Why not "besiege" Japan?

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Takao
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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#181

Post by Takao » 23 Feb 2019, 00:16

mikegriffith1 wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 22:47

Quotes are only cherry-picked if they are out of context and do not represent the actual views of the person being quoted. General Eisenhower left no doubt that he viewed the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as barbaric and unnecessary. So did Admiral Leahy, General MacArthur, Admiral Halsey, and many other senior officers.
We have had this argument before...From my response in a previous thread...Leahy was the only one that left no doubt, the rest only spoke out against the Bomb years later.
Takao wrote:Eisenhower,
The magazine quotes

In [July] 1945… Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. …the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.

During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face’. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude….

However, the notes Stimson's aide took during the meeting do not support Ike's recollection, nor does Stimson mention any such disagreement with Eisenhower on this matter. So, "Ike" either made his "grave misgivings" known in a far less forceful way then he makes it out, or his "grave misgivings" were mentioned in such a flippant way that they were not considered worth writing down.


MacArthur,
MacArthur is most enigmatic about the dropping of the Atomic bomb. When informed of it's impending use, he was seen as giving passing acceptance to it's use. For he was far to concerned with his plans for the impending invasion of Japan, to worry about a super-weapon that may or may not work.

Assistant Secretary of War John McLoy,
He was less concerned with whether or not to drop the Atomic bomb, than he was with properly warning the Japanese first. Not that Japan would have paid any attention to such a warning.

Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard(the article spells his name wrong),
To quote Bard's memo on the Atomic Bomb

MEMORANDUM ON THE USE OF S-1 BOMB Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.
During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.

I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in this country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out.

Note the closing sentence: The only way to find out is to try it out. He seems quite certain, contrary to all other evidence, that the Japanese would surrender IF WARNED first. Please NOTE that the US warnings before B-29 raids also fell on deaf ears. No reason to see that such a warning of the Atomic Bomb would have anymore effect.

Lemay,
His "famous" quote is often trotted out in this regard. But, is he speaking out against the Atomic Bomb, OR, is he attempting to take credit for "winning" the war. After all, Lemay's forces burned down nearly all of the Japanese cities, and in many ways caused far greater destruction than the Atomic Bomb. So, it is simply impossible that the Japanese surrendered because of the Soviets or Atomic Bombs.

So in a sense, Lemay can be grouped in with the others, such as,
Vice Chairman of the U.S. Bombing Survey Paul Nitze, and Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Ellis Zacharias,

Since all logically "thought" the war would have ended shortly thereafter, regardless of what happened. Except that the Japanese had not surrendered. The Japanese did not surrender when Saipan was taken and their inner defensive line was breached(it was at this point that the Japanese themselves knew the war was lost), they didn't surrender when our B-29s were burning down their cities, they didn't surrender when the US would announce raids on cities and the Japanese still could not defend these cities, they didn't surrender when US submarines an mines cut off Japan's supplies from abroad, they didn't surrender when their citizens were starving due to lack of food, the didn't surrender when American battleships were bombarding their shores, they didn't surrender when American carrier planes were bombing their citiesetc. So to simply say - Oh, the Japanese would have surrendered in a month or so, does not "cut the mustard."

King,
Was dead set on having the Navy "win the war", however, his "blockade" of Japan had been in place since mid-1944 and was proceeding as slowly as any siege campaign, given estimates were that Japan would survive until mid-1946 to mid-1947.

Nimitz,
the passage most associated to him advocating the use of the bombs is "This sounds fine, but this is only February. Can't we get one sooner." According to "No High Ground" by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II, Nimitz also advocated dropping a third atomic bomb on Tokyo. This is from Nimitz's discussions with General Nathan Twining and General Carl Spaatz on August 9, 1945.
mikegriffith1 wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 22:47
Noting a sequence of events does not prove that one event caused the other. The picture is clear from the relevant primary sources that the the Japanese government, with the hardliners still able to carry the day on the Supreme War Council, was prepared to fight on against more atomic bombings. We know the government even began to take steps, and issued instructions, to deal with future nukings. However, when Japan's long-time hated foe, the Soviet Union, invaded Manchuria, that changed everything and (1) caused even Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda to agree that Japan had to surrender, and (2) enabled Hirohito to get the Supreme Council and the cabinet to accept the Potsdam terms with just the one condition about the emperor's status.
Hardly...The Japanese had months of intelligence data telling them that the Soviets were moving a massive force along the Trans-Siberian Railway...A force that could only have one purpose. Those in IGHQ deluded themselves into thinking that the Soviets would never invade, it was hardly a surprise to anyone the was reading the intelligence data that actually took said data to heart.



mikegriffith1 wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 22:47
That is a hair-splitting argument that relies on a very rigid definition of "formal request" and that ignores what Truman et al knew from Japanese intercepts about the emperor's desire to end the war. We knew from intercepts, weeks before Hiroshima, that Hirohito had ordered Konoye, a known anti-war moderate, to go to Moscow to try to persuade the Soviets to broker a peace deal with the U.S., and that Togo had been ordered to seek permission from the Soviets for Konoye to come "as soon as possible." We also knew that the Japanese had already approached third parties about brokering a peace deal.
Hardly hairsplitting, the diplomatic channels are well-known. There never was any formal/official request. The only requests that were made came from those with no authority/responsibility/clout in the government.


mikegriffith1 wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 22:47
We could have sent the Japanese a copy of the film of the New Mexico test, including the after-footage of the incredibly destructive effects from the bomb within a 1-mile radius of ground zero. We could have sent them a copy of the report on the test so that they would understand the catastrophic damage the bomb would do. If we had this and they had ignored the information, then we could have honestly said that we tried to warn them. But we didn't even try.
What would it have achieved? Nothing, except to salve a 21st Century US consciousness.

The Japanese did not surrender after their inner defensive ring had been cracked wide open, they did not surrender after the capture of the Philippines, they did not surrender after the loss of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, they did not surrender after the effective loss of their fleet, they did not surrender after their cities had been burned to the ground(even to the point that the Americans dropped leaflets naming the Japanese cities to be bombed). Any and all of these gave the Japanese enough warning that their complete and total destruction was inevitable unless they surrendered. They had been given many warnings...They all went unheeded.


mikegriffith1 wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 22:47
But, again, the record is clear that we did not need to nuke Japan to end the war without an invasion. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that Japan was in such a weakened condition that Japan would have surrendered by no later than December 1945 even without the Soviet invasion and without the use of the atomic bomb:

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (p. 26)
Regretfully, the USSBS was trying to make the best case for the creation of a separate US Air Force, and that was the overall arc of their prepared papers. What they had to say is to be heeded, but also taken with a grain of salt.



WRT to a demonstration bombing, that was really a non-starter. You see, while the bomb had been proven to reliably explode, the detonation system and attendant fuses were not up to the task. There were several "Pumpkins" that had been dropped where the fuses & detonators failed to act properly. The last, or second to last Pumpkin fell into the Pacific without emitting the telltale puffs of smoke that signified that the fuses and detonators had functioned as required.

It hardly would have put the "fear" into the Japanese if such a much hyped "test" failed to go off as advertised. With no warning, their is deniability.

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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#182

Post by EKB » 23 Feb 2019, 02:06

mikegriffith1 wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 22:47
EKB wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 19:23
Actions of Japanese leaders are more important than quotes cherry-picked from old papers.
Quotes are only cherry-picked if they are out of context and do not represent the actual views of the person being quoted. General Eisenhower left no doubt that he viewed the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as barbaric and unnecessary. So did Admiral Leahy, General MacArthur, Admiral Halsey, and many other senior officers.
There was no official surrender by Japan before atomic bombs were used. That is immutable.
Noting a sequence of events does not prove that one event caused the other. The picture is clear from the relevant primary sources that the the Japanese government, with the hardliners still able to carry the day on the Supreme War Council, was prepared to fight on against more atomic bombings. We know the government even began to take steps, and issued instructions, to deal with future nukings. However, when Japan's long-time hated foe, the Soviet Union, invaded Manchuria, that changed everything and (1) caused even Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda to agree that Japan had to surrender, and (2) enabled Hirohito to get the Supreme Council and the cabinet to accept the Potsdam terms with just the one condition about the emperor's status.
There is no trace of a formal request by Japan to surrender until after atomic bombs were used.
That is a hair-splitting argument that relies on a very rigid definition of "formal request" and that ignores what Truman et al knew from Japanese intercepts about the emperor's desire to end the war. We knew from intercepts, weeks before Hiroshima, that Hirohito had ordered Konoye, a known anti-war moderate, to go to Moscow to try to persuade the Soviets to broker a peace deal with the U.S., and that Togo had been ordered to seek permission from the Soviets for Konoye to come "as soon as possible." We also knew that the Japanese had already approached third parties about brokering a peace deal.
We can’t know that releasing a nuke in unpopulated areas would be helpful. Damage must be seen to be believed, and information was carefully controlled by the government. The public received censored news about the war and therefore many people believed that Japan was winning, because that was the official story. Another issue with the idea of firing warning shots is the small production of atomic bombs vs. public pressure to end the war as soon as possible.
We could have sent the Japanese a copy of the film of the New Mexico test, including the after-footage of the incredibly destructive effects from the bomb within a 1-mile radius of ground zero. We could have sent them a copy of the report on the test so that they would understand the catastrophic damage the bomb would do. If we had this and they had ignored the information, then we could have honestly said that we tried to warn them. But we didn't even try.

But, again, the record is clear that we did not need to nuke Japan to end the war without an invasion. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that Japan was in such a weakened condition that Japan would have surrendered by no later than December 1945 even without the Soviet invasion and without the use of the atomic bomb:

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (p. 26)


Quotes about peace feelers and a possible deal is not a done deal. Banter and nothing actionable.

Willingness to discuss is not willingness to agree. We know from table conferences with North Vietnam that there is a big difference between honest negotiation and persistent delaying tactics to buy time.

Sharing movies of successful U.S. atomic tests with Japanese officials was pointless because they would claim it was a hoax.

You showed us a cite about the bombing survey that uses the words "in all probability" instead of "definitely". Surely you know that's a disclaimer, not a ringing endorsement.

These arguments flare up because some people won't accept that serious problems cannot always be solved with patience, tact and diplomacy. Divorce courts are jammed with a backlog of cases because talk only led to more argument ... not agreement.
Last edited by EKB on 23 Feb 2019, 09:12, edited 3 times in total.


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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#183

Post by rcocean » 23 Feb 2019, 02:37

Can you provide some sources for your last statement? And, do your sources specify how many of those 500 per week were due to sub attacks, kamikazes, and aerial combat?
Simple. Total US battle deaths from June 1 to August 15 1945 were approximately 6,600. 660 per week for 10 weeks. Adjust downward for the June wind-down of Okinawa and you get 500 men per week. Note: This doesn't include US POW Deaths. It should also be noted that just ONE sub attack or Kamikaze attack could kill 500-800 sailors (See USS Franklin or Bunker Hill or Indianapolis). B-29 losses declined in August because the Japanese were saving their air force for the Invasion, which of course, they wouldn't have done, if we'd decided to win the war by blockade instead of invasion.

As for breaking it out by type - no book gives that kind of data. You'd have to create it.

One more thing I forgot to add. The US navy was intending to invade the Chusan archipelago to tighten the blockade.

All causaulties number are from Frank's book Downfall

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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#184

Post by rcocean » 23 Feb 2019, 02:53

But what if Eisenhower, Leahy, Grew, and others were correct when they advised Truman and/or Stimson weeks before Hiroshima that if we would specify that unconditional surrender would not include deposing the emperor, the Japanese would surrender in very short order? MacArthur shared this view.
Seriously, how does Eisenhower get involved in this? He'd in Europe since June 1942, and had almost NOTHING To do with the war in Japan. Review of Ike's official papers shows ZERO evidence of him providing Marshall or Truman advise on how to end the war in Asia. Certainly, MacArthur should have been consulted. But he wasn't. And if Grew/Leahy said we should have been more explicit about NOT deposing the Emperor. Well, they weren't listen to. So what does it matter?

Here's a what if. What if the Japanese Army's coup against the Emperor in August 1945 had succeeded? Or what if FDR had decided to give 'easy' peace terms to Japan instead of demanding "unconditional surrender"? The war might have ended in July 1944. What if FDR had encouraged the German Army and Anti-nazis - instead of pursing a policy of Uncondtional surrender? The war might have ended in 1944 or even 1943. Yes, so many "what ifs" -why stop in 1945?

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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#185

Post by rcocean » 23 Feb 2019, 03:00

In my opinion, the debate over the A-bomb has always involved a group of people who are driven by politics. But there's another group (which includes - I hope -people on this this board) motivated by historical truth and want to lay out the facts. Re-reading books like "Japan's Longest Day" or Frank's "Downfall" it seems obvious that the A-bomb was required to get the Japanese Army to agree to a surrender on allied terms. Whether those terms should have been softened is another subject. After all, you can say the same about Nazi Germany. How many lives would've been saved if we had NOT insisted on unconditional surrender?

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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#186

Post by OpanaPointer » 23 Feb 2019, 03:24

Didn't Leahy say "That bomb will never go off, and I'm an expert in explosives." ? Foot-in-mouth disease caused a lot of people to rail about the bombs later in life.
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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#187

Post by mikegriffith1 » 23 Feb 2019, 04:17

Nuremberg prosecutor Telford Taylor's memoir gives us some idea of how commonly it was known among top American government officials that Japan was defeated, that Japan’s civilian leaders knew it, and that we knew from decrypted Japanese cables that Japan wanted to make peace. Telford was a reserve colonel in Army Intelligence. In May 1945, he returned to the U.S. from Europe and was thinking about trying to get an assignment in the Pacific. He spoke with his superiors in Army Intelligence, especially Colonel Alfred McCormack, who was a good friend of Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy and the director of the Military Intelligence Service. Telford tells us what McCormack told him when he asked about the Pacific War:
I visited Jackson's staff headquarters and discussed the situation in the Pacific theater with my superiors in the intelligence division, particularly with Colonel Alfred McCormack, in peacetime a law partner of John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War. I knew that McCormack was as well informed and otherwise equipped as anyone to assess the prospects of the war against Japan. Whether or not he was in on the secret of the atom bomb I do not know, but he told me categorically that the Japanese military situation was hopeless, that the Emperor's advisers knew it, and that intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages revealed their anxiety to make peace. (The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1992, p. xi)

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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#188

Post by OpanaPointer » 23 Feb 2019, 12:40

Can you share some of the communiques that you consider to be Japanese peace offers? I ask because the Japanese diplomatic people in Europe and Moscow were desperate for some kind of position they could use as talking points. Togo Shigenori didn't give them anything to work with.
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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#189

Post by South » 23 Feb 2019, 21:21

Good afternoon Rcocean,

May I change the word "debate" to "discussions" so as to address this matter I held off on until now ?

Yes, the A-bomb had always involved a group of people driven by politics.

When Truman got the job after FDR passed away, Give 'em hell Harry cleaned out his cabinet of FDR New-Dealers, less Wallace, Ickes and Morgenthau.

SecWar Henry Stimson advocated use of the A-bomb.

Stimson served as chairman of the completely civilian and secret Interim Committee on S-1.

How one defines "politics" governs some of this understanding on the decision governing the specifics of where, when, demonstrations, Soviet observers, etc ... the theme under discussion here.

Of the secret group of 8 members, 3 were nationally-prominent scientists:
- James Bryant Conant, Pres of Harvard
- Karl Compton, Pres of MIT
- Vannevar Bush, Pres of Carnegie, D.C. and and Dir Ofc of Scientific Research and Development

Also in group:
- Ralph Bard, Under SecNav
- William Clayton AsstSecState Econ
- George Harrison, Pres NY Life Insurance ans Stimson's go to guy for S-1

Truman's per rep: Jimmy Brynes

To partly digress: Truman had already been in contact with former Pres Herbert Hoover (banned from White House by FDR). From my research the records don't establish atomic matters. The absence of material is evidence of something going on. Some views were sought-if I may offer my opinion.

A later full meeting tells us that General Marshall mentioned inviting Soviet observers to A-bomb event.

After meetings, the committee and scientific panel recommended:

1. Use the A-bomb ASAP
2. Drop it against war plants next to the homes of the labor force to "make a profound psychological impression on as many inhabitants as possible".
3. It should be used without warning.

There's much more and I'm not citing my reference here - like I usually do - because I have a few with the above info - and there are many more on this aspect of the war against Japan. There is much more to all this than the minor such as:

civilian casualties
whether Eisenhower was involved
and other material I read throughout the thread (by others).

Again; I know the meaning of "minor" and had just reviewed my above comment re civilian casualties.

Please accept above for further exploration and research.

~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#190

Post by OpanaPointer » 23 Feb 2019, 21:41

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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#191

Post by mikegriffith1 » 24 Feb 2019, 13:52

OpanaPointer wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 13:28
It's good to remember that the USSB conclusions were directed by Curtis LeMay, they were PR for the independent air force he wanted.
So the USSBS members conspired to produce misleading PR to help create an independent Air Force branch? I don't believe that theory. All 12 of the USSBS Japan officials were civilians, and the Survey was established by Secretary of War Marshall, not by LeMay. Furthermore, by the end of the war, there was little doubt that the Air Force was going to become its own independent branch very soon, so there was no need for a conspiracy to rig the USSBS report.

Truman defenders don't like the USSBS because it told the truth about Japan's defensive capabilities as of the summer of 1945 (i.e., that Japan was virtually defenseless against air and naval attack by that time), and because it concluded that nuking Japan was not necessary to end the war without an invasion.

Regarding the claim that Hiroshima was a military target, Truman's erroneous August 9 description of Hiroshima as "a military base" belies this argument. Truman said that Hiroshima had been chosen as the first nuke target because it was "a military base" and because "we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians." This suggests one of two things: either Truman was given false information about Hiroshima or he did not want the American people to know that we had nuked a clearly civilian target and had killed tens of thousands of women and children in the attack.

Hiroshima's population in August 1945 was about 350,000. Truman apologists soon claimed there were 30,000-40,000 troops stationed in Hiroshima when it was nuked, but in fact there were only about 10,000 troops there, and they were mostly reservists and supply troops (Paul Ham, Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath, p. 410).

Truman defenders still point out that Hiroshima contained war-material factories and had a large port. But most of Hiroshima's factories were on the outskirts of the city, whereas the nuke was aimed at the center of the city, and as a result most of the factories escaped serious damage; as for Hiroshima's port, it had been mined by the U.S. Navy and had been virtually devoid of activity for some time (see, for example, Stephen Walker, Shockwave: Countdown to Hiroshima, Kindle edition, loc. 1916).

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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#192

Post by OpanaPointer » 24 Feb 2019, 16:07

The authors of the USSB studies knew which side their bread was buttered on.
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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#193

Post by R Leonard » 24 Feb 2019, 16:56

OpanaPointer wrote:
24 Feb 2019, 16:07
The authors of the USSB studies knew which side their bread was buttered on.
And from the USN's standpoint, yes, it was a bolster of the USAAF's push for a separate service. Apparently it was the conventional strategic bombing which brought Japan down, all by itself. One might want to look into the later careers of some of those USSBS folks.

Say, Mikey, if there was no use of the atomic bombs, what do you suppose would have happened to those cities set aside . . . such as Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Kokura, for example? I can tell you what would happen, by the end of September 1945 they would have been naught but cinders blowing in the breeze. Ain't conventional weapons just grand? And all before the supposed end timeframe suggested by USSBS folks . . . guess they were in on it, too, eh?

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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#194

Post by ljadw » 24 Feb 2019, 19:36

mikegriffith1 wrote:
24 Feb 2019, 13:52
OpanaPointer wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 13:28
It's good to remember that the USSB conclusions were directed by Curtis LeMay, they were PR for the independent air force he wanted.
So the USSBS members conspired to produce misleading PR to help create an independent Air Force branch? I don't believe that theory. All 12 of the USSBS Japan officials were civilians, and the Survey was established by Secretary of War Marshall, not by LeMay. Furthermore, by the end of the war, there was little doubt that the Air Force was going to become its own independent branch very soon, so there was no need for a conspiracy to rig the USSBS report.

Truman defenders don't like the USSBS because it told the truth about Japan's defensive capabilities as of the summer of 1945 (i.e., that Japan was virtually defenseless against air and naval attack by that time), and because it concluded that nuking Japan was not necessary to end the war without an invasion.

Regarding the claim that Hiroshima was a military target, Truman's erroneous August 9 description of Hiroshima as "a military base" belies this argument. Truman said that Hiroshima had been chosen as the first nuke target because it was "a military base" and because "we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians." This suggests one of two things: either Truman was given false information about Hiroshima or he did not want the American people to know that we had nuked a clearly civilian target and had killed tens of thousands of women and children in the attack.

Hiroshima's population in August 1945 was about 350,000. Truman apologists soon claimed there were 30,000-40,000 troops stationed in Hiroshima when it was nuked, but in fact there were only about 10,000 troops there, and they were mostly reservists and supply troops (Paul Ham, Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath, p. 410).

Truman defenders still point out that Hiroshima contained war-material factories and had a large port. But most of Hiroshima's factories were on the outskirts of the city, whereas the nuke was aimed at the center of the city, and as a result most of the factories escaped serious damage; as for Hiroshima's port, it had been mined by the U.S. Navy and had been virtually devoid of activity for some time (see, for example, Stephen Walker, Shockwave: Countdown to Hiroshima, Kindle edition, loc. 1916).
The Japanese were hiding these 10000 troops amongst civilians : there was no reason at all for the US to give way to this blackmail .
Japan,and Japan only was responsiblr for the civilian losses in N and H : Japan refused to capitulate and Japan hided its forces amongst women and children .

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Re: Why not "besiege" Japan?

#195

Post by OpanaPointer » 24 Feb 2019, 21:27

One of the bombs went off directly over 5,000 troops lined up for morning inspection. Deadliest "single round" in history. And, as mentioned above, all men and women of the right age were inducted en masse into the military earlier in the year. There were relatively few civilians there by August 1945.
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