Australia's involvment in the Pacific War

[Barry Graham]

Ive just finished reading five books about the Australians fighting in Papua / New Guinea. (I've yet to read "Those Ragged Bloody Heroes").

Are there any books written from an American perspective on the battles at Gona, Buna and Sanananda?

I'd be interested to read what the US troops thought of the aussie efforts there.

[JamesNo1]

Responding to Barry Graham's request for any books by American authors covering the Battle of the Beachheads (Buna, Gona, Sanananda), I checked my invaluable "War in the Pacific-Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay" (a magnificent coffe table size book covering most aspects of the Pacific War and with each chapter written by different experts) and found that the section on New Guinea (including the Battle of the Beachheads) had been written by American military historian Dr Edward J. Drea. I was familiar with his name because he wrote "MacArthur's Ultra".

I chased up his name on Google and came across the title:

"New Guinea- The US Campaigns of World War II" by Dr Edward J. Drea.

This appeared to be what you were looking for, so I then checked its availability on Amazon.com and found that it was out of print. However, if you really want a copy, I have found that both Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble can produce good quality second-hand copies of out-of-print titles. The only question is how much of the book covers the Battle of the Beachheads?

[Larso]

A few books used as references by McAulay may also be worthwhile for you.

'Forged by Fire' - JF Shortal, Uni of South Carolina Press, 1987

'Jungle Road to Tokyo' - Lt Gen Robert L Eichelberger, Odhams Press, London, 1951

I also think there was a divisional history 'The Junglers' which covers the campaign as well.

[Barry Graham]

Thanks James and Larso - I'll see what I can find.

[Joe Henry]

There were two militia battalions on the Kokoda Track , the 39th Victorian and the 58th (NSW), the 58th became known as "the greyhounds" as some of them ran so fast from the battlefield they trampled some of their own wounded, every Army has skeletons in its closet.

Rather than the 58th Battalion, it was the 53rd Battalion. Though 39 Bn and 53 Bn were thrust into battle in the most uneviable of circumstances, the 53rd's predicament was even poorer than the 39th. The 53rd had been loaded onto ships into Sydney withour even the opportunity to say good-bye to loved ones. Their numbers included approximately 100 miscellaneous troops, effectively shanghaied from other units on the day to make up numbers. Training before embarkation was lacking and almost non-existent because they were used as labour once they arrived in New Guinea. Though the battalion had received a smattering of experienced AIF Officers, their Officers were for the most part older, inexperienced and ill-equipped for the arduous trek along the Kokoda track and confrontation with experienced Japanese troops. The 39th benefitted from leadership by a couple of experienced and adventurous officers in the initial stages of their contact with the Japanese who in turn were not expecting to be confronted by a "large" body of Australian troops. In addition, the 39th had had the opportunity to recuperate to a degree after their walk over the Owen Stanleys and before they engaged the Japanese. The 53rd, on the other hand, struggled over the Track knowing the 39th were having difficulty holding the Japanese and were thrown into battle, piecemeal, and without the opportunity to rest from their journey or to establish any defences. They were confronting by a marauding horde of Japanese who outnumbered them and were cocky from their exploits in Malaya and other campaigns.

The 53rd Battalion was later amalgamated with the 55th Battalian to form 55/53 Bn. This battalion fought valiantly at Sananda and Gona.

[Joe Henry]

Firstly "James1" let me compliment you on your superb web site.

I'm curious to know why the Japanese made lttle or no use of the Kokoda airstrip to continue supply to the their forces operating further south along the Kokoda Track at the critical time of their retreat back over the Owen Stanleys.
The references I've read state that the events in New Britain and Milne Bay combined with supply to the Kokoda Track troops forced the Japanese to retreat.

Is it because the allies held air superiority or where the Japanese unable to fly in support because of lack of aircraft or were they busy elsewhere?

The Japanese appear not to have placed great reliance on re-supply by air. Supplies to Guadalcanal appeared to have been carried by destroyer or submarine. During the beaches campaigns at the end of the 1942, only one or two attempts were made to drop supplies from aircraft, most supply efforts being made by submarine.

The Japanese troops traditionally travelled light. They relied on capturing supplies from their opponents and foraging in the areas as they captured them.

The Japanese appeared to expect that they could advance rapidly over the Owen Stanley range and quickly capture Port Moresby. If they achieved this aim, they would not have had to rely on supplies brought over the Owen Stanley Ranges because they would have been able to easily get them to Port Moresby by sea.

While the campaign on the Kokoda Track was being waged, Guadcanal was in the balance. It appears that focus of the Japanese and Navy was in this theatre and few aircraft would have been available to support the thrust towards Port Moresby.[/quote]

[Michael Tapner]

The reason that the Japanese may not have used transports to fly supply to Kokoda is because they may not have had any transports in the theater. The Japanese did not have a heavy airlift capacity and what they did have was predominantly IJA, thus would have been involved in other theaters.

The above statement is entrely hypothetical, but I cannot recall reading about Japanese transports in the SWPA at all. Maybe some others that posess knowledgeable of such events can correct this?

[Barry Graham]

On this day 60 years ago (April 9th 1945) my father's brother, Pte William Hector Graham, 2/9 Field Ambulance, A.I.F., died at Ranau, Borneo aged 24, having survived the first Sandakan Death March.
Around 1790 Australian and 640 British prisoners died on the death marches or at the Sandakan P.O.W. camp. Only 6 Australian escapees survived.
The last prisoner remaining in the camp was beheaded just 5 hours before Japan surrendered.

I was only two years old when Hec and my father, Tom Graham, enlisted in the same unit of the A.I.F. After initial training they were sent from Victoria to Sydney where they boarded the Queen Mary bound, as they thought, to the Middle East.
Dad was hospitalised on board and when they reached Fremantle he was put ashore suffering from arthritis of the hip. He was discharged as medically unfit for tropical service and served the remainder of the war in the Militia based in Melbourne.

Hec continued on to Malaya where he was captured following the fall of Singapore.
After spending 6 months in Changi he was moved with B force in July 1942 to Sandakan where he spent two and a half years in captivity building an airstrip near the camp.
On January 28th 1945, as the threat of Allied invasion increased, the Japanese started moving troops westward from Sandakan to Tauran a distance of about 400 kilometres. With them went the Sandakan prisoners in groups of about 50 at a time to act as carriers for the Japanese army.

Already weakened by starvation, disease and medical neglect the prisoners dropped like flies during the enforced march. Those that couldn't keep up were shot, bayoneted or beheaded, the bodies were left where they fell.
The march ended at Ranau - few prisoners made it - those that did soon succumbed to disease or starvation.

I was too young to know my uncle when he left and I was only a young schoolboy when the war ended. It was a long time before the family learned that he died as a P.O.W. and even then the details were sketchy.
It was not until the publication of "Sandakan - A Conspiracy of Silence" by Lynette Ramsay Silver just over 6 years ago that I finally learned the actual fate of my uncle.

In his memory and for the thousands of Allied servicemen and women and the hundreds of thousands of Asians and Pacific Islanders that suffered or died at the hands of the Japanese in captivity and in labour camps, I dedicate this day.

Barry Graham
Melbourne, Australia

[Peter H]

Good on you Barry.

And God bless your uncle.

Regards,
Peter

[Peter H]

Does anyone know what division the 2/16th Field Company was attached to?One source I have come across states the 6th Division,but another the 9th Division.

[Larso]

Mark Johnston's book 'That Magnificient Ninth' has no mention of the 2/16th. It does include references to the 2/3, 2/4, 2/7 and 2/13 Field Co's.

[Larso]

The above report rated the 31 Australian Bde's as 'A' (efficient and experienced for mobile operations) and 'F' (unit training is not yet complete). Only four brigades, the 7th Div's three and the 6th's 19 Bde were rated 'A' at this key moment of the war.

Does anyone have knowledge of how the other 27 Bde's were rated? Also were there subsequent reports that showed changes and ideally battalion states of readiness?

[Brian Ross]

I'm new to this forum, so please excuse while I perhaps rehash a few points from earlier in the thread.

Hallo Dan,

It looks like it may be an interesting read. Since you have read it, can you please give us your impressions -- what you liked or disliked about it?

Thank You

Durand

Hello Durand,

If memory serves me correctly you had once said I post reviews on books that I have never read, so I'm assuming here that you think I never read the book by Bergerud.

I have read the book by Bergerud, and when I hear positive things about a book, yet have not read it myself, I make that explicitly clear.

How I would rate Touched with Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific would be about 3.5 stars on a 5 star scale. Personally I did not think the book was that great with one notable exception: The involvement of Australian forces in the land battles of the Pacific. In this regard I rate the book very well, in fact a 5 star rating applies. It thoroughly explores the contributions of Australian forces and I discovered a fierce fighting ability equal or exceeding that displayed by U.S. Marines. The author mentions two possible reasons for this: They were actually better acclimated for the tropical environment than U.S. Forces, and they often came from rural backgrounds and were therefore somewhat "toughened up" and able to endure the extremes that all soldiers had to in this theater.

After reading this book I realized just how much of a shortage of information there is contained in books written by either U.S. historians or firsthand accounts of U.S. servicemen detailing Australian contributions. Not so with this book. The Kokoda Trail was mentioned frequently and was an excellent bit of reading, to give but one example.

Many people would give this book a higher rating, and I guess I tend to compare everything to With The Old Breed or Tenozan when discussing land warfare in the South Pacific. Those are two books that rank in the highest tier regarding this subject.

Regards,
D.W.

As an Australian, I'm used to reading on international and primarily American forums how little is know about the contribution that my nation made to WWII and in particular the Pacific War. Bergerud's book goes part way to address that. However, where his book falls down is in its sources. He makes use of only very old, now largely revised views. I've spoken to him in other forums about this and he admits that he wasn't aware that there had been any large revision of what was known about the Pacific war, in Australia. Over the last 10-15 years, we've indeed seen a great many authours, of a new generation come on the scene. No long beholden to their parents or grandparents viewpoints, they have tended to re-examine that period of history in a much more critical and informed manner. McAuley, Stanley, Brune are but a few. All tend to be very critical of both our own government and that of the United States in particular for how they conducted the war.

[Brian Ross]

It seems that the general consensus opinion amongst British, Canadian, Australian, NZ, SA vets is that the Americans had the best allied equipment, and there were good individual US soldiers and units (82/101 AB, Marines, vets from North Afrcia/Sicily), but on a grand scale they were not as good as the Commonwealth troops, and were far too wasteful of troops(this second statement I totally agree with).

These criticism interesting are not just isolated to WWII. Having served with Korean and Vietnam War veterans, its one that they also echo.

[Brian Ross]

It really saddens me to hear such disparaging comments come from Australia when my family members have only said good things about your country. It seemed many times when the world turned away your country provided assistance to the U.S. military. You fought with us not only in WWII, but also provided troops and air assets in both Korea as well as Vietnam. My dad is a veteran of the Vietnam War and he always spoke very highly of Australian servicemen he met.

Mr. Chadwick, as a personal note, I think you should learn to distance yourself in these sorts of discussions and not to take such criticisms personally to heart. No nation is perfect, no military force is perfect. The Australian forces in the pacific made some horrendious mistakes and had some really stupid commanders. Tom Blamey is an excellent example, Gordon Bennet another. However, I don't think many Australians would do more than just shrug their shoulders and say, "fair cop, mate" and get on with the conversation. The US Army cops a lot of criticism. Some of it deserved, some of it. What is well known is that it is, all too often, very wasteful of its men, usually adopting tactics which would never be utilised in other armies. Some of them such as the use of massive, overwhelming material superiority are only useable by a nation which has the vast economy that your's does. Some, such as the use of its men essentially as "bait" to draw the enemy out where massive overwhelming firepower can eliminate him, sounds good, unless you're the bloke who's the bait. Instead of seeing these criticisms as being somehow directed at you, personally, perhaps you should see them as being directed at the impersonal entity which is the US Army.