The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

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Graham B
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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#61

Post by Graham B » 02 Dec 2010, 13:26

I think you're right Tim, Britain was not to know that Japan was going to attack. Britain was so heavily 'up against it' elsewhere that it really didn't want to think about war with Japan.
I may be wrong, but I often read (between the lines) Britain's position more as one of denial that Japan would attack, rather than one of a logical determination of Japan's intent. Hence the playing down through intelligence reports of Japan's combat capability (despite evidence to the contrary).
Churchill was certainly pleased that they attacked the US, bringing them into the war. How different might it have been if they had restricted their attack to British interests in the Far East?

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Tim Smith
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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#62

Post by Tim Smith » 04 Dec 2010, 23:54

I think if the Japanese had attacked only the British and Dutch colonies, leaving the Philippines and other US islands alone, this would still bring in the US against Japan eventually. Perhaps not immediately, Roosevelt might need a few months to persuade Congress to declare war, but in the end the US wasn't prepared to stand aside and let Japan do whatever she wanted in the Pacific as long as she left US possessions alone. US policy concerning Japan wasn't just about self-defence, it was about limiting Japanese power.


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Robert Rojas
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RE: The Great Myth Of Britain's "Great Betrayal".

#63

Post by Robert Rojas » 05 Dec 2010, 10:03

Greetings to citizen Tim Smith, the forum's British Commonwealth constituency and the community as a whole. Well sir, in respect to your installment of Saturday - December 04, 2010 - 10:54pm, old Uncle Bob would appreciate it if you would care to share your perceptions on what might trigger a bona fide casus belli specifically between the United States of America and the Imperial Japanese Empire. In otherwords, what particular action OR actions would the warlords of Dai Nihon have to invoke in order to clearly persuade the Roosevelt Administration to actively seek a formal declaration of war from the United States Congress? If the military junta in Tokyo should decide to studiously avoid an overt clash with the Roosevelt Administration ANYWHERE in greater Oceania, then I rather suspect (rightly OR wrongly) that the United States Congress will reject ANY formal request for a declaration of war against the Imperial Japanese Empire. On the otherhand, old yours truly could easily see the Roosevelt Administration adopting the same policy in the Pacific Ocean as it had already done in the Atlantic Ocean regarding its support of British Commonwealth interests across both Asia and the greater Pacific rim. With the United States Navy proactively "escorting" British Commonwealth merchant shipping to and from Australia and New Zealand, then a clash with elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy will all but be inevitable. The magnitude of such a maritime clash just might constitute the requisite casus belli the Roosevelt Administration would require to justify a formal declarartion of war against the land of the rising sun. Finally, on an incidental note anyway, I also rather imagine that the Roosevelt Administration will also pressure the Canadian Confederation to expand its commitment to the war effort of the British Commonwealth. The domestic machinations of Quebec notwithstanding, the whole of Canada could be contributing a greater share of manpower to the conflict in Europe and North Africa. This infusion of Canadian manpower would release Australian and New Zealand manpower for operations in Asia and the greater Pacific Rim. It's just some speculative, if not alternative, food for thought. Well, that's my latest two Yankee cents worth on this expansive topic of interest - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of the United Kingdom. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN - not to mention everybody else.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#64

Post by South » 05 Dec 2010, 10:20

Good morning all,

US "interests" were also heavily involved in the British and Dutch colonies.

For example, the marketing system of the western oil companies had the US oil companies in support of British and Dutch oil companies. US oil companies expressed this position on Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C.

Another example; US companies (part of the "interests" term) used Hong Kong BCC as an entropot and banking center for their China trade.

Plus, the US Pacific buffer zone would not allow a hostile power (Note that in 1936 Japan did sign the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany) near US territory, eg Territory of Hawaii, Territory of Alaska, Panama Canal Zone. The US was just not going to have Japan, with their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and League Manadates threaten US interests.

Note that in 1939 the US announced its intension to abrogate its Treaty of Commerce with Japan in 6 months.

Warm regards,

Bob

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Markus Becker
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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#65

Post by Markus Becker » 06 Dec 2010, 00:04

Graham B wrote: For its part, unaware of Britains real thoughts on Singapore, Australia upped its contribution of troops (8 Div) and aircraft (3 squadrons added then I think, but need to confirm timing).
Certainly Australia was naive and in retrospect should have yelled the obvious. But in any assessment you have to make an allowance for a young country with very strong and dependent ties to its former master.
During 1941 of course, Britain exported Hurricane fighters to Russia but could not spare any for the Far East, at least not until January 1942 when quite a few became available, but much too late then. Plus of course the Norfolk/Suffolk Brigades (18 Div I think) and AIF Divs released from the Middle East - but again, too late. What if they had been released during 1940/41?
I thought that report was just a report of the (sorry) state of the imperial defences in the Far East, not a political paper that stated the UK´s intention to abandon said Far East. The Japanese might have concluded that the Brits actually did just that but IIRC the British were just deceiving themselves about the intentions and capabilities of the Japanese.

The export of tanks and planes to the USSR was IMO justified. The Soviets tied down 100+ german divisions and if defeated would have provided Germany with vast resources. The Fall of the USSR would have been worse for the allied war effort than the fall of the Far East.

The really sad part is that the UK had the means to vastly strengthen the defenses of the Far East. I´m not talking about Spitfires, Hurricanes and elements of the AIF. Some of which could have been spared without adversely effecting the war effort in the UK and the Med.

Guess what the UK got from the USA right after the Fall of France? 204 late generation Curtiss Hawks with engines that were brand new and more powerful than the ones the Buffaloes got. An unknown number of ex-french Hawks also fell into the UK´s hands when their pilots escaped to UK controlled territory and last but not least another 36 were used by the Norwegians as advanced trainers in Canada.
In case you want bombers, how about 126 A-17A available right away plus 50 Vought Vindicators after May 1941?

Voila: The number of operational fighters has been tripled, the number of bombers doubled, the bomber force has plenty of spare planes and no other front has been weakened.

AA-guns could have been provided too. During the BoB 100 to 200 3 inch guns were still being used in the UK. They had an AA-ceiling of just 15k feet but that´s still a lot better than no AA at all. Add dispersal areas, blast pens and camouflage -all SOP in the UK and the Med- and the airfields would have been a lot harder to disable.

Now to the ground troops. There were really good ones around, the two brigades of the 8th AUS but they were stuck doing beach defense in the Mersing area. Find two additional second rate brigades and the Aussies can be relieved and send north. How about two African Brigades? The campaign in Ethiopia died down after mid-May, so there was time for a redeployment.


I don´t think anything I suggested would have required hindsight or hand-waving, just the realization that any enemy can take action you do not expect.

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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#66

Post by Graham B » 07 Dec 2010, 13:40

Markus,
Yes, exactly, the report was on the state of Far East defences. No suggestion otherwise. It would have given Japan a huge boost, and no doubt would have surprised Brit's allies, like Australia, who only heard Britain talk up Far East defences, and who was pouring forces into Singapore in good faith.
Betrayal - what betrayal?

I can't grasp why Britain couldn't afford to send some of the forces built up in the UK - a couple of DIVs (relieved by those from Ethiopia maybe, as you identify) and a couple of squadrons from Bomber Command. Even a couple of the numerous Australian squadrons in the UK. Sure, I understand Britain's fear of invasion, but that had faded greatly by mid 1941.
I'm keen to hear more about the Curtiss Hawk and A-17. Are they the P-36 fighter? Do you know what use they had in UK? (I guess fighter command, but any info you can provide would be great - need reference for book I'm working on). That's interesting you flag AA and dispersal pens etc. That (their lack of) really surprised the Australians in Malaya - they expected ground/passive defences and were pretty peeved about its non-existence. Are you suggesting that the RAF had surplus in the UK, after the Battle of Britin? Interesting if so, it would have made a difference, at least for a while in places like Butterworth, Kuantan, KL and Johore Bahru.

On the US. I'm not sure that they had any interest in defending UK and Dutch colonial interests in the Far East, or elsewhere for that matter. They certainly had major concerns about the invasion of and war in China. From what I've read, they saw China as a potential great friend (until nationalist Chiang grew support). I'm with Uncle Bob in thinking that, without Pearl Harbor and Philippines, the US would have kept its distance. Convoy escorts perhaps, like in the Atlantic. And perhaps a ship sunk might have drawn them in, but assumedly they had already considered such an event in the Atlantic. It's all hypothetical anyway.

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Markus Becker
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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#67

Post by Markus Becker » 07 Dec 2010, 14:37

Graham B wrote: I can't grasp why Britain couldn't afford to send some of the forces built up in the UK - a couple of DIVs (relieved by those from Ethiopia maybe, as you identify) and a couple of squadrons from Bomber Command. Even a couple of the numerous Australian squadrons in the UK. Sure, I understand Britain's fear of invasion, but that had faded greatly by mid 1941.
Like I said, they could have affored to send more than one division indeed, even from the UK. I think the official history from the 50s admitted there would be no risk of invasion until the summer of 1942, provided the USSR had been defeated by that time. So post June 21st 1941 the UK had not much to fear from Germany for almost a year.


I'm keen to hear more about the Curtiss Hawk and A-17. Are they the P-36 fighter? Do you know what use they had in UK? (I guess fighter command, but any info you can provide would be great - need reference for book I'm working on).
The Hawk-75 is the P-36. The A-4 version had a Wright Cyclone that generated 1,200hp at take off and 15k feet, top speed at that altitude was 323mph. 6*.303 guns, armour, internally sealed tanks. The plane had racks for four light bombs. The plane was also a fast climber. More details on that when I´m home.

The planes were not used for anything right after delivery. They were tested, considered superior to a Hurricane, inferior to a Spit and put into storage. Seems strange but 200 a/c were nothing compared to the UK´s monthly fighter production(450). Take into consideration that no UK pilot or mechanic knew the plane and the engine and the UK tools could not be used for US planes and not using them operationally in the UK made sense.

Later half were shipped to South Africa as fighter trainers, two dozen to Aden as fighters -they might have participated in the EA campaign- and the rest to India, also as trainers. That was probably sometime in 1941 and could have been done by Miles Masters or the Buffaloes.

That's interesting you flag AA and dispersal pens etc. That (their lack of) really surprised the Australians in Malaya - they expected ground/passive defences and were pretty peeved about its non-existence. Are you suggesting that the RAF had surplus in the UK, after the Battle of Britin? Interesting if so, it would have made a difference, at least for a while in places like Butterworth, Kuantan, KL and Johore Bahru.
Yes, the official history of the war said they were still used by the Army during the Blitz for morale reasons(to show the people that something fired back). Here are some links with further info:

Naval guns: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_3-45_mk1.htm

other: http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php? ... &Itemid=58
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QF_3_inch_20_cwt

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Peter H
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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#68

Post by Peter H » 08 Dec 2010, 12:25

Re Dutch East Indies and the USA in late 1941.

According to this 1948 article by Sherman Miles ( http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/shermanm.htm ):

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/arc ... pect/5485/
On November 26 the Japanese ambassadors in Washington, in a radio to Tokyo, spoke, in passing, of the possibility of a British and American military occupation of the Netherlands East Indies. Tokyo promptly picked up that "very important matter" and radioed back on the 27th to find out "more about it." (It had, in fact, been discussed in Washington, but not approved.) On the 27th, and again on the 28th, the Japanese ambassadors radioed their belief that it might come about.

Now, with that background, read (as we did) all of what Tokyo, on November 30, told its Ambassador in Berlin to say to Hitler and Ribbentrop: "Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms, and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."

Projected on the background of the idea of American occupation of the Dutch islands, which apparently Tokyo had accepted, this famous clue takes on quite a different complexion. It is certainly hard to read into it a warning of so premeditated an attack, on Japanese initiative, as that which had, in fact, already been launched on the high seas...

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Markus Becker
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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#69

Post by Markus Becker » 08 Dec 2010, 13:38

Some additional info and corrections taken from “Curtiss Fighter Aircraft: A Photographic History, 1917-1948”:

The A-4´s engine generated 1,000hp not 1,200 at 15k ft. They had no factory installed bomb racks but retrofitting was easy. Underwing racks for bombs up to 100lb were almost a standard item on any US made fighter since the 1920s.
Climb time to that altitude was 4,9 minutes. This and a max. fuel capacity of 168 US gal. gives me the impression that the plane had not factory installed armour and self-sealing tanks. If so, the cimb time would drop but on the other hand the French asked for cockpit armour as soon as the first A-1 saw action.
90 planes were supposed to be send to the Middle East, most of them eventually ended up equipping one OUT and two fighter sqn. in India but the units did not become operational until the spring of 1942. Another 90 went to South Africa, 24 to Aden and Portugal got 16 in 1941. In august of that year the USSR and the UK invaded Iran and nine more Hawks in their crates were captured by the UK´s forces.

The Norwegian Hawks were of two different versions. The A-6 was inferior to the A-4 and made only 311mph@10k ft, the A-8 was like the A-4 but it was better armed. Two cal.50 and four cal.30 machine guns, ten under wing racks for small bombs and two for large ones. In the book small bomb means anything up to 100lb, so the large bombs weighted probably 100 kilos(!) or more. The planes were all delivered to Canada in November 1940.

Last but not least, what kind of book are you working on?

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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#70

Post by Graham B » 09 Dec 2010, 13:40

Many thanks Markus. My book is on Australian involvement in the disastrous Far East air battle. I'm still researching, but the questions of force size, availability of more forces and were they appropriate, will undoubtedly arise.
I've read several options/comments from various writers about what could have been released - most suggest the Middle East, others suggest UK. Quite a few are critical of Bomber Command securing the bulk of air resources and of exports to Russia. Yours is the first mention I've seen of the Hawk - that's great for me, more food for thought.
Interestingly, today I picked up a book bought for research that I hadn't yet touched. An oldie (1977) by Louis Allen (Politics and Strategy of WWII - Singapore 1941-1942), one in a series I believe.
Allen quotes Southby (MP) in February 1942: 'One month's supply of the aircraft sent to Russia would have saved Malaya'.
He then writes agast that Churchill wasn't challenged when he advised the House of the fall of Penang, indignant that an escapee dared to critise the absence of AA ('where should we have been ... if we spread our limited aa through the immense and vulnerable points of the Far East', he quotes Winston). Obviously Louis Allen agrees your point on AA, and infers the House knew it.

Another interesting point from Allen that I haven't seen (or noticed) before - of all the appreciations done on defending Singapore in staff colleges and by various Defence staffs, the one that pretty much got it right was by Vieland, a civil servant who was Secretary for Defence, Malaya (ie. colonial office) until early 1941. He reckoned that an invasion would be from north Malaya, and that it had to be stopped in north west Malaya on the flat plains, otherwise it would succeed because there was no other terrain suitable to stop them (simple description).

Thanks again,
Graham

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Markus Becker
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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#71

Post by Markus Becker » 09 Dec 2010, 15:03

Graham B wrote:
Another interesting point from Allen that I haven't seen (or noticed) before - of all the appreciations done on defending Singapore in staff colleges and by various Defence staffs, the one that pretty much got it right was by Vieland, a civil servant who was Secretary for Defence, Malaya (ie. colonial office) until early 1941. He reckoned that an invasion would be from north Malaya, and that it had to be stopped in north west Malaya on the flat plains, otherwise it would succeed because there was no other terrain suitable to stop them (simple description).

Thanks again,
Graham
That fits into what I read so far. Malaya´s eastern coast was "bare", no major towns, ports, poor lines of communications. The only place to land south of Kota Bharu was the area around Endau and Mersing, where the 8th AUS was initially stationed.

Plane-wise the situation of the bomber force was probably worse than that of the fighters. The Buffaloes suffered from their defective engines that prevented them from being effective but at least there were 52 spares for the 60 operational planes. But there were just 15 spare Blenheims and 7 Hudsons for 39 and 24 operational planes. 120 A-17 split 50/50 would have kept the bomber force intact for a much longer time. The 112 Buffaloes lastet until the Fall of Singapore.

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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#72

Post by takata_1940 » 10 Dec 2010, 07:44

Hello,
Markus Becker wrote:Some additional info and corrections taken from “Curtiss Fighter Aircraft: A Photographic History, 1917-1948”:
The A-4´s engine generated 1,000hp not 1,200 at 15k ft. They had no factory installed bomb racks but retrofitting was easy. Underwing racks for bombs up to 100lb were almost a standard item on any US made fighter since the 1920s. Climb time to that altitude was 4,9 minutes. This and a max. fuel capacity of 168 US gal. gives me the impression that the plane had not factory installed armour and self-sealing tanks. If so, the cimb time would drop but on the other hand the French asked for cockpit armour as soon as the first A-1 saw action.
Those 204 British H-75A-4, or H-751 in French designation, were the reliquat of the French Curtiss orders undelivered at Armistice time. In June 1940, 81 in total were receptionned by France - metropole (28) or overseas (Morocco, Martinique) out of 285. None could be assembled in time for being used during the campaign but several were assembled and flown direct to North-Africa in order to avoid capture, some still boxed were assembled by the Germans later.

The Wright Cyclone R-1820 G205A engine was different from the previous Pratt & Whitney R-1830 SCG or SC3G from A1, A2 & A3 series. Despite being rated for take off at 1,200 hp (but 1,050 nominal), this was not an improvement over the previous series (no test made, but from pilots testimonies). It was more draggy as its engine had a larger diameter. In fact, the best performers (climb & agility) were the first series A-1 & A-2 with four guns and SCG engine. They were lighter but seriously undergunned. A-2 & A-3, equiped with SC3G, were slightly faster at altitude but climb rate, agility and cieling was degraded (3 mn 18s vs. 2 mn 28s @ 3,000 m; 16 mn 47s vs. 14 mn 57s @ 8,000 m). Top speed was under 500 km/h at 5,000 m (491 km/h vs 483 km/h). Fuel capacity (all airframes) was 376 liters normal or 600 liters maximum using the back tank, providing an above 4 hrs autonomy.

This "new" A-4 was sold by Curtiss as a stop gap for P&W shortages due to emergency for the French which had P-40s to be delivered next in July (Curtiss produced also this Wright engine). It was advertised at 520 km/h but this was not proved to be the case later. Finally, the most disapointing fact was revealed when one was trying to make aerobatics figures in A-4... engine's lubrification failed, killing it. None survived 50 flight hours flown carefully but most failed way before that point. Consequently, they were disassembled and used as spare parts for A1-A3. A couple were refitted with P&W engines at the end of the war, including the one still flying today as an A-1 (N°82). It is said that eventually a solution for this issue was found by the South African which used it and this was certainly applied to this Indian stock. Nonetheless, it could not be used straight away after arrival in Britain without changing French equipment (like seat, throttle, instruments..) and add GFE (guns, radios, gunsights...). Maybe the armor plates were French also, but it had one, and also self-sealing tanks.

Beside, most specs and details published before lately (Lionel Persyn 2008 book, Lela Press), were not correct as they were taken from P-36s series and not from the actual French ordered ones.

S~
Olivier

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Markus Becker
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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#73

Post by Markus Becker » 12 Dec 2010, 14:59

That would explain why the Dutch Hawks are critizised as unreliable in "Bloody Shambles Vol.1", while not one bad word is written in Vol.3 about the ones of the RAF. But how do the US Buffaloes fit into that? They too had Wright Cyclones - R-1820-34 and -40 - and I don´t recall any complaints about the engines. Generally poor workmanship, late delivery and undercarriage defects yes but nothing about the engines.

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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#74

Post by takata_1940 » 13 Dec 2010, 06:21

Markus Becker wrote:That would explain why the Dutch Hawks are critizised as unreliable in "Bloody Shambles Vol.1", while not one bad word is written in Vol.3 about the ones of the RAF. But how do the US Buffaloes fit into that? They too had Wright Cyclones - R-1820-34 and -40 - and I don´t recall any complaints about the engines. Generally poor workmanship, late delivery and undercarriage defects yes but nothing about the engines.
Maybe some production issue related to this specific export engine serie? It seems that all other series (A7-A8-A9) with the same Wright engine were also affected. All were produced in a row. It might be due also to this airframe fittings. I believe that the exact cause was never sorted out.
S~
Olivier

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Re: The Great Myth of Britain's "Great Betrayal"

#75

Post by Zaf1 » 15 Dec 2010, 19:35

Hi,

Did the US was deterred by the Tripartite Pact agreement with Germany from attacking the Japanese if only the British and Dutch were attacked by the Japanese in the Far East?

Regards

Zaf

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