Tactical Defeat of US marines at Iwo Jima?

[Carl Schwamberger]

I always suspected that the figures regarding B-29 landings on Iwo were a postwar effort to ease the public grief about the cost of taking Iwo. (A separate issue from the US requirement to secure a base in the rear of the impending invasion of the Home Islands in late '45.) The figure of 2,400 Superfort landings PRESUMABLY equalled c. 25,000 airmen saved, but that's a HUGE stretch. In researching Whirlwind I found that start to finish, 50% of XXI Bomber Command crewmen were recovered after ditching or bailing out over water--far higher toward the end when the army-navy fully co-operated. But more to the point, the vast majority of those landings were discretionary: XXI BC estimated that 10% saved airplanes though some offloaded wounded. Moreover, LeMay established a permanent AAF det on Iwo to service/repair B-29s, so there was even more incentive to land at Iwo.

Iwo as a long-range fighter base seemed to make sense before the fact, but VII FC found little combat: from April through August it shot down about 200 Japanese planes when B-29s were largely able to defend themselves against the declining threat. The majority of AAF fighter sorties over Japan were strike not escort--and a large % aborted due to weather.

I'm unsure either point about the bomber recovery, and the fighter base payoff could have been predicted when the Iwo operation was planned. But, I'll keep a open mind in case anyone has some usefull evidence. Looking at the map the Bonnin islands represent a potiential outpost in the defense of Japan and for raiding US LoC. In retrospect it is easy to dismiss this possibility, but again when the operation was planned it would be more difficult to ignore the possibility. the Japanese had suprised the US more than once with unexpected capabilities. I expect most folks faced with the information available for the planning of the Iwo operations would have made the decision to attack.

[Navy Vet]

I found that start to finish, 50% of XXI Bomber Command crewmen were recovered after ditching or bailing out over water--far higher toward the end when the army-navy fully co-operated

Please for educational purposes, can you provide example(s) of when they did not cooperate with each other?

[Barrett]

Lack of co-ordination was not intentional but reflected separate service policies. XXI BC had its methods--mostly aircraft--and the navy had its methods--mostly ships. Shortly before LeMay took over in January, his predecessor Haywood Hansell had begun integrating AAF/USN SAR, and LeMay continued that policy, expanding it as well. Eventually there were navy officers aboard B29s and AAF officers aboard ships and submarines. See Whirlwind Chapter Six.

[sonofsamphm1c]

I always suspected that the figures regarding B-29 landings on Iwo were a postwar effort to ease the public grief about the cost of taking Iwo.

This is just my opinion, but I think the effort started while the battle was ongoing. They had a public relations nightmare in the Battle of Iwo Jima, and two things fell into their hands to nullify it. One was Rosenthal's photograph. The hatred of that photograph by 5th Division Marines once back at Camp Tarawa was palpable. They thought it was screw job. But after awhile the power of the image and hard training won most of them over.

The other, when the first wounded B-29 landed there were Marines involved in combat at the north end of the airfield. When the B-29 ground to a stop on the runway, many Marines literally stopped shooting at the enemy and ran back to the airstrip to see the airplane. They were ecstatic, and the Navy brass noticed. They saw they had a powerful story to exploit. Soon every B-29 with as much as a pimple on its butt was landing on Iwo to have it squeezed and popped in front of the cameras. The crews doing the maintenance on the B-29s had to plead for relief: too many airplanes unnecessarily landing for them to handle. All this while the Marines were fully engaged in taking the remainder of the island.

[Navy Vet]

Not much detail but some info on the NMCB building of the airstrip...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seabees_in_World_War_II

What was needed after the successful Marianas campaign was an emergency landing field much closer to the Japanese homeland that would service crippled bombers returning from raids and enable shorter- ranged fighter planes to accompany the giant bombers to their targets. The island chosen for this purpose was Iwo Jima, scene of some of the most savage fighting of the war. On 19 February 1945, the Fifth Amphibious Corps, which included the 133rd Naval Construction Battalion and elements of the 31st Naval Construction Battalion, hit the beaches. During the assault, the 133rd Naval Construction Battalion had the dubious honor of suffering more men killed or wounded than any other Seabee battalion in any previous or subsequent engagement. Although only minor construction was accomplished during the first ten days of the operation, the Seabees later built one crucial emergency landing field and fighter airstrips so desperately needed by the Allies.

[donsor]

I think that the US Forces tasked with the capture of Iwo Jima could've done a better job in preping for the invasion than what they did. It seemed like the naval guns and air strikes were shooting blindly hoping to hit something. Just like in Operation Overlord in
Europe, the US Forces should have known that the Japanese will be dugged in and it was obvious from US intelligence that the Japanese won't put up a front on the flat beaches of Iwo Jima away from the anticipated softening up bombardment but instead dug in deep among the hills.

[Carl Schwamberger]

donsor...if you have the target lists/maps for either the Iwo Jima or Omaha Beach preperatory fires let us know. There has been some curiosity about those around here and some of us would like to get a close look at those. Target types, caliber/model of projectile, & number of rounds, duration of fire on each target, fuze types and post battle analysis of the effects are all items I & others would like to get a look at.

[donsor]

Sorry, I can't provide you with the information you need. However, if you go to any library I'm sure that you will find all the data you have listed above. I based my analysis on what I know from books, magazines, TV, etc. and what I believe did not make sense. Please tell me why the Allied forces were unable to bust the Fortress Europa. The bunkers were out in the open but still it remained intact while it took hundreds if not thosands of Allied casualties to neutralize it. As the saying goes, US lose the battles but win wars.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Actually no that information is not in the librarys here. Some fragments are in secondary sources, but those are too brief to be of the depth we have been looking for. The actual gunnery logs from the ships, the target list worksheets, ect... may very well still exist in various archives, but not within my reach here.

.... Please tell me why the Allied forces were unable to bust the Fortress Europa. The bunkers were out in the open but still it remained intact while it took hundreds if not thosands of Allied casualties to neutralize it. As the saying goes, US lose the battles but win wars.

Why do you believe the bunkers were in the open? Both German and Allied witnesses to Omaha beach describe them as camoflaged and sited in defilade to the sea when possible. There was a typical haze which usually hides detail. The battle ships & cruisers were firing from 5000 to 10,000 yards range. From experience I know you wont often 'see' a target like a bunker, even with less haze. One account by a USN gunnery officer on a cruiser describes firing at landmarks that refrenced his targets. The destroyers that came up to 1500 yards range after 09:00 still had trouble spotting the German bunkers and required signals from the soldiers ashore to spot them and make direct hits.

In any case I hardly think this battle was "lost". The first US infantry gained the bluffs by 07:30. At 08:30 (on the German clock) the commander of the regiment defending the Omaha Beach area reported to the division CP he was losing contact with his company commanders, and he could not make a counter attack. Yes the leading US battalions had several bad hours getting off the beach. They also fought their way though the defenses in a couple more hours despite the initial failure of the fire support. Perhaps a detailed comparison of the Omaha beach battle with some similar size attacks elsewhere will put it in perspective.

There are several other threads here which discsuss the battle on Omaha Beach in some detail. Here is one http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=54&t=79481

I'd also recommend Balikoski's recent book 'Omaha Beach'. It has a breakdown of the casualties by battalion or regiment.

On Iwo Jima the exposed positions were camoflaged, and in defilade. The Japanese had a fair idea of the sort of ammunition they were defending against and built accordingly. Perhaps a camparison of the Japanese defenses there with other places like Verdun, the structures of the Siegfried Line, the fortress at Brest-Litovisk, Eban Emael, or the defenses of Lenningrad, to name a few, would clarify how strong or weak they were.

[LWD]

... On Iwo Jima the exposed positions were camoflaged, and in defilade. The Japanese had a fair idea of the sort of ammunition they were defending against and built accordingly. Perhaps a camparison of the Japanese defenses there with other places like Verdun, the structures of the Siegfried Line, the fortress at Brest-Litovisk, Eban Emael, or the defenses of Lenningrad, to name a few, would clarify how strong or weak they were.

One thing to remember about Iwo Jima was that the Japanese had given up on the plan of trying to defeat the invasion on the beaches. Indeed they had given up on the plan of defeating the invasion. This meant that they could construct a lot of their defences in locations that were hard to observe or hit with naval gunfire.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The same tactic they had adopted nearly a year earlier. Pelilu, Okinawa, or any number of other Pacific islands large and small had the primary defense system inland, usually in defilaide to naval gunfire. Unlike the German built coastal defenses of Europe, or the earlier Pacific defenses deep tunnels inland were the norm.

[donsor]

Why didn't we know what tactics the Japanese were up to. What happened to our inteligence?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Earlier it was faulty analysis. Later we caught on and adapted. Iwo Jima would have been far worse and perhaps actually been a defeat with the tactics of 1943 or even 1944. Part of the fault lay in that no one could believe the Japanese would expend so much in defending all these islands. They were easy to bypass, & we needed only a few, but the Japanese could not be sure which we would choose. They expended a insane ammount of material and men fortifying these isolated islands. US submarines sank a lot of cargo ships delivering material and men to fortify them, and Japan was desperately short of cargo ships from the start. Yet most of that effort was wasted. At Raubal alone over 100,000 Japanese soldiers were bypassed and left sitting uselessly. Their naval base at Truk was heavily fortified, and the garrison left sitting there starving until the end. I'd not be suprised if more than 500,000 Japanese soldiers were left isolated across the central and south Pacific. Even with all their effort there were many islands with few fortifications and small garrisons. Tinian had hardly two brigades with bunkers of logs and dirt. Our suprise was they would follow such a wastefull strategy

[sonofsamphm1c]

When they made the decision to invade and capture Iwo Jima, their intelligence was not up to date. This is when the notion that a small force could separate from the task force to Okinawa, take Iwo in a few says, and rejoin the task force came to into existence. Later, when General Smith saw more current intelligence, he raised the casualty estimate to, I believe, ~13,000.

Earlier in the war Iwo was suggested as a target many times, and subsequently always rejected. Most were not keen on taking it. It's too bad the Japanese did not know that. Maybe they would not have fortified it. It wasn't until Admiral Spruance made it part of a dealmaker among the JCS that it got approved.

[LWD]

The same tactic they had adopted nearly a year earlier. Pelilu, Okinawa, or any number of other Pacific islands large and small had the primary defense system inland, usually in defilaide to naval gunfire. ...

My understanding is however, in those cases the plan was still to defeat the invasion. Thus the numerous large counter attacks including the famous or infamous "Banzai charges". At Iwo they didn't plan or even try to defeat the invasion they just wanted to inflict as many casualties as possible.