We have had this argument before...From my response in a previous thread...Leahy was the only one that left no doubt, the rest only spoke out against the Bomb years later.mikegriffith1 wrote: ↑22 Feb 2019, 22:47
Quotes are only cherry-picked if they are out of context and do not represent the actual views of the person being quoted. General Eisenhower left no doubt that he viewed the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as barbaric and unnecessary. So did Admiral Leahy, General MacArthur, Admiral Halsey, and many other senior officers.
Takao wrote:Eisenhower,
The magazine quotes
In [July] 1945… Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. …the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.
During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face’. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude….
However, the notes Stimson's aide took during the meeting do not support Ike's recollection, nor does Stimson mention any such disagreement with Eisenhower on this matter. So, "Ike" either made his "grave misgivings" known in a far less forceful way then he makes it out, or his "grave misgivings" were mentioned in such a flippant way that they were not considered worth writing down.
MacArthur,
MacArthur is most enigmatic about the dropping of the Atomic bomb. When informed of it's impending use, he was seen as giving passing acceptance to it's use. For he was far to concerned with his plans for the impending invasion of Japan, to worry about a super-weapon that may or may not work.
Assistant Secretary of War John McLoy,
He was less concerned with whether or not to drop the Atomic bomb, than he was with properly warning the Japanese first. Not that Japan would have paid any attention to such a warning.
Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard(the article spells his name wrong),
To quote Bard's memo on the Atomic Bomb
MEMORANDUM ON THE USE OF S-1 BOMB Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.
During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.
I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in this country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out.
Note the closing sentence: The only way to find out is to try it out. He seems quite certain, contrary to all other evidence, that the Japanese would surrender IF WARNED first. Please NOTE that the US warnings before B-29 raids also fell on deaf ears. No reason to see that such a warning of the Atomic Bomb would have anymore effect.
Lemay,
His "famous" quote is often trotted out in this regard. But, is he speaking out against the Atomic Bomb, OR, is he attempting to take credit for "winning" the war. After all, Lemay's forces burned down nearly all of the Japanese cities, and in many ways caused far greater destruction than the Atomic Bomb. So, it is simply impossible that the Japanese surrendered because of the Soviets or Atomic Bombs.
So in a sense, Lemay can be grouped in with the others, such as,
Vice Chairman of the U.S. Bombing Survey Paul Nitze, and Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Ellis Zacharias,
Since all logically "thought" the war would have ended shortly thereafter, regardless of what happened. Except that the Japanese had not surrendered. The Japanese did not surrender when Saipan was taken and their inner defensive line was breached(it was at this point that the Japanese themselves knew the war was lost), they didn't surrender when our B-29s were burning down their cities, they didn't surrender when the US would announce raids on cities and the Japanese still could not defend these cities, they didn't surrender when US submarines an mines cut off Japan's supplies from abroad, they didn't surrender when their citizens were starving due to lack of food, the didn't surrender when American battleships were bombarding their shores, they didn't surrender when American carrier planes were bombing their citiesetc. So to simply say - Oh, the Japanese would have surrendered in a month or so, does not "cut the mustard."
King,
Was dead set on having the Navy "win the war", however, his "blockade" of Japan had been in place since mid-1944 and was proceeding as slowly as any siege campaign, given estimates were that Japan would survive until mid-1946 to mid-1947.
Nimitz,
the passage most associated to him advocating the use of the bombs is "This sounds fine, but this is only February. Can't we get one sooner." According to "No High Ground" by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II, Nimitz also advocated dropping a third atomic bomb on Tokyo. This is from Nimitz's discussions with General Nathan Twining and General Carl Spaatz on August 9, 1945.
Hardly...The Japanese had months of intelligence data telling them that the Soviets were moving a massive force along the Trans-Siberian Railway...A force that could only have one purpose. Those in IGHQ deluded themselves into thinking that the Soviets would never invade, it was hardly a surprise to anyone the was reading the intelligence data that actually took said data to heart.mikegriffith1 wrote: ↑22 Feb 2019, 22:47Noting a sequence of events does not prove that one event caused the other. The picture is clear from the relevant primary sources that the the Japanese government, with the hardliners still able to carry the day on the Supreme War Council, was prepared to fight on against more atomic bombings. We know the government even began to take steps, and issued instructions, to deal with future nukings. However, when Japan's long-time hated foe, the Soviet Union, invaded Manchuria, that changed everything and (1) caused even Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda to agree that Japan had to surrender, and (2) enabled Hirohito to get the Supreme Council and the cabinet to accept the Potsdam terms with just the one condition about the emperor's status.
Hardly hairsplitting, the diplomatic channels are well-known. There never was any formal/official request. The only requests that were made came from those with no authority/responsibility/clout in the government.mikegriffith1 wrote: ↑22 Feb 2019, 22:47That is a hair-splitting argument that relies on a very rigid definition of "formal request" and that ignores what Truman et al knew from Japanese intercepts about the emperor's desire to end the war. We knew from intercepts, weeks before Hiroshima, that Hirohito had ordered Konoye, a known anti-war moderate, to go to Moscow to try to persuade the Soviets to broker a peace deal with the U.S., and that Togo had been ordered to seek permission from the Soviets for Konoye to come "as soon as possible." We also knew that the Japanese had already approached third parties about brokering a peace deal.
What would it have achieved? Nothing, except to salve a 21st Century US consciousness.mikegriffith1 wrote: ↑22 Feb 2019, 22:47We could have sent the Japanese a copy of the film of the New Mexico test, including the after-footage of the incredibly destructive effects from the bomb within a 1-mile radius of ground zero. We could have sent them a copy of the report on the test so that they would understand the catastrophic damage the bomb would do. If we had this and they had ignored the information, then we could have honestly said that we tried to warn them. But we didn't even try.
The Japanese did not surrender after their inner defensive ring had been cracked wide open, they did not surrender after the capture of the Philippines, they did not surrender after the loss of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, they did not surrender after the effective loss of their fleet, they did not surrender after their cities had been burned to the ground(even to the point that the Americans dropped leaflets naming the Japanese cities to be bombed). Any and all of these gave the Japanese enough warning that their complete and total destruction was inevitable unless they surrendered. They had been given many warnings...They all went unheeded.
Regretfully, the USSBS was trying to make the best case for the creation of a separate US Air Force, and that was the overall arc of their prepared papers. What they had to say is to be heeded, but also taken with a grain of salt.mikegriffith1 wrote: ↑22 Feb 2019, 22:47But, again, the record is clear that we did not need to nuke Japan to end the war without an invasion. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that Japan was in such a weakened condition that Japan would have surrendered by no later than December 1945 even without the Soviet invasion and without the use of the atomic bomb:
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (p. 26)
WRT to a demonstration bombing, that was really a non-starter. You see, while the bomb had been proven to reliably explode, the detonation system and attendant fuses were not up to the task. There were several "Pumpkins" that had been dropped where the fuses & detonators failed to act properly. The last, or second to last Pumpkin fell into the Pacific without emitting the telltale puffs of smoke that signified that the fuses and detonators had functioned as required.
It hardly would have put the "fear" into the Japanese if such a much hyped "test" failed to go off as advertised. With no warning, their is deniability.