MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

[Delta Tank]

To all,
I thought I would post the quote from the oral history that Admiral van Deurs gave back in 1975 if I recall correctly. This is the quote that E. B. Potter used in his book entitled “Bull Halsey”.

Q: Oh, you were still part of the Seventh Fleet.
Van Deurs: We were operating as part of the Seventh Fleet. The fast carriers and the fast battleships were operating separately under Nimitz. Part of that crossup that everybody made much of was a lot of misunderstanding. MacArthur was so damned insistent on having his own fleet and his own people that he wouldn’t let, would not have any direct channel of communication between Halsey and the Seventh Fleet. There were no radio channels set up. Halsey was working for Nimitz, and so MacArthur wouldn’t include him in any of the operations plans. They had this long complicated communications plan for the Seventh Fleet, that included us and all the amphibious things and so on, but there was no setup for that outfit to communicate directly with Halsey.

Now the principal actors in this drama were all dead when this oral history was done and as far as I can tell E. B. Potter was the first one to put it in print in 1985. None of the principal actors ever stated, as far as I can find, that the communications failure was General MacArthur's fault.
Admiral Kincaid died November 1972
Admiral Halsey died August 1959
Admiral Nimitz died February 1966
General MacArthur April 1964
Admiral King June 1956

Mike

[Mil-tech Bard]

Delta Tank,

According to CHAPTER VIII "Communications in the Southwest Pacific to Mid-1944" in the US Army WW2 Green book "The Technical Services THE SIGNAL CORPS: THE OUTCOME ( Mid-1943 Through 1945) by George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, Adm Halsey had a direct communication line to MacArthur.

See Page 242

An activity wherein direct control and quick action were peculiarly necessary was signal intelligence, one of the SWPA chief signal officer's large responsibilities.General Akin arranged for the direct and immediate provision of intercepted information to the commanders who were empowered to act thereon. To this end he attached signal intelligence elements to the commanders' headquarters or located them nearby. He assigned a signal intelligence detachment to Admiral Halsey's flagship, at the admiral's request. Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, when he took command of the Fifth Fleet in SWPA, found this Army service so valuable that he continued to keep the signal specialists on duty with him. Similar units were likewise attached to AAF advanced headquarters as well as to ground force commands, and were always sufficiently close at hand so that information from their intercept sources could be acted upon immediately.

You can be damned well certan that this Mac Arthur ot Halsey ULTRA intelligence direct line was being used during Leyte.

This Admiral van Deurs you are quoting is either lying, or unknowingly repeating a lie from someone else.

[Takao]

Mil-tech bard,

You either misread or misinterpreted Admiral van Deurs statement. He was not saying that there was no direct line of communication between MacArthur & Halsey, he is saying that there was no direct line of communication between 7th Fleet & Halsey.

[Delta Tank]

To all,

While thumbing through my book entitled, "Leyte: The Return to the Philippines" by M. Hamlin Cannon (a Green Series book) I read the footnote on page 89, where it mentioned two books that the passage was from. The two books are: James Field's "the Japanese at Leyte Gulf" and C. Vann Woodward's "The Battle for Leyte Gulf", does anyone own those books and if so what do they say about the communications or lack of between 7th and 3d Fleets? I ordered both books tonight, so in a week or so I hope to report back.

Mike

[Delta Tank]

Mil-tech bard,

You either misread or misinterpreted Admiral van Deurs statement. He was not saying that there was no direct line of communication between MacArthur & Halsey, he is saying that there was no direct line of communication between 7th Fleet & Halsey.

Just so no one is confuse, IF there was not a direct line of communications it was because the US Navy's leadership on the scene of action decided not to have a direct line of communications! This fault IF it occurred was not GENERAL MACARTHUR'S FAULT BUT THE FAULT OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! All indications that I have seen show that the US Navy did have communications between the 3d and 7th Fleet, but due to their incompetence it did not work properly. Because this is an embarrassing episode in US Naval History an obscure retired Admiral decided to blame it on MacArthur in 1974 or 1975 during an oral history interview, without showing documentation or proof of any kind, after everyone that could refute his assertions were dead!!! Then E. B. Potter put it in his book on Halsey and every "historian' after his book was published, doing due diligence and original research, repeated this lie and it has been repeated sooooooooo many times in other books that it has become a "fact", due to repetition!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Unless someone can show evidence that MacArthur forbade communications between 3d and 7th Fleet, which by the way he could not order Halsey to do anything, (small minds tend to forget this part) by a credible source, this will go down as another myth of World War II!!!!

Mike

[steverodgers801]

McArthur, Halsey, King and Nimitz all deserve blame. MacArthur did not allow Kinkaid to work with Halsey and Nimitz. Halsey was not aware that Kinkaid was low on ammo after the fight. They could communicate, but Halsey could not pass on orders. Halsey did not ensure that Kuritas force did in fact retreat. King allowed Kinkaid's ships to be detached from naval command, Nimitz knew that Halsey would go after carriers and did not make it clear that ships should have been left behind.

[Delta Tank]

McArthur, Halsey, King and Nimitz all deserve blame. MacArthur did not allow Kinkaid to work with Halsey and Nimitz. Halsey was not aware that Kinkaid was low on ammo after the fight. They could communicate, but Halsey could not pass on orders. Halsey did not ensure that Kuritas force did in fact retreat. King allowed Kinkaid's ships to be detached from naval command, Nimitz knew that Halsey would go after carriers and did not make it clear that ships should have been left behind.

And your source is???? If you have read this thread MacArthur did in fact allow Kinkaid to work with Halsey, in fact IIRC, I posted it in this thread that they actually met and discussed the operation.

Mike

[Delta Tank]

This is a re-post of a post in this thread.

The following is from the book entitled: "Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet, A Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, U. S. Navy" by Gerald E. Wheeler. ISBN 1-55750-936-0, page 38

By the end of August, Kinkaid had made all command arrangements. Neither MacArthur nor Nimitz had objections, Kinkaid would be seeing Halsey in Manus on 4 September to work out their plans for coordinating activities and to borrow his Amphibious Force, including Wilkinson. . . "

As we can see from this passage, MacArthur not only forbade Kinkaid to talk to Halsey he also interfered with their plans!! I am having to much fun!! How so many people would believe this myth is just beyond belief!! If some navy admiral would of said that MacArthur had a tail and worshiped the devil and boiled young children and eat them for breakfast, it would be in print and believed!!

How any responsible "historian" could fall for this myth is, well, mystifying!!

Mike

[Mil-tech Bard]

Delta Tank said:

>>>How any responsible "historian" could fall for this myth is, well, mystifying!!

It's not "mystifying" it's MARKETING.

You sell more military history books running down MacArthur -- and Lord he earned a lot of running down -- than pointing out Admirals Nimitz, Halsey and Kinkaid were less than perfect at Leyte.

[steverodgers801]

Delta I said he couldnt pass on orders not communicate.

[Delta Tank]

Delta I said he couldnt pass on orders not communicate.

What order could Halsey had possibly given that would of changed the situation? I will try to post how much ammo was on board the old BBs after their battle with the Southern Force, it is in the US Navy's Official History IIRC.

Mike

[Delta Tank]

To all,

Ammunition on Oldendorf's Battle Line after defeating the Southern Force. From the book entitled "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Leyte, June 1944-January 1945" by Samuel Eliot Morison, page 294-295:

The following table tells the story of the battleships' main battery ammunition, which would have been crucial had they engaged Kurita: - (I am going to abbreviate the table and only show what they had and not what they expended)

16 inch (8 guns)
West Virginia AP 107 HC 172
Maryland AP 192 HC 445

14 Inch (12 guns)
Tennessee AP 327 HC 262
California AP 177 HC 78
Mississippi AP 189 HC 543
Pennsylvania AP 360 HC 14

It will be observed that Maryland, Tennessee and Pennsylvania had 24 rounds or better of AP per gun; Mississippi, 15 3/4 rounds; West Virginia and California a trifle over 13 rounds per gun. Every gunnery officer wants his magazines full, but the shortage here was nothing to be alarmed about.

As we can see they had a good number of rounds, not as much as they may of wanted but enough to slow down the enemy battle line or even defeat it. I would think an HC round on a CA or a BB would do a tremendous amount of damage even if it could not penetrate the armor. I would imagine that an HC round, in sufficient quantities on a CL or DD would probably sink it.

Mike

[Takao]

Given that Sprague had umpteen CVEs at his command & more carrier aircraft than the Japanese had at Pearl Harbor, about the only thing the old BBs will be doing is picking up the pieces.

[Delta Tank]

Given that Sprague had umpteen CVEs at his command & more carrier aircraft than the Japanese had at Pearl Harbor, about the only thing the old BBs will be doing is picking up the pieces.

IIRC they did not have many torpedoes and AP bombs, but I am sure that GP bombs would do a lot of damage topside and would be enough to sink a destroyer.

Mike

[LWD]

... I would think an HC round on a CA or a BB would do a tremendous amount of damage even if it could not penetrate the armor. I would imagine that an HC round, in sufficient quantities on a CL or DD would probably ...

Against Yamato the HC rounds of the older battleships may have done more damage than the AP rounds. If the cruisers hadn't fired their torpedoes yet a hit in their vacinity would be enough to take out said cruiser. A few HC rounds hitting on or close to a cruiser would probably be enough to take them out of the fight. A single HC round might be enough to take out a DD.

Don't forget there were a lot of US DDs and DEs in the area that still had torpedoes as well.