three infantry divisions and one light tank regiment. 'Strength of existing garrison' was 'Infantry only of one division, one 3-7-in. howitzer regiment, equivalent of one field regiment (30 - 18-pdr. used for beach defence)'.'Interim reinforcements proposed during the coming winter' was put at two infantry divisions. 'Remarks' were 'Australia has been asked to send a division. Second division will have to come from United Kingdom.'


As regarding prioritising 'operational theatres' you will note that the Soviet Union itself always kept sufficiently powerful forces in their far east to deter, and if necessary, to defeat a Japanese attack.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Tom, I am sure you have read cab/66/11/42 'Future Strategy: Appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff Committee' of September 4th 1940

I have now, thanks for posting.

To hold Singapore entails holding the whole of Malaya and
air bases in Borneo, a task for which the present garrison is quite insufficient.
In view of the menacing attitude of Japan, the reinforcement of Malaya is a
matter of urgency.

Isn't that what happened and what was happening when the Japanese attacked?

It's perhaps also worth noting the comments of the COS in their report of 6 November 1940,[CAB80/22] which begins:

And again, the importance the British were placing on effective US co-operation to deter (or intimidate) Japan is stressed again on page 4:

COS(40) 905 - page 4 - 6 Nov 40.JPG (42.58 KiB) Viewed 1029 times

I'm pretty sure, as well, that we could find documents stressing need to reinforce Middle East, etc. during this period.

Regards

Tom

[daveshoup2MD]

I’m not sure that the use of 6 USN transports plus USN escort to South Africa that you keep referring to affects very much in the FE in late 1941. There was a shortage of troop shipping. But the real need for more arose from Churchill’s desire to move 2 divisions from Britain to the ME. He requested help from FDR at the beginning of Sept 1941 intending to use them for 2 trips, and FDR agreed on 6 Sept (there was only one eventually). But the use of these 6 vessels became part of a more complicated ballet to maximise troop shipping capacity to the ME.

18th Div sailed from the U.K. to Halifax in 8 British troopships in convoy CT5. There the troops were transferred to the 6 USN vessels for transport to South Africa, and then onwards, as convoy WS12X. That process took 10 days. Meanwhile the British ships loaded 5th Cdn Armoured Div for the return journey to Britain where it remained until sent to the Med in Nov 1943. 7 of those ships then joined WS14, forming about 25% of that convoy, which sailed on 8 Dec 1941. But the bulk of the personnel in WS14 were not in organised units but as drafts to existing units in various theatres (19,000 for ME, 12,000 Bombay and Iraq and 3,000 Malaya) with the rest being from 2 infantry battalions and 3 AA artillery regiments bound for India.

So it seems Britain did have the troop shipping to take 18th div east had it wanted. But that of course requires the foresight to know that war with Japan would break out in Dec. And it could possibly have arrived earlier (WS12X arrived in Bombay on 27 Dec 1941). Would an extra 10 days of that division in Singapore have made a difference? But as with everything there would have been sacrifices elsewhere. Delaying the arrival of 5th Cdn Armoured div in Britain would not however have been a huge loss given its subsequent 2 years of inactivity.

Absent the USN APs AND the north-south Atlantic escort (CV, CAs, DDs, AO), the British 18th not only has to travel in British troopships, it has to be escorted by British warships, which - presumably - in the fourth quarter of 1941, were rather busy ...

The British strategic reserve in the theater in Q41941 and Q11942 amounted to one reinforced infantry division, two separate brigades, a couple of squadron equivalents of Hurricanes, and two capital ships - and once they were committed anywhere, they were pretty much stuck ... throwing it all (essentially) into Malaya to be lost was a waste of resources that were slender to begin with...

[daveshoup2MD]

The delays to the aircraft deliveries was unfortunate.

90 Beauforts from the Australian production line intended as Vildebeest replacements and ordered in July 1939. The first aircraft didn’t come off the production line until Oct 1941 with the last in Aug 1942.

I only recently came across the intention to use Baltimores in the FE. An order for 400 was placed in May 1940. Production didn’t start until June 1941 (Maryland production had ceased in April), with trials aircraft arriving in Britain in Oct and deliveries to the OTU squadron in Egypt in Jan 1942, becoming operational in May. Only 146 built in 1941 (all but 25 in the last quarter) with the rest of the order completed by end of June 1942. This of course coincides with Martin ramping up B-26 production for the USAAF (that started Feb 1941). Plans of course changed and all the Baltimores from this and subsequent orders were retained for use in the ME.

That's one way to put it. Given the available personnel for the RAF and Commonwealth air units in the theater in this period, it's unclear that with - maybe - the equivalent of a half dozen fighter squadrons and roughly the same number of light bomber squadrons, split between Malaya/Singapore and Burma - even with better aircraft (Hurricanes rather than Buffaloes, Baltimores and Beauforts rather than Blenheims and biplane torpedo bombers) it seems unlikely 200 such aircraft are going to fend off odds of 8-1 or 9-1.

[EKB]

it seems unlikely 200 such aircraft are going to fend off odds of 8-1 or 9-1.

Even more unlikely is that Japan could deploy anything close to 2,000 combat aircraft over Malaya and Singapore. You count paper figures of airframes as opposed to what was actually available.

More important is how many aircraft were within reach of the battlefield. How many aircraft were fit for operations. How many pilots and crew were fit for operations. How many aircraft could be supported for sustained operations (according to stocks of fuel, lubricants, ammunition, spare parts, crew replacements, maintenance rotation and backlog, etc).

And consider what happened on the other side of the world. Germany’s night fighter force had just 60 crews trained for operations. In spite of that glaring weakness, the British bombing offensive of 1941 was a disaster for the RAF. Likewise, the RAF fighter offensive of 1941 failed with heavy losses when the German day fighter force was substantially outnumbered over France. This is another reason why it’s not convincing to draw conclusions from counting paper strength.

Snapshot data on the three largest air commands in the U.K. (1st January 1942):

RAF Fighter Command
Aircraft in establishment: 1,476
Aircraft serviceable: N/A
Aircraft with crews: 1,231
Total crews available: N/A

RAF Bomber Command
Aircraft in establishment: 832
Aircraft serviceable: 581
Aircraft with crews: 511
Total crews available: 569

RAF Coastal Command
Aircraft in establishment: 347
Aircraft serviceable: 174
Aircraft with crews: 123
Total crews available: 146

Does not include the Army Co-operation Command, PRU, weather recon flights, Fleet Air Arm or other air units that I’m not aware of. Not sure about the numbers on ground crew availability, but one would think that is important.

https://www.scribd.com/lists/3561207/RA ... ts-1939-45
https://www.amazon.com/Eagle-Flames-Luf ... 131&sr=8-1

In any case the British did not need 2,000 aircraft to defend Malaya and Singapore. What they did require was an integrated, well managed air defense network that also included radar, anti-aircraft guns, search lights and robust communications.

[daveshoup2MD]

it seems unlikely 200 such aircraft are going to fend off odds of 8-1 or 9-1.

Even more unlikely is that Japan could deploy anything close to 2,000 combat aircraft over Malaya and Singapore. You count paper figures of airframes as opposed to what was actually available.

More important is how many aircraft were within reach of the battlefield. How many aircraft were fit for operations. How many pilots and crew were fit for operations. How many aircraft could be supported for sustained operations (according to stocks of fuel, lubricants, ammunition, spare parts, crew replacements, maintenance rotation and backlog, etc).

And consider what happened on the other side of the world. Germany’s night fighter force had just 60 crews trained for operations. In spite of that glaring weakness, the British bombing offensive of 1941 was a disaster for the RAF. Likewise, the RAF fighter offensive of 1941 failed with heavy losses when the German day fighter force was substantially outnumbered over France. This is another reason why it’s not convincing to draw conclusions from counting paper strength.

Snapshot data on the three largest air commands in the U.K. (1st January 1942):

RAF Fighter Command
Aircraft in establishment: 1,476
Aircraft serviceable: N/A
Aircraft with crews: 1,231
Total crews available: N/A

RAF Bomber Command
Aircraft in establishment: 832
Aircraft serviceable: 581
Aircraft with crews: 511
Total crews available: 569

RAF Coastal Command
Aircraft in establishment: 347
Aircraft serviceable: 174
Aircraft with crews: 123
Total crews available: 146

Does not include the Army Co-operation Command, PRU, weather recon flights, Fleet Air Arm or other air units that I’m not aware of. Not sure about the numbers on ground crew availability, but one would think that is important.

https://www.scribd.com/lists/3561207/RA ... ts-1939-45
https://www.amazon.com/Eagle-Flames-Luf ... 131&sr=8-1

In any case the British did not need 2,000 aircraft to defend Malaya and Singapore. What they did require was an integrated, well managed air defense network that also included radar, anti-aircraft guns, search lights and robust communications.

And your source for Japanese air power strength in the Pacific in 1941-42, both the IJAAF and IJNAF, is what, exactly?

The histories by Craven & Cate (USAAF) and Morton (US Army) list the following:

USAAF: "2,700 a/c assigned to fully trained air units" (Army and Navy, combined); of which roughly IJAAF combat aircraft were in China, etc.

So including IJAAF land-based air, IJNAF land-based air, and IJNAF carrier-based air, some 2,000 a/c.

Historically, of course, they were not all deployed against the RAF in Malaya; however, the land-based air alone in the theater, split between Taiwan and French Indochina, were roughly 600 Army and 540 Navy, or 1,100+, not even including carrier-based air and land-based air units elsewhere in the Pacific. Even setting aside some percentage of those, but including the 1st Air Fleet (~350 of the most capable and mobile combat aircraft in the entire Pacific), those are still, easily, 6-1 odds, if not greater...

The RAF strength in the MTO was roughly 1,000 aircraft; at home, based on your figures, another 2,700 in the UK. ~200 a/c, slit between Malaya and Burma, makes it clear the entire effort was doomed.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Just to show that without the benefit of 80 years of hindsight prioritising between conflicting theatres of war (and possible war) is not that easy, I thought I'd post up this snip from a British Chiefs of Staff paper on 'General Strategy' produced at the end of July 1941:

CAB80-59 - COS (41) 155 - General Strategy - 31 Jul 41 - Singapore.JPG (24.27 KiB) Viewed 929 times

Other considerations were:

The Defence of the UK (given uncertainty of continued Russian resistance).
Security of our Sea Communications.
North Atlantic.
South Atlantic.
Middle East.
Singapore.
Russia.
United States intervention.
Blockade of Germany.
Bombing Offensive.
Subversive activities.
Future Strategy.

You can find it online in CAB80/59/1.

Regards

Tom