Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

[Mil-tech Bard]

This was the earlier 2014 discussion on the Japanese invading Midway --

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... ion%2C+ota

This was posted in one of the nine pages of that discussion:

Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 1 (MTBRon 1)
Lt. Clinton McKellar Jr., USN
Midway Island

USS PT-20
USS PT-21
USS PT-22
USS PT-24
USS PT-25
USS PT-26
USS PT-27
USS PT-28

[Mil-tech Bard]

This post sums up the Japanese invasion force's situation nicely --

==============

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 23 Nov 2014, 07:49

Well the entire IJN cannot just sit around Midway for a weeks or even a few days ( IMO 3+), They did not have the supplies or simply the logistical ability or know-how to do so. Also the Japanese had no amphibious assault doctrine, and extremely limited and/or crude commo between the SNLF and supporting ships.

Whether they have 2 carriers or 4 or 6 for two-days would not affect the "invasion/land battle" that much. I'd estimate 2 of the carriers would provide air support giving about 4 full deck strikes in 2 days. Prolly destroy alot of facilities,i.e- the airstrips, admin buildings,docks etc, but only a few defense strong-points as they are very hard to see and "destroy" from the air.- Reference the actual damage they did with their 1st strike on June4?( IIRC)

US combat troops on Midway were about 3000. Japanese assault troops were about 2500. Plus another 2500 follow-up Japanese construction and engineer troops/personnel. Midway is a coral atoll. Both of the two major islands are close together and were heavily fortified, besides the coral reef surrounding them , which prevent any ships or even small boats from approaching/landing except for 1 heavily covered cut.

Basically you are looking at the IJN doing "Tarawa" with 2500 combat troops against 3000 combat troops in 2 days (note -Tarawa was 12000:3000 in 3 days) and the Japanese don't have LTV's or an amphib doctrine. What do you think will happen? Without the LTV's at Tarawa, the USMC would have lost even with a 4:1 advantage.

[Mil-tech Bard]

Also from the earlier thread --


--------

Postby ChristopherPerrien » 29 Nov 2014, 06:48

Some tid-bits as I dig for actual Japanese plans and Midway defenses.

The man responsible for planning the Japanese amphibious landing on Midway Atoll was Commander Yasumi Toyama. Toyama laboured under a number of serious disadvantages. The only maps of Midway Atoll in his possession were old and likely to be unreliable. Toyama had no aerial photographs of the atoll because the pilots of Marine Fighter Squadron VMF-221 had intercepted and shot down a Japanese four-engined Kawanishi 97 "Mavis" patrol flying boat that had been approaching Midway on 10 March 1942. This Japanese flying boat had come from Wake Island and had been assigned to carry out a photographic reconnaissance of Midway to provide intelligence for the Japanese amphibious assault on Midway in June.

Toyama had no intelligence concerning the defences of Midway and the number of defenders. The Navy planners expected to face about 750 US Marines, and that would have been the pre-war strength of the Midway Detachment, Fleet Marine Force. The Army estimate was more realistic; they expected that the Marine strength would be closer to 2,000. It was anticipated that the Marines might have between 50-60 planes on the atoll.

Toyama planned a simultaneous attack on Sand and Eastern Islands from the southern side of the atoll where the two islands were close to the reef. The Japanese landing force would number about 5,000, and would be spearheaded by two elite assault units - Captain Minoru Ota's 2nd Combined Special Naval Landing Force numbering about one thousand five hundred marines, and the Army's Ichiki Detachment which numbered about two thousand men and was commanded by Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki.

http://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/Preparations.html

[Mil-tech Bard]

Last for now --

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 03 Dec 2014, 03:54

I've seen several claims the Patrol Boats carrying the Daihatsu to the Wake Island could not launch them on account of the sea state. both PB were lost after being beached on Wake island in order to disembark their assault units. Confirming the sea state @ Wake might give some clues about how the ship to shore movement at Midway would go.

Another question here is how many Daihatsu were present. Picking over the histories of the Japanese landing craft transports the following is found, but needs to be cross checked.

1. The Shinshu Maru seems to have been torpedoed and beached 1 March 1942 during the battle of Sunda Strait. It was refloated in September 1942 & eventually ended in dry dock at Singapore. http://www.combinedfleet.com/Shinshu_t.htm

2. The other ships similar to the Shinshu Maru with internal stowage for the Daihatsu & related boats were not available, either elsewhere in one case, or not yet launched in the others. http://www.combinedfleet.com/TETSUSEI%2 ... UDOTEI.htm

3. Next there are PB1 & 2 http://www.combinedfleet.com/PB-1_t.htm these carried two Daihatsu boats & 250 infantry. both were present @ Midway.

4. PB31 through 39 were destroyer conversions to amphib transports. http://www.combinedfleet.com/Shokaitei.htm 32 & 33 were lost at Wake island; 37 sunk January 1942; 38 is ambigious & not clear where it was; 39 must have been with 38; 34, 35, 36 were with the Midway invasion fleet.

5. PB46 has no indication of location in June 1942. May have been converted away from a amphib assault transport?

Obviously the four PB with their two Daihatsu each wont cut it. I've seen remarks about "six Army transports" carrying landing craft & assault units to Midway. Not clear how many Daihatsu might have been embarked on these. Eight, ten? If the latter then it is close to the "seventy" mentioned earlier in the thread when combined with the PB present.

A lot to cross check and confirm here.

[alecsandros]

Well the entire IJN cannot just sit around Midway for a weeks or even a few days ( IMO 3+), They did not have the supplies or simply the logistical ability or know-how to do so.

That is incorrect,
re-read the second post of this thread.

[Mil-tech Bard]

alecsandros,

Three points.

First, the ability of the Japanese to operate their fleet at economical cruising speed in the vicinity of Midway immediately after winning an alternate-history battle of Midway is problematic at best both due to the Midway aerial garrison and likely several times a day visits by Hawaii based B-17, B-26 and PBY's. Night heckling in the case of the PBY's with added ordnance due to staging through French Frigate shoals.

B-17's can't hit moving ships worth beans, but they were known to sink stationary Japanese shipping.

Second, US Navy submarines would have used the cover of such Midway (while it lasted) & Hawaii based aerial attacks to take shots at Japanese shipping. Even with all their torpedo problems, there would have been Japanese casualties and more importantly fleet alerts that burned fuel at accelerated rates.

Finally, US Navy Battleship gunfire directors were incapable of hitting point targets at range.

The Japanese gunfire directors were much inferior to the USN directors of similar vintage.

Effective point target engagement of bunkers by battleships required they be at anchorage at 3,000 yards or less using pointer fire through local mount's telescopic sights.

See this link:

http://www.allworldwars.com/Iwo-Jima-Na ... pport.html

COMMENT:

This extract is included for information.

H. GUNNERY AND GUNNERY PROCEDURES

>snippage<

3. EXTRACT:

"Long hours of telescope control drill paid off with the most effective type of fire during these bombardments. A fifty to one hundred yard shift of MPI made director control ineffective at close ranges. Whenever the range was closed, allowing pointers and trainers to pick up the target in their sights, telescope control was used to pinpoint the impact on one particular gun or pillbox rather than shooting at the area. In order to train gun, pointers and trainers and to stimulate interest in telescope control it is recommended that the old Short Range Practice 'A' be resurrected (Reference FTP 191), Section, 1G)."

And see also:

For information and because it is felt that the statements indicate the opinions of most bombarding ships, extracts from NEVADA's action report are quoted below:

"Experience at IWO JIMA shows that firing against, the extremely heavy block houses, covered artillery emplacements, troops shelters, and pill boxes is ineffective at medium and long ranges, even when the spotting planes can see to spot. Only repeated direct hits will destroy or seriously damage such Installations. The natural dispersion and normal percentage of hits to be expected even with a well aligned and controlled battery demands a large expenditure of ammunition to secure the hits necessary. The greatest amount of damage with the minimum ammunition expenditure is accomplished at ranges of 2000-4000 yards using pointer fire and ships' spots. It is estimated that this ship did over twice as much damage on D-l day at point blank ranges than she did on D-3 and D-E days combined when indirect fire at medium ranges was employed. It is recommended that the heavily armored and heavily armed bombarding ships(bombarding CAs and OBBs) close to short range at the earliest possible moment after known heavy coast defense installations have been neutralized or destroyed. These ships should close in even at the risk of being fired on by unknown and unsuspected camouflaged coast defense guns. They should remain at close range using pointer fire as long as possible or until all visible enemy installations have been fired on.

"The danger involved in closing in to short ranges is not considered great, based on the enemy reaction at IWO JIMA. The JAPANESE seem very reluctant to open up and disclose well camouflaged guns. This was shown by the actions of the heavy unknown battery in 183 W which did not open up until the UDT operations took place on D-2 day. This battery had made no attempt to fire on any bombarding ships prior to its opening fire at that time. Another example was the action of the battery at 219 A. This ship was ordered to close in and destroy this battery. The NEVADA closed to within 3200 yards from the beach and opened fire at a range of 3900 yards from the target. During the approach neither gun of the battery fired a shot. While the first gun was being fired on and destroyed, the second gun remained silent even though the range was less than-4000 yards.

"The enemy installations on IWO JIMA were very well camouflaged and of very heavy construction. The large ones could be destroyed or severely damaged only by repeated hits with the main battery. At ranges from 1500 to 2500 yards these targets could be distinguished by ship's spotters and gun pointers and trainers. Pointer fire was most effective as the fall of shot and results could be clearly seen. Most of the damage done to enemy installations by NEVADA'S gunfire was accomplished at short ranges with pointer fire. The performance of 14"/45 H.C. projectiles was excellent. No duds were observed. H.C. projectiles with steel nose plugs were used exclusively against the heavy enemy installations. The H.C. projectiles with Mk. 29-3 fuses set on super-quick were not effective and their only effect was to blow away sand and dirt, with which the installations were covered, without penetrating. A few A.P. projectiles were used and from the limited observation possible, it is believed that they are more effective against heavy installations than the H.C. with steel nose plugs. The 5"/38 fire was generally ineffective for destructive purposes at all ranges against the heavy enemy installations. Numerous installations were fired on by the 5"/38 battery and many direct hits made, but apparently little damage was done. The 5"/38 battery was used extensively to strip camouflage and to explore suspicious 1 areas. This was very effective in determining real from apparent targets before the main battery opened fire on them and thereby contributed greatly to the conservation of main battery ammunition. The 5"/38 battery was also used to fire anti-personnel air bursts. There was no visible enemy activity in the NEVADA'S sector of responsibility and hence the effectiveness of the air bursts is not known. The air bursts were fired to cover the assigned areas. No difficulty was experienced in covering the areas nor in placing the air bursts at the correct altitude. The appearance of many small puffs of dust over a wide area beneath the bursts indicated that the fragmentation was excellent.

"Several types of main battery fire control were used. For close range work, 2000-5000 yards, when the target could be clearly seen, pointer fire was used. This was most effective and resulted in maximum damage with minimum ammunition expenditure. For medium ranges, director fire was used when a definite point of aim could be distinguished. In some cases a point of aim other than the target was used and ballistic spots in range and deflection were applied to put fall of shot on the target which was not visible. Air spot was then used for final adjustment. For ranges outside of 8000 yards, indirect fire with the Mk. 1 Mod.. 23 rangekeeper in emergency was used with air spot. For ranges under 8000 yards, indirect fire is impossible when the ship is underway as the minimum range of the Mk. 1 Mod. 23 rangekeeper is 8000 yards. Below this range, it is not possible to maintain a rangekeeper solution. This is a serious handicap for shore bombardment work at short ranges.

See also this link:

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
by
DONALD M.WELLER
Major Geraerai, USMC (Ret.)

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a051873.pdf

Accuracy"

All gun systems employed in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam were
constrained by the inherent limitations of ballistic weaponry. However, high
velocity, a characteristic of all naval gun systems, produces flat trajectories
at short range with relatively small vertical dispersion. This characteristic,
coupled with the penetrative capability of heavy naval projectiles and the
employment of pointer fire to maximize gun laying accuracy, was exploited
in the Central Pacific campaign of World War II where the strategic environment
permitted operations before D day for deliberate destruction of coastal defense
guns and beach defenses. For example, a typical blockhouse for a medium caliber
coastal defense gun encountered on Iwo Jima, with a vertical surface
30 feet wide and 12 feet high, could be attacked with a hit probability of
about 12 percent (one hit in nine rounds). At 10,000 yards, ammunition
requirements for one hit escalated to 64 rounds, demonstrating dispersion
sensitivity to increased ranges.**

*See notes at the end of the report.
** See Table 4, page 50.

And this passage --

The new doctrine of preliminary operations for destruction of defenses
was to prove its worth in a series of amphibious operations in the Central
Pacific, which projected American power within 600 miles of the Japanese
homeland. The first of these came close on the heels of the Tarawa debacle
with the seizure of islands in the Kwajalein atoll in February 1944. The defenses
of these latest coral objectives were not as formidable as those on Tarawa,
but they were substantial. Roi-Namur, objective of the 4th Marine Division,
was defended by four coastal defense guns, 28 antiaircraft guns, four blockhouses,
and 17 pillboxes mounting antiboat and machine guns. The plan called for
3 days of preliminary bombardment delivered by three battleships, five cruisers,
and 11 destroyers, all under the direction of Admiral Connelly, a veteran
of Mediterranean operations.

The heavy ships were to fire at the shortest possible range that safe
navigation would permit, while lying to or steaming slowly, thereby maximizing
the accuracy of deliberate fire by single guns, using pointer (i.e., observed
direct) fire against the hard point targets. As in other operations, the assault
landings were to be covered by fires to neutralize remaining intact defenses.
The 3 days of preliminary bombardment at Roi-Namui proved the worth
of the destruction concept. Japanese defenses were almost completely obliterated,
and casualties were a small fraction of those suffered at Tarawa. Similar
success was achieved in support of the 7th U.S. Infantry Division landing on
Kwajalien. Thereafter, precision destructive fires from heavy ships were features
of the preliminary operations in successive amphibious operations in the Marianas
in June 1944 and Iwo Jima and Okinawa in February and April of the following
year

It took the failure of Tarawa to get the US Navy there as far as using pointer fire in an amphibious landings.

You would have to believe "Hitler had the sweet disposition of Lassie" to think the Imperial Japanese Navy would get there spontaneously for a landing at Midway atoll.

It was just not going to happen and any landings attempted by the IJN were doomed to fail for it's lack.

[alecsandros]

alecsandros,

Three points.

First, the ability of the Japanese to operate their fleet at economical cruising speed in the vicinity of Midway immediately after winning an alternate-history battle of Midway is problematic at best both due to the Midway aerial garrison and likely several times a day visits by Hawaii based B-17, B-26 and PBY's.

Do you know the bunker capacity of the historical Japanese fleet near Midway ?

Midway's air garrison was wiped out on June 4th.

Second, US Navy submarines would have used the cover of such Midway (while it lasted) & Hawaii based aerial attacks to take shots at Japanese shipping.

Correct, and what would IJN destroyers and A/S floatplanes be doing ?

Effective point target engagement of bunkers by battleships required they be at anchorage at 3,000 yards or less using pointer fire through local mount's telescopic sights.

there were no "bunkers" at Midway.

Most of the above-ground structures had been destroyed by the historical air attack.

[mikegriffith1]

Until I read John Toland's book The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, I had no idea that most of the top Army and Navy brass opposed Yamamoto's idea to attack Midway, and that Yamamoto threatened to resign if his idea was not accepted.

Obviously, the decision to attack Midway was a serious blunder and went far beyond the General Staff's original strategic plan.

[rcocean]

The Japanese were suffering under several handicaps. First the whole invasion had been planned as a quick strike. The IJN didn't have the fuel to sit around for a week and pound Midway into submission. Second, the Japanese had zero experience in amphibious landing against well prepared opposition. That may seem surprising - but its true. The nearest they got is Wake Island (which was weakly defended) and Corriegidor (which had been pounded by heavy artillery and air power for almost a month). Third, Japanese intelligence had severally underestimated the number of Midway defenders. From what I've read, I'm not positive the Japanese could've overcome the US resistance.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Seems this thread has been slightly active since I last checked in. Not sure what thats worth compared to th others on the subject...

... there were no "bunkers" at Midway.

Most of the above-ground structures had been destroyed by the historical air attack.

This is nonsense. For the first part examine this link to recent photographs of the concrete ammunition, gun, and SP type bunkers built there.

https://www.tracesofwar.com/sights/1053 ... Bunker.htm

Heres a account of the defense of Midway from its first occupation by the US. There is a map of the main defense positions of June 1942. Note how these cover probable landing site on the north shore as well as the south and easter beaches.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/Mi ... way-3.html

Also note the descriptions of the damage to the fuel tanks, and CP. But, lack of reference to any cannon or bunkers destroyed or neutralized.

This next account has a bit more detail on the air attack damage & does mention one three inch DP cannon knocked out by aircraft bombs.

https://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/Mi ... acked.html

Note the paragraph discussing Japanese estimates for their aircraft losses.

There is also the judgement of the Japanese strike commander that the attack had failed to neutralize the islands defense.

[Carl Schwamberger]

When reviewing the composition of the Japanese assault force I was reminded the Army portion was the Ikki or Ichiki Detachment. A reinforced battalion of about 1100 infantry and combat support units. This was made up of a infantry battalion and attachments from a Japanese Army infantry regiment. This was also the unit massacred in August on Guadalcanal. Post Midway it had sat on Truk for two months, then was hastily sent south to the Solomons to counter the US force landed on Guadalcanal. There LtCol Ichikis detachments the first combat force to reinforce the island. The mission was to probe the US "raid" & attack it as opportunity presented itself. This was apparently to prepare the way for the following infantry brigade (actually combined arms). Ichiki interpreted those orders to mean a maximum effort against the US defense of the airfield. An attack made against the outer perimeter without adequate reconnaissance. When the initial assault failed Ichikis action was to order repeated hasty attacks, reinforced with his reserve. After those resulted in severe casualties during six hours of night attacks Ichiki then failed to order a withdrawal of the survivors. Instead he kept his command pinned under the fire of the US defense, while a flanking force enveloped his survivors and methodically killed them off. Ichikis reaction to this was to abandon his command through suicide leaving the remaining defense leaderless and uncoordinated.

This was the sort of commander and tactical expertise that was aimed at the defense of one of the Midway islands. How the SNLF assault group aimed at the other island would have done I can't say

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

To Mr. Carl Schwamberger :

As for the defences at Midway :

Although Midway now appeared to bristle with defensive firepower, none of the gun emplacements or machine-gun bunkers were "hardened" with reinforced concrete. The large calibre gun emplacements, machine-gun bunkers, command posts, communication facilities, and underground sleeping quarters had all been simply dug out of the sand. The seacoast guns and anti-aircraft guns were protected against strafing, and air and off-shore naval bombardment only by sandbag walls. The machine-gun bunkers, command posts, and underground sleeping quarters were protected by sandbags and roofing comprised of slabs of wood supporting thick layers of sand.

The beaches were guarded against amphibious landings by machine-gun bunkers with overlapping fields of fire, but Sand and Eastern Islands were too small to provide defence in depth behind the beach defences. If a Japanese amphibious landing force breached the line of beach defences, there was little to stop them pouring more troops through that gap."

https://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/Ma ... idway.html

And it goes on to state, when describing the bombardment on December 7th, 1941:

The Japanese destroyers now commenced their second firing run, moving in a north-easterly direction up the long axis of Sand Island. The seaplane hangar was hit, and the resulting flames illuminated fresh targets for the Japanese. Ashore, some confusion reigned. Telephone lines were jammed, and it was not until 2148 that Lieutenant Colonel Shannon was given permission to engage the enemy with his Marine shore batteries.

At 2153, orders were received by the Marine searchlight batteries to illuminate the Japanese ships. One Japanese destroyer was immediately illuminated under the guns of Battery A, but the 5-inch guns of this battery had been rendered ineffectual by an earlier salvo that had disrupted firing data and fire command communications. It is doubtful whether any incident on this night demonstrated more clearly the extreme vulnerability of the gun emplacements on Midway to damage from flat trajectory naval bombardment.

I might respectfully submit that a determined bombardment by ALL of the bombardment assets available to the IJN, including ALL Four
Kongos, BOTH Nagatos, the Yamato, CruDiv 7, Crudiv 8, and the two sections from each of Crudiv 4 and CruDiv 5 ( a total of ten 8" gunned CAs, plus destroyers tasked for close support gunfire, would have proven very damaging to the Midway Defenders, both materially and morally.

And this does not even include ANY aerial bombardment, one attack of which had already proven so damaging to the Midway Defenders.



To Mr Rcocean

First the whole invasion had been planned as a quick strike. The IJN didn't have the fuel to sit around for a week and pound Midway into submission.

If you go back to the second posting on this thread, you will find that Mr. Alexandros has effectively demolished the MYTH of the so called ' Japanese Midway Force Shortage of Fuel ' that so many people have believed for so long. Based on his work, and I quote:

Mr. Alexandros states :

All in all, a probable length of the mission of Kido Butai would be around 28 to 34 days, of which 16 days travel TO and FROM the atoll (movement at cruise speed), 10-15 days waiting for Junyo/Ryujo to join up (movement at economical speed) and for the "demoralised enemy" to appear; 2-3 days actual "decisive battle" (movement at high speed).

Thus, with the ' Decisive Battle ' already over ( This thread assumes the USN would be defeated on June 4 th to June 5th ) then the IJN will have approximately one and a half to two weeks in which to overcome the Midway Defenders, occupy the islands, and then go home.



To Mr. Mikegriffith1 :

You stated:

Until I read John Toland's book The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, I had no
idea that most of the top Army and Navy brass opposed Yamamoto's idea to attack Midway, and that Yamamoto
threatened to resign if his idea was not accepted.

Obviously, the decision to attack Midway was a serious blunder and went far beyond the General Staff's original
strategic plan.

You might want to read Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor by Prof. John J. Stephan. This is an exhaustively researched and excellently documented study of both the situation in Hawaii and in Japan leading up to and following the Battle of Midway. He shows how the ENTIRE Japanese military strategy was changed overnight by the Doolittle Raid and it's effects on the High Commands of both the IJA and IJN. Prof. Stephan has both studied and taught in Japan for a many years, and his contacts and associations ultimately gave him access to extensive documentation not normally available to Westerners.

In effect, once the Doolittle Raid had shown the Japanese that the U.S. was capable of striking back, and that the Home Islands were at risk, the original strategic plan was discarded, and a program to occupy, first Midway, then Johnston, and finally the Hawaiian Islands, was put in place.



Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[paulrward]

Hello All :

To Mr. Carl Schwambeger:

Over the years, Colonel Ichiki has gotten a very bad rap from historians, prinicipally because he was the first Japanese Ground
Force leader to be decisively beaten by the U.S. Forces.

Here is how Wikipedia describes Colonel Ichiki : (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kiyonao_Ichiki )

On 19 August, six Japanese destroyers carried Ichiki and his 916 troops from Truk and landed them at Taivu Point on Guadalcanal. Ichiki had been ordered to wait on the beachhead for the remainder of his regiment, but finding the beach deserted and the island apparently lightly defended, Ichiki grossly underestimated the strength of the American forces, left a rear guard of 125 men, and advanced to make a nighttime frontal assault against the American positions. Unknown to Ichiki, the American Marines were aware of his landing and were entrenched in defensive positions. In the Battle of the Tenaru of 21 August 1942 Ichiki was defeated with extremely heavy losses.

Recent Japanese scholarship disputes the claim that Ichiki was personally reckless/at fault, and say that the Imperial general staff put Ichiki in a suicidal position by ordering him to attack into prepared positions, outnumbered 15 to 1, with no air support, no naval support, no heavy guns, and poor intelligence that vastly underestimated American strength. The additional troops from his second group would not have changed this equation. However, the general staff needed someone to take the blame, and figured it was easy to blame Ichiki. There was also speculation that the General Staff preferred to send Ichiki to battle directly from the aborted Midway operation, figuring if the entire detachment went back to Japan the secret of the failure at Midway would leak.

Accounts differ as to how Ichiki died. At least one account claims that Ichiki was killed in action during the heat of battle; others state that he committed ritual suicide due to the humiliation of his defeat in the battle. Despite the failure of his attack, Ichiki was promoted posthumously to major general.

In addition, according to Wikipedia, ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Tenaru )

An aerial reconnaissance of the U.S. Marine positions on Guadalcanal on August 12 by one of the senior Japanese staff officers from Rabaul sighted few U.S. troops in the open and no large ships in the waters nearby, convincing Imperial Headquarters that the Allies had withdrawn the majority of their troops. In fact, none of the Allied troops had been withdrawn. Hyakutake issued orders for an advance unit of 900 troops from Ichiki's regiment to be landed on Guadalcanal by fast warship to immediately attack the Allied position and reoccupy the airfield area at Lunga Point. The remaining personnel in Ichiki's regiment would be delivered to Guadalcanal by slower transport later. At the major Japanese naval base at Truk, which was the staging point for delivery of Ichiki's regiment to Guadalcanal, Colonel Ichiki was briefed that 2,000–10,000 U.S. troops were holding the Guadalcanal beachhead and that he should, "avoid frontal attacks."

Finally, though Ichiki was ordered to wait for his entire force to arrive, he and his men only had seven days worth of food and supplies, putting a definite sense of urgency in his getting the mission accomplished.

Now, if we study the second quote from above, we can see that Ichiki was given contradictory information: First, he was told that there were 2,000 - 10,000 U.S. troops on Guadalcanal, and, Second, that he was informed that Imperial Headquarters was convinced that the U.S. forces had been, for the most part, withdrawn, and that this second evaluation was based on a direct aerial reconnaissance by an experienced Staff Officer.


What really happened was that he was going into a battle against a force that, depending on how you look at it, was either three times his size, or nearly 15 times his size. Even if you accept only the first number, Ichiki was up against a force much larger than his own, dug in behind a river, with light cannon and squad automatic weapons, along with barbed wire, while Ichiki had no air cover, no artillery support, and poor communications after the action started.


Now, if Ichiki had landed at Midway, he would have been going in during daylight, with naval artillery, naval air support, and light artillery mounted in his landing boats, weapons which he had been drilling his men rigourously in the days leading up to their embarcation for the Midway Invasion.

The Midway Defenders, on the other hand, would have been facing air strikes, naval bombardment, and the knowledge that, with the USN defeated on June 4th, they were in the same position as the Marines on Wake Island. Remember, the Marines on Wake surrrendered after suffering about 25 % casualties. Ichiki's men on Guadalcanal suffered much higher losses than that before they withdrew, indicating that their fighting spirit might have been quite high in the face of adversity.


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

In my posting of 24 Mar 2019 14:18 , I inserted a link which was improperly formatted,
and did not work. Here is the proper link :


https://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/Ma ... idway.html

[rcocean]

Well the entire IJN cannot just sit around Midway for a weeks or even a few days ( IMO 3+), They did not have the supplies or simply the logistical ability or know-how to do so.

That is incorrect,re-read the second post of this thread.

With all due respect, you've shown no such thing. In order to prove the IJN could hang around for a week pounding Midway, you'd have to know the actual - not theoretical - fuel consumption of every ship. Then, you'd have to know the actual - not theoretical fuel capacity of every ship. And finally, you'd have to know how much fuel the IJN required to be in their bunkers BEFORE they headed for home. No, Japanese Admiral was going to head back to Truk with just enough Oil to get there. And If the IJN had 5 Oil tankers, they weren't going to stick around until every single one was empty. What if an American Sub sunk 1 of the 5 Oil Tankers? But - as I wrote - you don't know what Yamamoto's margin of safety was. So your calculations are meaningless.

And BTW, you can't look at DD and say, oh its 2,000 miles to Midway, and a destroyer burns X Tons of oil per mile on cruise speed, therefore... Why? Because DD's have to cover AC's as they launch planes. They have chase down SS contacts. They have to spread out in a circle and cover the taskforce. They aren't moving in a straight-line and they're covering more miles then indicated by using a ruler.

And we haven't even brought up the matter of ammunition. The IJN didn't bring along extra Ammo for shore bombardment. Once they dumped X amount of shells on Midway, that was it.

As I stated in my previous post ( or thought I did), the Japanese never assaulted a strong, heavily held island before Midway. Guam and Wake were weakly held walkovers. Corrigedor was an army job. The USN had 2x the logistical capacity and 3x the troops when we attacked Tarawa, and we still almost failed. 5,000 Japanese soldiers with zero amphibious training, weren't going to do the job at Midway.