Yamato, where could it have done the most damage?

[uloveme]

Hindsight is beautiful and uniquely disfiguring of History, least when we don't know what they were thinking before and during the process. Either way the Yamato is a great ship, discussed to this very day for great reasons. I want to know from Y'all who really enjoy the Yamato and Musashi, and discussions about them. What could they have done with the two big boy capital ships fighting the U.S. South Pacific operations from 1942 onward, that could've actually done the most damage to the U.S. Fleets.

For example if they showed up out of nowhere in one of the battles, perhaps even getting by RADAR and scouts. If the two capital ships that I've mentioned, maybe plus one more if you want to add your own, but make it a BB only (you could add a BC if you really want to, IDK why you would though... But that's another topic).

Could the new element actually do something serious? battlewagons are battlewagons and the U.S. proudly brought them along in every action they could once they started pouring in. I don't personally think anything stood much of a chance against any U.S. Task with BB's, though on paper the Japanese had very impressive BB's (as well did Germany with her own precious few Capital ships). I do not believe anything Japan could've ever done, possibly have done, or even theoretically could have done, could have saved Japan under any circumstance, period. Having said that I thoroughly enjoy the few serious engagements we (speaking for the U.S.) had with the Japanese. Could these beasts if wielded correctly have made a serious pain in the neck?

Let me know what you think, which battle? where in the battle? what do you think it could've been capable of? and for the sake of feasibility lets just say the thing has a full tank of gas lol (yes I know they didn't use gas, you get the idea tho)

[Kingfish]

One doesn't have to conjure up a fictional scenario in order to imagine the possible carnage Yamato could have wreaked on the allies. All you have to do is allow for Kurita to keep his cool off Samar and continue down to Leyte. Although it probably would have been a suicide mission, center force would have put a serious hurting on the allied invasion force.

[ChristopherPerrien]

A one-way trip to Los Angeles.

[Pips]

They should both have been used in the sea battles around Guadalcanal. Ample opportunity to inflict telling blows onto the USN.
And imagine just how devastating the 18" guns would have been in shelling Cactus airfield. The 14 " of Hiei and Kirishima were bad enough.

[Gorque]

On a one way death ride into Pearl with a scuttling in the narrow channel.

[ChristopherPerrien]

On a one way death ride into Pearl with a scuttling in the narrow channel.

Would be sunk by CDA before it got near that close.

[Delta Tank]

CP,

What is a CDA?

Mike

[ChristopherPerrien]

Coast Defense Artillery.

Anything coming near the Pearl Harbor Harbor entrance , would be engaged and sunk miles out. Or the days before by planes if detected by search. Same thing would have happened approaching Los Angeles Harbor, from Fort Macarthur/San Pedro. However a run-in to somewhere between Malibu and Santa Barbara and shelling LA from that area, until destroyed, might have precluded such CDA, as that area was thin on such assets. No idea of the shelf there though, as to if the Yamato could have beached herself. Total suicide mission , but most everything after 42 was for the Japanese, unless not carried though, like Kurita at Leyte Gulf for example.

For the same reason as Pearl Harbor, I don't think the Yamato could have made a suicide shelling run either of San Francisco, there too much CDA there again, with firing arcs would have prevent the Yamato from getting close enough to bombard the city before being sunk.

Panama Canal, ditto.

All these area also had plane and boat patrols (Even an LA approach from the backside there was Santa Rosa and the Channel Islands with their planes and RADAR.) , the last 300 miles is the thing. Have to do the same as original Pearl Harbor, cross the North Pacific, come in behind a storm front, high speed run in the last few days.

[glenn239]

Best use of Yamato was as Kusaka recommended in May, 1942 - have her sail with the Nagumo Force on account of her superior electronics suite. This would probably have prevented the Midway debacle. Or even more ahistorically, place the Main Body on the east flank of the Nagumo Force for a seaplane search in the ambush zone.

Best use of Shinano was to convert her to a fast oiler on the slipway. If she could haul, say 50,000 tons of oil at 25kt, she would be immune to interception and would burn about 15,000 tons per round trip, making her more efficient than an entire convoy of 12kt tankers.

In terms of Yamato and CDA, Pearl Harbor's 16" mounts were dangerous to her, but little else. The 16" mounts were open air, so if anything along the lines of charging into CDA range was contemplated, (certainly not to try to block the harbor entrance), the minimum pre-requisite would be a sweep for mines and the 16" mounts already knocked out by dive bomber attack.

[Carl Schwamberger]

They should both have been used in the sea battles around Guadalcanal. Ample opportunity to inflict telling blows onto the USN.
And imagine just how devastating the 18" guns would have been in shelling Cactus airfield. The 14 " of Hiei and Kirishima were bad enough.

My prefered scenario. I dont know how good its surface search radar would have been in those waters, the USN technicians had to improve their techniques when their ships arrived. This scenario does get one closer to learning the effects of US 16" ammo on the Yamato at medium or close range.

[BobTheBarbarian]

The two suggestions that immediately come to mind are as mentioned pressing the attack at Leyte or being committed to the fighting at Guadalcanal. At such close ranges as those experienced during the battles in Iron Bottom Sound it's not unfeasible that she could have bagged South Dakota, Washington, or both.

[Kingfish]

Unless I am mistaken, the only time the IJN ran a TF to Guadacanal for the express purpose of surface engagement was the battle of Savo Island. All the others were for other tasks, and whatever naval battles occurred were the result of coincidence that both sides had SAGS in the vicinity.

That is why I don't see the IJN sending Yamato down the slot.

[glenn239]

If Midway goes differently then Watchtower won't happen, so Yamato is better used aggressively at Midway than husbanded for Guadalcanal.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Unless I am mistaken, the only time the IJN ran a TF to Guadacanal for the express purpose of surface engagement was the battle of Savo Island. All the others were for other tasks, and whatever naval battles occurred were the result of coincidence that both sides had SAGS in the vicinity.

That is why I don't see the IJN sending Yamato down the slot.

In most of those cases the Japanese did prudently expect the USN to attempt to intervene. There were aspects to those battles that were a suprise to the Japanese, but they did not dismiss the posibility surface actions could occur & planned their actions on that contingent. In all five surface action off Guadalcanal both sides had intel of possible enemy SAGS near & a fair idea of the logical enemy intent. The battles were the result of good and bad planning by each side & not random encounters.

[Mil-tech Bard]

I would suggest that the Yamato surface action group that was being sent to Biak, and which was rerouted to the Marianas, would have done Japan a lot of good had it completed its run to Biak.

MacArthur would have lost the 7th Fleet cruisers, most of it's DD's and a number of amphibious transports plus pounded the American landing force there besides.

A sound IJN naval victory at Biak would have made a Leyte landing...problematic.