Admiral Crutchley and other non Japan/US/Aussie/NZ in the Pacific War

[jwsleser]

My apology for the late reply. So I can see why Crutchley was CO of Aussie ships, but why was he in command of US ships? Was it because of seniority?

While seniority decides the exact who, Crutchley commanded because it was a joint force. It is quite normal that when two or more nationalities combine military forces, senior positions are allocated with an eye to the forces provided. The ABDA command is a good example of this early in the war. At Salvo, the Australians, while not able to contribute a large number of naval units, they provided their most important ones and were a very important ally in other areas. So it was 'smart business' to include them in the senior command structure under the US. Another compromise is if one nationality commands, that individual's deputy is from another nationality that is participating. It is more about politics and insuring harmonious cooperation than purely military requirements. Mixing forces of different nationalities under subordinate leaders reflects more military necessity than politics. Crutchley needed modern destroyers for his force and Australia didn't have any to give.

To look at ABDA, ADM Hart (US) was the senior naval commander. His deputy was RADM Palliser (RN). Command of the ABDA Naval Strike force was RADM Doorman (RNN). The selection of Doorman was controversial because many felt the Dutch lacked any modern naval combat experience. However, due to the political issues at play, he remained in command. Also note that Doorman not only had four US destroyers, he had a US heavy cruiser (Houston), a UK heavy cruiser (Exeter), two UK destroyers, an Aust light cruiser (Perth), and most of the Dutch navy under his command.

Pista! Jeff

[cstunts]

1) I really don't see RADM Karel Doorman's assignment as very controversial at all.
Doorman didn't have any ships of a joint force to command until the beginning of Feb. 1942 anyway.

2) Doorman was selected because the Dutch had (very naturally) more experience in those waters, but also because they had finally offered to throw some of their own surface ships into the mix. Prior to that, they had not--although their subs had done courageous yeoman work. When they released those ships at the end of Jan/start of Feb, Hart made the decision to go w/Doorman. Hart also noted (in his diary) that he had received no information at all telling him that Doorman was not competent for the job.

3) Another factor was that Helfrich & Van Staveren (Helfrich's CofS) had been consistently adversarial towards Hart. Helfrich's behavior bordered on impudence, Hart wrote, and he noted that Van Staveren was "caustic" in his remarks about the USN. After such talk from the Dutch it made sense to let one of their officers take command of the Striking Force.
So, it was in a very real way, a political choice, as well as a practical one.

4) Doorman could have had as many DDs as Hart cared to let him have--and he did have more than four, of course--plus he had light cruiser Marblehead before she was bombed severely. Theoretically the Dutch could have commanded Boise as well, and they always argued that Phoenix had been 'promised' to them as a replacement, although that remains a very murky area...

5) It is merely speculative, but I feel that Hec Waller would've probably been the most experienced & capable bluewater commander out there. However, he arrived quite late in the day and the Java campaign was largely lost by then.

[Pips]

5) It is merely speculative, but I feel that Hec Waller would've probably been the most experienced & capable bluewater commander out there. However, he arrived quite late in the day and the Java campaign was largely lost by then.

Agree. Waller was indeed the most able and experienced commander available; a proven and successful battle commander. But politics played a massive part in everything to do with the ABDA (which was incredibly dysfunctional), and for that reason Doorman received the prime command position.