Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
scott.livesey
Member
Posts: 9
Joined: 30 Jan 2019, 20:58
Location: Raleigh,NC USA

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#61

Post by scott.livesey » 18 Apr 2019, 01:31

scott.livesey wrote:
18 Apr 2019, 01:08
glenn239 wrote:
17 Apr 2019, 18:57

You predict Kurita would fire from 20,000 yards and not hit the broadside of a barn door, while the other 13 warships would not fire at all. They would all sail around doing nothing while the invasion force was chopped to pieces on the beach and reefs for six hours. Under that prediction, the minefields and barbed wire would largely be intact, and the corps level firepower the invasion fleet brought with it would largely be silent.
Kurita's 4 cruisers were the designated bombardment force. don't know where you get corps level firepower. you had Kurita's cruisers, a few destroyers and the transports. that was all that was included in the Sacred Plan and the only ships ordered to invade the island. The Japanese armed forces did not deviate from the Sacred Plan and orders. As said, to meet the master schedule, bombardment would happen before first light on 6 June with landings to begin at dawn. The battleships were to stage 100 or so miles north and east of Midway to clean up what was left of Nimitz's reaction.
This is all make believe as it never happened. You can make appear any Japanese ships in the area and have them deliver fire wherever and whenever you want.
The battleships were not there for gunfire support, they were there to sink any US ships that survived the air battle and would be carrying mostly AP rounds.
a good summary of naval gunfire support accuracy and number of rounds to destroy targets based on actual bombardments, read Naval Gunfire Support by USMC Maj Gen Weller, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a051873.pdf An 8" gun cruiser, firing at a shore target, will place 50% of the rounds fired in a 400 yard circle with aiming point the center of the circle. Many areas of Midway Islands less than 400 yards across.
Again, this is all make believe as it never happened. Looking at the original plan, the invasion force and it's support group was not adequate.
the old sailor

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#62

Post by glenn239 » 18 Apr 2019, 18:38

scott.livesey wrote:
18 Apr 2019, 01:31
Kurita's 4 cruisers were the designated bombardment force. don't know where you get corps level firepower. you had Kurita's cruisers, a few destroyers and the transports. that was all that was included in the Sacred Plan and the only ships ordered to invade the island.
I read your post where you expressed the idea that Kurita bombards Midway incompetently. In that case the defenders might hope that their mine and barbed wire defenses might hold. I then asked you what happens if the bombardment goes otherwise, and contrary to your expectations, it is more fearsome and much closer in than you think. Your reply is to the effect that X and Y must happen, but A and B won't happen - all variables intended to favor the defenders. Without further reference to the variables you mention that favor the defenders, and assuming the bombardment is a real corker instead, I take it in that set of circumstances you're not as optimistic on the ability of the defenders to hold?

The invasion force and close fire support group brought 17 warships to Midway. Four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and 12 destroyers. A total of about 365 guns - 40x8", 7x5.5", 92 x 5", 200-300 x 25mm.
The Japanese armed forces did not deviate from the Sacred Plan and orders. As said, to meet the master schedule, bombardment would happen before first light on 6 June with landings to begin at dawn. The battleships were to stage 100 or so miles north and east of Midway to clean up what was left of Nimitz's reaction.
IJA amphibious tactics were more flexible than that - they'd switch plans and beaches on the basis of last minute intel or weather conditions. For instance, the assault on Corregidor was intended as a preliminary thrust and diversion to the main landing, and it became the main effort on the fly as it became clear it was gaining ground. Another example, the initial landing on Luzon one of the beaches was changed mid-debarkation due to opportunistic weather conditions elsewhere.
The battleships were not there for gunfire support, they were there to sink any US ships that survived the air battle and would be carrying mostly AP rounds.
Most of the 14" and 8" might have been AP - of limited use, but Kondo's force also had hundreds of secondary armament pieces that could fire thousands of rounds, and these were not AP.
a good summary of naval gunfire support accuracy and number of rounds to destroy targets based on actual bombardments, read Naval Gunfire Support by USMC Maj Gen Weller, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a051873.pdf An 8" gun cruiser, firing at a shore target, will place 50% of the rounds fired in a 400 yard circle with aiming point the center of the circle.
You stated the other day that the barbed wire and minefields on the beaches would be intact, but as we talk more about the possibility of a heavy bombardment, the more I'm getting the impression that if the bombardment was heavy, you and I both agree that the minefields and barbed wire would be anything but intact.

In terms of artillery positions and bunkers, how well camouflaged were these? The weather was pretty good, so a couple hundred dive bomber attacks might do some serious damage. Certainly any piece firing in the AA role would expose itself to attack.
Again, this is all make believe as it never happened.[/color][/u][/b] Looking at the original plan, the invasion force and it's support group was not adequate.
The warships the heavy armament of an infantry corps. Also, don't forget that the Diahatsus would have cannons (25mm?) on them, and the three landing destroyers probably had a variety of 5", 25mm and 13mm on their decks too. I'm not saying that the Marines don't win. I am saying that you'd probably be hard pressed on June 6th on Midway to find more than a few Marines to be disappointed the invasion was cancelled.


scott.livesey
Member
Posts: 9
Joined: 30 Jan 2019, 20:58
Location: Raleigh,NC USA

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#63

Post by scott.livesey » 18 Apr 2019, 22:51

glenn239 wrote:
18 Apr 2019, 18:38

I read your post where you expressed the idea that Kurita bombards Midway incompetently. In that case the defenders might hope that their mine and barbed wire defenses might hold.
I never said Kurita's bombardment was incompetent. I just pointed out the historic accuracy of 8" guns when fired at shore targets. The Circular Error Probable, which takes into account all possible errors, for 8" guns is a range from 195 to 600 yards, 400 yards being the middle value. CEP (CIRCULAR ERROR PROBABLE) is the mean distance at which a projectile will be offset from it’s aim point. The offsets break down roughly as 50% of all projectiles will impact within the radius of the CEP(400 yards) and 90% of all projectiles will impact within 2.5 times the radius of the CEP(1000 yards). Lots of Sand and parts of Eastern Island are less than 400 yards across, so 50% of rounds fired hit the island. I picked a range of 20,000 yards to be out of range of shore batteries. You move closer to improve CEP, you get hit with 5" and 7" AP. You drop anchor to improve CEP, the US submarines(there were 8 within 12 miles of Midway by 11PM 5 June.) get to test torpedo effectiveness.
the old sailor

scott.livesey
Member
Posts: 9
Joined: 30 Jan 2019, 20:58
Location: Raleigh,NC USA

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#64

Post by scott.livesey » 19 Apr 2019, 00:32

glenn239 wrote:
18 Apr 2019, 18:38
In terms of artillery positions and bunkers, how well camouflaged were these? The weather was pretty good, so a couple hundred dive bomber attacks might do some serious damage. Certainly any piece firing in the AA role would expose itself to attack.
Remember that IJN only brought 70 dive bombers and 81 level bombers to the party. They lost 10% during the first raid. If they attacked US carriers, figure 30% loss per sortie minimum. Invasion had to take place at dawn on 6 June, not much time or planes for hundreds of attacks.
Anti-ship guns, 5" and 7", were in concrete enclosures re-enforced with sand bags and had camo net covers. 3" and smaller AAA were trailer mounted and were surrounded with sand bags and had camo net covers. Machine gun and rifle positions were in dugouts lined with wood or sheet metal, roofs of sheet metal and railroad ties, re-enforced with sandbags, covered with sand and native plants. The only damage to artillery positions during 4 June raid was damage range-finder that was repaired before dark.
To answer thread question, no force was not adequate.
the old sailor

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#65

Post by glenn239 » 22 Apr 2019, 18:34

scott.livesey wrote:
18 Apr 2019, 22:51
I never said Kurita's bombardment was incompetent. I just pointed out the historic accuracy of 8" guns when fired at shore targets. The Circular Error Probable, which takes into account all possible errors, for 8" guns is a range from 195 to 600 yards, 400 yards being the middle value.
CEP depends on range and how tight the salvos are of the navy in question. If you're talking the Italian navy from 20,000 yards then a 400 yard grouping might be in the ballpark. If you're talking the IJN from 4,000 yards, then I'd expect a much tighter pattern - the IJN had just about the tightest salvo patterns in the game.

BTW, 7th CRU DIV had been employed in fire support before, but I've not seen specific details on its methods.
Lots of Sand and parts of Eastern Island are less than 400 yards across, so 50% of rounds fired hit the island. I picked a range of 20,000 yards to be out of range of shore batteries. You move closer to improve CEP, you get hit with 5" and 7" AP. You drop anchor to improve CEP, the US submarines(there were 8 within 12 miles of Midway by 11PM 5 June.) get to test torpedo effectiveness.
the old sailor
Seemed to me you picked the range as being 20,000 yards because that's where the bombardment can't possibly supress the Marine positions and allow the attack to succeed. I agree - if the IJN warships stay at 20,000 yards they are essentially not in the battle and the Marines can spend 12 daylight hours pumping fire into the reefs where the invasion forces are huddling, the survivors scrambling back to their transports after dark. So, let's set that scenario to one aside and concentrate on where the IJN is willing to get right in close with everything it's got - 25mm range - as soon as it's clear the invasion is in trouble. That's 350 guns of 25mm and over, plus hundreds of attack and spotter aircraft. Do the Marines win so easily if that happens? I'm not certain.

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#66

Post by glenn239 » 22 Apr 2019, 18:46

scott.livesey wrote:
19 Apr 2019, 00:32
Remember that IJN only brought 70 dive bombers and 81 level bombers to the party. They lost 10% during the first raid. If they attacked US carriers, figure 30% loss per sortie minimum. Invasion had to take place at dawn on 6 June, not much time or planes for hundreds of attacks.
I'm not considering any scenario with US carriers present before June 7th, since it's not likely the landing even occurs in that event.

The attack on Midway cost 1 dive bomber, with 72 embarked. Six Kates were shot down, another 4 ditched back at the fleet, with 79 embarked. This left 71 dive bombers and about 83 torpedo bombers remaining, not including any disassembled spares, but including Zuiho's 12 x B5N1's. In addition, the seaplane anchorage would have 32 seaplanes capable of recce or bombing missions. On the 5th, something like 150-250 aircraft bombing sorties. On the 6th, maybe more like 300-400 as things get hairy. The seaplane anchorage at Kure was close and Nagumo could have come right in (50 miles?) to peak his sortie rate.
Anti-ship guns, 5" and 7", were in concrete enclosures re-enforced with sand bags and had camo net covers. 3" and smaller AAA were trailer mounted and were surrounded with sand bags and had camo net covers. Machine gun and rifle positions were in dugouts lined with wood or sheet metal, roofs of sheet metal and railroad ties, re-enforced with sandbags, covered with sand and native plants. The only damage to artillery positions during 4 June raid was damage range-finder that was repaired before dark.
It's quite possible that many of the 5" and 7" guns could escape damage prior to the invasion, but once they opened fire they are revealed and they would be the top priority target for IJN ships, dive and level bombers.

scott.livesey
Member
Posts: 9
Joined: 30 Jan 2019, 20:58
Location: Raleigh,NC USA

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#67

Post by scott.livesey » 24 Apr 2019, 20:51

Yes the Japanese could improvise, something they were not good at, and put up a good fight. There would be heavy losses on both sides.
Issues with the plan:
1. Short planning time. Orders of who was going to do what did not reach lower level commands till after 20 May. Not much time to plan.
2. Divided forces. There were army troops sailing in army transports, navy troops sailing in navy transports, both sailing from Saipan. No records of IJN Capt. Ota having a sit down with IJA Col. Ichiki to discuss the invasion. IJN Adm. Kurita, commander of Midway bombardment force, sailed from Guam. No records of Kurita having a sit down with Ichiki and Ota. Had anyone done the required grunt work to make an invasion work? Maps, to include grid maps of Midway, communications, pre-invasion bombardment procedures, timing, ......
3. Number of troops. Ota and Ichiki each had about 1200 infantry. not quite enough. lots of engineers, but most of them were shovel operators. Nobody realized that they were attacking about 1500 marines with 40+ machine guns in addition to many automatic AAA per island. If you going to invade, make sure you have at least 3::1 advantage in troops.
scott

paulrward
Member
Posts: 665
Joined: 10 Dec 2008, 21:14

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#68

Post by paulrward » 25 Apr 2019, 00:51

Hello All :

I am going to put in a few comments, to dispell a number of myths relating to Midway:

1. " The Marines were dug in behind concrete bunkers. " There have been a number of posters who have mentioned that the Marines on Midway were well emplaced, with concrete bunkers and emplacements for the 7" and 5" artillery. This is FALSE. The concrete emplacements were constructed AFTER the Battle of Midway, in the 1943-1944 timeframe. At the time of the battle, the shore based artillery was in fact situated in a series of sand bag revetments, with no overhead cover except camoflage nets and brush. All of the machine gun emplacements were simply dug into the sand until the Marines got to coral, ( about 18'' -24" deep ) and then were ringed with sandbags filled with the sand removed by the digging. Some were roofed with boards or plywood, covered with sand and bits of scrub for camoflage. NONE were ' hardened ' .



2. " The Marines were equipped with heavy shore batteries to resist the invasion. " The 7" and 5" guns were a mixture of weapons that dated back as far at the 1910s, were bag loaded manually, and had no power traverse. The best that could be said of them was that they were elderly. ALL were sited for indirect fire, and had few fields of direct fire, and these were poor at best. They relied on gunlaying information from direct spotters.

From US MARINES AT MIDWAY , https://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/Ma ... idway.html

On December 7, 1941,
The Japanese destroyers now commenced their second firing run, moving in a north-easterly direction up the long axis of Sand Island. The seaplane hangar was hit, and the resulting flames illuminated fresh targets for the Japanese. Ashore, some confusion reigned. Telephone lines were jammed, and it was not until 2148 that Lieutenant Colonel Shannon was given permission to engage the enemy with his Marine shore batteries.

At 2153, orders were received by the Marine searchlight batteries to illuminate the Japanese ships. One Japanese destroyer was immediately illuminated under the guns of Battery A, but the 5-inch guns of this battery had been rendered ineffectual by an earlier salvo that had disrupted firing data and fire command communications. It is doubtful whether any incident on this night demonstrated more clearly the extreme vulnerability of the gun emplacements on Midway to damage from flat trajectory naval bombardment.

At this point only Battery D, located on the south-eastern shore of Sand Island, was able to bring its 3-inch anti-aircraft guns to bear on the Japanese destroyers. The destroyers were now close enough to the reef for Captain Jean H. Buckner to see the Japanese Navy battle flag flying from the foremast of the lead destroyer. Buckner ordered his gunners to fire. Battery D was then joined by the 5-inch guns of Battery B on Eastern Island. By 2158, as Marine fire intensified and became better coordinated, the Japanese destroyers ceased firing and withdrew under cover of their own smoke screen.

The very skilful Japanese night attack caused serious damage to the seaplane hangar, and damaged the power house and other buildings on Sand Island. The 6th Defense Battalion lost two killed and ten wounded. The Naval Air Station lost two killed.
From this it can be seen how just TWO destroyers, firing at Sand Island, inflicted heavy damage with just two firing passes, and suffered no damage in return. Their low angle gunfire had severed the telephone lines from the spotting positions to the guns, and the defensive guns at Midway had gone silent.

We must ask: What would have been the effect on Midway if seven battleships and as many as ten 8" gunned CAs had bombarded the islands for a number of hours ? Remember, the battleships and cruisers would have been well out of range of the shore guns, and, even if they were not, the smallest IJN guns ( nearly one hundred 8" guns ) were larger than the eight elderly 7" guns on shore.

The 3" guns were primarily AA guns, and while they might have been used as point defense weapons, they were not set up for barrage
fire, and they had no training or equipment, and little ammunition, for doing so.


3. "The IJN had no Naval Gunfire Support Doctrine or Training " This is utterly ridiculous. The IJN had supported the IJA and
the SNLF landings in the first Sino Japanese war in the 1890s, had used naval gunfire support against the Russians in 1904-1906, and against
the Chinese again starting in the 1930s. In fact, a quick search on the internet will show you film footage of the IJN supporting the landings in Shanghai in the 1930s, and again when the IJN attacked Hong Kong in 1942. In the fighting for Guadalcanal, the IJN repeatedly used gunfire against Marine targets ashore, to great effect. The statements made by some posters that the IJN had no doctrine or training in
naval gunfire support therefore have no basis in fact.

All IJN warships had a loadout of about 10% HE shells for their batteries, and ships designated for strictly gunfire support missions carried almost exclusively HE loadouts. Thus, the four cruisers assigned to shell Midway would have had about 1000 8" shells EACH to carry out their mission.

Considering this, we must assume that in a fight for Midway Island, the IJN would be fully capable, and only too willing, to use it's heavy
guns in support of an island assault.


4. " The Assault on Corregidor does not count, as it was an ARMY operation.... " Many of the posters who discount the possibility of a Japanese victory in a Midway assault do everything they can to ignore previous IJA victories. We must remember, up until
the battle of Midway, EVERY OBJECTIVE THE IJN AND IJA ATTACKED WAS OCCUPIED ! Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch Indies, Wake Island, the Philippines, and Corregidor were ALL conquered. The Japanese may have suffered reverses, but in every case, they ultimately triumphed.

At Corregidor, the US had some 4000 defenders, of which 1500 were Marines of the 4th Regiment, 1250 were converted artillerymen from the guns of Corregidor, and 1250 were army personnel from various units who had made their way to the island. The Japanese assaulted the island starting about midnight on the 5th-6th of May, 1941, with three waves of about 800 - 900 men each ( a total of less than 2500 men ). Towards the end of the fighting, three IJA light tanks (one of which was a captured American M3 light tank ) landed on Corregidor, and the U.S. Garrison surrendered.

In other words, the IJA carried out a NIGHT LANDING, with Armor, and overwhelmed a force SIXTY PERCENT LARGER than itself ! To those posters who insist that a three to one superiority of Japanese troops to American troops is necessary for the Japanese to be successful in an island assault, this is the proof that it isn't. And, we must consider: Corregidor was a large, rocky island honeycombed with tunnels and concrete fortifications, lines of barbed wire, and excellent interior communications, which the U.S. had spent nearly 30 years building and perfecting. Yet, when the Japanese hit the island, they captured ' The Rock " in less than 12 hours with a force that was inferior in numbers to the defenders.

HMMMMMM....... Does this scenario sound familiar to anyone ?



5. " If you going to invade, make sure you have at least 3::1 advantage in troops. ...... " The fact is , the SNLF were elite IJN troops who specialized in naval landings, just like the USMC, and the Ichiki Detachment had just spent weeks practicing island assault tactics, including landing in heavy surf and using the IJA's light infantry supports artillery mounted in the bows of their landing boats to serve as close support gunfire. The IJN officers were even debating among themselves whether it would be wise to try to call on IJN gunfire support during the landing, as it might disrupt the command and communications of the IJA officers and troops.

Here is the ugly truth : If you compare the fighting ability and morale of the SNLF and IJA assault troops with the USMC, the USMC of early 1942 comes off second best. At Guadalcanal, some 11,000 Marines landed, and were initially faced by only an IJA Construction Brigade of some 700 Japanese combat engineers and 1400 Korean laborers, yet the Marines stalled around for over two weeks, and failed to destroy their opponents. Even with a five to one advantage, the USMC just couldn't seem to come to grips with it's enemy.

In the first half of 1942, again and again, smaller numbers of Japanese troops defeated larger Allied forces, using fire and maneuver against fixed defenses, and accomplished their objectives under conditions that Allied generals found impossible to believe. The idea of a three to one ratio might apply to Allied troops attacking the Japanese, but apparently not the other way around. At least, not in early 1942.



6. There is one final note that many people are ignoring: This scenario assumes a USN DEFEAT on June 4th. In other words, there are no more USN carriers in the waters north of Midway. The surface ships of Task Forces 16 and 17 are retreating south to Hawaii, as Nimitz had
given orders prior to the battle that,
.....which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior
enemy forces
without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the
enemy. This applies to a landing phase as well as during preliminary air attacks.
He had also given orders that,
.... Take every precaution against being destroyed on the ground or water. Long range aircraft retire
to OAHU when necessary to avoid such destruction. Patrol planes fuel from AVD at FRENCH FRIGATE SHOAL
if necessary.
In other words, if the IJN had defeated the USN on June 4th, the Saratoga would NOT have been deployed to support the Midway defenders, and the B-17s and the PBYs would have been withdrawn. This would have left less than a half dozen fighters ( some of which were damaged) and and less than a dozen bombers to defend the island going forward from June 6th.

The Marines and the rest of the Midway Garrison would have watched the aircraft depart, never to return, and would have known that, with the defeat of the USN carriers, they were cut off and on their own. In other words, they were just like the troops on Wake and on Corregidor.



Does anyone know the Japanese words for , " I surrender " ?



Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6349
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#69

Post by Richard Anderson » 25 Apr 2019, 07:20

paulrward wrote:
25 Apr 2019, 00:51
Hello All :

I am going to put in a few comments, to dispell a number of myths relating to Midway:

1. " The Marines were dug in behind concrete bunkers. " There have been a number of posters who have mentioned that the Marines on Midway were well emplaced, with concrete bunkers and emplacements for the 7" and 5" artillery. This is FALSE. The concrete emplacements were constructed AFTER the Battle of Midway, in the 1943-1944 timeframe. At the time of the battle, the shore based artillery was in fact situated in a series of sand bag revetments, with no overhead cover except camoflage nets and brush. All of the machine gun emplacements were simply dug into the sand until the Marines got to coral, ( about 18'' -24" deep ) and then were ringed with sandbags filled with the sand removed by the digging. Some were roofed with boards or plywood, covered with sand and bits of scrub for camoflage. NONE were ' hardened ' .
Actually, its a mixture of true and false. The post-battle construction by the 5th, 10th, and 50th CB was focused on repairing battle damage and expanding the offensive rather than the defensive capability of the islands. In constructing the "three strips on the Sand Island airfield, revetments, magazines for high explosives, airfield lighting, and additional quarters and messing facilities" (Building the Navy's Bases in World War II, Volume II, p. 156) the Seabees actually destroyed most of the concrete firing emplacements for coast and AA guns in the expansion of the airfield and submarine base on Sand Island. All the 3" AA emplacements of Battery D and Battery F, 6th Marine Defense Battalion and all but one and a half of those of Battery D, 3d Marine Defense Battalion were destroyed (although it is also possible the battery position was incomplete at the time of the battle). Similarly, the emplacements for the 5-inch coast defense guns of Battery A and C, 6th Marine Defense Battalion, and the 7-inch Battery were all destroyed. The position of the two-gun 3-inch coast defense guns remained, constructed on the top of two artificial 20-foot mounds as a substantial seven-sided concrete emplacement. Both the 3-inch AA and 3-inch coast defense emplacements had integral ready-use magazine with additional magazines nearby. The separate magazines were all constructed prior to the battle and several survived the Seabee construction spree, three for Battery D, 6th Marine Defense Battalion and two for Battery D, 3d Marine Defense Battalion, and one for the 3-inch naval battery. They were built by laying a concrete floor for an Armco Quonset hut, then covering them with sand, dredge material, and topsoil to a depth of six to ten feet. Similarly constructed personnel shelters were constructed sufficient to house the entire garrison using Quonset huts heavily revetted by sandbags and then covered in sand and dredge...there is a famous photo of Admiral Nimitz striding out of one on his 2 June 1942 visit. The extemporaneous magazine were later supplemented by more conventional reinforced concrete "igloos" and the personnel shelters were later faced by concrete replacing the sandbag revetments.

Other buildings on the island were concrete, most not "bombproof", but some so designated such as the power station (which proved not to be as designed) and radar installation complex. At least two concrete defense positions are still extant on Sand Island, but it is unclear what their function was or when they were completed.

Otherwise, the Marine infantry defense positions were sandbagged, with overhead cover using corrugated iron, wooden balks, and sand for direct-fire positions and sandbagged but open for AA machine gun positions. Little or no "plywood" was used that I can find, given the heat and humidty's effect on its strength. Nor did they dig down "about 18'' -24" deep" until the "Marines got to coral". Sand Island and its sister Eastern are not coral islands. Midway is a coral atoll, but the two most prominent islands are the remains of volcanoes that subsided and then were covered by up to 516 feet of varied material: sand and fill (9 to 36 feet or more in the "low-laying" areas of the islands, but originally the highest point on the island was 43 feet high), carbonate sediment and coral-algal limestone, unconsolidated (36-208 feet), lithified or partly lithified sediment, with much compacted plastic lime mud (208-428 feet), then basalt pebbles and cobbles (428-443 feet). On top of that 9,000 tons of topsoil were imported to Midway in the early 20th century. Typically, field fortifications such as the Marines built were sufficient to sustain near misses from light and medium artillery up to 155mm without significant damage - direct hits were required for destruction rather than neutralization - only near misses from heavier rounds could result possibly in destruction. For example, the Japanese bombing resulted in just two KIA, two DOW, and nine WIA in the Marine Defense battalions, plus another six KIA and eight WIA in the MAW, just 27 casualties despite considerable surface damage.
2. " The Marines were equipped with heavy shore batteries to resist the invasion. " The 7" and 5" guns were a mixture of weapons that dated back as far at the 1910s, were bag loaded manually, and had no power traverse. The best that could be said of them was that they were elderly. ALL were sited for indirect fire, and had few fields of direct fire, and these were poor at best. They relied on gunlaying information from direct spotters.
Sorry, but no, none were "sited for indirect fire". The 3-inch, 5-inch, and 7-inch coast defense batteries were all established on the dune-line, typically about 20 feet above the waterline and so had a good view of their field of fire. As mentioned earlier, the 3-inch naval battery on Sand was emplaced on 20-foot mounds, adjacent to the cemetery and had a field of fire to the northeast, north, northwest, and, for the left-hand gun, west. You are confusing how American coast artillery practice utilized multiple range finders transmitting data to plotting rooms, which then transmitted range and bearing data to the firing positions. That is not relying on "gunlaying information from direct spotters", but is controlled gunfire to gain the best possible chance of a hit. Nevertheless, direct lay by the guns, despite their lack of power training and elevation, could be deadly, as the Japanese discovered at Wake, where none of the battery range finders were operational, but still inflicted considerable damage.

BTW, the 5"/51 was extremely accurate. "As a result of its high muzzle velocity, the danger space for this gun was quite large, actually longer than the range to the target for distances less than 3,000 yards" (NAVWEAPS).
Rather more complete sources are Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr. USMC, Marines at Midway, 1946 and Stephen Ronald Maynard's 1996 MA thesis, Marine Defense Battalions, October 1939-December 1942: Their Contributions in the Early Phases of World War II. Major Charles D. Melson's, Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II, is somewhat more general, but also good. The "Historical Source Material" https://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/Hi ... urces.html given for your source above gives me little confidence in its accuracy.
On December 7, 1941,
The Japanese destroyers now commenced their second firing run, moving in a north-easterly direction up the long axis of Sand Island. The seaplane hangar was hit, and the resulting flames illuminated fresh targets for the Japanese. Ashore, some confusion reigned. Telephone lines were jammed, and it was not until 2148 that Lieutenant Colonel Shannon was given permission to engage the enemy with his Marine shore batteries.

At 2153, orders were received by the Marine searchlight batteries to illuminate the Japanese ships. One Japanese destroyer was immediately illuminated under the guns of Battery A, but the 5-inch guns of this battery had been rendered ineffectual by an earlier salvo that had disrupted firing data and fire command communications. It is doubtful whether any incident on this night demonstrated more clearly the extreme vulnerability of the gun emplacements on Midway to damage from flat trajectory naval bombardment.

At this point only Battery D, located on the south-eastern shore of Sand Island, was able to bring its 3-inch anti-aircraft guns to bear on the Japanese destroyers. The destroyers were now close enough to the reef for Captain Jean H. Buckner to see the Japanese Navy battle flag flying from the foremast of the lead destroyer. Buckner ordered his gunners to fire. Battery D was then joined by the 5-inch guns of Battery B on Eastern Island. By 2158, as Marine fire intensified and became better coordinated, the Japanese destroyers ceased firing and withdrew under cover of their own smoke screen.

The very skilful Japanese night attack caused serious damage to the seaplane hangar, and damaged the power house and other buildings on Sand Island. The 6th Defense Battalion lost two killed and ten wounded. The Naval Air Station lost two killed.
That considerably underplays the problems actually encountered by the inexperienced and surprised Marines on 7 December. First, it was believed the two Japanese destroyers might be friendly and so the request to illuminate them was withheld. Then, Konishi's initial salvos resulted in a freak hit on the power station, which knocked out the communication center. That meant that by the time orders to illuminate finally reached the searchlights, only one could bear...and then it was temporarily disabled by Japanese fire, and then a second freak Japanese round knocked out all communications in Battery A, the only one which could bear. The Japanese attack demonstrated little skill, but considerable luck. The similar, but larger attack on Wake four days later displayed a similar lack of skill and considerably less luck.
From this it can be seen how just TWO destroyers, firing at Sand Island, inflicted heavy damage with just two firing passes, and suffered no damage in return. Their low angle gunfire had severed the telephone lines from the spotting positions to the guns, and the defensive guns at Midway had gone silent.
The only "heavy damage" inflicted on the defending gun batteries were three rounds, the first that knocked out island communications, the second that temporarily knocked out a single searchlight, and the last that knocked out Battery A communications. Otherwise, the "heavy damage" was the destruction of one of the hangers...there were four KIA and ten WIA.
We must ask: What would have been the effect on Midway if seven battleships and as many as ten 8" gunned CAs had bombarded the islands for a number of hours ? Remember, the battleships and cruisers would have been well out of range of the shore guns, and, even if they were not, the smallest IJN guns ( nearly one hundred 8" guns ) were larger than the eight elderly 7" guns on shore.
What "seven battleships" were those"? The Second Fleet has the 1st Section of 3d Battleship Division, Kongo and Hiei. What "ten 8" gunned CAs" were those? The Second Fleet had the 4th and 5th Cruiser Division with Atago, Chokai, Myoko, and Haguro.
The 3" guns were primarily AA guns, and while they might have been used as point defense weapons, they were not set up for barrage
fire, and they had no training or equipment, and little ammunition, for doing so.
The Army 3-inch AA guns used by the Marine Defense Battalions were primarily AA guns. I'm not sure why you think "barrage fire" was critical for firing at ships "as point defense weapons"? Anyway, the naval battery were Navy 3"/50 guns, which were "point defense weapons".

(snip) I'm afraid that the Japanese doctrine for shore bombardment and close support of a landing by the Navy was similar to that of the American Navy, which depended on neutralization rather than destruction...until Betio demonstrated how dangerous that was when confronted with prepared beach defenses. Earlier, in China, the Japanese doctrine worked well against the ill-prepared, hasty, and poorly constructed Chinese defenses at Shanghai, but it was likely to suffer the same comeuppance they had at Wake and the Americans had at Betio.

BTW, I'm not sure anyone is aware, but in addition to surrounding Sand Island "with two double-apron tactical wire barriers" and ringing "all installations on both islands" with "protective wire" (Heinl), the improvised land and sea mines, the Marines also ringed both islands with "concertina-type reinforcing steel, underwater obstacles. Almost the entire beach line of the two islands had at least one line of these obstacles and the more likely landing beaches had two such lines." (CO, 6th Marine Defense Battalion, FMF, Action Report) I don't think the Japanese SNLF were prepared for underwater demolitions. And, no, I don't know the Japanese words for underwater demolition.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

scott.livesey
Member
Posts: 9
Joined: 30 Jan 2019, 20:58
Location: Raleigh,NC USA

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#70

Post by scott.livesey » 25 Apr 2019, 18:19

Yes, if you assigned every ship with guns to bombard Midway, defense would suffer badly. The assigned bombardment force was CruDiv 7 with 4 8" cruisers. The four ships returned from the IO adventure and took turns in dry dock. As best as I can find, they did not steam as a unit until the end of May when they headed for Saipan. Can't find any records of Kurita meeting with Ota of the SNLF or IJA's Ichiki at any time. Invasion had to take place at dawn on 6 June, ships would start arriving after dark on 5 June. I don't think the ships would have a quiet evening as the 8 US subs within 12 miles of Midway would have a chance to test over 190 torpedoes.
The marines on Midway had been there since 9/41. They had about 45 heavy machine guns dug in on each island. While the emplacements were not concrete, they well constructed and would be eliminated only by a direct hit. The emplacements had been planted with native plants and would be invisible except for 4' x 1' firing slot visible only from ground level.
Invasion forces would have to approach the islands on foot as landing craft could not get them closer than 200 yards. The only way to communicate with the ships was flares, flashing light, or semaphore. Training and banzi spirit only go so far when walking in waist deep water filled with obstacles.
just an observation or 3.
the old sailor

paulrward
Member
Posts: 665
Joined: 10 Dec 2008, 21:14

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#71

Post by paulrward » 25 Apr 2019, 18:40

ello All :
What "seven battleships" were those"? The Second Fleet has the 1st Section of 3d Battleship Division, Kongo and Hiei. What "ten 8" gunned CAs" were those? The Second Fleet had the 4th and 5th Cruiser Division with Atago, Chokai, Myoko, and Haguro.
Let us review the bidding....

First Mobile Force Haruna, Kirishima ( BBs ) Tone, Chikuma ( CAs )
MIdway Occupaton Force - Covering Group Kongo, Hiei ( BBs ) Atago, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro ( CAs )
Close Support Group Suzuya, Kumano, Mogami, Mikuma ( CAs )
Main Body Yamato, Mutsu, Nagato (BBs )

I count seven battleships and ten heavy cruisers. All of which would have been available to Yamamoto if he required them to reduce Midway
to a pulp.

As to the geology of Midway, Sand and Eastern Islands are the result of coral growth on top of the volcanic rim as they subsided into the Pacific. As you note,
sand and fill (9 to 36 feet or more in the "low-laying" areas of the islands, but originally the highest point on the island was 43 feet high), carbonate sediment and coral-algal limestone, unconsolidated (36-208 feet)
" Carbonate sediment and coral-algal limestone" are the technical terms for what we tend to call, " Coral" It is the white stuff that most Atolls are made of, and when it erodes, it makes that really nice, white sand beach that everyone loves. Now, if you go on the internet, you can find lots of pictures of the landscape of the two Midway Islands, and you will see that inland, away from the beaches, you have a thin
layer of sand with outcroppings of coral, and, in places, a few sand dunes that are raised by the wind, and move / subside with the changing of the seasons and the wind direction.

Prior to June, 1942, the Seabees and civilian contract workers were emplacing the guns in what were primarily sand bag revetments. For the larger guns, ( 5"-51 and 7"-45 ) they laid down the concrete pads, and then surrounded them with sand bags . Some of the 3" guns were emplaced at the top of the sand dunes, and again, were ringed with sand bags for splinter protection.

And, Mr. Anderson, I might add, burying a Qonset Hut under a few feet of sand and then filling it with high explosives does NOT make it a concrete armored magazine. One single 14" or 16" hit on one of those buried MOABs would have shaken the fillings out of every Marine on both islands !


While it is true that the 5"-51 had a long danger space due to a high muzzle velocity, when firing against ships, it would still be firing in the indirect mode, as it would have to be laid using director firing to account for the bearing motion and change of range of the target. Thus, any disruption of the communications between the spotting-control site and the gun would leave the gun essentially useless in any artillery duel agianst ships that were beyond point-blank range. The same applies to the 7"-45s. And, as had been demonstrated already, the communication lines between the spotters and the guns were simple two strand telephone wires, buried a few inches under the sand, and were very vulnerable to incoming fire.

How could less than 20 artillery pieces, ranging from ancient 7" down to 3", sited in sandbag revetments, be able to outgun all of the battleships and cruisers I have listed above ? Especially if the IJN uses naval gunfire spotting aircraft, which was in their doctrine and training when shelling shore targets. Essentially, the scenario that had played out at Wake Island and at Corregidor would be repeated, but with more forces on each side. Which means that one or two IJN ships might have been damaged, but the Marine guns would have eventually gone silent. It's just basic mathematics.

Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

paulrward
Member
Posts: 665
Joined: 10 Dec 2008, 21:14

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#72

Post by paulrward » 25 Apr 2019, 18:50

Hello All :
What "seven battleships" were those"? The Second Fleet has the 1st Section of 3d Battleship Division, Kongo and Hiei. What "ten 8" gunned CAs" were those? The Second Fleet had the 4th and 5th Cruiser Division with Atago, Chokai, Myoko, and Haguro.
Let us review the bidding....

First Mobile Force - Haruna, Kirishima ( BBs ) Tone, Chikuma ( CAs )
MIdway Occupaton Force - Covering Group - Kongo, Hiei ( BBs ) Atago, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro ( CAs )
Close Support Group - Suzuya, Kumano, Mogami, Mikuma ( CAs )
Main Body - Yamato, Mutsu, Nagato (BBs )

I count seven battleships and ten heavy cruisers. All of which would have been available to Yamamoto if he required them to reduce Midway
to a pulp.

As to the geology of Midway, Sand and Eastern Islands are the result of coral growth on top of the volcanic rim as they subsided into the Pacific. As you note,
sand and fill (9 to 36 feet or more in the "low-laying" areas of the islands, but originally the highest point on the island was 43 feet high), carbonate sediment and coral-algal limestone, unconsolidated (36-208 feet)
" Carbonate sediment and coral-algal limestone" are the technical terms for what we tend to call, " Coral" It is the white stuff that most Atolls are made of, and when it erodes, it makes that really nice, white sand beach that everyone loves. Now, if you go on the internet, you can find lots of pictures of the landscape of the two Midway Islands, and you will see that inland, away from the beaches, you have a thin
layer of sand with outcroppings of coral, and, in places, a few sand dunes that are raised by the wind, and move / subside with the changing of the seasons and the wind direction.

Prior to June, 1942, the Seabees and civilian contract workers were emplacing the guns in what were primarily sand bag revetments. For the larger guns, ( 5"-51 and 7"-45 ) they laid down the concrete pads, and then surrounded them with sand bags . Some of the 3" guns were emplaced at the top of the sand dunes, and again, were ringed with sand bags for splinter protection.

And, Mr. Anderson, I might add, burying a Qonset Hut under a few feet of sand and then filling it with high explosives does NOT make it a concrete armored magazine. One single 14" or 16" hit on one of those buried MOABs would have shaken the fillings out of every Marine on both islands !


While it is true that the 5"-51 had a long danger space due to a high muzzle velocity, when firing against ships, it would still be firing in the indirect mode, as it would have to be laid using director firing to account for the bearing motion and change of range of the target. Thus, any disruption of the communications between the spotting-control site and the gun would leave the gun essentially useless in any artillery duel agianst ships that were beyond point-blank range. The same applies to the 7"-45s. And, as had been demonstrated already, the communication lines between the spotters and the guns were simple two strand telephone wires, buried a few inches under the sand, and were very vulnerable to incoming fire.

How could less than 20 artillery pieces, ranging from ancient 7" down to 3", sited in sandbag revetments, be able to outgun all of the battleships and cruisers I have listed above ? Especially if the IJN uses naval gunfire spotting aircraft, which was in their doctrine and training when shelling shore targets. Essentially, the scenario that had played out at Wake Island and at Corregidor would be repeated, but with more forces on each side. Which means that one or two IJN ships might have been damaged, but the Marine guns would have eventually gone silent. It's just basic mathematics.

Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

scott.livesey
Member
Posts: 9
Joined: 30 Jan 2019, 20:58
Location: Raleigh,NC USA

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#73

Post by scott.livesey » 26 Apr 2019, 02:00

The only ones planned to deliver pre-invasion bombardment was the Close Support Group. That others could get to Midway by dawn 6 June is debatable. A point no one wants to address is when did bombardment force have a chance to meet with invasion forces? Other than semaphore or flashing light, how did invasion force communicate with bombardment forces? Could IJA ships even talk to IJN ships?
Master plan had invasion at dawn, pre-invasion bombardment would be before then in the dark. Best plan for defenders is not fire until landing craft approach the reef. Japanese forces would be greeted with air burst 3", 37mm and 20mm automatic cannon, and .50 and .30 machine guns as they grounded on the reef and started to wade through 2' to 8' of water filled with barbed wire obstacles to the shore line edged with 2 rows of double apron barbed wire.
Second point no one wants to address is what happens when the 8 subs within 12 miles of Midway start shooting the 190+ torpedoes they are carrying. 10% explosion rate is still 19 ship hits.
Just a couple of thoughts of an old sailor glad to be home from the sea.
the old sailor

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6349
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#74

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Apr 2019, 04:46

Mrpaulrward
paulrward wrote:
25 Apr 2019, 18:50
Let us review the bidding....
I see. You are under the delusion that the Japanese win a big carrier victory and then the entire Japanese task force circles Midway like Indians around a wagon train in a bad 1950s movie.

The problem is that is probably the least likely scenario, given the presence of three American carriers with air strength similar to that of the four Japanese carriers. The most likely scenario, if the historical "miracle at Midway" (it was nothing of the sort) does not occur - the Japanese are not totally surprised by the dive bomber attack - is more likely similar to Coral Sea...a carrier stalemate with some carriers on each side heavily damaged/sunk and heavy losses to the air groups. Even if the edge is slightly to the Japanese in such an encounter, the arrival of Saratoga likely balances it out again.

In that case, the Japanese and American carrier forces probably mutually withdraw. If the Japanese then choose to risk an assault on Midway, do they "reinforce a draw" by stripping the Kido Butai of its escort and also commit the Main Body? I think it unlikely, given Japanese habit and doctrine. However, in typical "what if" fashion we have a scenario generated by an unlikely event - an overwhelming Japanese victory in the carrier battle - leading to an unlikely decision - the Japanese committing all of their heavy forces, rather than the forces actually allocated to the Midway invasion, to a massive bombardment of the islands.

In any case, only the ships of Second Fleet would have been carrying any significant number of HE Common rounds, all of the heavy elements of 1st Fleet would have carried APC rounds for Kantai Kessen.
As to the geology of Midway, Sand and Eastern Islands are the result of coral growth on top of the volcanic rim as they subsided into the Pacific. As you note,
Oh, sorry, but you may have missed the actual thrust of my remark. I was not quibbling over whether Sand and Eastern were "coral islands" or not, but rather your artless statement that the soil surface of the island was "18"-24" deep" before the "Marines got to coral". It was not. Instead, the topsoil of the island was 9 to 36 feet deep where bore samples were taken at the edge of the island. So six to twenty-four times the depth you alleged to promote the notion of ill-prepared and poorly constructed Marine field works.
Prior to June, 1942, the Seabees and civilian contract workers were emplacing the guns in what were primarily sand bag revetments. For the larger guns, ( 5"-51 and 7"-45 ) they laid down the concrete pads, and then surrounded them with sand bags . Some of the 3" guns were emplaced at the top of the sand dunes, and again, were ringed with sand bags for splinter protection.
Um, no, sorry, but that is simply incorrect. The 3-inch naval battery constructed on Sand Island prior to the attack is intact and is a seven-sided concrete emplacement, on top of a twenty foot mound. The concrete parapet was four feet high and incorporated ready-use magazines. Work on the 3-inch AA battery positions had been going on for eight months and also were concrete. The statement that it was the post-battle construction that resulted in concrete emplacements is simply incorrect...the post-battle construction by the three Seabee battalions was for installations that DISPLACED and DESTROYED most of the original AA battery positions, especially on Sand, where only the partial remnants of D Battery NOT DESTROYED by the airfield and submarine base construction are still extant. See the NPS survey of historical sites on Sand Island.

In either case, the point is moot...a well-constructed sandbagged revetment can be as efficient in protecting as position as is a concrete position.
And, Mr. Anderson, I might add, burying a Qonset Hut under a few feet of sand and then filling it with high explosives does NOT make it a concrete armored magazine. One single 14" or 16" hit on one of those buried MOABs would have shaken the fillings out of every Marine on both islands !
I see Mrpaulrward that you still like to employ strawmen. I never said that improvised magazines were "concrete armored magazine[s]". In fact, I specifically stated they were replaced by such later...and yet the original improvised magazines were retained and continued to be used by the air units deployed there for air ordnance stores. Nor did I ever state that they could resist a "single 14" or 16" hit". Well done, two strawmen in a single paragraph. On the other hand, the dispersed structures were well-designed and built to resist near misses, which given the randomness of such a bombardment is the more likely threat than a direct hit.
While it is true that the 5"-51 had a long danger space due to a high muzzle velocity, when firing against ships, it would still be firing in the indirect mode, as it would have to be laid using director firing to account for the bearing motion and change of range of the target. Thus, any disruption of the communications between the spotting-control site and the gun would leave the gun essentially useless in any artillery duel agianst ships that were beyond point-blank range. The same applies to the 7"-45s. And, as had been demonstrated already, the communication lines between the spotters and the guns were simple two strand telephone wires, buried a few inches under the sand, and were very vulnerable to incoming fire.
You are still confused. You are describing "director control" rather than "indirect fire". When firing at ships, US coast artillery utilized direct fire — fire delivered on a target using the target itself as a point of aim for either the weapon or the director. It did not utilize indirect fire - aiming and firing a projectile without relying on a direct line of sight between the gun and its target, as in the case of direct fire. Aiming is performed by calculating azimuth and inclination, and may include correcting aim by observing the fall of shot and calculating new angles.
How could less than 20 artillery pieces, ranging from ancient 7" down to 3", sited in sandbag revetments, be able to outgun all of the battleships and cruisers I have listed above ? Especially if the IJN uses naval gunfire spotting aircraft, which was in their doctrine and training when shelling shore targets. Essentially, the scenario that had played out at Wake Island and at Corregidor would be repeated, but with more forces on each side. Which means that one or two IJN ships might have been damaged, but the Marine guns would have eventually gone silent. It's just basic mathematics.
Another strawman. Nowhere did I claim that the 7-inch, 5-inch, or 3-inch guns would "be able to outgun all of the battleships and cruisers", either those that could be reasonably expected to bombard the island or the ridiculous number posited by you.

Meanwhile, the "scenario that had played out at Wake Island and at Corregidor" - at least the real one as opposed to your fantasy one - was quite a bit different. At Wake, the Japanese closed to within 4,500 yards at dawn. The result were numerous hits on Japanese ships by the defending 5-inch/51s, firing, BTW, without rangefinders or directors, and one significant hit on the defenses, which disabled a single gun, which, also BTW, were unprotected even by sandbagged revetments. The second attack on Wake was at night to negate the coast defense guns and was conducted without a naval bombardment.

At Corregidor, there was no Japanese naval bombardment, but instead a sustained air bombardment of 121 days and an even more sustained land bombardment of 25 days by 75 artillery pieces, expending up to 16,000 rounds per day. The heavy guns on the seven Japanese battleships carried something between 5,000 and 6,000 rounds total. Once expended, they would have needed to return to Japan or Truk to re-ammunition.

Oh so respectfully submitted for your perusal Mrpaulrward and in great anticipation of your next round of strawmen.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6349
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Was the Japanese Midway Invasion Force Adequate for the Task?

#75

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Apr 2019, 04:47

Stuttering Mrpaulrward?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Locked

Return to “WW2 in the Pacific & Asia”