Unternehmen Mammut.

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Planning and development

After the flight of the Gailani government and the Grand Mufti, as well as the total failure of German military aid to Iraq, the area of ​​southern Kurdistan was out of the direct focus of the activities of the German Abwehr for almost a year and a half. The competition here was under the Abwehr KO in Istanbul. Diplomatic support for this activity in Turkey was offered by the treaty of friendship and non-aggression between the German Reich and Turkey, which was signed on June 18, 1941. In August 1941, Admiral Canaris, accompanied by Oberst Piepenbrok, traveled to Turkey to get real support. In the summer of 1941, with respect to overall strategic development, the Abwehr assumed that without the possibility of gaining support points in the Caucasus, the chances of success for subversive actions in the Middle East would have no chance. Since the German Army Group South had to leave the gateway to the Caucasus, the Soviet city of Rostov-on-Don in the winter of 1941-42, such considerations were postponed until the summer offensive of 1942.

Meanwhile, the Abwehr had continued or relaunched some espionage campaigns in the Middle East, in those countries in which a weak or friendly Axis central government was involved. Thus, the main German agent Schulze-Holthus managed to continue his subversive activity for many months, even after the summer of 1941, despite the serious losses of the troops he led and after several escapes, taking advantage of the conflicts of interests allied with the new occupying powers in Iran, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

In mid-October 1942, the capture of Stalingrad by the German Sixth Army had stalled in the city's extensive debris field and in the self-sacrificing resistance of its defenders, while in the Caucasus, the advance of Army Group A in the direction of the local oil wells had achieved minimal progress. Although a specific track could not be found in the archives, on October 21, 1942, a relevant discussion took place between the head of the Eastern Department of the Abwehr II, the Oberstleutnant Putz and his colleague the Leutnant Gottfried Johannes Müller on a possible broader scope of the activities carried out in Iraqi Kurdistan. In November, Müller was commissioned to prepare the corresponding planning study. Therefore, it seems certain that on December 5, 1942 he sent a memorandum to his superiors in which he proposed himself as a possible leader of an espionage campaign in the southern area of ​​Kurdistan between Kirkuk and Suleimanyya.

In fact, the Department of Foreign Affairs / Abwehr II on January 14, 1943, just under six weeks after entering the Müller memorandum, had ratified a corresponding operation by means of an official declaration. Surprisingly, at a time when the Sixth Army, which had been encircled in the Stalingrad area, was no longer struggling to survive, but was facing its immediate demise, and the Panzer and mountain units of Army Group A, trapped in the Caucasus on the night of 27/28 December had received permission from Hitler himself to withdraw from the Caucasus westward by the corresponding directive. Meanwhile, also in the theater of war in North Africa, the situation had also turned against the Axis troops, since the beginning of November 1942, the heavily fortified defensive position of the Army Group Africa was broken in El-Alamein, so they had to start the retreat to the west with heavy losses. In addition, since mid-November 1942, US troops had landed in the French ports of Morocco, so Axis troops were trapped in Libya and Tunisia and their end seemed to be only a matter of time.

In spite of the negative development of the real war situation, the operational planning of the Operation "Mammut" continued its course of apparently normal military-bureaucratic occupation. Following the issuance of the draft of the order of January 14, 1943, consultations were initiated with the Division of Eastern Foreign Armies (Fremde Heere Ost) at the OKH and the Air Force Staff to cooperate with the Department of the Abwehr II. After some positive agreements, Admiral Canaris signed this plan. Then, in February 1943, it was presented to Generalfeldmarschall Keitel for approval.

Sources: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Planning and development

Meanwhile, the situation on the front had developed further in the wrong way for the Germans, so the 6th Army in Stalingrad finally surrendered at the beginning of February 1943 and the African armored army was in a rather disorderly retreat to the west . So, from this point of view, Operation "Mammut", organized by the Abteilung Ausland / Abwehr II, was an "Order driven from Heaven" purely from the beginning, and if so, what purpose should it have and How would it classify?

Another question, was Operation "Mammut", therefore, only organized to clean up the now very bad image of Abteilung Ausland / Abwehr II through a spectacular success? Or was behind the attempt, of an imminent change of tendency in the power structure within the Nazi government between the Wehrmacht and the numerous subdivisions of the SS of Heinrich Himmler (1900-45) and especially the RSHA, as the new star rising to counteract military espionage?

But going back to Operation "Mammut", however, it is inevitable to give below some cryptic comments about Müller's presentation. First of all, at the beginning of his designation among the reasons for carrying out the operation in northern Iraq (ie in the south of Kurdistan), first of all, was inspired by the unfavorable development of the war on the Eastern Front. Therefore, he wanted to make a contribution to finally give the Wehrmacht, which (to that date) was firmly established in the Caucasus and in front of Baku, access to the much needed oil wells. Müller said: "I look at the map, there are comrades in the Caucasus, here I jump in. Here are the oil wells, I'm going to get them! You should have oil! Soon! Very soon!"

Since the summer of 1942, the Hydrocarbon Technical Brigade (TBM - Technische Brigade Mineralöl) had accompanied the largest offensive to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. In two meetings at the Goring Headquarters with the presidents of Konti-Öl and Ostöl, not only on July 10, but also on November 21, 1942, not only the possible access to the Caucasus oil wells was addressed, but also to the Iraqis in the area of ​​Mosul and Kirkuk, touching on specific topics such as oil production and the possible construction of oil pipelines.

When Army Group A was forced to withdraw from the Caucasus in January 1943, as of January 17, 1943, the TBM was ordered to destroy all oil production facilities in German hands in the Caucasus. This was three days after the order given by the Ausland / Abwehr Department to start Operation "Mammut". Anyone could say at this time that the Caucasus and especially the area of ​​Kirkuk Mosul were no longer long-term goals in the area.

Of course, Müller in the OKW military hierarchy was, in any case, bound by the orders and instructions of his superiors. However, in his secret mission, he had the means and ways that a normal unit leader did not have. Because he operated in a way with his troop of spies, he was equipped as the Command's call with special privileges. But if he used it, he did not have to fear a court martial, but, on the other hand, there was the threat of not being covered by his superiors. Through the troops entrusted to him, he possessed a disciplinary power of disposition beyond the usual normal level, that is, he was able to impose obedience by means of arms if necessary and he also had the right to kill the person on the spot in case of proven betrayal of secrecy. A practice that is still valid with all the secret services of this world today.

On the other hand, he was assigned a lump sum, a relatively small amount of money with which he was able to make the necessary purchases, that is, goods and objects that were not available in military warehouses. Müller was also able to pay fees to informants and instructors (such as language teachers, doctors and scientists). As will be shown below, the preparation of "Mammut" involved such a large number of military decision-makers, as well as an even greater number of military and civilian facilities, which was easy for British counterintelligence, to know the German plans and to deal with them, to turn harmless the parties.

To name the operation later the name "Mammut" was chosen because this name was phonetically similar to that of Sheikh Mahmud. This was confirmed by Muller in a subsequent interrogation during his captivity as follows: "The Mammut expedition bears the name of the Iraqi Sheikh Mahmud." Unlike Iran, there was virtually no information available on northern Iraq and the Kurdistan area. So he started only in mid-May 1943 with the Wehrwirtschafts stab (Ausl.) I./Gr. Süd II with the development of questionnaires

Sources: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Operational objectives and possibilities of success of Operation "Mammut".

Müller thought that once he had jumped and landed with his staff, he would be able to motivate the families of the two Kurdish tribal chiefs of the south, Sheikh Mahmud and Sheikh Agha Bassar, to carry out an offensive action against the British positions and bases in the north Iraq with its two espionage squads with a little more than a dozen men and explicitly named the following attack targets:

"Occupation and protection against the destruction of the oil fields and refineries of Kirkuk and its surroundings, occupation of military objectives and public buildings (post offices, telegraphs, railways), until the arrival of the German troops, in preparation for the exploration and assurance of the German advanced routes, to hide the real intentions of the operation (occupation of oil areas, etc.), to allow the enemy to withdraw the troops from the oil fields, but to hold on to the enemy troops, the operation would have to be divided into Two parts: the surreptitious organization and bring the Kurds to the oil fields and military bases of Kirkuk, Chem Chemal and Suleimanje. Constant enemy alarm by guerrilla warfare with ever-changing tactics on the Persian frontier and on Persian soil, NOT east of Sulaimanje. "

Even if, as he claims, "his" operation would have taken between three and four months to prepare, what German troops could have arrived in northern Iraq in April/May 1943, and by what means? In retrospect, he reveals his plan as the beginning of the revolution in the Near East, which was directed against England, to free the Kurds and even to relieve the hard pressed eastern front. The Ausland / Abwehr II department also confirmed the selection of personnel already chosen by Müller. As the first group (Mammut I), so to speak, the advanced command with the Müller Command, two German radio operators and a Kurdish V-Mann ((Verbindungsmann - liaison) had to jump over the area in question and get in contact with the Kurdish clans surrounding the Sheikh Mahmud and prepare the entire operation. At the same time, a remote radio station had to be established, which had to maintain radio communication between the Müller group and the Department of Defense II during the slow withdrawal movement of the German troops from the Caucasus, this consisted of the Defense Liaison Officer, Leutnant Dr. Hans-Christof Messow, and the radio operator, soldier Johannes Müller, Gottfried Johannes Müller's younger brother.

The second group (Mammut II) would be composed of five to six non-commissioned officers and German teams to present themselves as trainers of the Kurdish rebels and leaders of the Kurdish troops in relation to actions with explosives and sabotage.

A third group (Mammut III) should follow if the first two had managed to establish themselves in the Kurdish area. At the suggestion of the Kurdish activist Ramzi Nafie Rasheed, it should be made up of a doctor and also a female doctor for the treatment of Kurdish women. For this purpose, it was chosen the medical student Maria Effinger, who should have completed a specific internship at tropical hospital 118 in Berlin-Dahlem in the next semester recess, as well as a geologist, a civil engineer and an economist. About the selection of the last mentioned specialists, however, when starting Operation "Mammut" there was still no final decision.

Sources: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The personnel, training and education requirements of the German participants.

Approximately a dozen and a half people were scheduled to carry out Mammut. The main protagonist was, undoubtedly, the commanding officer, the Leutnant d. Res. Gottfried Johannes Müller. Born in 1914 in the family of the saddler and parish priest Johannes Matthäus Müller in Gschwend (Swabia), he grew up in humble social circumstances and under the impression of the years of scarcity immediately after the First World War. After only six years of primary school, he completed a three-year commercial apprenticeship with the shopkeeper Kienzle in Gschwend until 1929. Since his parents could not afford a place in school for their second oldest son, the dream of studying medicine did not come true.

In 1932 he joined the NSDAP and the SA, member of a SA Reiterstandarte (cavalry regiment), in 1933 he was promoted to leader of the troop SA (approximately squad leader). After working as a sales assistant at the Ploquet company in Heidenheim / Brenz, he had to work until the mid-30s as a representative of men's clothing in Austria and Italy. The rather unstable life of a sales representative was his nature and, in this sense, led the young adventurer in the mid-30s to his journey east to the unknown Kurdistan. Previously, he had learned the basic rudiments of the Arabic language. This trip took him and a friend, each with a bicycle and 60 Reichsmark to travel through the European capitals of the Balkans to Istanbul (Constantinople).

Back in Germany, Müller was summoned to Ulm in October 1936 for two years of service in the 4. Company (MG.) of the Infantry Regiment 56 (IR 56), where he received training as a radio operator and messenger. In June 1937 he became Reserveoffiziersbewerber (ROB - candidate for a commission as reserve officer), in March 1938 he was promoted to Obergefreiter and Reserveoffiziersanwärter (ROA - candidate for reserve officer) and two months before his release, in September of 1938, he was Unteroffizier in the 8. (MG) / IR 56.

After retiring from military service, he worked in 1939-40 as a merchant in Vienna and as a sales agent in Sweden, Slovakia, Italy and Switzerland, before he was recalled in early June 1940. He arrived in Poitiers to join the 4. Company (MG) of the Infantry Regiment 134 and made in its ranks the last battles of the campaign in France. In March 1941 he was promoted to Leutnant der Reserve. Previously, he had volunteered for the Air Force to complete an apprenticeship as an observer in Army aviation and was transferred to the Army's Main Aviation Department to Reichenberg (Sudetenland). Then he visited the School of Reconnaissance in Brieg (Lower Silesia). In June 1941, he was recognized as a close observer of the air force "Nah" and could now be used as an observer in a nearby reconnaissance squadron or Nahaufklärer (H) of the army aviation. But it would be different again.

Through his childhood friend, Sepp Hagleitner, Gottfried Johannes Müller joined the Abwehr on 1º July 1941 and was initially employed at the Abwehrstelle in Vienna. After working in that branch, he was also a staff member in Sofia and Paris. From the end of 1941 to the spring of 1942, Müller worked at the KO in Istanbul, although his boss, Hauptmann Paul Leverkuehn, does not mention it in his memories. From April to November 1942, Müller was assigned to the 8. Company (MG) II. (Replacement) Batallion of the 131st Infantry Regiment in Brno to train recruits. There he already began to develop his plans for Operation "Mammut" and then he remained as its leader.

Sources: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The personnel, training and education requirements of the German participants.

The second officer employed in Operation "Mammut" was Leutnant d.Res. Dr. Hans-Christof Messow (radio code name "Messner"). Presumably, also Messow, taking into account his qualifications, was an Abwehr officer, who constituted the other part of the operation (radio code name "Seehund - seal", was at the same time the code name for the Gefreiten Johannes Müller) deployed in the Caucasus to receive radio messages from the active group in northern Iraq "Mammut I" commanded by Leutnant Muller. This fraction was to receive, evaluate and forward the reports to the main Ausland / Abwehr II department in Berlin.

When the operation began in June 1943, the Caucasus had already been evicted by German troops. So this fraction was established instead in Crimea. Assuming a fairly high degree of freedom of decision for a chief of fraction of the Abwehr, it might even be true at this point that Mueller wanted the displacement of Messow from "Mammut" as he himself later wrote, since it is likely that both members of the old military service already knew each other.

The Gefreite (Corporal) Friedrich Wilhelm Hoffmann was born in 1912 in Güdingen (Saarland). After attending primary and secondary school, he worked for the turbine manufacturer Brown (Braun) Bowery as electrical engineer and workshop manager. After the referendum in Saarland, he was a full-time HJ leader from 1935-36 (Unterbannführer).

Since the spring of 1936, he completed a brief four-month military training at Pioneer Btl. 49 (battalion of sappers) in Bewern, near Holzminden, who completed as a soldier and as ROA (officer candidate). From October 1937 until the end of December 1941, he was a teacher at the Maktabi Mechaniki School (Technical School) in Kabul. From January to May 1942, he worked as part of the Organization Todt (OT) in Minsk and Smolensk on the Eastern Front and then came to the department of teaching interpreters in Berlin.

In November 1942 he briefly visited the Gebirgspionier-Bataillon 54 in Mittenwald. At the beginning of December 1942, he was integrated into the Abwehr and, from January 20, 1943, took part in Operation "Mammut I". Hoffmann had been trained as a specialist for the operation, but also for the destruction of oil installations.

Sources: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The personnel, training and education requirements of the German participants.

Georg Heinrich Adalbert (Mustafa) Konieczny was born in Berlin in 1912. His father was of Polish descent, his mother was Italian. Despite his strict Catholic education, at the age of 15 he showed great interest in the Orient and Islam and visited the mosque located at the Fehrbelliner Square in Berlin several times. Three years before graduating from high school, he finished grammar school with only a medium degree and then learned the glass painter profession at the famous Puhl & Wagner mosaic company in Berlin-Treptow and dedicated himself to it until August 1934. Upon reaching adulthood, he resigned from the Catholic Church and converted to Islam.

Until April 1935 he made a trip to Persia, where he studied language and art. He worked there mainly on behalf of his company in the palace of the Shah of Persia, Reza Shah Pahlavi (1878-1944). From July 1935 to September 1936 he was unemployed. In October 1936 he was called to the Wehrmacht, where he served until the autumn of 1937, and then as Gefreiter with the Cavalry Regiment No. 6 in Schwedt a. d. Oder, then in Darmstadt. After that he worked among other things as a publicist in various companies. In 1938, despite his great interest in Islam, he returned to the Catholic Church and entered the Polish Consulate in Tehran in August 1939 as an employee.

At the beginning of the war, he expressed his desire not to fight against the Poles and even asked to join the Polish army. However, the development of the war in favor of Germany prevented the execution of this intention. Since his visa for Iran was not renewed in 1940, he returned to Germany, although he did not have great sympathies for the Nazis. After spending a short period as an unemployed person, he was again working as an advertising agent. In October 1940, he was called up and assigned to a reconnaissance detachment, where he was assigned to the Eastern Front until September 1941.

From October 1941 to March 1943 he was a Persian professor, first in the Department of Replacements of the Feldgendarmerie in Stuttgart, then in the Department of Teaching of Interpreters in Berlin. From March 1943 he moved to the Lehr-Regiment "Brandenburg" and then became a participant in the operation "Mammut". The promotion to Leutnant der Reserve did not come directly to him because he was already in action. Konieczny was a paramedic and trained in the treatment of tropical diseases.

Sources: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Edward L. Hsiao]

This is all new to me. What is the results of Unternehmen "Mammut"? I'm looking forward to hear more information of this little known operation. By the way,what is the Hydrocarbon Technical Brigade anyway? I never heard of that German unit before in my life. What was the purpose of this unit? Who was the unit's commanding officer?

Edward L. Hsiao

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The personnel, training and education requirements of the German participants.

Little is known about the biographical data of the other participants. They were usually low-ranking Abwehr personnel and probably were predominantly ethnic Germans. It is therefore assumed that they would have lived and worked for a long time before the war in the Arab-Turkish-Persian area and that they normally dominated the respective national language with varying degrees of fluency.

Among them were, in addition to the so-called Palestinian Swabians, members of the Imperial Asian Corps (kaiserlichen Asien-korps) "Jilderim-Yildrim", who after 1918 preferred to remain in the Middle East. After the outbreak of the war in 1939 or even later, this group had some success, either in disguise and with false documents, escaping Allied internment and trying to reach Germany. Or they were already German civilians in the custody of the Allies, who had been repatriated to the German Red Cross in Geneva in the course of the war if they did not have military training. (In individual cases, military personnel were also repatriated against the word of honor).

However, as in the case of Hoffmann and Konieczny, these could also be people who grew up in Germany, but who, because of their own private interest in the East and Islam, possessed special knowledge or mastered local languages ​​well through of longer stays abroad in Eastern countries, and also knew the culture, history and tradition of its inhabitants. These people went very quickly to the Department of Interpreter Education in Berlin because of their relatively rare knowledge of the language and national customs and, therefore, they were interesting for the Abwehr. After their official transfer, they were directly subordinated to the Lehr-Regiment "Brandenburg". For this group of people, the service in the country with the OKW identification plate was relatively easy and did not endanger their lives, since for a long time they were not involved in a dangerous operation at the front.

For Edward "Technische Brigade Mineralöl" (TBM)

On March 29, 1942, Göring created the "Technische Brigade Mineralöl" (TBM) Oil Technical Brigade, designating Generalmajor Erich Homburg as Head of the Unit. His Chief of Staff was Major Erich Will. The mission of the unit was: "to start the oil fields, the extraction facilities and the oil stocks in the east, immediately after occupation by the Wehrmacht."

The TBM consisted of 6,500 men, technical director was Günther Schicht of the Deutsche Erdöl Aktiengesellschaft (DEA).

Command and Staff = 150,
Battalion of specialists:
I drilling, II transformation, III transport = 600,
Technical Battalion 11 and 33 = 1,800
Transmissions = 100
Transport company = 100
Heavy transport unit = 150,
Gas Technical Battalion = 800,
Water Technical Battalion = 800
Organization Todt = 500,
AA unit 15 and 42 = 300,
Field Hospital = 80,
The storage location of the main material was Breslau.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.
http://www.passionmilitaria.com/t43222- ... du-petrole

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The personnel, training and education requirements of the German participants.

The second group also included the astronomer Dr. Oehler, who had to carry in his luggage a nautical equipment complete with sextant, octant, gyrocompass, chronometer, plumb line, peephole and telescope for the exact positioning of the stars and for mapping. The long-term nature of Müller's espionage mission among the Kurds between Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyya, however, is demonstrated by the fact that after lengthy discussions, including the Kurdish Ramzi, they continued to have two trained tropical health professionals ( a man and a woman), with the decision to send a geologist, a civil engineer and a graduate in economics to this region. This fact has already been indicated previously.

The beginning of the training of the participants until now available already began on January 18, 1943, but finally due to several problems and difficulties it extended in the duration, so that the original date of training at least to the first group that had to conclude in Holy Week (April 26), it could not be fulfilled. The training was extended until the first 10 days of June, while the second group continued with their instruction until the beginning of July.

When looking at the lists available in the archive, it is notable that the training of the possible agents was intended to provide them with as many specialized areas as possible. This led to a very tight instructional plan, which he usually took, minus the usual midday rest, from 6 in the morning (wake up) until 8:00 p.m. (curfew) and lasted for a few more days and was quite exhausting for the participants. In contrast to the practice of Western intelligence agencies, where the training of future spies was limited to fulfilling the essentials of their task, training at the Abteilung Ausland / Abwehr II also consisted of a service similar to military training, as with any normal recruit used in the Wehrmacht.

This meant that, in addition to the formation of radio and languages ​​and the various branches of the espionage and sabotage service and the preparation of very difficult lectures on the culture, history, ethnology and religion of the Near and Middle East, especially Kurdistan , necessary to serve in the general commissions, during the day they executed sports, field exercises, armament (carbine 98k), shot in the field and of precision, cleaning of the armament, clearing of zone, etc. Here, the typical "German meticulousness" appeared again. The agent not only had to become a good spy, but also a solid soldier. If one can find one way or another exaggerated in this training, then its surface development is clearly shown. German saboteurs should establish themselves after the deployment for a longer period with the Kurds, infiltrate, indoctrinate and radicalize them in the fight against England and ultimately lead small and medium Kurdish guerrilla groups.

In the period until early June 1943, an avalanche of military offices and civilian installations came into contact, and it would have been difficult to maintain a minimum of secrecy as a prerequisite for a successful espionage operation. The inevitable increase in the number of participants in the operation "Mammut" moved from one side to another similar to a traveling circus throughout the Reich, from training center to training center. The skiing and climbing training, as well as radio employment in the high mountains, took place in the Karawanken in Bodental behind Klagenfurt (on the border of Carinthia with the Upper Carniola in Slovenia), the courses of espionage and sabotage in the Gut Quenzsee in Brandenburg / Havel (which was the main training center of the "Brandenburg" Division), radio education was continuous, there was special radio training for advanced students also at Krumme Lanke near Berlin and in Vienna. The parachute training was conducted at the paratrooper school in Wittstock, the eight practice jumps were finally carried out under the supervision and guidance of Feldwebel Paulus at the Wiener-Neustadt airfield.

In addition to the contact with the departments of Foreign Armies in the OKH in Zossen and Berlin by the Leutnants Müller, Messow and Gefreite Hoffmann, a visit was also made to the local oil fields and oil production facilities near Hannover. These facilities near Nienhagen, near Hanover, were not very profitable in terms of production. However, the exploitation of its own oil fields despite the low effectiveness due to the efforts of self-sufficiency in raw material in the Third Reich was carried out constantly.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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At the Tropical Clinic in Hamburg, them even consulted with the internationally recognized academic in the field of treatment of tropical diseases, Professor Mühlens, and the subsequent shipment of tropical doctors was also discussed. The same happened to Dr. Klie, the head of the Hamburger Ratsapotheke with regard to drugs. The result of these discussions was the accelerated completion of the so-called "Tropical Week" at the Tropical Institute of the Military Medical Academy in Berlin in March 1943.

The selection and acquisition of Kurdish liaison agents (V-Mannes) initially did not have any good stars. This group of people contacted by the Abwehr were mostly Kurds who had lived in exile in Paris, Ankara, Istanbul or other cities in the Middle East for a long time, or after the failed coup d'etat of the Gailani regime. The government had to flee in May 1941. The incorporation of a link from the circle of prisoners of war, who were former members of the British armed forces, was barely perceptible among the Kurds. The Kurds, apart from a few exceptions, were considered unreliable by the British for military service and, therefore, had little representation in the British army.

The first attempt to contact a Kurd named Mukri (aka "Albert May") at the end of January 1943 and the corresponding reliability tests in the military training area in Meseritz (Warthegau) was negative. Although Mukri received a letter of recommendation from the respected Kurdish leader Mohamed Khan of Sakis in Iran, he was not accepted into the Abwehr, apparently because of his prophetic attitude. Presumably, he had absolutely no ideas that Müller needed from a reliable Kurdish, it was also from Sakiz, so it did not come directly from the area selected for the jump around Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyya.

Therefore, since the beginning of March 1943, the Abwehr intensified its efforts to recruit a more suitable Kurdish V-Mann for Operation "Mammut". First, three other candidates were selected: Aloisi, Karadi and a third, whose name was not registered. However, Aloisi was out of the question at that time because he fell ill shortly after the contact. On the reliability of Karadi, the competent Oberstleutnant Dr. Eisenberg of the Foreign Department of the Abwehr II even consulted Raschid Ali al-Gailani, exiled in Germany. This gave Eisenberg a quick response regarding the character of Karadi: "A bad man, but very suitable for an expedition like this!

Some time later, at the beginning of April 1943, Dr. Eisenberg heard the message of the Istanbul KO that a reliable representative of Kurdish descent, called Raschid, was ready to cooperate with Germany. It was decided to send Rashid to Sofia under the supervision of Dr. Wolf. The compliance schedule for the safe operation of the "Mammut" operation was already very tight. Through Vienna, Raschid finally arrived accompanied by Leutnant Altmann on April 28, 1943 to the training center of the operation "Mammut" in Bodental.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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As already mentioned, the chief of a secret operation moved largely autonomously and, therefore, initially had to be financially independent. In his memorandum, Müller requested the provision of RM 5,000 for the purchase of additional items that are not available in the military depots and the payment of courses and external facilities. For example as the so-called morning gift (financial gifts), he provided the Sheikh Mahmud 1,000 pounds, the Sheikh Agha Bassar 500 pounds and another 500 pounds, mainly in paper money but also in gold coins, for the compensation of the local Kurdish authorities.

The Ausland / Abwehr II Department confirmed its financial requirements for the funds that would be brought to Kurdistan, but awarded Müller three times the amount to prepare the operation in Germany. For the provision of all cash, arms, equipment and other material, there was the Orient Department of the Amtsgruppe under the command of Oberstleutnant Putz. To this were added the "gifts" that were wanted for the Kurds. With them it was expected to know the taste of the local population and win their sympathy.

As with any espionage activity, selecting the right team is critical for its success. In the Operation "Mammut" had to resort to numerous improvisations from the beginning because there was no better or more adequate material. This has already begun with the provision of uniforms. While normal paratroopers clothing such as the "Knochensäcke-bone bag" needed to be repainted from the usual greenish gray only to khaki, it was more difficult with the other clothes, because in the zone of application prevailed very strong temperature fluctuations. After a long period of trial, they decided to wear the captured French officer coats of light khaki colour.

The field blouses and trousers also went back to work from the uniforms of the French officers until the German imitation. The pants received inside a leather trim for riding and mountaineering. Both pants and blouses were equipped with large interior pockets to hold the folding radio, gun with ammunition, compass and maps, and emergency food.

The shoes consisted of mountain hunter boots and climbing shoes with rubber soles. The rest of the pieces of equipment were similar to those used by the Afrika korps. All the other equipment and the consumed food were, without wanting to go into details here, quite similar to the survival equipment of the modern commandos of our days.

Each group had to have two small 99/10 removable radio devices with 10 watts of transmission power at their disposal. For the power supply of the devices, pedal systems for normal bicycles were used. These devices could be operated with batteries (range 900-1000 km) or with the crank set (range 1200-1500 km). All participants were trained to transmit and receive the German alphabet of group Q and had a special radio key chart with fictitious abbreviations for geographical locations.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The personnel, training and education requirements of the German participants.

In the case of falling prisoners of the British, a radio code had been established using a famous quote from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's Faust: "Reason becomes absurd, wisdom a plague", which replaces the word "benevolence" with " wisdom". Therefore, the Abwehr was warned that the radio messages contained intentional false information. When jumping, they had to wear traditional Kurdish clothes under the uniform in case they were forced to discard the uniform temporarily or completely.

A major problem in the struggle for the survival of German agents in the Kurdish area was to equip them with effective weapons. It would not be enough to equip the espionage squad with adequate weapons. Another important objective of the operation "Mammut" was the constant supply of arms to the Kurdish insurgents. As Müller had already correctly recognized in his memorandum, the armament of the Kurds was rather uneven. However, even today, when it comes to replicating or repairing guns and rifles, the Kurds are extremely skilled gunsmiths and master the art of repairing weapons.

With regard to the issue of explosives and detonators for the execution of sabotage actions, their transport was not yet planned for the group "Mammut I" commanded by Müller. The explosives and detonators had to be delivered in large quantities only after the departure of the "Mammut II" group in August 1943 when they were launched with a cargo parachute from a transport machine. Until then, the defense laboratory in Berlin-Tegel had to produce enough explosives and detonators.

Until then, the corresponding laboratories produced explosives and detonators in relatively small quantities and only for training and practice purposes for all "Mammut" personnel. For the whole operation, the following amounts were provided to be parachuted: 250-300 kg of plastic explosive, 50-75 kg of sabotage material of different types, in particular detonators and 50 pieces of "camouflage". The detonators should be used as everyday objects due to their better camouflage, giving them a harmless appearance as possible. Therefore, the detonators had to disguise themselves as: tobacco pipes, alarm clocks, toothbrushes, brushes and brushes for washing and fountain pens. In addition, the installation of highly explosive detonators, camouflaged in safe thermoses for tea or coffee, was provided.

As objectives for the destruction of the military and industrial infrastructure in the south of Kurdistan in the training of all the personnel of "Mammut", basically a distinction was made between the actions of sabotage and the so-called small sabotage. In the latter case, in order to save as many explosives as possible for large, important targets, for example, locomotives and motorized vehicles had to be taken out of service by the simplest means, for example, by manipulating the boiler of steam or on the drive train of a locomotive or a river boat or polluting the tanks of motorized vehicles by placing sugar, nails or other materials. Also sawing the springs and axles, cutting the brake hoses or breaking the tires. Rolling railway equipment, such as wagons, was planned to put sand on the shaft bearings and destroy the brake cylinder.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The personnel, training and education requirements of the German participants.

In addition, the attacks on the railway network by the elimination of timber railway sleepers and the loosening or removal of the screws were in the program. When attacking large targets, one of the most obvious was the breaking of the railway lines and the blowing up of bridges. Of this, southern Kurdistan, which in any case was equipped with weak infrastructure, expected the largest and most sustainable effect. The specialists of the Abwehr distinguished themselves during the meticulous training on the dosage of the scarce explosive material according to the different types of bridges. Clearly, the amount of explosives used in the destruction of older wood or stone bridges was much lower than that of the more modern iron or steel structures. Other objectives were the interruption of the telecommunications network and the destruction of radio stations. Of crucial importance for the operation as a whole, however, was the total or at least temporary paralysis of oil production, especially in the Mosul and Kirkuk region.

The extremely wide range of objectives, which should have been completed throughout the espionage operation, is another indication of the long-term nature of the entire action. In fact, a massive sabotage attack on the entire military and industrial infrastructure in this part of Iraq would have required the prior incitement of a major popular uprising by numerous Kurdish tribes and clans, first in some territory under rebel rule for some time or, in Second, in the territory under British-Iraqi central power in areas controlled by force.

However, after weighing all known facts, there remain considerable doubts about the extent to which this would actually have been possible under the existing balance of power. In the course of the very intense and more than a year-long interrogations of the German specialists of the Abwehr Müller, Hoffmann and Konieczny, the British interrogation officers will have slowly and to their horror taken a notion of the whole dimension of the Operation " Mammut "of having worked.

The replacement of arms was, therefore, crucial to stimulate a major Kurdish popular uprising against the British army and the Iraqi central government. In the air transport, after the withdrawal of the two groups of agents, they flew to the south of Kurdistan and dropped or landed: 3,000 rifles (loot weapons, possibly English or Russian, but standardized), 3,000 bayonets (for previous rifles), 250 cartridges for each rifle, 1,000 pistols (booty), 150 cartridges for each gun, 300 machine guns (possibly English or Russian, but standardized) with 5,000 projectiles for each.

In Muller's post-war descriptions of the supply of arms to the Kurds, he says: "At the same moment, the German airborne troops are sent from the Caucasus without stopping, without stopping, they will jump, the weapons will fall, the planes will fly back, full of gasoline. "

The central point of a secret airborne operation during the night and in the fog is the safe and unexpected deployment of the group of agents by parachute. The two standard models RZ 16 and RZ 20 of the German parachute troops were used to deploy individual agents. Both types are round canopy with automatic opening. The use of a canopy model with individual opening by the parachutist himself had been deliberately omitted. The same principle was applied to the launch of cargo parachutes for weapons containers and backpacks. The RZ 16 and RZ 20 parachutes used at that time were not yet strong enough to have brought a paratrooper with full military equipment to Earth. Then, the speed of fall would have been so high that a parachutist could hardly have escaped unharmed. Therefore, all the rest of the material and all the weapons, except the weapon that the paratrooper carried, were stored in the weapons containers. For this reason, it was considered a supreme principle when launching agents and containers of weapons that landed as close as possible, so that they were not completely defenseless against the enemy on land for a long time.

If this basic principle was violated for any reason or was not respected, all action was threatened with failure from the beginning. Already in the preparatory phase, Müller, the head of operations and the specialist in charge of the jump, Feldwebel Paulus, had a violent controversy on the appropriate method.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The material requirements.

It is said that the participants, including Ramzi, had great doubts about the so-called "coupling jump" (in tandem), which Fw Paulus and his superior Oberleutnant Figulla successfully performed in April 1943 for demonstration purposes in Wiener Neustadt. Consequently, Müller and his men would have agreed at first to execute a coupling jump with a not too heavy backpack. In addition, Müller demanded five large containers of weapons for the material. It should not be hidden at this point that coupling jumps have been considered problematic, even in the case of the trained Fallschirmschjäger.

To remedy the problem that the weapons containers fell separately and often could not be found, the launch of the container together with the parachutist was tested on a loading parachute fixed with the parachute. It turned out, however, that even two coupled parachutes had a too high rate of descent. Therefore, only a fairly light and small parachutist could perform a successful coupling jump. The size and weight would not have been a problem, at least with Müller, but he, like everyone else, was not a trained paratrooper.

Meanwhile, on the night of June 10, 1943, during a test flight with a "Condor" Focke-Wulf Fw 200, the transport machine chosen for Operation "Mammut", Fw Paulus had determined in a practical experiment that only a maximum of two weapons containers could be launched. Not because of the weight, but because when more than two containers were dropped, due to the delay between launch and landing, they were extended to such a large area that it would be difficult to recover them. Mueller protested immediately and finally agreed to take four containers.

As the departure date approached, suddenly everyone refused to do the coupling jump together with a backpack. So there was nothing left but to put all the equipment and material in the four full and overloaded weapons containers. Only Müller himself should carry one of the demountable radios, as well as his own personal equipment. Also the urgent requests of Paulus, to take at least the set of test for the operation of the radios and some of the most necessary reserve foods in a coupled backpack, Mueller with vehemence, observed that he would be the chief of operations, also an officer and, in any case, he was authorized to return. Thus, the impending and inevitable disaster was already preprogrammed.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more: The material requirements.
Now, they had to find an appropriate transport aircraft for the Operation "Mammut". In the first place, it was clear that it could only be a four-engine machine with the appropriate range, otherwise it would not have been possible to reach the operations area or return to its airport of origin. For this reason, the personnel of the Air Force Command for Experimental units (Luftwaffen-Führungsstab vom Versuchsverband OBdL) had to provide a suitable machine. Initially, apparently it was destined to Operation "Mammut", one of the modern and initially available with only a few specimens, the four-engine jumbo Junkers Ju 290, which also had a folding ramp to unload voluminous loads.

A subsequent observation by Müller suggests this in all likelihood: "Before leaving, I asked about the aircraft planned for the operation, which was specially configured to launch the commandos, was able to remain in the air for several thousand kilometers, fly up to 8,000 m, and had a retractable ramp on the bottom of the fuselage, where both men and containers could approach and launch at the same time, and then get together to the ground. "

However, in the spring of 1943, there was not a single Junkers Ju 290 available for the Versuchsverband OBdL test equipment, since the few Ju 290 V models available to date and the few A-0 and A-1 aircraft flew exclusively for the air transport units at that time.

Fritz Hoffmann had expressed with respect to the aircraft, which had visited with Konieczny, Müller and Messow at the Rangsdorf airport that the aircraft of Operation "Mammut" in question would have been two Focke-Wulf "Condor", a Junkers Ju 290 and a captured Russian transport machine. Hoffmann also said that the Junkers Ju 290 due to its larger fuselage compared to the "Condor" and the folding loading ramp was apparently the most suitable aircraft. In addition, he assured that an air force officer told him that he had made an espionage flight to Persia with a Ju 290.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M .