Unternehmen Mammut.

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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 23 Jun 2019 17:26

Hello to all :D; more: The material requirements.

The 2. Staffel of the Versuchsverbandes OBdL responsible for the aerial aspects of the operation "Mammut" under its commander, Hauptmann Karl-Edmund Gartenfeld, finally had to resort to a Focke-Wulf Fw 200 "Condor" much less suitable for an operation of this type. This four-engine machine could handle the return flight with a total flight distance of 2,700 km to the north of Iraq and vice versa, without stopping and refueling on the condition that it depart from an airfield in the Crimea and at night, in violation of Turkish neutral airspace overflyng the jumping area and dropping the agents.

After a careful examination of the available sources, the machine assigned to the Mammut operation was almost certainly the Focke-Wulf Fw 200 B-1 (V-10) aircraft, serial No. 0001. This aircraft had been in service since the change of year 1939/40 on the Sonderverband Rowehl (civil DLH code: D-ASHH Hessen, then military code: F8 + BU) and equipped with a Telefunken S 427/1/36 radio system and two machine guns MG 15 of 7, 92mm as a defense. The armament was placed in an elongated tray on the floor or on a support B on the back of the fuselage. One disadvantage of all Focke-Wulf "Condor" machines was that they did not have a loading ramp. All the Fw 200 of the A and B series had been developed as commercial aircraft and only in the course of the war were they provisionally converted into military machines.

Due to its concept of civil development, the "Condor" had on its port side only a narrow cabin entrance door and a slightly wider but lower rear cargo door of very limited proportions. The subsequent comment by Müller was, therefore, laconic:

"You can take a look at this bird, however, it does not have any ramp, but you have to jump through the door"

This should have fatal consequences for the course of the "Mammut" operation.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 30 Jun 2019 18:02

Hello to all :D; more: The march and the failure of Operation Mammut.

During the course of April 1943, through the mediation of the Abwehr / Ausland the Kurdish Ramzi who had arrived in Germany, had initiated, developed by Müller, Messow and others, his suitability examination for the activity of the secret service.

Since the planned group of people had not yet completely passed through their teaching program, the date of assignment was postponed until May 20, 1943. The head of the department was hardly notified in this matter by the pressure of time; In any case, it seems that the department was conducting the operation quite independently of the actual course of the war. In any case, Ausland / Abwehr II granted all participants an additional special leave of 14 days after completing the extensive training program, a generosity that was otherwise rare in the rest of the Wehrmacht. Previously, Müller had yet to draft a so-called will and leave it for safekeeping. Thus, all the procedures for the preparation of the operation "Mammut" were carried out.

Finally, the designated Focke-Wulf Fw 200 "Condor" B-1 took off with good weather conditions with Group I and Group III on board on June 15, 1943 at 12:40 hours from its operating airport in Rangsdorf, near of Berlin. The aircraft landed after approximately six hours of flight at 18:30hours at the Sarabus airport, 25 km north of Simferopol, Crimea. Leutnant Messow and the radio operator Johannes Müller remained in Crimea, while the rest waited for their flight, which began a day later, on June 16 at 18:43 hours. In addition to Hauptmann Liemann, the crew of five men included the co-pilot Leutnant Nebel, the observer Leutnant Wagner, as well as a radio operator and a flight mechanic.

On board was also the paratrooper Feldwebel Paulus, and Gefreite Grüning of the group "Mammut II", who had to support Paulus in the launching, also the agents of the group "Mammut I", with Leutnant Gottfried Johannes Müller, Gefreiten Fritz Hoffmann and Georg Konieczny and the Kurd Ramzi Nafi'Rashid. All the agents of the group "Mammut I" had German passbooks with their last names, only that Mueller there was designated as Major and the two corporals as lieutenants. Ramzi owned a Soldbuch in the name of "Feldwebel Maier". Even in the German intelligence service, therefore, the inevitable differences of state remained perfectly preserved! All of them also possessed simple Iraqi identity documents with their Kurdish code names.

The flight route inevitably led to the violation of Turkish airspace. This was done smoothly and freely at an altitude of 4,500 to 5,000 meters above Anatolia, beyond Trapzon and Lake Van (Van See) in Turkey. Understandably, very nervous agents at this altitude used abundant oxygen masks, so that the bottles were emptied too quickly, and therefore the men already before the launch weakened a bit. In retrospect, Müller, in an effort to be able to blame the supposedly bad performance of the flight crew for the wrong launching of the group, gave the absurd explanation that the pilots did not want to give them oxygen.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 07 Jul 2019 17:56

Hello to all :D; more: The march and the failure of Operation Mammut.

In northern Iraq, the machine followed the course of the Zab (Great Zab) and then flew for a long time along an arch at an altitude of between 600 and 900 m in the area above the city of Mosul, to find the proper launch site. An additional descent of the aircraft was canceled by a partial cloud cover and the peaks of the surrounding mountains. It was planned to place the agents between Ranya and Sulaimaniyya (Pishder area), the area of ​​influence of Sheikh Mahmud. In fact, the plane was still too far west of Ranya.

Müller in his memoirs: "Is the pilot crazy? What is he doing there? We are circling around 300-500 m altitude, at 1 o'clock in the morning, in the light of the moon, as a German plane of four engines, above a very bright city ".

Since the pilots had to fly at ground level due to the inaccuracy of the compass to reach the target area, they had apparently confused the Zab (Great Zab) River east of Mosul with the small river Zab in Ranya. The city illuminated below them, therefore, was not Ranya, but Mosul.

On June 16, 1943, the British had observed an unknown four-engine aircraft with a long fuselage flying over Mosul at the time in question and, therefore, expected parachute jumps. It is true that the British had practically followed the "condor" route. The unknown four-engine plane was sighted on the night of June 16 to 17, 1943 at 22:45 hours at Tel Kotchek and at 01:30 hours at 'Ainzala. At 00:25 hours, it was observed for the first time that it was flying south over Mosul, then a second time at 01:05 hours, heading north (all times are local).

Müller had testified in his first interrogation in Erbil to the Iraqi police chief that at the time of the launch a heavy fog prevailed in the whole area, and occasionally hail clouds, so the flight crew due to the alleged poor visibility insisted in a quick exit of the agents. However, this statement contradicts the fact that during the launch season and in this place, the weather is generally hot during the day and clear during the night. In addition, as already mentioned in his memoirs, Müller had declared that the full moon had shone that night.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 14 Jul 2019 22:38

Hello to all :D; more: The march and the failure of Operation Mammut.

In this regard, the Chief of jump, Feldwebel Paulus, commented in his report on the climate that then, upon reaching the Turkish coast, the clear vision would have prevailed initially, but then a cloud cover was closed over Turkey. This climatic situation had also stopped when the machine flew over Lake Van (still in Turkey) and approached the small Zab lake (northern Iraq), which was already close to the launch site. Then, the pilot took advantage of the cloud gaps that opened up to orientate themselves in courses of lower rivers and notable points of the terrain. In this case, very probably confusing the cities Ranya and Mosul. Once again, at this point, doubts arise again about the truth, not only for the memories of the post-war of Müller. In his interrogation, Müller told the British interrogator that he had heard another version of why he and his group had been left in the wrong place in the area of ​​operations. This was so important for the Briton that he added a note of his own to the proceedings of the hearing, according to which Müller told him that the Chief of jump, Feldwebel Paulus with his assistant, Gefreite Grüning, contrary to the orders, had told the pilot Liemann, who knowingly let them jump in the wrong place.

Müller justified this by stating that Paulus and Grüning had good relations with the SD, and that the SD itself would have wanted to carry out its own secret operation in the area of ​​northern Iraq. The veracity of this statement by Müller is also very doubtful. Assuming he knew, that the British already knew the rivalries of the Abwehr and the SD, it could also have been a directed misinformation. The last half sentence indicates that the Briton seemed to have his legitimate doubts about this version of Müller. In any case, he seemed to treat Müller's statement with great caution.

The release of the material and the agents took place from approximately 23:30 until 0:05 hours. Due to an obvious navigational error, Müller and his men were probably left at a point they estimated to be about 200-300 km from their original destination. As Paulus already feared, but Müller obstinately put it aside already during the practice attempts in Rangsdorf, the heavy weapons containers of approximately 125 kg could only be removed from the aircraft with great difficulty and with great effort. This caused an unpleasant delay, since only the first two containers were placed on the edge of the cabin door to be ejected at the same time. During this process, the third adjacent container was temporarily overturned and crushed Paulus below him, who temporarily lost consciousness and, therefore, could not intervene for a few minutes. The fourth container and the four agents left the plane in rapid succession and as planned. Müller later declared in his post-war presentation as a purely protective statement that the men and the container had a free fall of about 2,000 m, that is, they were thrown from a very large height, to make it believable that they could not be located the weapons containers. Based on the record, his statement made at this point once again proves to be pure fantasy.

The Focke-Wulf machine landed with full crew on June 17, 1943 at 03:53 hours again at Sarabus. After landing, the crew discovered in the rear wheel of the machine the remains of a cargo parachute, which obviously must have been trapped in the fall. Therefore, it was assumed that at least one of the containers had fallen freely to the ground and had been destroyed there. The agents, on the other hand, had reached the ground without damage, and were fortunate to be in the course of the dawn, which was already happening.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 04 Aug 2019 18:56

Hello to all :D; more: The march and the failure of Operation Mammut.

Konieczny had landed at a distance of 15 m from Müller, Hoffmann about 250 m. After meeting, they looked for Ramzi, whom they also found after 20 minutes. However, about a kilometer away, they discovered only one of their four weapons containers, depriving them of all their material and weapons, with the exception of one gun per man. However the found container broke along with its content on impact. Evidently, it was the container whose parachute had been shattered upon falling. Worse, Müller had carried the detachable radio in his body, but the device to generate power was missing, because it was probably in one of the other containers. Resigned, they also found that they had reached the ground about 220 kilometers west of their planned place, by checking their location with the compass and the map.

So the German agents could not send a single radio message home from the first minute of their landing. The radio had become useless without power to transmit and had to be buried along with other important equipment. At this point, everyone had to realize that the operation previously prepared and with all the possible details previously played for Operation "Mammut" had already failed at the beginning. Even Müller addicted to glory and partly already at this time quite unrealistic had to admit this incontrovertible and bitter fact. Therefore, he decided to hide the uniforms and with Kurdish costumes and under the local leadership of the Kurdish Ramzi, they headed in an arduous march, first to his hometown, Erbil.

Perhaps they would be lucky enough to be able to go to neutral Turkey to escape the imminent English captivity. For all involved it was more than clear that being in possession of German military documents, but in civilian clothing, they could not be treated as combatants and, therefore, as prisoners of war within the meaning of the Hague Convention. However, it seems strange that if Müller and his men had only their immediate salvation in mind, they would not attempt to reach the Turkish border by the shortest and least dangerous route north.

Perhaps despite their desperate situation, they still wanted to carry out their mission, as well as find refuge with Ramzi's family and the safe haven of Sheikh Mahmud. Perhaps the decision to march towards Erbil also came from an inspiration from Ramzi, who had now taken command. In any case, a direct north direction would undoubtedly have been the shortest and safest route to neutral Turkey.

The group of German agents had landed without knowing the exact location at twilight on June 17, 1943, shortly before dawn. (Müller does not give a date in his memoirs) in a stubble field near a small town, near a river in northern Iraq. They reached this town, of approximately 50 houses, after about 2 kilometers on foot, where Ramzi asked an old man about the area. Ramzi led the group through the village and took over his leadership.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 18 Aug 2019 15:33

Hello to all :D; more: The march and the failure of Operation Mammut.

Everyone involved agreed that only he should speak when they meet with the inhabitants of the country, and the others should remain silent. If they wanted to use their minimum opportunity, perhaps even to escape along the Turkish border, Müller had to give up his leadership position to Ramzi, which he later commented with the following words:

"Even today, after years of this tragedy, a warm and sincere feeling is invaded by this brave man, who has guided us and maintained us with insurmountable courage and skill, without the need to do so. For the moment, he assumed my role as "The Commander" and Ramzi assumed the leadership by knowledge of their language and the land of the country. "

Ramzi had realized that they were still in Iraqi territory when a woman dressed in a Nestorian costume passed by a donkey. They had landed in a town near the Tigris, where there was no bridge, so they decided to head south to continue towards Mosul to observe the river crossing. For security reasons, they just wanted to move at night, and rest during the day.

But they could only maintain this tactic for one night because they could not orient themselves in the dark. Already, everyone was suffering from the great heat and the almost unbearable lack of water. On the road to Mosul passed English field fortifications and an airfield. Later, they met another pastor, whom they asked about the way forward. They reached the road that led to Mosul and stopped a bus with locals and with that cover they entered the city. Even before the bridge there was a checkpoint of the Iraqi police. After Ramzi had given a large amount of bakshee (bribe) to a police officer, they all went to the city and first visited a cafe and then a tea house. Due to their false identifications, no one noticed and they stayed overnight in the courtyard of a hostel in Mosul.

However, a serious incident almost occurred. Because the policeman in question suddenly turned to Müller in the tea house. Muller himself was surprised that the policeman could not understand his answer because Muller's Arabic pronunciation was obviously very bad. Therefore, after his failed attempt at communication, he probably tried quite badly to play the role of a deaf mute. However, the policeman did not suspect because the money previously received and left after another cup of tea without much haste. Ramzi had told the policeman a true fairy tale story, according to which his three companions would be servants whom he had brought "in black" from Persia across the border.

The next day (June 18), they realized that they could not safely cross the Tigris Bridge in Mosul, because in the middle of the bridge there was another police station, which apparently controlled very strictly. Ramzi, therefore, went to the other side of the city again while the others waited for him. Ramzi wanted to see a relative, but no one was found in his apartment. There were no signs of a new railway line from Baghdad to the north of the country, because German agents had landed too far from the railroad track. After Ramzi's return, they learned that they were being sought and that their reward was high. Therefore, they decided to cross the Tigris about 50 km downstream.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 25 Aug 2019 17:10

Hello to all :D; more: The march and the failure of Operation Mammut.

Meanwhile, British-Iraqi security forces had discovered almost all the equipment left by the German agents: four parachutes in green and brown camouflage colors, guns and ammunition, medical equipment with specialized literature on tropical diseases, German military jackets, cameras , maps, tents and camping equipment, rifle sights, radio equipment with generator (i.e., the crank kit), a picture with the portrait of Sheikh Mahmud, a pin-up badge of the Khoybun party, a Kurdish national flag and gifts. Thus, the British had almost all the contents of the weapons containers in their hands. Another telegram of the C.I.C.I. On June 20, 1943, he warned of a possible Kurdish insurrection caused by Germany, and it was reported that as of June 17, four Europeans dressed in Kurdish costumes were sighted 20 miles north of Mosul. Only one of them spoke bad Kurdish or Arabic.

After a brief march, the group of agents was surpassed by a British military column, and they involuntarily got into the middle of a military exercise. Then they met the nomads, who knew nothing about the Germans who had been cast. A short time later, after a payment, they were given milk diluted with water. That was June 19, 1943, around 1:00 p.m. It was a small town near Gudad, near Mosul. In the next town, they rented three horses to an old man (in Hoffmann's opinion, they were mules) and continued on their way. In the next town, they exchanged the three tired animals for fresh donkeys, but learned with horror that the old man from the neighboring town had recognized them as foreigners and was traveling to Mosul to inform the authorities.

Müller said in his interrogation, that Ramzi would have told this man of his own accord, that they were all paratroopers and were addressing Kurdish leaders. A statement so open to a stranger, however, seems very doubtful. It is likely that the others have not noticed anything about this incident, which took place on June 20, if so. During the continuation of the march, Ramzi had some health problems. However, then all together crossed the Tigris River on a raft. On the other shore there was a small town with a police station. Due to Ramzi's presence, they had no trouble translating. Ramzi had named his boatman and paid him six dinars for the crossing.

They arrived at a small town without police control, which was on the north bank of the Tigris. There they got fresh horses and decided to march towards Erbil. In addition, after arriving in Erbil, they planned to send one of them, with local orientation, across the Turkish border, to return to Germany, inform about their destination and help them from abroad. Georg Konieczny was selected for this, but Müller calls him in his memoirs here, otherwise not by name.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 01 Sep 2019 14:51

Hello to all :D; more: The march and the failure of Operation Mammut.

After another day of marching on the north bank of the Tigris, they arrived in Erbil. Following the usual tradition, Ramzi negotiated with his older brother if newcomers were welcome. Unfortunately, he had to take note of the opposite. Because the father was under observation for his anti-British attitude, strangers in Ramzi's house were only tolerated for as long as the custom of hospitality required. So they could only stay there until 10:00 pm on June 21.

The group of German agents, therefore, had no choice but to continue marching northeast towards the mountains. Ramzi visited his relative Khurshid Nuradin Agha (1917-1987) in the village of Bioka, who was the lord of this village to seek refuge there, and where they could get a rest day at home. This happened on June 22. They were then transferred to an isolated house in the mountains inhabited by a family that belonged to the tribe of Ramzi's father. That event was on June 23, 1943. By now, rumors about the Germans had become true legends.

"It was the first part of a great German army that jumped; these soldiers would have faces like lions, and if they only breathed, the fire consumed would come out of their mouths. They would have tanks with them, whose only appearance would be enough to destroy everything human and animal".

Next to the house was a cave, which would serve as a hiding place, until the local guides took them across the mountains to the Turkish border and the great anxiety of the authorities and the investigation measures initiated were calmed down. First Konieczny should go and then they would follow the others.

After a few days in the cave, a gang of Kurdish smugglers arrived. These were men from the tribe of Ramzi's mother, so there was no reason to believe in imminent betrayal. Ramzi once again went secretly to Erbil alone. Nor could he show himself openly because he was supposedly abroad for more than a year. The day after Ramzi's departure, suddenly, a strong police patrol approached the cave. Although the three Germans, Muller, Hoffmann and Konieczny managed to flee to a nearby swampy ground with a reedbed, they were arrested shortly thereafter, one after another. That was June 28, 1943.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 08 Sep 2019 13:00

Hello to all :D; more: The march and the failure of Operation Mammut.

Müller said after his arrest that he suspected they had been betrayed by the leader of the smuggler gang, named Hassan, to the Iraqi police. The prisoners were taken to the police headquarters in Erbil, where a day later Ramzi arrived as a prisoner. Müller states in his reminiscences that Ramzi had turned himself in to the Iraqi police, shortly after his father and all his closest relatives were arrested. After a brief stay in the Erbil police prison, all detainees were transferred, through Mosul, to the Baghdad police prison.

However, Ramzi had not a minor role in Operation "Mammut", which had almost failed after the ill-fated landing. Presumably, the three German agents after their landing in the early hours of June 17, 1943 could hardly have survived a day in freedom without him. With their help, they failed to cross the border into a neutral Turkey, but they still had an exciting eleven-day escape from the Iraqi police and the British army. While the three Germans were taken prisoners near their hiding place on June 28, 1943, Ramzi had appealed to the authorities a day later, after the arrest of his father and relatives.

The British authorities reported on the capture of the "Mammut" group on June 29, 1943. The military doctor "Kumpz snow" was reported (most likely an error of interpretation, because the name was improved by hand as Konieczny), the Major Müller, the Oberleutnant Hoffmann and an Iraqi named Ramzi Nafi 'Rashid. In addition, the finding of four German military rifles with 50 projectiles in five-cartridge magazines, eleven German and three Belgian pistols, and a double-barrel shotgun with a telescopic sight and binoculars with container and other paratrooper equipment were specified.

As soon as June 28, 1943, the British of C.I.C.I. (Combined Intelligence Center of Iraq) in Baghdad, produced a summary report, in which the first stages of the path of the march of the group of German agents could already be reconstructed on the basis of their provisional statements. Consequently, German agents had landed near Kharab Quba village. The nearest parachute to this town had fallen just 300 yards away, the population was still asleep. The first parachute was discovered on the morning of June 17, the rest a little later by a passerby. This discovery was immediately reported to the village Mukthar, and by the afternoon of June 17, the police station in Flefel had already been alerted. Flefel was about eight miles from Kharab Quba, but he had no phone, so this message about the arrival of German paratroopers had to be carried by a messenger more than eight miles to Tel Kaif.

On June 18 and 19, all other weapons containers were found and the British offices in Mosul were alerted. From there, the countermeasures began immediately. On June 18, paratroopers were seen in the town (Seimahla?). There they obtained milk from a woman and paid for the drink. They told the villagers that they would visit their friends in Mosul and shot a gazelle on the way. This was strange for the locals, because strangers had no hunting rifles with them, only their spokesman (which would mean Ramzi) was carrying a gun openly. He was the only one who led the conversation. He spoke a somewhat confusing dialect of Zakho (bahdinani), a regional Kurdish dialect and a rather bad Arabic, as sometimes spoken in Baghdad. They were all dressed in the Kurdish suit, their pants were very thin fabric. The strangers then headed to Mahweir, two and a half miles south of Seimahla. Meanwhile, all police stations in Mosul were alarmed, as was the HQ of the 21st British Army Corps. All of their subordinate units were told that when the paratroopers were captured, they should be strongly and clearly ordered to raise their hands. The prisoners were to be handcuffed and kept safe. In addition, they should not be given the chance to commit suicide.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 15 Sep 2019 13:58

Hello to all :D; more: The march and the failure of Operation Mammut.

On July 23, 1943, the Ausland / Abwehr II Department learned about the capture of Müller and his men by a British radio message captured and decrypted. The radio station in Crimea with Messow and Müller's brother, Johannes, packed their equipment again, Group II was stopped in its preparations and then used elsewhere. Previously, long-range German reconnaissance planes flew over Iraq to determine the fate of the agents, but found nothing, although the British noticed and recorded their flights.

In addition to the continuous interrogations for weeks and months, the fate of Ramzi and the German agents has not yet been clear for a long time. Due to more than abundant sources of information, the British tried to keep the prisoners under their control in El Cairo for a long time and to delay the requests of the Iraqi judiciary, which had openly requested a martial court followed by a death sentence. After lengthy negotiations, the British and Iraqis agreed that the prisoners would remain in British custody as necessary to obtain information. For this reason alone, Ramzi was sentenced to death only in 1945. Later, through interventions by his family, this sentence was reduced to a 20-year prison sentence.

Although Muller and his men were saved from death, they all had to endure years of imprisonment, with all the terrible consequences of being guilty of espionage and having been captured by the enemy. Müller declared after the war about the conspiracy theory in his memoirs about the failure of the Operation "Mammut" that a British sentry in the "Kloster Emmaus" camp allegedly told him that German paratroopers had already been expected: " Fourteen days before our landing, the local units had already received orders to be ready to immediately seize a German command that would be launched here (that is, by Mosul). "

Not only can this version not be confirmed in view of the situation of the file, but it is simply incorrect and a pure invention. The mention of the city of Mosul as a possible starting point is certainly wrong, because the planned landing site was the Ranya area.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Unternehmen Mammut.

Post by tigre » 22 Sep 2019 15:59

Hello to all :D; more: The march and the failure of Operation Mammut.

Contrary to Müller's reckless speculation, if one considers the real chances of success of the "Mammut" operation, one must reach another conclusion about its failure. Even the plans for this German intelligence operation were extremely adventurous and hardly reality oriented. Other authors have pointed out this, since the German Abwehr's knowledge of the area in question, where they believed they were causing an anti-British Kurdish uprising, was not only extremely flawed, there was virtually no concrete information available.

They hadn't even bothered to visualize the memories of official British politicians like Rupert Hay or Ely Bannister Soane about Kurdistan in the Abwehr II Department of the East. In addition, everyone had their personal reservations. His compatriots, who for some years knew the circumstances in Iraq from their own experience, such as Fritz Grobba, for example, were not consulted during the preparation. It had also been completely overlooked that Sheikh Mahmud no longer played an active political role during that time, because he lived since 1931 first in exile, later in Baghdad. Along the way, other major political and military leaders had taken their place.

Finally, it is worth asking at this point about the historical alternative. What would have happened if Ramzi and the German agents had landed in the originally planned place, had taken their equipment with them and managed to reach Sheikh Mahmud? Not only the author, but also other authors assume that Sheikh Mahmud in 1943 would no longer have participated in any anti-British uprising, since he had obviously accepted an armistice in his relationship with them.

In addition, after the repression of the coup d'etat of Gailani in May 1941, the conduct of Kurdish concrete uprisings was generally considered less dangerous by the British than for example the anti-British partisan struggle of the Pashtuns in Warziristan. Operation "Mammut" would have been doomed to failure, even taking into account the almost ideal preconditions, since it had been planned from the first day of its preparation on the basis of unfounded premises.

Source: Das Unternehmen "Mammut". Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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