Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
daveshoup2MD
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by daveshoup2MD » 16 Jan 2022 22:27

rcocean wrote:
16 Jan 2022 22:05
The fact remains that George Marshall was the top man during Pearl Harbor, the fall of the Philippines, the loss of wake island, and the U-boat "happy time" off the East Coast in 1942.
If your understanding is that the chief of staff of the United States Army was responsible for the decisions made by US naval commanders in the Pacific in 1941 or the Atlantic in 1942, you may need to read more...

Beyond that, MacArthur was the commanding general of the military advisory group that "organized" (to use the term loosely) the PCA in 1935-41; he was theater commander for USAFFE in 1941-42; and he was SCAP in the Far East in 1950-51. His failures to match strategies to resources in all three posts are a matter of historical record.

One can pretend otherwise, but the historical reality is undeniable.

In his favor, Mac was a capable combat commander at the brigade/divisional level in WW I, and a relatively capable Army CoS in peacetime in the 1930s. He was fair as wartime theater commander in SWPA in 1942-44, and good as the peacetime occupation commander in Japan in 1945-50.

In comparison to his US flag/general officer peers engaging in coalition warfare at "relatively" the same theater-level of responsibility and complexity in WW II, (Hart, Nimitz, Eisenhower, maybe Ghormley and Halsey in the SWP) the only one he really outshines is Ghormley, and that's faint praise.

In terms of a wartime SCAP in the Far East, Ridgway was heads and shoulders better than MacArthur.

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by Sid Guttridge » 17 Jan 2022 08:00

Hi daveshoup,

You post, "The Filipinos - with the exception of the US Army's Philippine Scout units - were NOT trained soldiers in any sense of the word; they were an untrained to ill-trained (at best), poorly-organized, marginally-equipped, and woefully-officered militia that spoke multiple languages and were utterly incapable of anything approximating combined arms maneuver warfare." And yet at times, according to your own link, they were holding almost the entire front line in Bataan! I would suggest that you are far too quick to dismiss them. You are sending mixed messages. At one point the ten Philipino "divisions" were the equivalent of ten square brigades. At other times, they barely seem to exist at all!

You post, "Now, if you are willing to acknowledge that the British Army's 18th Infantry Division, the Australian Imperial Force's 8th Infantry Division, and the British Indian Army's 9th and 11th divisions, as well as the separate 44th and 45th brigades, and the British Army's fortress troops in Malaya and Singapore, were the same as the above, than sure, count the PCA and the PC as the equivalent of the British, Australian, and Indian armies." I have not claimed that, so I don't have to address it.

As I have said twice before, "We can break them down further using other factors, which certainly would benefit the Americans in the Philippines, but we can't pretend the Philipinos weren't there."

Cheers,

Sid.

daveshoup2MD
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by daveshoup2MD » 17 Jan 2022 20:24

Sid Guttridge wrote:
17 Jan 2022 08:00
Hi daveshoup,

You post, "The Filipinos - with the exception of the US Army's Philippine Scout units - were NOT trained soldiers in any sense of the word; they were an untrained to ill-trained (at best), poorly-organized, marginally-equipped, and woefully-officered militia that spoke multiple languages and were utterly incapable of anything approximating combined arms maneuver warfare." And yet at times, according to your own link, they were holding almost the entire front line in Bataan! I would suggest that you are far too quick to dismiss them. You are sending mixed messages. At one point the ten Philipino "divisions" were the equivalent of ten square brigades. At other times, they barely seem to exist at all!

You post, "Now, if you are willing to acknowledge that the British Army's 18th Infantry Division, the Australian Imperial Force's 8th Infantry Division, and the British Indian Army's 9th and 11th divisions, as well as the separate 44th and 45th brigades, and the British Army's fortress troops in Malaya and Singapore, were the same as the above, than sure, count the PCA and the PC as the equivalent of the British, Australian, and Indian armies." I have not claimed that, so I don't have to address it.

As I have said twice before, "We can break them down further using other factors, which certainly would benefit the Americans in the Philippines, but we can't pretend the Philipinos weren't there."

Cheers,

Sid.
The "10 square brigades" equivalent is IF the PCA had actually mobilized to the strength and TO&E that MacArthur et al "planned for," the reality is they did not, in fact, mobilize as such in 1941, and in fact amounted to 10 poorly trained, officered, equipped, and organized infantry regiments/RCTs that even if at full strength, were less than two-thirds the size of their US Army equivalent (much less a British/Commonwealth "brigade group.") and without any regular cadre worth the name.

The point of the Bataan campaign at which the PCA regiments held the line was the same point, essentially, from late January to the end of March, 1942, when the IJA was content to allow them to do so. When the IJA attacked in force in April, the PCA collapsed, as was to be expected from a militia force.

As you continually claim the PCA and PC were each something more than a militia, then you have to consider them the equivalent of the British, Indian, and Australian soldiers - as opposed to the ISF, SSVF, and MR militiamen - in Malaya; it is a two-way street.

Delta Tank
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by Delta Tank » 23 Jan 2022 16:03

Delta Tank wrote:
09 Jan 2022 02:18
daveshoup2MD wrote:
09 Jan 2022 01:55
Delta Tank wrote:
09 Jan 2022 01:35
daveshoup2MD wrote:
09 Jan 2022 00:29
His abilities in terms of the peacetime administration and organization of the Philippine Commonwealth Army in the late 1930s, and his record as a wartime theater commander in the Philippines in 1941-42, in the SWPA in 1942-45, and in the Far East in 1950-51, is severely lacking. Whether he could have or should have been replaced in those assignments, and who could have functioned as such a replacement, and how well they would have done, is unknowable, but there are some indications - Ridgeway, for example, was a far more effective theater commander in the Far East than MacArthur had been.
Severely lacking? Please explain.

Mike
See below:

1) The PCA's organization and administration in the prewar period (call it 1936-40) was poorly conceived and led, given the available resources; the PCA's performance in 1941-42 makes that clear. The PCA fought, and many of its officers and men did so gallantly, but they lost, hard ... and MacArthur was the architect and builder of the PCA, who had taken up that responsibility willingly. Thus, he failed.

2) As theater commander in the PI in 1941-42, MacArthur and his subordinates and staff were surprised by Japan's initiation of hostilities, his initial strategy to meet the Japanese on the beaches failed, and his management of the withdrawal to, and defense of, Bataan was fair at best. The comparison with Hart's ability to preserve his force, and actually fight and win a battle against the Japanese in the theater, is a notable contrast.

3) In the SWPA in 1942-45, his ability to lead a joint, combined, and Allied force was fair to poor, especially in comparison to his American peers in similar posts, who - in comparison to MacArthur - were masters of coalition warfare. There's no comparison between MacArthur's ability and those of, for example, Eisenhower's ability to lead an Allied command, much less Nimitz' (and Halsey's) ability to lead joint commands. Of the four US flag/general officers who served as (essentially) supreme Allied commanders in theaters in high intensity operations with Allied and joint forces under command, MacArthur was by far the least capable.

4) In FEC, MacArthur and his his subordinates and staff were surprised yet again, twice - both by the initial North Korean invasion and the subsequent Chinese intervention, which is a matter of historical record in both instances.

Other than that, he was a great captain, undoubtedly. ;)
Define PCA?

Will respond in due time.

Mike
I don’t read much about the Korean War, but Korea was an independent country with its own military and intelligence services. I believe that they were ultimately responsible for their own defense. So, while digging around the internet I found a couple of sites that makes me wonder what was our (USA) responsibility for Korea’s defense.

https://parama.blog.arph.org/why-was-so ... perimeter/

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... v07p2/d266

Mike

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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by daveshoup2MD » 25 Jan 2022 04:34

Delta Tank wrote:
23 Jan 2022 16:03
Delta Tank wrote:
09 Jan 2022 02:18
daveshoup2MD wrote:
09 Jan 2022 01:55
Delta Tank wrote:
09 Jan 2022 01:35
daveshoup2MD wrote:
09 Jan 2022 00:29
His abilities in terms of the peacetime administration and organization of the Philippine Commonwealth Army in the late 1930s, and his record as a wartime theater commander in the Philippines in 1941-42, in the SWPA in 1942-45, and in the Far East in 1950-51, is severely lacking. Whether he could have or should have been replaced in those assignments, and who could have functioned as such a replacement, and how well they would have done, is unknowable, but there are some indications - Ridgeway, for example, was a far more effective theater commander in the Far East than MacArthur had been.
Severely lacking? Please explain.

Mike
See below:

1) The PCA's organization and administration in the prewar period (call it 1936-40) was poorly conceived and led, given the available resources; the PCA's performance in 1941-42 makes that clear. The PCA fought, and many of its officers and men did so gallantly, but they lost, hard ... and MacArthur was the architect and builder of the PCA, who had taken up that responsibility willingly. Thus, he failed.

2) As theater commander in the PI in 1941-42, MacArthur and his subordinates and staff were surprised by Japan's initiation of hostilities, his initial strategy to meet the Japanese on the beaches failed, and his management of the withdrawal to, and defense of, Bataan was fair at best. The comparison with Hart's ability to preserve his force, and actually fight and win a battle against the Japanese in the theater, is a notable contrast.

3) In the SWPA in 1942-45, his ability to lead a joint, combined, and Allied force was fair to poor, especially in comparison to his American peers in similar posts, who - in comparison to MacArthur - were masters of coalition warfare. There's no comparison between MacArthur's ability and those of, for example, Eisenhower's ability to lead an Allied command, much less Nimitz' (and Halsey's) ability to lead joint commands. Of the four US flag/general officers who served as (essentially) supreme Allied commanders in theaters in high intensity operations with Allied and joint forces under command, MacArthur was by far the least capable.

4) In FEC, MacArthur and his his subordinates and staff were surprised yet again, twice - both by the initial North Korean invasion and the subsequent Chinese intervention, which is a matter of historical record in both instances.

Other than that, he was a great captain, undoubtedly. ;)
Define PCA?

Will respond in due time.

Mike
I don’t read much about the Korean War, but Korea was an independent country with its own military and intelligence services. I believe that they were ultimately responsible for their own defense. So, while digging around the internet I found a couple of sites that makes me wonder what was our (USA) responsibility for Korea’s defense.

https://parama.blog.arph.org/why-was-so ... perimeter/

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... v07p2/d266

Mike
The formerly Japanese territory that became the ROK was occupied by the US from 1945 to August, 1948; the ROK military was organized and equipped and trained by the US KMAG; as SCAP, MacArthur had theater level command responsibility for the Western Pacific,

This is not hard to find:

On 30 December 1949, General Willoughby (MacArthur's G-2) sent to Washington several reports that indicated a North Korean invasion in March or April 1950. But his own personal evaluation was that "such an act is unlikely." On 19 February 1950, he passed on two agent reports, which he also discounted, one saying that the North Koreans would attack in March, the other in June. On 10 March, the Korean Liaison Office sent him an agent's report that the North Korean invasion schedule had been set back from March or April to June 1950. Late in March Willoughby said: "It is believed that there will be no civil war in Korea this spring or summer. . . . South Korea is not expected to seriously consider warfare so long as her precipitating war entails probable discontinuance of United States aid. The most probable course of North Korean action this spring and summer is furtherance of attempts to overthrow South Korean government by creation of chaotic conditions in the Republic of Korea through guerrillas and psychological warfare."

The North Koreans, of course, attacked in June, 1950.

Source: https://history.army.mil/html/books/020 ... b_20-1.pdf

In 1951, when the Chinese invaded, the failures were much the same, and with the same individuals - even though the US had been at war for a year.

rcocean
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by rcocean » 25 Jan 2022 04:45

THe budget was too small for any Philippine army to become well trained. MacArthur had so little money, they couldn't even hold a parade in 1937. And the Filipino army wasn't just organized by MacArthur, it was organized by Eisenhower. So, you'll have to blame him too.

FDR didn't provide MacArthur with enough miliary aid. He's the one to blame. He refused to mobilize the Philippine army and provide it with adequate $$ in the fall of 1940. He was POTUS, the buck stops there.

daveshoup2MD
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by daveshoup2MD » 25 Jan 2022 05:33

rcocean wrote:
25 Jan 2022 04:45
THe budget was too small for any Philippine army to become well trained. MacArthur had so little money, they couldn't even hold a parade in 1937. And the Filipino army wasn't just organized by MacArthur, it was organized by Eisenhower. So, you'll have to blame him too. FDR didn't provide MacArthur with enough miliary aid. He's the one to blame. He refused to mobilize the Philippine army and provide it with adequate $$ in the fall of 1940. He was POTUS, the buck stops there.
MacArthur was employed by the Filipino government and given the rank of Field Marshal in the PCA, with the responsibility of organizing and training a militia army. He had a budget from the Filipino government; he was in command; and it was his job to realistically match strategies to resources. Instead, he laid out a paper plan that when the balloon went up, was absolutely divorced from reality. MacArthur told the Filipinos what they wanted to hear, that a useful defense force could be assembled for the PI absent the personnel, monetary, and industrial resources necessary to do so.

That was not FDR's responsibility; it was not Eisenhower's either. It was MacArthur's, and - arguably - that of Quezon and Sison.

US strategy since the Washington Treaty wrote off the garrison in the PI; this was stated clearly in 1922-23, and then re-stated very clearly in 1934 and afterwards until the Pacific War began; the only significant modification was the decision, late in 1941, to try and reinforce the Far east air forces, but that was still too little, too late - and air forces without a secure supply line end up a wasting asset.

For MacArthur to pretend otherwise, given his interwar service, was self-delusion of the highest degree.

Delta Tank
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by Delta Tank » 25 Jan 2022 12:28

daveshoup2MD wrote:
25 Jan 2022 05:33
rcocean wrote:
25 Jan 2022 04:45
THe budget was too small for any Philippine army to become well trained. MacArthur had so little money, they couldn't even hold a parade in 1937. And the Filipino army wasn't just organized by MacArthur, it was organized by Eisenhower. So, you'll have to blame him too. FDR didn't provide MacArthur with enough miliary aid. He's the one to blame. He refused to mobilize the Philippine army and provide it with adequate $$ in the fall of 1940. He was POTUS, the buck stops there.
MacArthur was employed by the Filipino government and given the rank of Field Marshal in the PCA, with the responsibility of organizing and training a militia army. He had a budget from the Filipino government; he was in command; and it was his job to realistically match strategies to resources. Instead, he laid out a paper plan that when the balloon went up, was absolutely divorced from reality. MacArthur told the Filipinos what they wanted to hear, that a useful defense force could be assembled for the PI absent the personnel, monetary, and industrial resources necessary to do so.

That was not FDR's responsibility; it was not Eisenhower's either. It was MacArthur's, and - arguably - that of Quezon and Sison.

US strategy since the Washington Treaty wrote off the garrison in the PI; this was stated clearly in 1922-23, and then re-stated very clearly in 1934 and afterwards until the Pacific War began; the only significant modification was the decision, late in 1941, to try and reinforce the Far east air forces, but that was still too little, too late - and air forces without a secure supply line end up a wasting asset.

For MacArthur to pretend otherwise, given his interwar service, was self-delusion of the highest degree.
The Philippine Military was supposed to be ready to defend their nation in 1946 not 1941. The US had written off the Philippines before World War II but, it was MacArthur that convinced the US that the Philippines could be defended if properly equipped and trained. It was believed that the attack if it came would be in April 1942, but the attack happened in December 1941. I believe that a lot of people don’t understand all the problems facing the Philippine nation in forming an effective military. Building a military from scratch, no trained officers or NCOs, with very little money, language barriers within the Philippines, and of course the Roosevelt administration did not help.

And with all those obstacles the Philippines held out for almost six months which was their mission under War Plan Orange, unfortunately it took the US Military until January 1945 to return to Luzon.

Mike

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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Jan 2022 07:45

Delta Tank wrote:
25 Jan 2022 12:28
daveshoup2MD wrote:
25 Jan 2022 05:33
rcocean wrote:
25 Jan 2022 04:45
THe budget was too small for any Philippine army to become well trained. MacArthur had so little money, they couldn't even hold a parade in 1937. And the Filipino army wasn't just organized by MacArthur, it was organized by Eisenhower. So, you'll have to blame him too. FDR didn't provide MacArthur with enough miliary aid. He's the one to blame. He refused to mobilize the Philippine army and provide it with adequate $$ in the fall of 1940. He was POTUS, the buck stops there.
MacArthur was employed by the Filipino government and given the rank of Field Marshal in the PCA, with the responsibility of organizing and training a militia army. He had a budget from the Filipino government; he was in command; and it was his job to realistically match strategies to resources. Instead, he laid out a paper plan that when the balloon went up, was absolutely divorced from reality. MacArthur told the Filipinos what they wanted to hear, that a useful defense force could be assembled for the PI absent the personnel, monetary, and industrial resources necessary to do so.

That was not FDR's responsibility; it was not Eisenhower's either. It was MacArthur's, and - arguably - that of Quezon and Sison.

US strategy since the Washington Treaty wrote off the garrison in the PI; this was stated clearly in 1922-23, and then re-stated very clearly in 1934 and afterwards until the Pacific War began; the only significant modification was the decision, late in 1941, to try and reinforce the Far east air forces, but that was still too little, too late - and air forces without a secure supply line end up a wasting asset.

For MacArthur to pretend otherwise, given his interwar service, was self-delusion of the highest degree.
The Philippine Military was supposed to be ready to defend their nation in 1946 not 1941. The US had written off the Philippines before World War II but, it was MacArthur that convinced the US that the Philippines could be defended if properly equipped and trained. It was believed that the attack if it came would be in April 1942, but the attack happened in December 1941. I believe that a lot of people don’t understand all the problems facing the Philippine nation in forming an effective military. Building a military from scratch, no trained officers or NCOs, with very little money, language barriers within the Philippines, and of course the Roosevelt administration did not help.

And with all those obstacles the Philippines held out for almost six months which was their mission under War Plan Orange, unfortunately it took the US Military until January 1945 to return to Luzon.

Mike
The problem, of course, is that the Philippines forces were not, in fact, "trained" to do anything, and the equipment that had been transferred was lost, generally to no purpose.

The Roosevelt Administration supplied the US garrison forces with some of the most modern equipment in the arsenal in 1941, to the tune of 35 B-17s (only 12 were in Hawaii, which was much more important to the US) and 107 P-40Es (compared to 138 in Hawaii, of which only 39 were P-40Es). The US Army maneuver forces included two tank battalions of the grand total of 15 separate battalions in the Army's order of battle in 1941 - there was all of a company in Hawaii. The US Army forces - the infantry division, the coast artillery/harbor defense, and the air forces - were as well-equipped as any comparable formations in the US Army order of battle - in some cases, probably better.

The PCA and PC had enough US standard/substitute standard small arms, infantry/automatic and heavy weapons, and artillery for the units they actually mobilized, such as they were - but given the abysmal state of training of the PCA as mobilized in 1941 (and after five years of MacArthur's "leadership," mind you) what exactly was the PCA going to do with anything more than the equipment they had?

Delta Tank
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by Delta Tank » 26 Jan 2022 14:28

daveshoup2MD wrote:
26 Jan 2022 07:45
Delta Tank wrote:
25 Jan 2022 12:28
daveshoup2MD wrote:
25 Jan 2022 05:33
rcocean wrote:
25 Jan 2022 04:45
THe budget was too small for any Philippine army to become well trained. MacArthur had so little money, they couldn't even hold a parade in 1937. And the Filipino army wasn't just organized by MacArthur, it was organized by Eisenhower. So, you'll have to blame him too. FDR didn't provide MacArthur with enough miliary aid. He's the one to blame. He refused to mobilize the Philippine army and provide it with adequate $$ in the fall of 1940. He was POTUS, the buck stops there.
MacArthur was employed by the Filipino government and given the rank of Field Marshal in the PCA, with the responsibility of organizing and training a militia army. He had a budget from the Filipino government; he was in command; and it was his job to realistically match strategies to resources. Instead, he laid out a paper plan that when the balloon went up, was absolutely divorced from reality. MacArthur told the Filipinos what they wanted to hear, that a useful defense force could be assembled for the PI absent the personnel, monetary, and industrial resources necessary to do so.

That was not FDR's responsibility; it was not Eisenhower's either. It was MacArthur's, and - arguably - that of Quezon and Sison.

US strategy since the Washington Treaty wrote off the garrison in the PI; this was stated clearly in 1922-23, and then re-stated very clearly in 1934 and afterwards until the Pacific War began; the only significant modification was the decision, late in 1941, to try and reinforce the Far east air forces, but that was still too little, too late - and air forces without a secure supply line end up a wasting asset.

For MacArthur to pretend otherwise, given his interwar service, was self-delusion of the highest degree.
The Philippine Military was supposed to be ready to defend their nation in 1946 not 1941. The US had written off the Philippines before World War II but, it was MacArthur that convinced the US that the Philippines could be defended if properly equipped and trained. It was believed that the attack if it came would be in April 1942, but the attack happened in December 1941. I believe that a lot of people don’t understand all the problems facing the Philippine nation in forming an effective military. Building a military from scratch, no trained officers or NCOs, with very little money, language barriers within the Philippines, and of course the Roosevelt administration did not help.

And with all those obstacles the Philippines held out for almost six months which was their mission under War Plan Orange, unfortunately it took the US Military until January 1945 to return to Luzon.

Mike
The problem, of course, is that the Philippines forces were not, in fact, "trained" to do anything, and the equipment that had been transferred was lost, generally to no purpose.

The Roosevelt Administration supplied the US garrison forces with some of the most modern equipment in the arsenal in 1941, to the tune of 35 B-17s (only 12 were in Hawaii, which was much more important to the US) and 107 P-40Es (compared to 138 in Hawaii, of which only 39 were P-40Es). The US Army maneuver forces included two tank battalions of the grand total of 15 separate battalions in the Army's order of battle in 1941 - there was all of a company in Hawaii. The US Army forces - the infantry division, the coast artillery/harbor defense, and the air forces - were as well-equipped as any comparable formations in the US Army order of battle - in some cases, probably better.

The PCA and PC had enough US standard/substitute standard small arms, infantry/automatic and heavy weapons, and artillery for the units they actually mobilized, such as they were - but given the abysmal state of training of the PCA as mobilized in 1941 (and after five years of MacArthur's "leadership," mind you) what exactly was the PCA going to do with anything more than the equipment they had?
Well, you know all the answers. You believe that equipment makes an Army, it does not. May I recommend that you re-read the book entitled “The Fall of the Philippines”. I spent over 20 years on active duty in the US Army, I was in the Field Artillery as a Cannoneer and as an FDC Chief Manual Computer. Do you know how long it takes to be a proficient FA Manual Computer and that is all they had in 1941. I was also an Armor Officer for 16 years, I also was in a 4.2 inch mortar platoon while I was in PAARNG. the Army turned a Shower and Bath Platoon into a 4,2 inch mortar platoon! Guess what it takes a lot of time to make that transition, it ain’t easy and if it was we would have monkeys doing it. In my opinion it takes three years of peace time training to produce a Soldier, you just can’t snap your fingers and presto you have an Army.

How long does it take to train a competent division commander? They needed ten.
How long does it take to produce a competent division Chief of Staff and division staff? They needed ten.
How long does it take to produce a competent regimental commander? They needed 30.
How long does it take to produce a competent DIVARTY commander? They needed 10.
How long does it take to produce a competent infantry battalion commander? They needed 90?
How long does it take to produce a competent artillery battalion commander? They needed 30?
And plus the DIVARTYs, regiments and battalions all needed staffs!!

You like a lot of others on Axis History Forum really don’t know what you are talking about. You have limited knowledge on what it takes to make a modern Army. It is not “The Minute Men” with squirrel rifles lined up on the village green.

I will try to find the equipment that was available, Richard C. Anderson listed it one day. Artillery without sights, tanks without HE rounds, mortar ammunition that were duds, etc.

Mike

Delta Tank
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by Delta Tank » 26 Jan 2022 14:46

To All,

I will try to post what Ricard C. Anderson wrote on the equipment available to the Philippine Army in December 1941. If dates when the equipment was received appear, remember just because you have the equipment doesn’t mean anyone knows how to use it, employ it or maintain it.
The thread is here: viewtopic.php?f=33&t=168183&hilit=Artillery
The title is the “The Surprising Fall of Singapore”. It morphs into the Philippines.

“Do you have a page reference for that? I find on page 29 of Fall of the Phillipines that the 31st PA Division artillery consisted of eight elderly 2.95" mountain guns. The three PA divisions in the southern islands received eight more 2.95" guns on 12 December, page 499, while the remaining PA divisional artillery consisted of 32 75mm M1916 Field Guns, page 35 (note that the 2.95" and 75mm guns were usually lumped together in counts), so there were 48 of 276 required, 17.4%, not 20%. The reality regarding the machine guns was that they were not "more than sufficient"' the example of the 31st PA Division was that there was "one Browning automatic rifle for each infantry company and eight .30-caliber Browning water-cooled machine guns for each machine gun company. Each infantry regiment had two .50-caliber machine guns and six 3-inch trench mortars, 70 percent of the ammunition for which proved to be duds", page 29. In addition, the 86th and 88th FA PA manned the 24 155mm GPF guns shipped without fire control equipment.”

Mike

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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by daveshoup2MD » 27 Jan 2022 03:06

Delta Tank wrote:
26 Jan 2022 14:28
Obviously, the Philippines could not defend itself in 1941 (and it still can't today), absent a great power ally.

In 1941, however, absent a US field army and air force, and a fleet worth the name, the archipelago was indefensible against the forces the Japanese could assemble in the Western Pacific. The US, of course, had no interest or - frankly - the ability to deploy such forces to the PI in 1940-41.

The strategic realities of the Western Pacific had been demonstrated in 1904-05, again in 1914-18, and was understood and recognized by US strategists going back to 1921, when the Washington Treaty made clear the US had no interest in building up a military and naval position in the Western Pacific sufficient to fend off the Japanese.

MacArthur's "mission" was a bluff, at best; Mac's failing was that he lied about his progress for five years, which is proven by what the reality of the PCA mobilization yielded in 1941 - 10 weak, barely organized, poorly officered, and essentially untrained light infantry RCTs.

Given the above, in the circumstances of 1941, the best strategy for the US was to write off the PI - as had been accepted for two decades and was, in fact the strategy pursued.

Pretending otherwise - which is what MacArthur basically did from 1936-41, until the reality smacked him both in the face in 1942 - was self-delusion at its worst.

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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by daveshoup2MD » 27 Jan 2022 03:11

Delta Tank wrote:
26 Jan 2022 14:46
To All,

I will try to post what Ricard C. Anderson wrote on the equipment available to the Philippine Army in December 1941. If dates when the equipment was received appear, remember just because you have the equipment doesn’t mean anyone knows how to use it, employ it or maintain it.
The thread is here: viewtopic.php?f=33&t=168183&hilit=Artillery
The title is the “The Surprising Fall of Singapore”. It morphs into the Philippines.

“Do you have a page reference for that? I find on page 29 of Fall of the Phillipines that the 31st PA Division artillery consisted of eight elderly 2.95" mountain guns. The three PA divisions in the southern islands received eight more 2.95" guns on 12 December, page 499, while the remaining PA divisional artillery consisted of 32 75mm M1916 Field Guns, page 35 (note that the 2.95" and 75mm guns were usually lumped together in counts), so there were 48 of 276 required, 17.4%, not 20%. The reality regarding the machine guns was that they were not "more than sufficient"' the example of the 31st PA Division was that there was "one Browning automatic rifle for each infantry company and eight .30-caliber Browning water-cooled machine guns for each machine gun company. Each infantry regiment had two .50-caliber machine guns and six 3-inch trench mortars, 70 percent of the ammunition for which proved to be duds", page 29. In addition, the 86th and 88th FA PA manned the 24 155mm GPF guns shipped without fire control equipment.”

Mike
What is your point? The PCA was a militia/home guard, at best, that equally barely managed to field 10 understrength light infantry RCTs in 1941, spread across Luzon, Mindanao, and the Visayas. The PC were MPs, at best. The PAAC and OSP were insignificant.

The only ground forces in the PI that were in any way comparable to the IJA were the US Army and USMC personnel.

harry2
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by harry2 » 29 Jan 2022 00:01

Linkagain wrote:
20 Nov 2021 20:48
McArthur actions after Inchon....doomed any chance for a short war....he had 2 choices:
1) Send the Marines cross country to the eastern of Korea..link with Walter Walker forces to cut off the enemies retreat then liberte Seoul
2) Send the USMC all the way around to the east coast of Korea.....and establish a beachead there....

he choose option #2 with the following results...
1} The port in question had aready been liberated by south Koreans
2) the vast majority of North Koreans escaped northward.....

By his actions :wink: :lol: :P he snatched defeat from victory.....
Mac totally screwed up in Korea...a whole Corps was kicked off the peninsula.....all forces pushed back below the parallel with many losses ....this was after the Chinese gave the UN forces a bloody nose in the First Offensive
....there were many clues/etc telling the UN that China would get into the fight if the UN crossed the parallel
....Mac said US airpower would destroy any Chinese forces = wrong
....USMC General Smith knew the terrain and weather were just too much to expect the UN to continue to the border and still keep the advantages
etc etc etc

daveshoup2MD
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

Post by daveshoup2MD » 29 Jan 2022 05:30

harry2 wrote:
29 Jan 2022 00:01
Mac totally screwed up in Korea...
Yep. Twice, 1950 and again in 1951.

Exact same pattern as in the PI, 1941-42.

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