Australia's involvment in the Pacific War

[Rickshaw_665]

I recommend that you read Eric M. Bergerud "Fire In The Sky" and "Touched by Fire". Air and Sea forces did matter but until 1943, Australia was the main contributor to those forces. While the US Navy had larger ships and hence fought larger battles, it was th RAAF and RAN which fought the Japanese in the first two years of the Pacific War. Few American authors get it right but Bergerud does. Yes, the Americans lost more men but Australians fought as valiantly and as strongly as the Americans did. Losing men doesn't make you a good general/admiral/etc.

[Mil-tech Bard]

I own a copies of both of Bergerud's books.

And the less said about Australia's Operation Lilliput the better, as far as the US Navy is concerned.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Lilliput

The facts of the matter are still that the USN lost 4900(+) in defense of the alliance in 1942-1943. Which was larger than all the land combat KIA
casualties in Guadalcanal, Kokoda, Milne bay and Buna combined in the same period.

And it was Seapower and Airpower that called the tune then. And the tools of Sea and Airpower in 1942-1943 were American, however many Australian RAAF air crews fought in them.

For good or ill, the US Navy called the tune in the Pacific. Much to General MacArthur's chagrin.

[Rickshaw_665]

No one is denying that it was airpower and seapower that did the combats. What I am talking about is who pushed the Japanese land forces back. US Forces were ill trained and ill prepared for combat against the Japanese. The Australian forces were initially little better. However, the Militia and AIF forces quickly got the measure of the Japanese facing them and defeated them. The first land defeats suffered by the Japanese occurred before Australian forces.

You however, seem to feel that the numbers of casualties determines who did the most fighting. I'd actually suggest a high casualty rate shows a lack of training and forethought by amateur commanders.

[LineDoggie]

No one is denying that it was airpower and seapower that did the combats. What I am talking about is who pushed the Japanese land forces back. US Forces were ill trained and ill prepared for combat against the Japanese. The Australian forces were initially little better. However, the Militia and AIF forces quickly got the measure of the Japanese facing them and defeated them. The first land defeats suffered by the Japanese occurred before Australian forces.

You however, seem to feel that the numbers of casualties determines who did the most fighting. I'd actually suggest a high casualty rate shows a lack of training and forethought by amateur commanders.

You would suggest...., I would suggest it shows a higher OPTEMPO

ALL Allied forces were ill trained to fight the Japanese in 41-42, even the Nationalist Chinese who had done the bulk of the fighting and had the largest portion of actual combat experience by then.

By the way the US commanders at least were ALL professional officers in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Forces, graduates of USMA, USNA

Hardly Amateurs and at least there was no Run Rabbit Run comments by their commanders like Blamey did to his own men of 21 bde

https://www.swcs.com.au/runrabbit.htm

[Rickshaw_665]

You would suggest...., I would suggest it shows a higher OPTEMPO

Losing your own men in larger numbers just means you run out of men quicker. The Japanese did that in 1942-43-44 rather well.

ALL Allied forces were ill trained to fight the Japanese in 41-42, even the Nationalist Chinese who had done the bulk of the fighting and had the largest portion of actual combat experience by then.

And yet the Australians learned how to carry out their battle plans and indeed formed their battle plans faster than the Japanese or it seems the Americans. Indeed, the Japanese usually had only two responses to whatever their enemy was doing - outflank them and when that failed undertake a Banzai charge. When that failed they were basically stuffed.

By the way the US commanders at least were ALL professional officers in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Forces, graduates of USMA, USNA

Hardly Amateurs and at least there was no Run Rabbit Run comments by their commanders like Blamey did to his own men of 21 bde

Blamey was hardly typical of Australian commanders. He was a careerist in the extreme. Look at Vasey, Robertson, and other commanders to see a better quality soldier.

OK, admittedly the Americans whom the Australians first encountered were National Guard units, thrown into battle before their training was complete and it showed in New Guinea. The Australians OTOH had fought their way from Port Moresby until they got to the Japanese beachheads. Their first encounters with the Japanese were not good. However, they learnt and soon proved they were much better than the Japanese at Jungle Warfare. The American officers were political appointees, rather than professionals.

[LineDoggie]

Losing your own men in larger numbers just means you run out of men quicker. The Japanese did that in 1942-43-44 rather well.

so like Gallipoli then?

It also means your fighting a bigger battle aka OPTEMPO

The American officers were political appointees, rather than professionals.

a Lie, to be a division commander in the National Guard one had to be a Graduate of USMA
MG Harding was USMA 1909
BG Waldron was USMA 1915 the class the stars fell on
MG Byers was USMA 1916
LTG Eichelberger was USMA 1909

[Rickshaw_665]

Losing your own men in larger numbers just means you run out of men quicker. The Japanese did that in 1942-43-44 rather well.

so like Gallipoli then?

Not quite. Australians were not in command at Gallipoli and that was a different war fought differently to the SW Pacific theatre.

It also means your fighting a bigger battle aka OPTEMPO

Not necessarily. In the case of the US Marines it means that the US Navy is in command and the US Navy only has one way of fighting a battle - go hell for leather at the enemy and engage them as much as possible, whereas infantry combat is a great deal more subtle than that.

The American officers were political appointees, rather than professionals.

a Lie, to be a division commander in the National Guard one had to be a Graduate of USMA
MG Harding was USMA 1909
BG Waldron was USMA 1915 the class the stars fell on
MG Byers was USMA 1916
LTG Eichelberger was USMA 1909

I'm talking about the company and battalion commanders. You know, the officers who actually led their men into battle on the battlefield? You're talking about Generals, the older buggers who sat in châteaus/tents well removed from the mud and blood their men were forced to wallow in.

[daveshoup2MD]

the National Guard one had to be a Graduate of USMA
MG Harding was USMA 1909
BG Waldron was USMA 1915 the class the stars fell on
MG Byers was USMA 1916
LTG Eichelberger was USMA 1909
[/quote]

by Rickshaw_665 » 21 Dec 2019, 20:06
I'm talking about the company and battalion commanders. You know, the officers who actually led their men into battle on the battlefield? You're talking about Generals, the older buggers who sat in châteaus/tents well removed from the mud and blood their men were forced to wallow in.
[/quote]

Actually, no.

Waldron was WIA (shot on 5 December 1942) at Buna-Gona, as was Byers (shot 16 December 1942); BG Hanford MacNider had been wounded (grenade) in November; Eichelberger took command of the 32nd Division because he was, literally, about the only US Army infantry branch general officer left on his feet. Eichelberger was a combat veteran of WW I, and had received the DSC (2nd highest US decoration for valor, after the MOH), so hardly a chateau general; Waldron, Byers, and MacNider were all also DSC recipients - MacNider three times, twice in WW I and once in WW II, all for combat action.

Harding was not the right man to command at Buna-Gona, but given the mission and the available resources, he actually was far more sinned against than sinner; at least, in comparison to someone like, say, Lt. Gen. Henry Gordon Bennett, CB, CMG, DSO, VD.

The experience and record of the 32nd Division at Buna-Gona is, frankly, quite comparable to the experiences of the 14th and 30th brigades, and the record of the 7th Division's brigades in the battle was not extraordinarily better. The entire Q41942- Q11943 Papuan and northeast New Guinea campaign was far too ambitious for the available forces, and given the Solomons campaign was going on at the same time, a distraction from the operations that were actually strategically significant.

After the (primarily Australian) victory at Milne Bay in August and the Japanese retreat from Imita Ridge in September, the entire theater should have remained on the strategic defensive and been placed under Australian command by the end of 1942; Blamey could have replaced MacArthur, with - in turn - an American deputy, and the entire island of New Guinea could have been left as a sack for isolated Japanese garrisons.

The road to defeating Imperial Japan after 1941 ran from the US West Coast to Hawaii through Micronesia to the PI and north towards Japan. The entire Southwest Pacific theater was a cul-de-sac, and the South Pacific wasn't much more.

[daveshoup2MD]

So, here's an option on the SW Pacific Theater - early in 1942, rather than Gen. MacArthur being given the command, Adm. Hart is, with Gen. Blamey as his deputy. US ground forces are not deployed to New Guinea; instead, the Australians defend at Imita Ridge and MIlne Bay with a mix of AMF and AIF ground troops and RAAF units. After Coral Sea and MIdway, the focus of the Pacific War remains in the Central Pacific, and by the end of 1942, Adm. Hart turns over the theater command to Blamey and back to the US.

Blamey commands a "national" theater (much like R.Adm. Murray in the NW Atlantic) from 1943 onwards, but with limited Allied forces under command ...

So, what can the Australians do by themselves in the theater? Presume the three remaining AIF divisions (6th, 7th, and 9th) and the equivalent of 2-3 AMF divisions (take your pick) for replacements and garrison duty, along with a limited number of corps and army-level troops, and No. 9 Group with with all of 6-9 squadrons (Tomahawks, Beauforts, Hudsons, etc.) for air support. The RAN and AMM, at their historical strength in the beginning of 1943, provide the sea power... The start line is the historical one for Buna-Gona in November, 1942, except delayed until the new year (Q1, 1943).

So, what can the Australians do by themselves at this point?

[Mil-tech Bard]

Rabaul had to be neutralized. That put lots of troops, ships and planes on the North Coast of New Guinea.

More than Australia had.

That put an American in charge and that American was going to be MacArthur because of American domestic politics.

[Mil-tech Bard]

The road to defeating Imperial Japan after 1941 ran from the US West Coast to Hawaii through Micronesia to the PI and north towards Japan. The entire Southwest Pacific theater was a cul-de-sac, and the South Pacific wasn't much more.

Nope.

Both Formosa and Okinawa were logistically impossible without Luzon.

With Luzon, you didn't need Formosa.

Without Luzon, Okinawa is a "Pacific Island Too Far."

Check the attached Operation Causeway air range map.

[daveshoup2MD]

We're making the same point - the road to defeating Japan ran from the US West Coast through Hawaii and Micronesia to the PI (including Luzon; always helpful when the locals ae on your side), and then north to Japan.

The South and Southwest Pacific theaters were cul-de-sacs.

[daveshoup2MD]

The road to defeating Imperial Japan after 1941 ran from the US West Coast to Hawaii through Micronesia to the PI and north towards Japan. The entire Southwest Pacific theater was a cul-de-sac, and the South Pacific wasn't much more.

Nope.

Both Formosa and Okinawa were logistically impossible without Luzon.

With Luzon, you didn't need Formosa.

Without Luzon, Okinawa is a "Pacific Island Too Far."

Check the attached Operation Causeway air range map.

We're making the same point - the road to defeating Japan ran from the US West Coast through Hawaii and Micronesia to the PI (including Luzon; always helpful when the locals ae on your side), and then north to Japan.

The South and Southwest Pacific theaters were cul-de-sacs.

[daveshoup2MD]

Rabaul had to be neutralized. That put lots of troops, ships and planes on the North Coast of New Guinea.

More than Australia had.

That put an American in charge and that American was going to be MacArthur because of American domestic politics.

Rabaul "had to be neutralized"?

Why?

The results of Japanese land-based air power operating from Rabaul over the Central and Southern Solomons in 1942-43 make it quite clear Rabaul was not any real threat to the Allied positions in the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific theaters; once the US offensive gained control of Micronesia in 1943-44, the Japanese forces in (what was then) New Britain, etc. were cut off from Japan and amounted to self-policing POW camps.

[Delta Tank]

In any drinking bout between Diggers and G.I.'s - I bet the Diggers won as long as the contest was focussed on beer. The Aussie beer then and even now make them refer to American beers as 'weak pi**'

Obviously you have not been to the USA for a long time. There are soooo many breweries that make so many different types and styles of beer that you would need several lifetimes to taste them all. My favorite beer is Perpetual IPA, made by Troegs Brewery, alc/vol is 7.5% which is pretty high for a beer. I worked for several Australians when I was in the Army, when it came to drinking, the Australians win!! I heard there was a study (don’t know if it is true) done on alcohol effects on the brain, the author of this study didn’t screw around, he went to Australia to conduct the study!

https://www.statista.com/statistics/224 ... ince-1990/

Mike