Sheldrake wrote:The 21 Army Group Operations Research Group study no 292 was a study of the effectivness of fire support on the two Us Beacvhes on D Day with the British Beaches, the subject of study 261.
Indeed, but if you have done a careful reading of the two you will realize the limitations of the comparison, which the original writers certainly understood. The parameters for what was considered casualties in report No. 261 were carefully determined (in Report No. 264 actually, which is usually ignored) and assessed as only those incurred in the actual beach assault, i.e., the assault waves. However, such a careful delineation was not possible for the researchers WRT to OMAHA and UTAH, so the figures are not in fact direct comparisons.
Furthermore, slopping readings of the two reports have led to the ludicrously under-reported British and Canadian casualty figures that have now been repeated ad-nauseum by lazy historians for the last 70 years...and they took the report for the 4th ID casualties at UTAH as the total figure - also incorrect - which has also been repeated over and over again.
The conclusions were that each German machine gun on Omaha beach inflicted about 16-17 casualties, about 1.5 times more than on the British beaches. This in itself meant that the machine guns were less than half as effective as should have been inflicted.
Sorry, but that is a typical mixing up of correlation and causality. Other factors related to that causality are the terrain and siting of the German positions, the more effective sighting of the beach defense guns, more effective use of mortars and field artillery, and so on.
On Utah the casualties were only a quarter per Mg of those on the British beaches, which is attributed to a weight of fire three times greater than on the British beaches. Here the fire plan all worked.
Unfortunately that is an assumption based on poor data. The actual casualties were about three times that usually quoted due to a misapprehension of exactly what the figures reported. There is actually little evidence that the naval gunfire support worked significantly better or worse than anywhere else. Anecdotally, the medium bomber strike was much more effective and timely than at any other beach, but that is about it.
The short answer is that the NGS worked. The assault was successful.
Of course the gunfire "worked"...ammunition was expended after all. However, there is little evidence that it had much effect on the defenses it faced until the various close support craft, LCG and DD, closed to engage targets of opportunity...and the LCG fared pretty badly in the exchange. Certainly the LCT (R) were ineffective (except in sinking British DD at SWORD, IIRC), there is little evidence that the LCT (A) were worth the effort, and only one of the LCT (CB) that I can recall (I think on SWORD as well) did what it was supposed to. As far as the LCT (SP) go given the reality of howitzers firing from landing craft heaving up and down three to four feet for every three to four feet they advanced, I think that attributing suppression effects to them is charitable (you can argue that the British/Canadian beach suppression per brigade/regiment front was more effective than at OMAHA because there were 24 instead of 18 M7 105mm GMC firing, but I would beg to doubt it).
Cheers!