MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
Mil-tech Bard
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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 04 Jun 2016 14:04

OpanaPointer wrote:Yeah, but very few who define the criteria.
Douglas MacArthur wasn't a button on the tunic of General and later Democratic presidential candidate during the Civil War George B. McClellan.

A Presidential candidate whose platform was pre-emptive surrender to a rebellion for the government he was running to head.

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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 04 Jun 2016 14:57

>>Mike the main component of 7th fleet were the old battleships

The main components of 7th Fleet were the (mostly landing) ships of the 7th Amphibious Force. The 7th Amphibious force amounted to three flotillas of LCTs, LCI Flotilla Seven, and LST Flotilla Seven, two US AKA, three Australian LSI and, from 2 October 1944 Jan 1945, six British LSI's.

At Lae in Sept 1943 there was a total of 12 American destroyers, 12 corvettes, five minesweepers and 63 transports and landing craft (including 13 LSTs, 20 LCIs and 23 LCTs).

With the closing down of the Solomon's campaign in late 1943/early 1944, newly appointed commander of 7th Fleet Adm Kincaid commanded 27 destroyers, 18 destroyer escorts, 30 submarines, 8 attack transports, 60 LCIs, 40 LSTs, and numerous support ships.

The cruiser force of 7th Fleet got shortly afterwards was 3-4 Cruisers with 1-2 Australian cruisers and two American six-inch gun light cruisers.

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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Delta Tank » 23 Jun 2016 14:38

To all,

I found this site and I posted it on another thread, but I thought it also belonged here: http://www.angelfire.com/fm/odyssey/Halsey_decision.htm
Mike

The following is quoted from the US Navy official history - "History of US Naval Operations in World War II" by Samuel Eliot Morison - Volume XII "Leyte," pages 193-7. The emphasis indicated by showing text in red and bold (or by underlining) is my own, not Morison's.
Dave James

Admiral Halsey's Decision
Admiral Halsey's reaction to these sightings and to the information already received about the Central and Southern Forces can best be stated in his own dispatch to Admiral Nimitz and General Macarthur at about 2200 October 25, after the battle was over: -

Searches by my carrier planes revealed the presence of the Northern carrier force on the afternoon of 24 October, which completed the picture of all enemy naval forces. As it seemed childish to me to guard statically San Bernadino Strait, I concentrated TF 38 during the night and steamed north to attack the Northern Force at dawn.

I believed that the Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet.

Accordingly, at 2022 October 24, Admiral Halsey ordered Bogan's Group 2 and Davison's Group 4 to steam north at 25 knots, join Sherman's Group 3 and attack Ozawa. McCain's Group 1, now returning northwesterly from the direction of Ulithi, was ordered to complete fueling and join the others.

By midnight 24-25 October fast carrier groups 2, 3 and 4, including Admiral Lee in Washington and Admiral Halsey in New Jersey and all their battleships and cruisers, were tearing north, just as the Japanese wanted them to do.

In the meantime, Kurita's Center Force, which Halsey had assumed to be no serious menace to Kinkaid, was debouching from San Bernadino Strait unopposed and even undetected.

Admiral Kinkaid assumed in his operation plan, "Any major enemy naval force approaching from the north will be intercepted and attacked by Third Fleet covering force." This was a natural interpretation of Halsey's orders from Nimitz to engage the enemy fleet if and when an opportunity occurred. But now that two major enemy forces were approaching from the north of Leyte Gulf, Halsey ignored the stronger and let it get between him and Seventh Fleet, Becuase he mistakenly assumed that it was the weaker, and "no serious menace." In other words, he made the same mistake that the Japanese higher command did about the air battle over Formosa, accepting aviators' reports of damage as actual damage.

It was not a case of either-or. Halsey had enough gun and air power to handle both Japanese forces. The alternative to rushing everything up north was not, as he said, "to guard statically San Bernadino Strait." Three groups of Task Force 34 (Battle Line, of which we shall hear more anon), had more than enough power to take care of Ozawa's 17 ships. Battle Line might have been detached to guard San Bernadino Strait, not statically but actively.

But Halsey wished to deal the Northern Force a really crushing blow. In every previous carrier action of the war - Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz and Philippine Sea - the Japanese, although badly mauled, had saved most of their ships. He was determined that this would not happen again. He expected that the Northern Force was planning to shuttle-bomb him by ferrying planes back and forth between carriers and airfields, as they had attempted to do in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

He felt it unwise to leave any considerable surface force to watch San Bernadino Strait without detaching one carrier group for air protection, which would weaken his striking power.

[Morison here has the following footnote - "Admiral Lee, however, said after the battle that he would have been only too glad to have been ordered to cover San Bernadino Strait without air cover."]

After all, the Northern Force was out in the Philippine Sea, "asking for it." The Center Force might never come out; and Halsey was no man to watch a rathole from which the rat might never emerge. He had just lost [the light carrier] Princeton to an air attack which he believed, erroneously, to have come from Ozawa. The quickened tempo of enemy air activity on the 24th seemed a presage of worse to come, and it was natural for Halsey to aim at annihilating the one sure source of Japanese air power, the carriers of the Northern Force. He did know, before ordering Task Force 38 north, that the Japanese Center Force had resumed course toward San Bernadino Strait; but still assumed that it was too "heavily damaged" to be a "serious menace" to Kinkaid.

At least three task force commanders were amazed and disturbed by Halsey's decision. Admiral Bogan even contemplated a protest.

After seeing aircraft reports to the effect that the Center Force had resumed an easterly course, he [Bogan] discussed the situation over TBS [voice radio] with Captain Ewen of Independence.Ewen not only confirmed the reports but mentioned the ominous fact that all navigation lights in San Bernadino Strait were brightly lit, after a long black-out. Bogan immediately drafted a message to Halsey incorporating this intelligence, then called him personally over TBS and read it. "A rather impatient voice" - of a staff officer, presumably - replied "Yes, yes, we have that information." Bogan was prepared to follow up with another message, recommending that Admiral Lee's Battle Line be formed with his TG38.2 [Bogan's own carrier group] as cover, letting Sherman's and Davison's groups handle Ozawa. But after that brush-off, he said no more.

Lee himself was an officer of alert mind and keen analytical sense, whose advice was often sought on strategy; but not now. Working on the mass of intelligence that reached [Washington's] flag plot, he had figured out that the Northern Force must be a decoy with little or no striking power, and that the earlier turn-around of the Center Force was temporary. Before sunset ended the opportunity of sending visual signals, Admiral Lee in Washington sent Admiral Halsey in New Jersey a message stating his views. No reply was made other than a perfunctory "Roger." After darkness descended and the Independence reports came in, Lee sent Halsey a message by TBS to the effect that he was certain Kurita was coming out. After that he kept silence.

CTF 39 [Commanding Officer Task Force 38 - the fast carrier force], Vice Admiral Mitscher in Lexington, by-passed for days by Admiral Halsey in issuing orders, had become little better than a passenger in his beloved Fast Carrier Forces Pacific Fleet. When, at 2029, he received Commander Third Fleet's [Halsey's] order to turn north, he inferred that Halsey intended to assume the tactical command in the following day's battle, and decided to turn in. As he left flag plot his chief of staff, Commodore Arleigh Burke, remarked "We'd better see where that [Japanese] fleet is." Mitscher assented.

A few minutes later, Burke received the Independence aircraft contact on Center Force "still very much afloat and still moving towards San Bernadino"; and at about 2305 a clarifying report came through. No doubt about it! Burke and Commander James Flatley, operations officer, thought it was imperative to detach Battle Line. The woke Mitscher up and urged him to "tell Halsey" to do so. "Does Admiral Halsey have that report?" said the task force commander. "Yes," said Flatley. "If he wants my advice he'll ask for it," said Mitscher. Then he rolled over and went back to sleep.

Thus three task groups of Third Fleet - 65 ships strong - went steaming north at 16 knots to engage the 17 ships of Ozawa's Northern Force, leaving nothing but empty air and ocean between the Seventh Fleet [the invasion fleet], in and around Leyte Gulf, and Kurita. His still powerful Center Force completed the transit of San Bernadino Strait at 0035 October 25, amazed to find nobody there to fight, and shaped a course for the rendezvous off Suluan with Nishimura [commanding the Japanese Southern Force].

The following is taken from Morison's summary of the outcome of the battle on pages 336-7 of the same volume -

The mighty gunfire of the Third Fleet's Battle Line, greater than that of the whole Japanese Navy, was never brought into action except to finish off one or two crippled light ships. That of the Seventh Fleet, although more fully utilised, engaged for only half an hour a minor part of the Japanese Fleet, of about one fifth its strength, and after that force had been crippled by two well-delivered torpedo attacks.

Despite this vast preponderance of power on the American side, the Japanese Center Force, comprising more than half the enemy's naval gunfire strength, and therefore a prize of the first importance, steamed undetected into gun range, caught Seventh Fleet by surprise and inflicted losses which fell short of a major catastrophe only by the resolute application of air power, aided by the self-sacrificing courage of a few destroyers and destroyer escorts.

The following is from Morison pages 289-294, under the heading "Responsibility and Reaction' -

Admiral Halsey's erroneous estimate that the Japanese Center Force had been too badly damaged to be a serious menace was the primary event in a chain of wrong assumptions . . .

At 0412 October 25, when sending Halsey news of the victory in Surigao Strait, Kinkaid added a query as to whether Task Force 34 was guarding San Bernadino Strait. Halsey did not receive this message until 0648, and at 0705 he sent the discouraging reply that TF 34 [Task Force 34] was with the fast carriers going north.

Six minutes earlier, the escort carriers had received a much more emphatic answer in the same sense from the muzzles of Kurita's guns.

That startling news was received by Captain Whitehead at 0700, and was referred imediately to Admiral Kinkaid, who says in his report -

"The first news of this enemy force was received on board the [Seventh Fleet] flagship about 0724 [sic] when CTU 77.4.3. [Clifton Sprague] reported he was under gunfire attack by four battleships, eight heavy cruisers and many destroyers, at a range of 30,000 yards. This was the first indication that the enemy's Central Force had succeeded in passing through San Bernadino Strait."

"Up to this time, from information available to Commander Seventh Fleet, it was assumed that Third Fleet forces were guarding the San Bernadino Strait position to intercept and destroy any enemy forces attempting to come through."

. . . Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague [afterwards] wrote with deep feeling on the failure of Admiral Halsey to guard the Strait; and his statement represents the reaction of most sailors in and around Leyte Gulf on 25 October:

"In the absence of any information that this exit was no longer blocked, it was logical to assume that our northern flank could not be exposed without ample warning ."

Too much confidence was placed by Seventh Fleet flag officers in what Halsey would do, and Halsey placed too much confidence in the preliminary assessments of his carrier pilots' flash reports of the Sibuyan Sea action on the 24th. Even the stationing of one destroyer off San Bernadino Strait to give warning would have helped the escort carrers;for if the Spragues [ T.L. Sprague and C.A.F. Sprague - the escort carrier group and unit commanders respectively ] had expected Kurita they would have tracked his force and stationed their units beyond his gunfire range.

And the following is from Morison, pages 329-331 -

If TF 34 (Task Force 34) had been detached a few hours earlier, after Kinkaid's first urgent request for help, and had left the destroyers behind, since their fueling caused a delay of over two hours and a half, a powerful battle line of six modern battleships under the command of Admiral Lee, the most experienced battle squadron commander in the Navy, would have arrived off San Bernadino Strait in time to have clashed with Kurita's Center Force . . .

. . . Apart from the accidents common in naval warfare, there is every reason to suppose that Lee would have crossed Kurita's T and completed the destruction of Center Force. As it was, Badger's TG34.5, consisting of only two battleships, three light cruisers and eight destroyers, was both too late and too weak for the work in hand. Supported by Bogan's carrier group it would doubtless have put up a good fight,but it would have been seriously outgunned by Kurita's four battleships. Halsey should have sent all Task Force 34 or nothing, and done it earlier. It is clear that his heart was with the carriers up north,although he himself gallantly sought action down south in New Jersey.

Delta Tank
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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Delta Tank » 23 Jun 2016 14:42

To all,
From the same site above, under the Admiral Halsey section:
"The difference between the two commanders [Halsey and Admiral Spruance] amazed those who worked under them. One officer said that in working for Halsey 'you never knew what you were going to do in the next five minutes or how you were going to do it . . . '

'I have never met a commander who did not prefer working under the methodical Spruance . . . '

'My feeling was one of confidence when Spruance was there and one of concern when Halsey was there.' "

[From "Admiral Raymond A. Spruance" by John F. Wukovits]

Mike

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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by steverodgers801 » 23 Jun 2016 20:18

Delta, yet it was Halsey's method that reinvigorated the south Pacific theater and helped turn the tide

Delta Tank
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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Delta Tank » 23 Jun 2016 22:50

Yes that is true, but what does that have to do with the subject of the thread? My most recent posts have to do with his judgment, which is pertinent. Do you have any information from his time in the South Pacific that refutes what is posted above?

Mike

Delta Tank
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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Delta Tank » 21 May 2019 14:01

To All,

I went to the Library of Congress, Madison Building, and read Boxes 35,36, and 37 of the William Frederick Halsey Papers, on 18 March 2019. I found no evidence that General MacArthur interfered with the US Navy’s communications plan, in fact I did not see MacArthur’s name on any of the documents that I read.

Items that I did find was correspondence discussing how to deal with Elliot Morrison’s book on Leyte Gulf and correspondence from Admiral Halsey to E. B. Potter disagreeing with a text book that he had written on Leyte Gulf for Midshipmen at the US Naval Academy. On one document Admiral Halsey stated that the battle would of been fought differently if the US Navy had one commander and not two.

The Fox Schedule was discussed in an After Action Review type document, and the following was discussed that the circuit was overloaded, too much administrative traffic, bad atmospherics, Japanese jamming, etc. The atmospherics were so bad the US Navy moved the Fox Schedule from Manus to Guam. This last action sort of cements my assertion that General MacArthur had nothing to do with US Navy internal communications, just as Morrison states in his book on Leyte Gulf.

If anyone has an idea on where I can look at the Library of Congress for more information, I can go back one day and try to find it. The people that work at the Library of Congress were very helpful and really easy to work with. It was a good day!

Mike

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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 27 May 2019 19:32

Delta Tank,

Thanks for the update!

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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 27 May 2019 19:54

Delta Tank,

Adm Halsey's complains about Fox Channel reflect the fact the US Navy was plug ignorant of ionospheric propagation conditions in the SWPA and was unwilling to learn from MacArthur's experts in the Australian Radio Research Board to deal with the issue prior to the Leyte Campaign.

The key for the Leyte campaign was the Imperial Japanese had figuring out the "longitudinal effect" on long range H/F radio transmission before the Anglo-American Allies in WW2 by about a year.

Squadron Leader A L Hall RAAF debuted the Australian discovery of how to work through the "longitudinal effect" in talks during the London & Washington Ionosphere conferences in March and April 1944 respectively. (See: CIC Combat Information Center Magazine, August 1944)

This is from S/L Hall's August 1944 CIC article:
Meteorology eliminates failures:

In the Australian theatre there exists a network of widely separated key meteorological stations which
interchange information by a W/T network with each other & then must inform all airfields within its
area of the synoptic charts. The frequencies used & their time of operation are all planned on the basis
of ionospheric predictions & no failures now arise (at first equipment in use could not reach sufficiently
low frequencies, but later equipment was installed eliminating the difficulty).

Direction finding saves planes:

In the SWPA high frequency direction finding is used as a navigational aid to aircraft & no heavy losses
have been experienced due to the selection of the wrong frequency, resulting in an aircraft being in the
skip zone. The SWPA has been divided into zones, time tables carefully drawn up & selected frequencies
laid down for each zone, thus ensuring that no aircraft shall be within skip of the D/F station at any time,
day or night. No failures have arisen except where instructions have been disobeyed, & frequencies
used involving skip (eg. A Hudson flight with 10 people aboard on a flight from Horn Island to Brisbane in
bad weather where the ground station would not accept the advice to go to a lower frequency because
of a fear of loss of communication with the plane which crashed) .

Operational Channels scientifically planned:

Just prior to the Coral Sea Battle, a meeting was hastily called at General MacArthur’s HQ to decide ways
& means of ensuring communications between ground stations, ships, aircraft & organisations vitally
concerned with obtaining information which would enable them to follow the course of the anticipated
battle & take appropriate action. Because of the number & disposition of the forces concerned, both in
the South & SWPA, the system of necessity had to be as simple as possible. Some communication
officers at the conference therefore advocated the use of a single frequency. It was pointed out by
reference to ionospheric predictions, that if this plan was adopted, communication failures would
inevitably result. The more scientific approach was finally agreed upon, & additional frequencies were
selected, the hours of operation on each being specified in advance. The plan was completely successful
& as far as is known there was not a single hitch during the battle due to a communication failure.
Since the time of the Coral Sea Battle, reconnaissance, strike, convoy & broadcast frequency allocations
in SWPA have been based on ionospheric data & the success has amply justified the comparatively small
expenditure of effort in this direction.
There are implications in that for Pacific war history on a number of levels. In particular on Japanese ability to monitor and geo-locate American carrier task forces in the last year of the war.

US Carrier task forces used several frequencies in the 30mhz band for fighter direction and it was discovered in the Philippines campaign by the US Navy that
1. "E-skip" ionosphere propagation in that band was fairly common in the Western Pacific providing ranges of up to 1,200 miles and
2. Via Ultra, that Japanese direction finding 'cuts' in that band were good enough to put Japanese patrol planes with radars on top of Carrier task forces within radar detection range.

The US Navy identified these radar planes as 'pathfinders' for Kamikaze attacks.

My research here shows that the Imperial Japanese had better ionosphere forecasting for their fixed pre-war radio communications, intercept and direction finding facilities because they got the "longitudinal effect" first and had more experience with using it for forecasts.

There are a significant number of unexplained 'surprise' attacks on US Navy AGC amphibious command ships -- which were electromagnetic radio beacons -- during the Okinawa campaign that would have benefited greatly from good radio D/F geo-location.

Delta Tank
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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Delta Tank » 30 May 2019 01:40

Mil-Tech Bard,

Who knew?? I never heard of this!

I may be able to go to the Library of Congress in July, if there is a box of the William Frederick Halsey Papers that I should look at tell me and I will try to read it.

I believe that this is another “Myth” that got into print and no one tried to verify if it was true or not.

Mike

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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 01 Jun 2019 20:54

Delta Tank,

See the paragraphs excerpts from the document below, which was from the electronic warfare portion of Halsey's Sept 1944 to Jan 1945 report of 3rd Fleet CV ops.
COMMANDER THIRD FLEET
SERIAL 0087 26 JANUARY 1945

REPORT ON COMMUNICATION OPERATIONS
SEPTEMBER 1944 - JANUARY 1945

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATIONS
DURING THE THIRD FLEET OPERATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF THE PALAU, LEYTE,
AND LINGAYEN CAMPAIGNS



7. INTRA-FLEET CIRCUITS
(a) Practically no use was made of the Task Force Commanders, Task
Group Commanders or Task Force Common frequencies as set forth
in the Basic Fleet Frequency Plan. This was due to normal radio
silence conditions observed and the use of the two TBS circuits
and visual channels to handle all intra-fleet traffic. The
Task Group Commanders frequency was used several times early in
the operations period but was discontinued when it was discovered
that units were accurately DF'd by the enemy.
The Task Force
Commanders frequency was employed as a command channel between
THIRD Fleet and Southwest Pacific Commanders. It was not used
as a Task Force Commanders circuit within the THIRD Fleet since
traffic normally sent via this channel was of interest or addressed
to other commands necessitating transmission via fleet
broadcasts. The Task Force Common was guarded primarily as an
emergency circuit during general quarters, during bad weather
when groups became separated, and during operations in the China
Sea. In the light of operating experience, it is believed that
many of the frequencies assigned in the Basic Frequency Plan may
be released for other: uses provided a few are retained for emergency
use as set forth above. It is doubted if C. will ever be
used for tactical circuits in the future.

(b) MAN and 608/808 equipment was used on inter-fighter director
circuits. Each Task Group of Task Force 38 was assigned a separate
group inter-fighter director frequency in the 30-40 me band and the
group fighter directors were linked by a force inter-fighter
director circuit in this frequency band in addition to the high
frequency secondary frequency (2096 kcs).
' The primary interfighter
director frequencies were generally used except that
when groups separated beyond range or traffic became heavy both
the primary and secondary frequencies were used. Destroyer
strike pickets stationed 25 to 50 miles distant used the secondary.
During radio silence and at night one VHF channel (140.4
mcs) was used for all inter-fighter director communications.


(e) The 30 - 40 megacycle band is considered insecure and its use was
restricted to periods of no radio silence or when in contact with
the enemy.
This restriction was placed in effect upon receipt of
several reports of strong signals and two way communications between
units from 200 to 1700 miles apart
. It is known to be used
by the enemy and Jap voices were heard on these circuits several
times during the operations.

11. RADIO SILENCE

(a) Three conditions of- radio silence were prescribed. Absolute
- silence on all frequencies was used only during approaches for
" strikes. Condition two which was the normal condition permitted
the use of TBS and VHF channels. Condition three allowing.
all transmissions was observed whenever the situation permitted.
Complete surprise was achieved on all strikes except one and
that was probably due to traffic analysis which showed a definite
dispatch pattern just prior to operations conducted.

(b) Use of the 30 - 40 mcs band was not permitted under radio silence
condition two except when in contact with or endangered by the
enemy.


(c) Enemy DFs on high frequencies which were reported were very
inaccurate. Errors of from three to five hundred miles in
reported positions were noted. In view of this experience
only the high harmonics of ship-shore frequencies were used
for transmission of traffic to NPM when it was necessary to
deny information as to our position. Enemy DFs on lower fre-
quencies were considerably more accurate and use thereof was
minimized.



15. RADIO DECEPTION

(f) During the first Formosa strike two cruisers were damaged by
torpedoes within ninety miles of the coast of Formosa. Exaggerated
claims of damage and "annihilation" of our fleet units
were noted on Japanese broadcasts and enemy fleet units were
reported to be sortieing to wipe out remaining damaged units.
In an attempt to set a trap for these enemy units, the damaged
group was directed to make appropriate transmissions while
TF 38 attained a position to intercept. - Unfortunately an enemy
snooper sighted the Fleet before contact could be made and the
enemy forces beat a hasty retreat to port. The cruisers returned
to port safely.



16. ENEMY DECEPTION AND JAMMING

(a) On various occasions the enemy attempted deception on shipshore
and point-to-point circuits. Apparently it was intended
to interfere with our communications rather than deceive. In
the attempts noted, the enemy tried to create confusion by use
of operator signals, asking various stations to make V's, or
to report signal strength. On other occasions he would receipt
for transmissions or would repeat back long dispatches transmitted
to radio stations. These methods were effective in that
they were not easily recognized. In any case, proper authentication
was an effective countermeasure.

(b) The only attempted deception on voice circuits was reported
by a pilot who while in the vicinity of Okinawa was asked.
"What is the course to the fleet?" on 140.5 mcs apparently
by an enemy station or plane.

(c) Although several reports of enemy jamming have been received,
it is believed that very few cases of deliberate jamming have
been experienced. In most cases reported enemy jamming has
proved to be interference caused by enemy circuits or harmonics
of Jap circuits on the same frequency. In some cases it is
believed to be electrical noises within own ships, The only
case of deliberate jamming heard by the writer was during
the last strike on Formosa. Several frequencies were being
jammed simultaneously including the secondary inter-fighter director
circuit (2096 kcs). The jammer was using voice spelling in
Japanese and make morse characters in voice.

(d) Enemy attempts at jamming have been intermittent, for short
periods only, and have been totally ineffective, insofar as the THIRD
Fleet is concerned.


20. RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

(a) Frequent and effective use was made of countermeasures equipment
installed in ships of the fleet. Alterations were made to permit
use of the RUQ jammers on enemy aircraft radar frequencies. Modi -
fications for the TDY equipment were received later and resulted
in increased effectiveness of countermeasures.

(b) The procedure normally used, consisted searching watches on all
available intercept receivers whenever contact was made with
enemy aircraft or the possibility existed of contact with enemy
surface forces. Enemy aircraft radar signals were generally

23. On 25 November the LUZON area was again attacked by Task
Groups 38.2 and 38.3, seeking to destroy crippled enemy combatant
ships and to wreck the reinforcement pipeline to LEYTE. One heavy
cruiser, believed to be the KUMANO, was found and destroyed,
along with other important shipping, including AKs, CMs and LSMs;
many other components of a potential "Tokyo Express" were
damaged or probably sunk. A well-executed, deceptive
Japanese air attack
shortly after noon damaged Task Group 38.2
heavily, the HANCOCK, CABOT and INTREPID being hit.
Suicide dives
were again responsible for most of the damage. Enclosure (C) contains
the details of the damage incurred. In addition, the ESSEX in Task
Group 38.3 was damaged by a similar attack.



27. One fact is becoming increasingly evident. The Japanese air
command, profiting by bitter experiences, has at last evolved a
sound defensive plan against carrier attacks. He has coordinated
and centralized his command responsibilities but decentralized and
dispersed his air forces, taking advantage of dispersal opportunities
he has previously rejected.
As of the end of November further
casual air strikes did not appear profitable; only strikes in great
force for valuable stakes or at vital times would justify exposure of
the fast carriers to suicidal attacks - at least until better defensive
techniques were perfected.
Paragraph 7. (e) above was a description of the E-Skip phenomena at 30-40 Mhz.

In times of low sun spot output "E-Skip" at 30-40 Mhz happens every day in the Western Pacific. Which was true in 1942 through about 1947.

This is what I found in the USS Bullard's Action Report found, in the Fold3.com web site, regards how E-Skip helped compromise USN communications in the Okinawa campaign:
CDD96/A16-3,
Serial: 033
Commander Destroyer Division Ninty-Six
Report of Ops During carrier air strikes on Japan, Ryukus & Jap Task Force, 3/18/1945 - 5/27/1945
Action Report USS Bullard (DD660)
Part VIII Conclusions and Recommendations
Page 207 - 208


https://www.fold3.com/image/1/296118816
page 208

"The security of the MAN circuit is NIL. During this operation 36.5 KCS and 33.2 Mcs were used on this equipment for inter-fighter direction. This vessel has had excellent reception from various ranges up to 1100 miles. On March 10th, when 1100 miles to the south east, ships operating off Iwo Jima were heard distinctly. On May 10th, while operating 80 miles northeast of OKINAWA, good reception was heard over MAN with the radar picket group of Task Group 58.1 who was at the time some 600 miles to the southeast. During this operation, vessels operating off OKINAWA beaches were heard from distances of 50 to 250 miles. In spite of the poor security of this circuit, we continue to put out information of great value to the enemy. Our task groups are more vulnerable during periods of launching and landing of aircraft. Yet we broadcast the pancake time of our CAP regularly in plain language. We also make available to the enemy over this circuit valuable information on the characteristics of our search radars.

https://www.fold3.com/image/1/296118817
page 208

We broadcast the fact that "bogey faded on bearing 300 Degree T distance 30 miles" and follow it up with "Bogey now out of fade bearing 320 Degrees T distance 20 miles". Giving the enemy credit for having average intelligence it is not inconceivable that from this information he can prepare fade charts of our radars. During this operation it is certain that enemy planes made use of this information we so generously gave them. It is recommended that a circuit that affords greater security be used for inter-fighter director work."
The key take away about US Navy communications in the last year of the Pacific War is they were neither well managed nor secure.

Mil-tech Bard
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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 01 Jun 2019 21:06

Delta Tank,

Regards this:
There are a significant number of unexplained 'surprise' attacks on US Navy AGC amphibious command ships -- which were electromagnetic radio beacons -- during the Okinawa campaign that would have benefited greatly from good radio D/F geo-location.
USS Panamint -- the AGC command ship in charge of the Northern Okinawa radar picket screen -- reported it had three separate attacks off Ie Shima that seem to have been specifically targeted upon her, including a two plane "Jill" torpedo raid on May 11th at 0857 in the morning.

She only escaped torpedo damage on May 11th 1945 because her captain insisted on keeping her boilers hot for immediate evasive action.

Delta Tank
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Location: Pennsylvania

Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Delta Tank » 02 Jun 2019 15:53

Mil-tech Bard,

From what you posted above, there is this:
“The Task Force
Commanders frequency was employed as a command channel between
THIRD Fleet and Southwest Pacific Commanders. It was not used
as a Task Force Commanders circuit within the THIRD Fleet since
traffic normally sent via this channel was of interest or addressed
to other commands necessitating transmission via fleet
broadcasts.”

This states pretty clearly that there was a communications link between Third Fleet and Southwest Pacific Commanders. You found it!!

Tanks!

Mike

Delta Tank
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Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Delta Tank » 08 Dec 2021 11:52

An interesting article on the performance of Admiral Halsey at Leyte Gulf, and the author did not blame MacArthur!

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-hi ... des-debate

Mike

Delta Tank
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Posts: 2512
Joined: 16 Aug 2004 01:51
Location: Pennsylvania

Re: MacArthur, Kinkaid, and Halsey!

Post by Delta Tank » 12 Dec 2021 19:44

Another interesting article on the performance of Admiral Halsey at Leyte Gulf, and the author did not blame MacArthur!! This is starting to show a pattern! Kinkaid didn’t blame MacArthur, Halsey didn’t blame MacArthur.

https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2016/07/1 ... tscript-i/

Mike

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