The surprising fall of Singapore

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Zaf1
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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#16

Post by Zaf1 » 23 Jul 2010, 04:48

Thanks Peter for these valuable information. The Japanese certainly made extensive record of captured equipment. Some of these guns were shipped to Japan and elsewhere and thought shipped to Tarawa, which it wasn't. In the report some anti-tank guns were shipped to fight against expected Russian assault possibly in Manchuria but not known if it was actually made.

Certainly the British lacked fighting spirit, partially due fighting in colonial territory and also they lacked air cover. Most of the wartime complaints by British troops under constant air attacks were about lack of British air cover and if it appeared it was by obsolete planes. The Japanese themselves admitted that it was because the British lacked air power that made their victory possible, much like the German Blitzkrieg strategy in 1940-41. The fanatical fighting spirit and highly disciplined Japanese soldier were also a big factor.

The other could be blamed on the British commanders such as Percival who depended too much on Operation Matador especially when it was already impractical after the Japanese already landed in southern Thailand.

The British have this 'fortress mentality' which they thought they were safe behind their fortress bunkers and large guns, and this also what happened to the French with the 'Maginot Line' in 1940.

Regards

Zaf

cstunts
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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#17

Post by cstunts » 23 Jul 2010, 05:00

Hello,

Japan first began considering the British--which of course meant Singapore eventually--as Far Eastern enemies in about 1936 or so. In 1937 & 1938 the Rikugun (Army) & Kaigun (Navy) annual Operation Plans included operations against Britain in the Far East, but these were in name only; i.e., the operational plans which named GB as an opponent did not contain any actual operational plans against GB.

The first year of specific detailed ops plans came in the IJA & IJN annual Operations Plans of 1939. From the beginning Singapore was to be attacked from landward, never from the sea. Also, the plans were always conceived as predominantly an IJA operation, with the IJN merely convoying troops and protecting. The initial landing site was to be Singora, in Thailand, and the IJA was to move down Malaya to Singapore from the north. In the IJA & IJN annual Operations Plans of 1940 tactical/geographical matters were further refined; the seizure of
airbases in southern French Indo-China were included as advanced staging bases, etc. (The IJA air force could not advance from China directly into the Malayan Peninsula at that time.)

Typically the military planning led the political in Japan. More refining then took place--primarily by Operations Section of the Army General Staff, who sent officers south into the region for more intelligence gathering--in the final operational plans of the IJA & IJN in 1941.

In January 1941 the Nazi Ambassador, Eugen Ott, in Tokyo conducted a study over two days with German Attaches, and Political, and Economic experts, examining in (Germanic) detail "the prospects of an attack on Singapore" by the Japanese.
Its "positive" conclusions were as follows (and I'm paraphrasing for brevity & to save time; emphasis mine throughout):
1) Chances of success are "favorable"--It would be carried out by stages from Saigon & landing on the Malay Peninsula, etc. "At present British forces of any kind are far inferior to available Japanese offensive forces and cannot be increased decisively in a short time. The same case holds true for addition of American forces in the Western Pacific..."
2) Conquering Singapore would have the effect of a) giving J. leadership in Greater E. Asia Sphere. NEI no longer able to resist J. pressure.
b) It would aid conclusion of China Incident. (Germans very much in error here, but so were the J.)
c) Acquisition of raw materials for J.'s war economy--However, the Germans (rightly) saw J.'s economic exploitation of conquered regions as inefficient and wasteful.

For the Germans & Italians, the main advantage to J.'s ascendance in the east would be "pressure...on the Indian Ocean and India, the main British supply area [to Africa & the Med]...The main disadvantage lies in an extension of the war, contrary to our efforts so far..."

The Germans/Ott saw very lucidly that if Japan brought the eastern conflict to a close within a year--not more--she might succeed. She hadn't more than "approximately 1 year's war supplies" by their reckoning. A good estimate in the end.

FWIW


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Zaf1
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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#18

Post by Zaf1 » 23 Jul 2010, 17:38

Hi cstunts

Thanks for the information. In 1936-37 Japan was heavily involved on the China front. Are there reason for the Japanese to consider GB as an enemy in military planning. I think Britain begin to build fortification on Singapore around 1939 due to the Japanese expansion southward in China and French Indo-China was yet to fall to the Germans and was a deterrence for the Japanese. Although it is mainly an Army operation did the Navy had some strategy since the Royal Navy was also quite strong. In 1940 when the planning was being made are there some sort of agreement reached with the Thais since they wanted to land on southern Thailand to advance towards northern Malaya. The Thais fought a conflict with the French Indo-China and the Japanese had played a mediator role.

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Zaf

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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#19

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 24 Jul 2010, 15:47

Hi SVaaka
SVaaka wrote:I think main reason for this was plain and simply - lack of spirit to fight.
Sorry I can't go with this. Fighting spirt was there throughout the camapaign amoung the Indian, British and Australian troops. There are plenty of examples of heroic endeavour.
SVaaka wrote: Plenty of AA, reasonable number of good artillery supported by good number of mortars and enough Antitan-guns.
The amount of AA guns provided were way below the planned level, and most were only 3 inch AA Guns. The Japanese bombers simply flew above their ceiling range. AA cover outside of Singapore was almost non existent, few airfields had much more than a few twin Lewis guns for AA defence.

Most of the Artillery arrived in the November of 1941, less than a month before the Japanese invasion. No effective training between them and the Infantry Brigades was done due to lack of time. Some artillery Regiments only had 2 battery's, instead of the normal 3. Many were equipped with the 4.5 inch How, and not the 25 Pounders. The British mixed up the battery's, so Artillery Regiments became a mix of both 25 Pdr and 4.5 Inch How battery's. The Australian batterys were only equipped with 25 pdrs in the December!

That said, much of the campaign was best suited to Mortars, with ranges being short, and in jungle. Again the British had a shortage of 3 inch motars, many of these also only arriving just before the fighting. Motar ammunition had been short and very little practice given as a result.

The Japanese were well aware of the Britsh doctrine of fighting with fixed defences, and well supported with artillery, and did their best not to get into this kind of a battle. Only at Kampar was the British able to fight with their strengths.

Anti-Tank defence was another matter. There was a shortage of the Boyes Anti-Tank rifle, and again little training, while initially there was only 1 Anti-Tank Regiment of 48 x 2 pdr guns (newly arrived in the November). However I agree it is fair to criticise how the British conducted anti-tank defence. The terrain limited the Japanese tanks to the roads for most of the time, and this should have significently helped the British. A combination of AT Rifles, 2 Pdr AT guns, AT mines, along with road blocks should have stopped the spectacular successes the Japanese tanks had.
SVaaka wrote: and it is the will to win and certainly good leaders which british did not have.


Well we have a few threads discussing the British leaders and their decisions

British Commanders Singapore
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3&t=164793

Australian Troops in Malaya
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=33&t=85169

Operation Matador
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=157094

Steve
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SVaaka
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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#20

Post by SVaaka » 25 Jul 2010, 04:13

Hi Coxy

Incase the Japs report of captured arms in Singapore is not false, British and others had plenty moore aa, arty and atg in Singapore than you claim. Numbers are so huge compared to area defended - it seems that it was nearly impossible for Japs to cross over to Singapore. Neither were the numbers of Japs bombers or other aircraft in the area so huge that they could have seriously damaged Singapores defence with this number of aa-guns. So is the repport just a paper without any trace of truth or ? Heck if it is true there were certainly moore aa-guns in Singapore alone in 1942 than in whole Finland in 1939-1940.

SVaaka

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Zaf1
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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#21

Post by Zaf1 » 25 Jul 2010, 17:11

Hi SVaaka,

I think that most of the A/A gunners were mainly the inexperienced and untrained Indian gunners. On the very first night the Japanese bombers attacked Singapore the RAF had night fighters. These could have flown and attacked the Japanese bombers but were not allowed to fly because they might be shot down by the inexperienced A/A gunners.

I read that in the last days of the battle the A/A gunners were pressed into service as infantries

Regards

Zaf

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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#22

Post by SVaaka » 25 Jul 2010, 19:13

Hi Zaf1,

Incase all the force of Jap airforces had in Java were those 93 Ki43, 44 and A6M I-line fighter supported by dated 135 Ki 27 and A5M fighters, 80 Ki-30, Ki51 and Ki-36 lightbombers and 200 Ki-21, Ki48, 72 G3M and G4M mediums all with very moderate carrying capeability of bombs, this was probably in the beginning of Java campaign - like told in previous topics - so the Japs did not have so overwhelming airsupermacy over Java or Singapore. Probably some of these planes were lost and possibly in the end of capaign many needed maintenance.
If these nubers given by Peters document of the aa-guns in Singapore are correct, there were 48 new 3,7" , 19 obsolete 3" Vickers, two 4,5" new heavyantitank guns, possibly over 70 ( or 69+ 80 ) new Bofors 40 mm, 35 obsolete 37mm Vickers Pom Poms + aa-mashineguns in Singapore. In my opinion that is a hell if a force. And according to japs report they had plenty of ammo - even antipersonel ammo for those old 76 mm Vickers aa-guns. About the fact that were the guncrews lacking experience or not, I cannot say anything else, but those finnish troops which recieved 24 of these same model 76mm Vickers guns or 40 mm Bofors guns were also lacking experience or proper training and they had quite larger area to defend - and much much much less guns and much moore planes too shoot down and in most cases planes with much heavier load and better fighter support. And as far as I understand from the repport, these british aa-guns were backed up by a radar.
About reason why aa-gunners were pressed into service as infanteries, I can just make a wild quess - There was nothing in the air to shoot down.
I do not care to list all the field artillery pieces mentioned in Japs report, but say just if these numbers are right, there was moore arty in Singapore than Three FA divisions had during the Winter War, Plenty of mortars and same number of Anti-Tank guns that whole FA had in the beginning of The Winter War supported by quite a many Boys-rifles.
In my opinion after reading this document, I am convinced that British and their allyes in Singapore did have all to win the situation, but thay still had the Gallipoli-syndrome, first nice successfull landing. Then makeing a cup of tee and waiting enamy inforcements to arrive and then get beaten like hell. Like in Gallipoli during WW I.



Regards

SVaaka

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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#23

Post by Zaf1 » 26 Jul 2010, 16:34

Hi SVaaka,

There are some major differences between these battles. The Finns were fighting for their homeland and the winter condition had affected the battle condition. The Russian although far larger army were also weakened by Stalin's purge which effectively made their army commanders at all level weak. This does shows just how much the love of one's homeland had affected the morale of the battle. The British soldiers in Singapore consist mainly of colonial troops which were not very keen because they focus more on their own land elsewhere. The local Malay soldiers although not many had fought to the last on the island.

The reason the A/A gunners were pressed into service as infantries in the last days in Singapore in 1942 was because the army had lost many troops in battles on the mainland and on the island itself.

You are quite right about the attitude of the British that they had under estimated their enemy and were unpleasantly surprised by supposedly inferior force.

Regards

Zaf

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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#24

Post by Zaf1 » 27 Jul 2010, 00:26

Hi SVaaka,

You had mentioned that the British had some sort of syndrome during the Malayan campaign. The British commander Lt-Gen A.E. Percival himself had described it ' Nevertheless, both during the period before the war and during the campaign itself, an artificial and unwarlike atmosphere prevailed throughout Malaya'

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Zaf

Sid Guttridge
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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#25

Post by Sid Guttridge » 27 Jul 2010, 15:05

Malaya was being used by the British as a training area and source of manpower for other theatres. Regular units had already been drained of much experienced manpower and reinforcements were generally raw. It was a bit like Germany giving over a theatre of war to its Ersatzheer rather than the Feldheer. The poor British performance was undoubtedly embarrassing, but it was not that extraordinary in hindsight.

And credit where credit is due, the Japanese had a first rate commander, experienced troops and performed well, despite severe logistical problems themselves.

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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#26

Post by Zaf1 » 28 Jul 2010, 00:15

Hi Scirburniensis,

That's a fair view, thanks.

Regards,

Zaf

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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#27

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 28 Jul 2010, 00:46

Hi Scirburniensis (interesting name!) I agree with Zaf re your comments. Do you think the Japanese forcast for the capture of Singapore in 100 days was a reasonable one, and so doing it in 70 days a surprise?

Steve
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#28

Post by Sid Guttridge » 28 Jul 2010, 11:22

I don't think any such forecasts are reasonable. There are too many imponderables in war and forecasts set up too many artificial deadlines that soldiers get unecessarily killed in trying to achieve.

I have Masonobu Tsuji's book somewhere, but I haven't read it recently, so I can't recall if 100 days was a forecast, or a planning aim.

In either case, I would suggest that anything in the 70-130 day range is much of a muchness. War is not a science. The Japanese achieved their goal with a bit of time to spare, but only by the skin of their teeth. Their position on Singapore Island at the end was pretty precarious and early surrender depended on breaking the British command's will.

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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#29

Post by Peter H » 28 Jul 2010, 12:17

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SVaaka
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Re: The surprising fall of Singapore

#30

Post by SVaaka » 28 Jul 2010, 16:46

Yep. I think all that could go not so well for the brits just went wrong. All possiabilities existed to keep Singapore, but they were just lost mainly by bad command. There has been lot of writing about costal-artillery and it´s capeability to fire to mainland, but according to this japs document, this was not even needed. There was plenty of arty to shoot Japs to kingdom come and certainly enough aa-artillery to cover them and defending footsoldiers. Even lack of antitankguns seems not to exist. Enamy artilleryfire and airbombardment can effect quite hard to defending troops, but in this case seems that japanese did not have enough ammo for artillery, neither were their airforces by number or quality close let us say german-standards to make efficent dive-bombardment against british positions. Planes were not so many, they had poor bombloads and mainly could be used as arialbombardment to with pin point accuracy against small targets well defended. And certainly british did have lot of time to prepair good defencepositions - meaning to dig in to the ground...Hmm... may be they didn´t have showels :) .Only one lack I found in british armament in this document - was lack of lightmashineguns which must have been one reason failing in defence against japanese mass infantry attacks.
But how an earth did japanese forces success crossing over to Singapore? This kind of amfibious operation is allways full of hazzards and extreamly costly for attacker - in case there is some one at the opposit bank with plenty of rifles, handgrenades and mashineguns, with support of arty, mortars and so.

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