1 :this is wrong .You can't use MacArthur as a scapegoat for the failure to defeat the Japanese forces in the Philippines,given the inability/unwillingness ( or both ) from the WH to give MacArthur the supplies/manpower he needed .daveshoup2MD wrote: ↑09 Jan 2022 01:55See below:Delta Tank wrote: ↑09 Jan 2022 01:35Severely lacking? Please explain.daveshoup2MD wrote: ↑09 Jan 2022 00:29His abilities in terms of the peacetime administration and organization of the Philippine Commonwealth Army in the late 1930s, and his record as a wartime theater commander in the Philippines in 1941-42, in the SWPA in 1942-45, and in the Far East in 1950-51, is severely lacking. Whether he could have or should have been replaced in those assignments, and who could have functioned as such a replacement, and how well they would have done, is unknowable, but there are some indications - Ridgeway, for example, was a far more effective theater commander in the Far East than MacArthur had been.
1) The PCA's organization and administration in the prewar period (call it 1936-40) was poorly conceived and led, given the available resources; the PCA's performance in 1941-42 makes that clear. The PCA fought, and many of its officers and men did so gallantly, but they lost, hard ... and MacArthur was the architect and builder of the PCA, who had taken up that responsibility willingly. Thus, he failed.
2) As theater commander in the PI in 1941-42, MacArthur and his subordinates and staff were surprised by Japan's initiation of hostilities, his initial strategy to meet the Japanese on the beaches failed, and his management of the withdrawal to, and defense of, Bataan was fair at best. The comparison with Hart's ability to preserve his force, and actually fight and win a battle against the Japanese in the theater, is a notable contrast.
3) In the SWPA in 1942-45, his ability to lead a joint, combined, and Allied force was fair to poor, especially in comparison to his American peers in similar posts, who - in comparison to MacArthur - were masters of coalition warfare. There's no comparison between MacArthur's ability and those of, for example, Eisenhower's ability to lead an Allied command, much less Nimitz' (and Halsey's) ability to lead joint commands. Of the four US flag/general officers who served as (essentially) supreme Allied commanders in theaters in high intensity operations with Allied and joint forces under command, MacArthur was by far the least capable.
4) In FEC, MacArthur and his his subordinates and staff were surprised yet again, twice - both by the initial North Korean invasion and the subsequent Chinese intervention, which is a matter of historical record in both instances.
Other than that, he was a great captain, undoubtedly.
2 He was surprised! As were Washington, FDR, Marshall, Stark ,... (Why was Marshall not fired as was Stark ?)
And if he was not surprised,the results would be the same
3 The difference between Mac Arthur and Ike was that initially Ike's forces were mainly not American,while MacArthur's forces were mainly American .
Besides : did the Australians criticize Mac Arthur ?
4 The CIA was also surprised, twice,but the Langley lobby invented a lot of excuses .