Cavite superior to Pearl, or could be built up to snuff?

[daveshoup2MD]

When I was laid up with a bad appendix Mom came out to visit. I took her over to NI and let her see a mile of aircraft carriers tied up at the dock. I was RAdm. Grace Hopper's driver one day, she was at NI to dedicate their new super computer.

Pretty cool re Amazing Grace.

Yep. She visited our office when I told her we had just received our computers. She patted one. (I had no idea what I was doing so I went to book store, gave them the cover letter and said "UHH!!!". "Well, you have an IBM computer running MSDOS." He gave me a book and still owe him a lot.")

LOL.

"In the beginning ... was the command line."

[OpanaPointer]

Now, 37 years later...

[daveshoup2MD]

Now, 37 years later...

Back to the small craft/splinter fleet/local naval forces concept, there's a fair amount of material available on the US-flag tuna clipper fleet out of San Diego and Los Angeles on-line, which amounted to something like 100 large (100 foot plus) long-range, ocean-going vessels with diesels, on-board reefer capabilities, and decent habitability - the USN (and US Army, and USCG) took up something 75% of the fleet and gave the skippers, mates, and engineers warrants or PO ratings as appropriate, painted, armed them (lightly), added some signal equipment, and sent them off, to forward AORs from Alaska to Hawaii (and the Central Pacific), Panama, the South Pacific, and the Southwest Pacific... a couple of the fisherman-turned-warrants ended up with NCs for their actions during WATCHTOWER, for example.

Could be a very interesting story to tell, and one imagines their equivalents on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, as well.

[OpanaPointer]

I have a book on the US Army's "fleet".

[daveshoup2MD]

I have a book on the US Army's "fleet".

Which one? Book, that is...

[OpanaPointer]

U.S. Army Ships and Watercraft of World War II by David H. Grover (Author)

Naval Institute Press (1987), Edition: 1st, 296 pages

[daveshoup2MD]

U.S. Army Ships and Watercraft of World War II by David H. Grover (Author)

Naval Institute Press (1987), Edition: 1st, 296 pages

Interesting table derived from same on the USMM site:

http://www.usmm.org/armynavy.html

[reedwh52]

1) The United States could not begin to improve the defenses of Guam or the Philippines before 1937 because of treaty provisions. The US was forbidden (by Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty) to improve defense facilities in the Philippines or Guam from August 17, 1923 to December 31, 1936. (The end of the treaty). Under the Treaty, Pearl Harbor could be developed; Cavite could not.

2) By that time, the Tydings-McDuffie Act (Philippine Independence Act (Pub.L. 73–12)) provided for Philippine independence within 10 years and transfer of US assets, including military assets, to the new country within 10 years of its Constitution.

3) The same statute (Section 11) directed the President to begin negotiations for a treaty for perpetual neutralization of the Philippines.

4) In the period 1936-1940, Congress would not allocate funds to improve the base at Cavite which would be surrendered within 10 years while legally required to seek neutralization of the Philippines.

"Article XIX
The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:
(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;
(2) Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand;
(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.
The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace."

[OpanaPointer]

Good job.

[Carl Schwamberger]

1) The United States could not begin to improve the defenses of Guam or the Philippines before 1937 because of treaty provisions. The US was forbidden (by Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty) to improve defense facilities in the Philippines or Guam from August 17, 1923 to December 31, 1936. (The end of the treaty). Under the Treaty, Pearl Harbor could be developed; Cavite could not.

2) By that time, the Tydings-McDuffie Act (Philippine Independence Act (Pub.L. 73–12)) provided for Philippine independence within 10 years and transfer of US assets, including military assets, to the new country within 10 years of its Constitution.

3) The same statute (Section 11) directed the President to begin negotiations for a treaty for perpetual neutralization of the Philippines.

4) In the period 1936-1940, Congress would not allocate funds to improve the base at Cavite which would be surrendered within 10 years while legally required to seek neutralization of the Philippines.

"Article XIX
The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, ...

All that means you need a PoD back during the Roosvelt/Taft era. Maybe its still possible early in Wilsons presidency. However, in that era Roosvelt had reached accommodation with Japan, at least there was that assumption despite the war scare of 1907. It was not until post Great War that any significant contrary indicators appeared, & the WNT & other diplomacy had every appearance of maintaining good relations. Its not until the 1930s that people can realistcally say that Japan & the US may actually be at war in a decade. Then its far to late.

[daveshoup2MD]

1) The United States could not begin to improve the defenses of Guam or the Philippines before 1937 because of treaty provisions. The US was forbidden (by Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty) to improve defense facilities in the Philippines or Guam from August 17, 1923 to December 31, 1936. (The end of the treaty). Under the Treaty, Pearl Harbor could be developed; Cavite could not.

2) By that time, the Tydings-McDuffie Act (Philippine Independence Act (Pub.L. 73–12)) provided for Philippine independence within 10 years and transfer of US assets, including military assets, to the new country within 10 years of its Constitution.

3) The same statute (Section 11) directed the President to begin negotiations for a treaty for perpetual neutralization of the Philippines.

4) In the period 1936-1940, Congress would not allocate funds to improve the base at Cavite which would be surrendered within 10 years while legally required to seek neutralization of the Philippines.

"Article XIX
The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, ...

All that means you need a PoD back during the Roosvelt/Taft era. Maybe its still possible early in Wilsons presidency. However, in that era Roosvelt had reached accommodation with Japan, at least there was that assumption despite the war scare of 1907. It was not until post Great War that any significant contrary indicators appeared, & the WNT & other diplomacy had every appearance of maintaining good relations. Its not until the 1930s that people can realistcally say that Japan & the US may actually be at war in a decade. Then its far to late.

Fair point, but which is a lot ... the US takeover of the PI from Spain, given the distances involved and the post-Civil War US strategic outlook of dominate the continent, build a trans-Isthmian canal, and create a defensive perimeter to cover the eastern Pacific (Alaska-Hawaii-Panama), and ending up with Guam and the PI is really not something that was to be expected...

[Carl Schwamberger]

US policy in the Pacifc & Asia was dominated by trade & in the first three decades of the 20th Century China was more or less the center of that. The only way Japan of anyone else will get cross ways with the US enough to cause military investment is to threat trade enough to justify the cost. The establishment of the Asiatic Squadron of the USN with the 4th Marines & 15th Infantry in China was the result of a hostile Chinese policy towards foreign trade. If 1907-1910 Japan or some other power in Asia/Pacific somehow actually threatens US regional trade, then you get to a fleet vs a squadron and major bases. Otherwise its simply unneeded.

[OpanaPointer]

The US supported the Open Door Policy, which is not hegemonistic.

[daveshoup2MD]

US policy in the Pacifc & Asia was dominated by trade & in the first three decades of the 20th Century China was more or less the center of that. The only way Japan of anyone else will get cross ways with the US enough to cause military investment is to threat trade enough to justify the cost. The establishment of the Asiatic Squadron of the USN with the 4th Marines & 15th Infantry in China was the result of a hostile Chinese policy towards foreign trade. If 1907-1910 Japan or some other power in Asia/Pacific somehow actually threatens US regional trade, then you get to a fleet vs a squadron and major bases. Otherwise its simply unneeded.

Asiatic Fleet was established in 1902, which - arguably - was an outgrowth of both the S-A war and takeover of the PI and Guam and the Boxer Rebellion; prior to that (1898 and after) the Asiatic Squadron (and prior to that, the East Indies Squadron) was essentially a diplomacy enforcement and trade protection organization... the "China trade" notwithstanding, the US was able to gain whatever basin was necessary, even in a coal-fired steel and steam era, ad hoc, in Hong Kong, China, Japan, etc. The takeover of the PI and Guam was a significant escalation of US involvement in the region, and one which was pretty much untenable in the face of a modernized Asian power - which was undeniable after 1904-05, if not before.

McKinley, TR, et al did not consider the consequences of their orders to Dewey before Manila Bay, and that lack of forethought led to a high cost in blood and treasure four decades later.