Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

[paulrward]

Hello All :

To Mr. Rcocean :

A number of interesting points, which we can handle one at a time:

In order to prove the IJN could hang around for a week pounding Midway, you'd have to know the actual - not theoretical - fuel consumption of every ship. Then, you'd have to know the actual - not theoretical fuel capacity of every ship. And finally, you'd have to know how much fuel the IJN required to be in their bunkers BEFORE they headed for home.

Not necessarily. After all, when I used to fly cross country flights in my airplane, I never tried to determine to the milliliter how much fuel my aircraft would burn. Instead, I used a known rate of consumption from the flight manual, and then, knowing the distance and the
need for a loiter and alternative destination reserve, I would determine how much fuel I expected to burn on a worst case scenario.

Worst case for the IJN is the need to stay for a week to ten days, and fight another battle in the waters north of Midway. While waiting
for the USN, the IJN would be conducting air raids, perhaps two per day, using half the aircraft complement for each strike, thus, each
day, for take off and landing, the IJN task groups would accelerate to 30 knots, and then, at all other times, be in a low speed, fuel
conservation mode. Based on this, Mr. Alexandros, using the KNOWN CONSUMPTION RATES of IJN warships, has calculated that the
Kido Butai, reserving enough fuel to get home plus a 10% margin, would have been able to stay on station at Midway at low cruise
speeds for 10 - 15 days, and STILL have enough fuel to fight a 2-3 day battle against the USN while keeping sufficient fuel to return
home with a 10% margin .

Remember, the IJN carried out a hit and run raid into the Indian Ocean, a considerable distance from their home waters, with no fuel
supply issues.

And If the IJN had 5 Oil tankers, they weren't going to stick around until every single one was empty.

The idea that the IJN would do so is ludicrous. Instead, they would fuel from ALL of their tankers, keeping a balanced load in each
one, and, long before the tankers were empty, would head for home, refueling as they went. Which is what they did historically in
each of their operations in early 1942.

What if an American Sub sunk 1 of the 5 Oil Tankers?

All we have to do is look at the effectiveness of the USN submarine force in the historical Midway Action. The Nautilus carried out two
attacks, one of which scored zero hits, and the second which scored one hit with a dud torpedo. The Tambor failed in it's night attack
on the group of four cruisers, though the attack did result in a night collision amongst the Japanese. ( Nimitz was so impressed with the
Tambor's performance that he relieved her commanding officer ! )

Remember, USN 21" torpedoes had defective depth control, defective magnetic detonators, and defective contact detonators, a set of
problems not fully resolved until September of 1943. In other words, the odds are in favor of the IJN on this one....

you don't know what Yamamoto's margin of safety was. So your calculations are meaningless.

This is the difference between a naval strategist and a naval historian. A historian relies ONLY on what he can read in a book. If he can't
find it in a book, then he throws up his hands and moans, " I don't know ! " In other words, he isn't a problem solver.....

Any decent strategist can come up with his own levels of safety margins, and make plans on that basis. You should try it sometime. It
is very broadening to the intellect.

And we haven't even brought up the matter of ammunition. The IJN didn't bring along extra Ammo for shore bombardment. Once they dumped X amount of shells on Midway, that was it.

In another forum, I estimated that, using just 10% of the ammunition supply carried on board the five IJN battleships and the ten heavy cruisers, the IJN had sufficient weight of fire to essentially knock out anything on the two islets.

I leave this to you, Mr. Rcocean, as a test problem : Assuming a normal loadout of 100 shells per gun on each IJN capital ship, and that
just 10% are HE, what is the total tonnage of main battery shells that the fifteen ships could fire against Midway ? I think the answer will surprise you.

5,000 Japanese soldiers with zero amphibious training, weren't going to do the job at Midway.

Hmmmmm....... How to handle this one ? Well, half of the force was IJN SNLF. Thats Special Naval Landing Force. In other words, these were specialist amphibious warfare troops. The other half were the Ichiki Regiment, who had just finished up two weeks of daily
practice in their landing craft carrying out mock assaults on beaches, and among other interesting items, had been practicing shooting
their regimental 75mm howitzers over the bows of their daihatsu landing craft. In other words, BOTH halves of the IJN assault force
were trained in amphibious warfare.

Respectfully

Paul R. Ward

[glenn239]

Well the entire IJN cannot just sit around Midway for a weeks or even a few days ( IMO 3+), They did not have the supplies or simply the logistical ability or know-how to do so.

That is incorrect,re-read the second post of this thread.

With all due respect, you've shown no such thing. In order to prove the IJN could hang around for a week pounding Midway, you'd have to know the actual - not theoretical - fuel consumption of every ship. Then, you'd have to know the actual - not theoretical fuel capacity of every ship. And finally, you'd have to know how much fuel the IJN required to be in their bunkers BEFORE they headed for home. No, Japanese Admiral was going to head back to Truk with just enough Oil to get there. And If the IJN had 5 Oil tankers, they weren't going to stick around until every single one was empty. What if an American Sub sunk 1 of the 5 Oil Tankers? But - as I wrote - you don't know what Yamamoto's margin of safety was. So your calculations are meaningless.

And BTW, you can't look at DD and say, oh its 2,000 miles to Midway, and a destroyer burns X Tons of oil per mile on cruise speed, therefore... Why? Because DD's have to cover AC's as they launch planes. They have chase down SS contacts. They have to spread out in a circle and cover the taskforce. They aren't moving in a straight-line and they're covering more miles then indicated by using a ruler.

And we haven't even brought up the matter of ammunition. The IJN didn't bring along extra Ammo for shore bombardment. Once they dumped X amount of shells on Midway, that was it.

As I stated in my previous post ( or thought I did), the Japanese never assaulted a strong, heavily held island before Midway. Guam and Wake were weakly held walkovers. Corrigedor was an army job. The USN had 2x the logistical capacity and 3x the troops when we attacked Tarawa, and we still almost failed. 5,000 Japanese soldiers with zero amphibious training, weren't going to do the job at Midway.

Not sure how Corrigedor doesn't count because it was an "army" job. I thought 4th ID attacked a heavily fortified island with US Marine defenses head on and took the island in less than one day by direct assault.

On the fuel front, if you go to the Combined Fleet website you'll find a list of all the IJN oilers in WW2, with their capacities listed. The Midway invasion force, not including the oiler allocated to the invasion force (Akibono Maru), or the oilers allocated to the Aleutians, were 12 in total-

Kyokuto, Shinkoku, Toho, Nippon, Kukuyo, Naruto, Toei, Nichiei, Sata, Tsurumi, Genyo, Kenyo. Their carrying capacity was 134,900 tons. Of that, if we assume 2,000 tons is earmarked to supply each tanker, not less than 110,000 tons is available for other ships.

The Midway invasion covering forces, not including the landing forces themselves, comprised 4xCV, 7xBB, 4xCVL/CVS, 10xCA, 3xCL, 27xDD. The approx. endurance of IJN warships at sea, broadly speaking, was about 20 days at 16kt. The approx. bunkerage of the warships for this 20 days endurance was -

CV's - 22,500
BB's - 43,500
CVL/CVS - 8,000
CA - 25,000
CL - 4,500
DD - 15,000
Total - 118,500

110,000 tons on the tankers was about 18.5 days extra endurance. In fact, you'll notice that it's almost like the number of tankers and the capacity they picked would double the bunkerage of the warship forces they were supporting.

So, when the forces left Japan, the approx. endurance at 16kt would be about 38.5 days. Nagumo departed Japan on 27 May and cruised towards Midway until 3 June when refueling activities ceased. At that point b(on June 3rd) 7 days had been consumed, and something about another 10 days would be in a "never touch" so the operation had about 38.5-7-10 - 21.5 days left at 16kt, which was about 11 days remaining at 24kt.

Note, however, that nothing said all 106 warships cruising towards Midway on 3 June need be there 2 weeks later if circumstances warranted. The Nagumo Force had about 47,000 tons of fuel, so the Main Body and some of the support forces could withdraw, fueling their destroyers as they went from the battleships, and the fuel savings in the tanker train could be used to extend Nagumo's stay off Midway for perhaps another 12-20 days or so.

[rcocean]

An interesting post. I'll reply in more detail later. Corregidor doesn't count because it was done by the Army and not the IJN. Corregidor was bombarded for almost a month by Japanese Army guns stationed on Bataan. And the Japanese assault troops just got in small boats and motored a couple miles across Manila Bay. It was not really an amphibious assault, but was more like a River crossing. This is entirely different from the IJN ships bombarding an island in the middle of the pacific, and then sending Japanese Marines in to "Hit the Beach" with no artillery barrage or tanks to help them.

[glenn239]

An interesting post. I'll reply in more detail later. Corregidor doesn't count because it was done by the Army and not the IJN. Corregidor was bombarded for almost a month by Japanese Army guns stationed on Bataan. And the Japanese assault troops just got in small boats and motored a couple miles across Manila Bay. It was not really an amphibious assault, but was more like a River crossing. This is entirely different from the IJN ships bombarding an island in the middle of the pacific, and then sending Japanese Marines in to "Hit the Beach" with no artillery barrage or tanks to help them.

On the fuel situation, the numbers seem to suggest that the tanker force was about the size to double the endurance of the forces involved, from something like a 16kt cruise range of 7,000 miles to 14,000 miles. The invasion force groups (seaplane, assault) were not so equipped, no doubt because they were intended to anchor at the target, not sail around, and then return to Japan the moment their mission was completed.

On Corriegidor, it was an island fortress largely impervious to bombardment. Some of the topside structures and batteries were damaged or destroyed, but the garrison was basically immune. The garrison included a Marine regiment, the 4th, which was overrun. To say the bombardment lasted "a month" is not correct. The pre-invasion bombardment lasted a few days. Prior to that sporadic air raids and bombardments of little weight or consequence.

This is not to say that the IJN/IJA succeed in taking Midway. I think the defenders were tough, well lead, well prepared, and favored to hold, that they could contain the invasion in some beachhead, and stood a good chance of causing the Japanese to fail to take the runway.

[rcocean]

On Corriegidor, it was an island fortress largely impervious to bombardment. Some of the topside structures and batteries were damaged or destroyed, but the garrison was basically immune. The garrison included a Marine regiment, the 4th, which was overrun. To say the bombardment lasted "a month" is not correct. The pre-invasion bombardment lasted a few days. Prior to that sporadic air raids and bombardments of little weight or consequence.

This is going off topic, but I'm not too sure what you mean by

"largely impervious to bombardment".

The Japanese 80-150 batteries on Bataan were able to systematically shell Corrigedor for 27 days. They set up two observation balloons, and destroyed almost every big gun on the island and most of the AAA guns (although there were only 32 3-inch guns). On April 29th, 1942 - Wainwright estimated the island had been hit with 10,000 shells and on May 2nd, 16,000 shells. And all this fire was "observed Fire" from Bataan. All the vegetation was blown away. And according to Hanson Badwin in "Battles lost and won" by the May 5th assault, 46 out of 48 beach guns had been destroyed, while the Marine corps history quotes the leader of the 4th Regiment:

...the beach defenses were practically destroyed. Very little defensive wire remained, tank traps constructed with great difficulty had been rendered useless, and all my weapons were in temporary emplacements as the original emplacements had been destroyed. I told Colonel Howard at this time that I was very dubious as to my ability to withstand a landing attack in force.

[rcocean]

On the fuel situation, the numbers seem to suggest that the tanker force was about the size to double the endurance of the forces involved, from something like a 16kt cruise range of 7,000 miles to 14,000 miles. The invasion force groups (seaplane, assault) were not so equipped, no doubt because they were intended to anchor at the target, not sail around, and then return to Japan the moment their mission was completed.

Yes, perhaps your right then -if the IJN had 12 tankers instead of 6. One mystery to me, is why US Task forces off Wake Island in Jan 1942 or Guadalcanal in August 1942, were always "Refueling" - even though they should have had plenty of fuel, given the distance traveled. I find the whole thing confusing, but am certainly willing to admit you're right about the IJN off Midway.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Mr. RcOcean stated :

Yes, perhaps your right then -if the IJN had 12 tankers instead of 6.

Hmmmmmm...... As one of my favorite bridge partners likes to say, " Shall we review the bidding ? "


The Midway Attack Force Tankers with their tonnages :

Attached to First Carrier Striking Force
Kyokuto Maru 10000
Shinkoku M 10000
Toho M 9900
Nippon M 9900
Kokuyo M 10000

Attached to Main Body
Naruto M 14000
Toei M 10000

Attached to Midway Invasion Force
Sata M 14000
Tsurumi M 14000
Genyo M 10000
Kenyo M 10000

Attached to Close Support Group
Nichiei M 10000

Attached to Transport Group
Akebono M 10000


By my reckoning, this is a total of 13 tankers, comprising about 140,000 tons. Now, according to the records, the 14,000 tonners
carried 8,000 tons of oil as cargo. This means, by extension, that 140,000 tons of tankers should be able to carry roughly 80,000
tons of oil. But, in reality, they could carry much more, as the 8000 ton per ship figure applies only to the OILERs, and not the TANKERs.
So the IJN had Much more fuel, right in line with Mr. Alexandros' figures.

So much for the IJN being short of tankers or oil.

Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[scott.livesey]

Midway invasion force was in for an unpleasant surprise. The defenders were well dug in on an island with about 3000 combat troops, the beaches are mined and covered with two rows of double apron barbed wire. They have 85+ dug in .30 or .50 machine guns, numerous 20mm, 37mm, and 40mm AA guns that can be depressed and used as anti infantry, 24 3" guns(the type later mounted on the M4 Sherman), 6 5" guns and 4 7" guns with an effective range of 9 miles. To make things interesting, there are 6 or more PT boats close to shore and in the lagoon and 6-12 subs within 25 miles.(Even with a 10% success rate, 10 subs have 24 hits). There are 1000 or so other troops, all with rifles, doing other stuff but trained to fight as infantry. The NCO's, company grade and field grade officers have been training for this moment for years.
IJN has a 2500 man invasion force in two groups who have never trained together. Because of planning, no rehearsals. Communications are limited. The support force is untrained in shore bombardment and has limited bombardment ammunition. The landing boats will drop the troops off 200 to 800 yards from shore and the troops will have to walk thru 2 to 8 feet of water to get to the shore.
No, the invasion force and associated planning were not adequate. Before anyone answers about how heavy the bombardment will be, remember that the runways on Eastern Island have to be ready to accept planes on 7 June or the whole mission fails.

the old sailor

[glenn239]

). On April 29th, 1942 - Wainwright estimated the island had been hit with 10,000 shells and on May 2nd, 16,000 shells.

Right, the really heavy stuff was in the days ahead of the assault - 26,000 shells on those two days alone. AFAIK, Corriegdor and Singapore were the only landing assaults where the Japanese bombardments were extremely heavy. I see with a quick bit of googling that Iwo Jima took something like 6,400 tons of bombs and about 40,000 shells in the preliminary months and days before the invasion, so the IJA bombardment was pretty darn heavy.)

[glenn239]

Yes, perhaps your right then -if the IJN had 12 tankers instead of 6. One mystery to me, is why US Task forces off Wake Island in Jan 1942 or Guadalcanal in August 1942, were always "Refueling" - even though they should have had plenty of fuel, given the distance traveled. I find the whole thing confusing, but am certainly willing to admit you're right about the IJN off Midway.

Fletcher off Wake Island was preoccupied with refuelling because (1) he only had one tanker for his TF (Nagumo had 5) and (2) the USN just wasn't very good at refuelling at that time and took too long at it. Off Guadalcanal USN refuelling was presumably much better - I'd assume that the problem was that Fletcher needed to maintain an alert posture (ie enough fuel to fight a 2-day high speed carrier battle) against a potential attack that could come at any time.

[glenn239]

This means, by extension, that 140,000 tons of tankers should be able to carry roughly 80,000
tons of oil.

Paul R. Ward

The capacity for the tankers is here,

http://www.combinedfleet.com/Yusosen.htm

If you click on each class it lists the bunkerage, typically about 12,000 tons. It's not clear whether that includes the fuel for the ship or not. If so, then about 10,000 tons each.

[glenn239]

Midway invasion force was in for an unpleasant surprise. The defenders were well dug in on an island with about 3000 combat troops, the beaches are mined and covered with two rows of double apron barbed wire.

What would the effect of the bombardment be on the barbed wire and mines?

[scott.livesey]

Midway invasion force was in for an unpleasant surprise. The defenders were well dug in on an island with about 3000 combat troops, the beaches are mined and covered with two rows of double apron barbed wire.

What would the effect of the bombardment be on the barbed wire and mines?

With original assigned bombardment force, Kurita's four cruisers would probably be firing from 20,000 yards or more to stay out of shore gun range. With landing scheduled for dawn, firing in the dark, probably 50-50 chance rounds would hit the targeted island. As said, Kurita did not want to do too much damage to runways on Eastern Island. Shells would land in soft sand at about a 40 degree angle and make a deep, small diameter hole. The occasional round that landed within 30 feet of waters edge might damage some of the barbed wire or explode a mine or two. The damage probably would not be seen until troops reached the reef. The double apron was just part of the barbed wire laid. There was miles of barbed wire laid in shallow water that could not be seen until one stepped into it. The Marines in the defense battalion had nothing to do for the previous six to nine months but lay barbed wire and dig in and site their guns. Invasion by a force about the same size as the defenders, on paper as it never happened, does not look to have much chance of success.
the old sailor

[glenn239]

Midway invasion force was in for an unpleasant surprise. The defenders were well dug in on an island with about 3000 combat troops, the beaches are mined and covered with two rows of double apron barbed wire.

What would the effect of the bombardment be on the barbed wire and mines?

With original assigned bombardment force, Kurita's four cruisers would probably be firing from 20,000 yards or more to stay out of shore gun range. With landing scheduled for dawn, firing in the dark, probably 50-50 chance rounds would hit the targeted island. As said, Kurita did not want to do too much damage to runways on Eastern Island. Shells would land in soft sand at about a 40 degree angle and make a deep, small diameter hole. The occasional round that landed within 30 feet of waters edge might damage some of the barbed wire or explode a mine or two. The damage probably would not be seen until troops reached the reef. The double apron was just part of the barbed wire laid. There was miles of barbed wire laid in shallow water that could not be seen until one stepped into it. The Marines in the defense battalion had nothing to do for the previous six to nine months but lay barbed wire and dig in and site their guns. Invasion by a force about the same size as the defenders, on paper as it never happened, does not look to have much chance of success.
the old sailor

You predict Kurita would fire from 20,000 yards and not hit the broadside of a barn door, while the other 13 warships would not fire at all. They would all sail around doing nothing while the invasion force was chopped to pieces on the beach and reefs for six hours. Under that prediction, the minefields and barbed wire would largely be intact, and the corps level firepower the invasion fleet brought with it would largely be silent.

Let's say for sake of argument the invasion fire support is not that incompetent, but instead more like Singapore and Corregidor against fortified objectives, and that all 17 warships are willing to bombard Midway in support from as little as 3,000 yards, that Kondo peels off, let's say half a dozen warships for a preliminary bombardment ranging from 5" to 14", and that Nagumo - with no carrier battle on the 4th - and the seaplanes manage maybe 800 bombing sorties for invasion softening up before, and on the day, of the invasion, (call it 70/70 dive/level bombers on the afternoon of the 4th, 140/140 on the 5th, 140/140 on the 6th and 100 seaplane bomber runs).

What's the effect on the mines, defending positions, and barbed wire?

[scott.livesey]

.