Best Allied PTO strategy?

[EwenS]

Ships don’t need to be sunk to be mission killed. Don’t forget the USS Canberra and Houston that had to be towed out of the combat zone in Oct 1944 after being hit with torpedoes from land based aircraft. Saved by much improved damage control. While not sunk they were out of the war, not returning to service until Oct 1945.

The following month Reno took a submarine torpedo and only just survived again due to excellent damage control. She was not returned to service until Oct 1945.

And the carrier Franklin bombed, not kamikazied, on 19 March 1945 by land based aircraft. Again not sunk but out of the war. Her repairs lasted into 1946.

All these ships were so heavily damaged they were patched up in the Pacific and then sent to yards on the east coast of the USA for repair.

Edit - Earlier in the war, due to the level of damage they had suffered, all the above ships might have become war losses through scuttling due to the inability to protect them as they were withdrawn.

[Takao]

Invasion of the Gilberts, once the Essex and Independence class carriers were available in sufficient numbers, and the fleet train was there to support them. But, there was still a healthy respect for Japanese land-based air.

Yes, but until kamikaze tactics were adopted wholesale in 1945, the Japanese land-based air was dealt with; other than Chicago at Rennell Island and Princeton at Leyte, I'm not thinking of significant American losses due to Japanese land-based air.

My point was not that Japanese land-based air was effective or dealt significant damage. My point was that US carrier admirals still had a good deal of respect for Japanese land-based air and it's potential to concentrate against US forces, and that it had to be well defended against.

[daveshoup2MD]

Invasion of the Gilberts, once the Essex and Independence class carriers were available in sufficient numbers, and the fleet train was there to support them. But, there was still a healthy respect for Japanese land-based air.

Yes, but until kamikaze tactics were adopted wholesale in 1945, the Japanese land-based air was dealt with; other than Chicago at Rennell Island and Princeton at Leyte, I'm not thinking of significant American losses due to Japanese land-based air.

My point was not that Japanese land-based air was effective or dealt significant damage. My point was that US carrier admirals still had a good deal of respect for Japanese land-based air and it's potential to concentrate against US forces, and that it had to be well defended against.

Ships don’t need to be sunk to be mission killed. Don’t forget the USS Canberra and Houston that had to be towed out of the combat zone in Oct 1944 after being hit with torpedoes from land based aircraft. Saved by much improved damage control. While not sunk they were out of the war, not returning to service until Oct 1945.

The following month Reno took a submarine torpedo and only just survived again due to excellent damage control. She was not returned to service until Oct 1945.

And the carrier Franklin bombed, not kamikazied, on 19 March 1945 by land based aircraft. Again not sunk but out of the war. Her repairs lasted into 1946.

All these ships were so heavily damaged they were patched up in the Pacific and then sent to yards on the east coast of the USA for repair.

Edit - Earlier in the war, due to the level of damage they had suffered, all the above ships might have become war losses through scuttling due to the inability to protect them as they were withdrawn.

Fair, but in response, my point is simply once the Pacific Fleet had the fast carrier force of 1943 up and running, the US could basically go where it wished in the Central Pacific and points west and north; Japanese land-based air was never enough to stop US offensive operations.

[Takao]

Fair, but in response, my point is simply once the Pacific Fleet had the fast carrier force of 1943 up and running, the US could basically go where it wished in the Central Pacific and points west and north; Japanese land-based air was never enough to stop US offensive operations.

Yes, but that was not the question asked.

Having up and running was one thing, realizing it's effectiveness was another.

Not to mention the required fleet train and advance bases to keep the fleet at sea for months on end.

[daveshoup2MD]

Fair, but in response, my point is simply once the Pacific Fleet had the fast carrier force of 1943 up and running, the US could basically go where it wished in the Central Pacific and points west and north; Japanese land-based air was never enough to stop US offensive operations.

Yes, but that was not the question asked.

Having up and running was one thing, realizing it's effectiveness was another.

Not to mention the required fleet train and advance bases to keep the fleet at sea for months on end.

Excepts that it was essentially simultaneous, as the Central Pacific operations of the second half of 1943 make clear. from the initial raids under Pownall in August to GALVANIC in November under Spruance.

[Felix C]

When Taiwan's airfields were raided in 1944 was Japanese resistance skilled? I mean as in the USN encountered experienced pilots or the lesser trained type as met in the Philippine Sea battle?

[Felix C]

Invasion of the Gilberts, once the Essex and Independence class carriers were available in sufficient numbers, and the fleet train was there to support them. But, there was still a healthy respect for Japanese land-based air.

You mean the two engine strike bombers? I would have guessed it was known how vulnerable they were to .50 hits by then and were not a daytime threat. Was not Reno and Canberra struck in night/dusk attacks?

[Carl Schwamberger]

When Taiwan's airfields were raided in 1944 was Japanese resistance skilled? I mean as in the USN encountered experienced pilots or the lesser trained type as met in the Philippine Sea battle?

Mostly the latter is my impression. Less than a year later they were so desperate Saburo Saki was accepted as a combat pilot, with a eye missing.

[Felix C]

To all,

When did the US Navy discover (?) that they could go basically anywhere and do almost anything and the Japanese could not stop them?

Mike

Great question. Surprised not addressed decades ago in books

[Takao]

Invasion of the Gilberts, once the Essex and Independence class carriers were available in sufficient numbers, and the fleet train was there to support them. But, there was still a healthy respect for Japanese land-based air.

You mean the two engine strike bombers? I would have guessed it was known how vulnerable they were to .50 hits by then and were not a daytime threat. Was not Reno and Canberra struck in night/dusk attacks?

Mostly the twin engine bombers came at night, because the Japanese also knew of their vulnerability. USS Independence took a torpedo in a dusk attack during the Tarawa Invasion that knocked her out of the war for 6 months, and USS Lexington caught a torpedo in the stern during a night attack off Kwajalein in December, 1943. Further, at this stage, the various outlying Japanese bases were only capable of mutual support with the long-range multi-engine bombers. Also, carrier-based nightfighters were still in their infancy at this point(very late 43 - very early 44) in the Pacific War

[Takao]

To all,

When did the US Navy discover (?) that they could go basically anywhere and do almost anything and the Japanese could not stop them?

Mike

Great question. Surprised not addressed decades ago in books

Get a copy of "Fast Carriers - The Forging of an Air Navy" by Clark G. Reynolds, reprinted with corrections in 1978. It will give you a pretty good idea.

[Takao]

When Taiwan's airfields were raided in 1944 was Japanese resistance skilled? I mean as in the USN encountered experienced pilots or the lesser trained type as met in the Philippine Sea battle?

No, they were not usually very skilled, and it was another Turkey Shoot. Western sources usually put Japanese losses at around 500 aircraft, with the vast majority coming on the second and third day.