Somerville's Aggressiveness at Ceylon

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
herosrest
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Location: Northall - Ansgar the Staller's Realm

Re: Somerville's Aggressiveness at Ceylon

Post by herosrest » 19 Dec 2019 22:45

Let's reprise.

https://slate.com/human-interest/2013/1 ... idway.html and one of those little things that meant nothing then or now. The Japanese had intercepted radio traffic that suggested another attack on Wake Island and Shōkaku and Zuikaku sailed for Eniwetok to be in a position to intercept any such attack, but no attack occurred. So...... this was 17 October,1943 and one month after the US carrier raid of Tarawa on 18 September.

AF..... Come in, over? :roll: https://web.archive.org/web/20080411142 ... howers.mp4 MacShowers - Wayback Machine :lol:

For those who really love study of Rembrandt's never drying painted wall - Something happened with JN-25 in..... http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Mag ... -25.1.html During August and December 1943, transitions to altered code transmissions took place and it is not clear whether Sigint were tearing out hair or scratching heads. Don't go to Davos.

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Somerville's Aggressiveness at Ceylon

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 03 Feb 2020 14:47

herosrest. Interesting comments on the possible effects of signet on Japanese decisions. Holt comments on the lack of response of the Japanese military to Allied deception ops, 'The Deceivers. Your comments indicate the possibility of some successful deception or self-deception.

daveshoup2MD
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Re: Somerville's Aggressiveness at Ceylon

Post by daveshoup2MD » 01 Mar 2020 05:36

Pips wrote:
25 Jan 2010 00:37
Somerville continued searching for Nagumo until 8 April, when he then had the Fleet return to Addu Atoll for replenishment. At a conference there with his senior officers, among them the rescued captains of Cornwall and Dorsetshire, Somerville finally realized how seriously outmatched he was. It was clear that his fighters would not be able to ward off large-scale attacks like the one that sank his heavy cruisers, that the R-class battleships were liabilities, and that Colombo, Trincomalee, and Addu Atoll were not secure bases. He therefore sent Force B to the east coast of Africa, where it could protect the sea route to the Middle East, and personally led Force A to Bombay. The Eastern Fleet did not move back to Ceylon until September 1943.
A similar realization on Dec. 8 or Dec. 9 by Tom Phillips would have been helpful.

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