Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

[daveshoup2MD]

Hello All ;

To Mr. Daveshoup2md :

Dugout Doug MacArthur lies a shaking on the Rock
Safe from all the bombers and from any sudden shock
Dugout Doug is eating of the best food on Bataan
And his troops go starving on.

Dugout Doug’s not timid, he’s just cautious, not afraid
He’s protecting carefully the stars that Franklin made
Four-star generals are rare as good food on Bataan
And his troops go starving on.

Dugout Doug is ready in his Kris Craft for the flee
Over bounding billows and the wildly raging sea
For the Japs are pounding on the gates of Old Bataan
And his troops go starving on…


This rather scurrilous song was composed by a pair of draftees from the 194th tank Battalion.
This Battalion had been formed from three National Guard Units that had been ' Federalized ',
and after brief training, were sent with their M-3 Stuart Light Tanks to the Philippines. To
say that the men in the unit were unhappy would be an understatement. Many of them were
draftees, often with families and financial responsibilities, who had signed up for the draft
and now they found themselves in the Jungles of the Philippines, and after December 7th,
they were at war in a garrison that had been abandoned by Roosevelt and Marshall. They
were embittered, angry, frustrated, and wanted nothing more than to find a way out, to get
home to their loved ones.

And, the song is pure BULLSHIT.

1. MacArthur was NEVER shaking on the Rock. He went ashore to Bataan whenever he could
and, on many occasions, during IJA and IJN bomber attacks, went ' topside ' to watch his
AA gunners fight back.

2. MacArthur was NOT eating of the best food on Bataan. In fact, he was hardly eating at
all. His wife and 4 year old son were also on Corregidor, but were not military personnel,
and so could draw no rations. So MacArthur gave his family HIS rations, which were split
between the two of them ( They were dividing about 1000 calories per day, frequently less)
and essentially, MacArthur starved himself. That is why , when you see the photos of him
taken right after his arrival in Australia, he is thin, gaunt, with a haggard face, and is leaning
on a cane for support.

3. MacArthur's four stars were NOT made by Franklin. He got them during the Hoover
Administration. Roosevelt tried to steal them from him, but, in the end, he failed.

4. MacArthur NEVER had a yacht to flee in. He left on a PT boat, one of four that was
tasked by the navy for the job. The boats were in such bad shape that one of them
broke down, and had to be left behind by the others. And it must be remembered:
MacArthur repeatedly kept delaying his departure from Corregidor, defying orders from
Marshall and Roosevelt, until they gave him no more options. They also deceived
MacArthur, informing him via radio, that he would be taking command of U.S. Forces
in Australia for the relief expedition to rescue the Philippines. Of course, this was
a lie, but no one lied better than Roosevelt, who, as MacArthur so cogently phrased
it, " ... always lied, even when the truth would have served him better . "


As for MacArthur's wife and son, go back and read his Autobiography. He and his
wife agreed that none of them were to be taken prisoner. Mr. Daveshoup2md, do
YOU have that kind of courage ?

And, after getting his family to Australia, he immediately began the New Guinea
Campaign. As I mentioned above, he was initially too sick and weak to go to
the front lines, but as soon as his health improved, he left his family behind, and
set up his headquarters on New Guinea. ( And , the bullshit you will hear about
it being ' palatial ' is just that - Eddie Rickenbacker spent a few days meeting
with MacArthur, and bringing him top secret orders from the Secretary of War, and
Rickenbacker described the place as being very primitive, nothing but rain soaked
tents and a complete lack of plumbing ! )


Mr. Daveshoup2md, I am attaching a pair of photos for your consideration. The
photo on the left is MacArthur on arriving in Australia. Note how thin his arms
and neck are. You can see the bones in his hands, and he is hunched over, leaning
on the cane so that he can walk. Is this the photo of a man who was ' eating of
the best food on Bataan...' ?

The photo on the right was taken at the end of the New Guinea Campaign, just
before the start of the Invasion of the Philippines - note how MacArthur is once
again standing straight and tall, he has filled out again, and his face is no longer
haggard and gaunt.

Looking at those two photos, no honest person could say that MacArthur did not
share the suffering of his men on Bataan and Corregidor.


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

MacArthur photos.jpg

"Rather" scurrilous? Oh no, it's very scurrilous ... which doesn't mean it's not valid evidence of his troops' opinions.

Even the draftees - who - quelle horreur - were allowed to have them, even before the 'Death March,' shockingly enough; it's pretty much been the reality for every American citizen army since 1775, in fact.

It does bely the earlier statement that "Dugout Doug" was an honorific from WW I, of course. Skipped right past that one... along with the circumstances of MG Vandegrift's assignment that led to his MOH.

The question of why the MacArthur family civilians (complete with civilian maid) were not evacuated before December raises yet another question about MacArthur's strategic insight and understanding of the correlation of forces in the Western Pacific in 1941; the fact they were after the war broke out, of course, is equally indicative of that lack...

[rcocean]

As for MacArthur spending so much time on Corregidor, and so little on Bataan, the primary
reason was because the U.S. Army in the Philippines had few field radios, and relied on field
telephones and telegraphs for signal work. As a result, every time MacArthur went onto
Bataan, he was essentially out of communication with his army, and could only pass messages
to the various commands with extreme difficulty, and in a time consuming manner. As they
say, in War, the Devil is in the Details...

Thanks for bringing this up! There's another reason. MacArthur was not in direct command of the forces on Bataan. He had two corps commanders Parker and Wainwright. He was theater Commander of FEAF. THere was no reason for him to be on Bataan, anymore then Eisenhower or Bradley should have stationed themselves on the front lines during the Battle of the Bulge. Basically as an army commander with two corps he was well situated to coordinate their efforts from Corregidor.

And after the January crisis (during which he was on Bataan about Jan 10th) the front was quiet. And remained so, until he was ordered to leave by FDR in late February and finally left by PT boat in March.

Supposedly it was the Marines who made a song about "Dug out Doug quaking on the rock" which is rather odd, considering the vast majority of Marines were on the same "Rock" as "dougout Doug" and never fought on Bataan. In fact, 4th regiment was used for Corrigedor Beach defense because according to Offical history: "The Marines had no tactical training and were not suitable for use as a tactical combat unit."

[Richard Anderson]

In fact, 4th regiment was used for Corrigedor Beach defense because according to Offical history: "The Marines had no tactical training and were not suitable for use as a tactical combat unit."

Which "Offical [sic] history" would that quote be appearing in? It is certainly not in The Fall of the Philippines or Volume I of the History of USMC Operations in World War II. I do find that on page 47 of The Fall of the Philippines that official history states, "With its weapons and equipment, and consisting of long service men and a full complement of regular officers, the 4th Marines (strength, 750 men) formed a valuable addition to the infantry force in the Islands."

[daveshoup2MD]

In fact, 4th regiment was used for Corrigedor Beach defense because according to Offical history: "The Marines had no tactical training and were not suitable for use as a tactical combat unit."

Which "Offical [sic] history" would that quote be appearing in? It is certainly not in The Fall of the Philippines or Volume I of the History of USMC Operations in World War II. I do find that on page 47 of The Fall of the Philippines that official history states, "With its weapons and equipment, and consisting of long service men and a full complement of regular officers, the 4th Marines (strength, 750 men) formed a valuable addition to the infantry force in the Islands."

Just for kicks, just checked Morton's Strategy and Command: The First two Years volume of the Green Boks subseries The War in the Pacific; not mentioned there, either.

Also checked Vol. III of United States Naval Operations in WW II; nothing there, either.

[Richard Anderson]

In fact, 4th regiment was used for Corrigedor Beach defense because according to Offical history: "The Marines had no tactical training and were not suitable for use as a tactical combat unit."

Which "Offical [sic] history" would that quote be appearing in? It is certainly not in The Fall of the Philippines or Volume I of the History of USMC Operations in World War II. I do find that on page 47 of The Fall of the Philippines that official history states, "With its weapons and equipment, and consisting of long service men and a full complement of regular officers, the 4th Marines (strength, 750 men) formed a valuable addition to the infantry force in the Islands."

Just for kicks, just checked Morton's Strategy and Command: The First two Years volume of the Green Boks subseries The War in the Pacific; not mentioned there, either.

Also checked Vol. III of United States Naval Operations in WW II; nothing there, either.

I suspect the "quote" was ginned up from a quick reading of J. Michael Miller's From Shanghai to Corregidor under the assumption that since the 1st Separate Marine Battalion was a combined defense and recruit battalion set up by Hart at Cavite to keep Marine replacements from flowing to Shanghai, then it would have "no tactical training"? Or he is confusing the "72 officers and 1,173 enlisted men from more than 50 different organizations" assigned to the 4th Marines on Corregidor on 9 April who were not trained or equipped for ground combat with the 4th Marines.

Anyway, the 4th Marines and 1st Separate Battalion went to Corregidor to man beach defenses because Sutherland ordered them to, which meant MacArthur ordered them to.

[rcocean]

Which "Offical [sic] history" would that quote be appearing in? It is certainly not in The Fall of the Philippines or Volume I of the History of USMC Operations in World War II. I do find that on page 47 of The Fall of the Philippines that official history states, "With its weapons and equipment, and consisting of long service men and a full complement of regular officers, the 4th Marines (strength, 750 men) formed a valuable addition to the infantry force in the Islands."

Just for kicks, just checked Morton's Strategy and Command: The First two Years volume of the Green Boks subseries The War in the Pacific; not mentioned there, either.

Also checked Vol. III of United States Naval Operations in WW II; nothing there, either.

Why don't you check the marine corps history for their short history on the Marines "From Shanghai to Corregidor"? "Marines in World War II Commemorative Series".

And maybe you should start reading more on your own, instead of constantly asking for sources everytime someone says something you disagree with.

[Richard Anderson]

Why don't you check the marine corps history for their short history on the Marines "From Shanghai to Corregidor"? "Marines in World War II Commemorative Series".

And maybe you should start reading more on your own, instead of constantly asking for sources everytime someone says something you disagree with.

Yeah, you might want to re-read that section too, starting with the last paragraph of page 11 and then continuing on to page 14, which putsMacArthur's comment that you quoted as if it was the analysis of the "offical [sic] history", into context.

The mission of the 4th Marines was as infantry,

Admiral Hart believed that the 4th Marines "were the strongest infantry regiment in the Philippines," because of the experience of their veteran officers and noncommissioned officers. In an 8 December formal letter Admiral Hart reminded MacArthur that the 4th Marines regiment was available, but the USAFFE commander requested only a battalion to serve as a guard for USAFFE headquarters...(page 14)

Hart declined to use "his" Marines in such a way. At 1940, 15 December, the USAFFE staff met and proposed to convert the 4th Marines into two regiments, and combine them with two regiments of the Philippine Constabulary. The brigade would be used as a reinforcement unit for USAFFE.
The following day, Lieutenant Colonel William T. Clement, Fleet Marine Officer, responded by agreeing to the merger with the Philippine troops, and to provide them with ammunition and supplies. Each Marine battalion would absorb one or two companies of Philippine troops and Marines would command the Philippine regiments, with the division commanded by Colonel Howard.

However, Admiral Hart and Colonel Clement changed the proposal and convinced Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff, that the Marines still needed field training after their long stay in Shanghai. Sutherland then decided that the 4th Marines would be used for beach defense on Corregidor. Indeed, on 2 January, MacArthur stated to his staff that the "Marines had no tactical training and were not suitable for use as a tactical combat unit." (page 15)

In other words, Hart deliberately manipulated the USAFFE command and staff to prevent the Marines from being used as a glorified palace guard for the Mikado. Your source does not in fact say what you claim it does, which is selective and deceptive "sourcing" of the worst sort.

[daveshoup2MD]

In fact, 4th regiment was used for Corrigedor Beach defense because according to Offical history: "The Marines had no tactical training and were not suitable for use as a tactical combat unit."

Which "Offical [sic] history" would that quote be appearing in? It is certainly not in The Fall of the Philippines or Volume I of the History of USMC Operations in World War II. I do find that on page 47 of The Fall of the Philippines that official history states, "With its weapons and equipment, and consisting of long service men and a full complement of regular officers, the 4th Marines (strength, 750 men) formed a valuable addition to the infantry force in the Islands."

Just for kicks, just checked Morton's Strategy and Command: The First two Years volume of the Green Boks subseries The War in the Pacific; not mentioned there, either.

Also checked Vol. III of United States Naval Operations in WW II; nothing there, either.

I suspect the "quote" was ginned up from a quick reading of J. Michael Miller's From Shanghai to Corregidor under the assumption that since the 1st Separate Marine Battalion was a combined defense and recruit battalion set up by Hart at Cavite to keep Marine replacements from flowing to Shanghai, then it would have "no tactical training"? Or he is confusing the "72 officers and 1,173 enlisted men from more than 50 different organizations" assigned to the 4th Marines on Corregidor on 9 April who were not trained or equipped for ground combat with the 4th Marines.

Anyway, the 4th Marines and 1st Separate Battalion went to Corregidor to man beach defenses because Sutherland ordered them to, which meant MacArthur ordered them to.

There's a mention of the "Marine Brigade" proposal in Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 166, which attributes it to Adm. Hart's report. Same basic idea, combined the Marines (infantry) with PC personnel (in other words, cops), and a naval battalion from Mariveles, under a Marine officer (presumably Howard) as brigade commander, and with Marine officers and ncos in charge of the PCs - which didn't happen because of time, but belies the MacArthur statement you detail above.

It also speaks volumes about the readiness of the PC element of the PCA; utterly useless as infantry, despite four years of the MacArthur mission's alleged "planning and training" of the fulltime PC for just that role in wartime (much less the mass of the PCA militia, who were just as useless, but at least had the excuse of being militia, not (allegedly) "professionals" like the PC.

Of course, the history of Bridget's naval battalion - detailed in Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal - makes clear that if 480 beached sailors and 120 Marines making up a provisional battalion under a naval aviator 0-5 was necessary (and, for that matter, "good enough") for combat duty on Bataan, the idea the 4th Marines would not be - and from MacArthur, no less - is so much bilge. :roll:

The record of Bridget's battalion also makes clear - yet again - how useless most of "MacArthur's Own" PCA and PC troops really were ...

[jbroshot]

Just reactivated my membership and came across this thread...

Some books that might be of interest

For the 4th Marines, the regimental history HOLD HIGH THE TORCH A HISTORY OF THE 4th MARINES, by Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh (1960)
Out of print but can be downloaded from the USMC History Division site

https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/holdh ... 00unit.pdf

A more recent book on the subject, FIGHTING FOR MacARTHUR THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS' DESPERATE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES, by John Gordon (2011)

Two books about the US air defense (or lack there of) in the Philippines

DOOMED AT THE START AMERICAN PURSUIT PILOTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1941-1942, by William H. Bartsch (1992)
DECEMBER 8, 1941 MacARTHUR's PEARL HARBOR, by William H. Bartsch (2003)

And I am surprised that while discussing MacArthur's fitness for command, no one (I think) has mentioned EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN THE AMERICAN WAR WITH JAPAN, by Ronald H. Spector (1985), especially the brief discussion in Chapter Five about the cash awards to MacArthur, his Chief of Staff, his Deputy Chief of Staff, and his aide by order of President Quezon (and approved by FDR)

Another (?) version of a scurrilous ditty about MacArthur, as recited by my father, a WW2 Marine,

"They sent for the Army to come to Tulagai
"But Douglas MacArthur said no
"He said, 'there's a reason
"It isn't the season
"and besides there is no USO.'"

[daveshoup2MD]

Just reactivated my membership and came across this thread...

Some books that might be of interest

For the 4th Marines, the regimental history HOLD HIGH THE TORCH A HISTORY OF THE 4th MARINES, by Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh (1960)
Out of print but can be downloaded from the USMC History Division site

https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/holdh ... 00unit.pdf

A more recent book on the subject, FIGHTING FOR MacARTHUR THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS' DESPERATE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES, by John Gordon (2011)

Two books about the US air defense (or lack there of) in the Philippines

DOOMED AT THE START AMERICAN PURSUIT PILOTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1941-1942, by William H. Bartsch (1992)
DECEMBER 8, 1941 MacARTHUR's PEARL HARBOR, by William H. Bartsch (2003)

And I am surprised that while discussing MacArthur's fitness for command, no one (I think) has mentioned EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN THE AMERICAN WAR WITH JAPAN, by Ronald H. Spector (1985), especially the brief discussion in Chapter Five about the cash awards to MacArthur, his Chief of Staff, his Deputy Chief of Staff, and his aide by order of President Quezon (and approved by FDR)

Another (?) version of a scurrilous ditty about MacArthur, as recited by my father, a WW2 Marine,

"They sent for the Army to come to Tulagai
"But Douglas MacArthur said no
"He said, 'there's a reason
"It isn't the season
"and besides there is no USO.'"

Thanks for the above, but given the rhyme, think that last "scurrilous ditty" is a verse of "Fuck 'em All," i.e. "The Long, and the Short, and the Tall" ... or "Bless 'em all," for those of delicate constitutions.

There are (probably) hundreds if not thousands of verses referring to ... various and sundry.

"Oh, the officers, they ride in a motorboat;
the captain, he rides in a gig,
It doesn't go one bit faster,
but it makes the old bastard feel big...

(chorus)

"Fuck 'em All, fuck 'em all, fuck 'em all,
the long, and the short, and the tall,
There will be no promotion, this side of the ocean,
but still I say ... fuck 'em all."

and etc, etc., etc...

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

Mr. Jim Broshot stated :

And I am surprised that while discussing MacArthur's fitness for command, no
one (I think) has mentioned EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN THE AMERICAN WAR WITH JAPAN,
by Ronald H. Spector (1985), especially the brief discussion in Chapter Five about the
cash awards to MacArthur, his Chief of Staff, his Deputy Chief of Staff, and his aide by
order of President Quezon (and approved by FDR)

This is just more Anti-MacArthur BS by the Leftist Academia, and I am surprised that Mr. Spector
chose to repeat this long discredited story. These were NOT ' Cash Awards ', they were, in fact
payment for work contracted by the Philippine Government, who had hired MacArthur, Eisenhower,
and Ord in 1935, and after Ord had died and Eisenhower had left, continued the arrangement
with Sutherland, Richard Marshall, and Sidney Huff.

The documents show that on Jan. 3, 1942, Quezon directed by executive order that $640,000 from
the Philippine treasury be conveyed to the personal bank accounts of MacArthur and the three
members of his staff "in recognition of outstanding service to the Commonwealth of the Philippines
from Nov. 15, 1935, to Dec. 30, 1941.

The transactions, made by radio grams from Corregidor to the Chase National Bank of the City of
New York, placed $500,000 in MacArthur's account according to the records. Major Gen. Sutherland,
MacArthur's chief of staff, received $75,000; Brig. Gen. Marshall, the deputy chief of staff, received
$45,000 and Lt. Col. Huff, MacArthur's personal aide, received $20,000.

Records indicate that President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the
interior Harold Ickes knew about the transactions but apparently did not interfere with them,
as they were perfectly legal.

It must be noted that these salaries had been pre-arranged years earlier, in MacArthur's case, in
1935, and in the case of the other three officers, in the years between 1939 and 1940. All the
payments were made by Gold Transfers in New York, and were completely legal.


While he was serving in the Philippines, Dwight D. Eisenhower was paid $ 10.00 per day, or
$ 3650.00 per year, in gold, for the first three years he served in the Philippines. The final year,
1940, he renegotiated his salary with Quezon up to $ 6000.00 per year, in gold. Ord was paid
the same for the two years before his death, which helped his widow tremendously. MacArthur
had negotiated a salary of $ 30,000.00 per year for ten years, or $ 300,000.00. He had not
been paid any of it for the first six years he was organizing the Philippine Army, and so, with
six years salary accrued to him, he was owed some $ 180,000.00 - of which he was paid, in
January, 1942, the amount due him, with the rest to be paid at a later date. The remainder
was held in the account during the war, and returned to the Philippines after the war was over.
MacArthur NEVER took that additional money.


The reason the payments were made at that time was because the Officers in question had
agreed to defer their payments until their service in the islands was complete. As the war
had started on December 7th, in effect, they were no longer serving the Philippine Government,
but were instead on Active duty with the U.S. Army, and so they were paid the moneys owed
them in January, 1942.


As a note: When he left the Philippines, Eisenhower left with nearly $ 17,000.00 in Gold,
deposited to his account. Up until that time, Eisenhower and his family had lived the frugal
lives of career military families in the 1920s-30s, and, in fact, Eisenhower had been deeply
troubled by the thought of the costs of sending his son, John, to college. However, when
Eisenhower returned home to the U.S., he had a conversation with his son, who had expressed
an interest in attending West Point, and he told his son that, because of recent improvements
in the family financial condition, there was now enough available funds to send John to ANY
College or University to which he was accepted. At that time, the most expensive University
in the U.S.A. was Harvard, which had an annual tuition of about $ 1500.00, and additional costs
of another $ 500.00 per year.

John Eisenhower chose to attend West Point, but, unlike his father, who had gone there because
it was a ' free ' college education, John Eisenhower told his father that he wished to go to
West Point because, growing up, he'd had the opportunity to meet many of the officers his
father served with, who were West Point Graduates, and he wished to be associated with
men of that caliber.


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[rcocean]

[

And I am surprised that while discussing MacArthur's fitness for command, no
one (I think) has mentioned EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN THE AMERICAN WAR WITH JAPAN,
by Ronald H. Spector (1985), especially the brief discussion in Chapter Five about the
cash awards to MacArthur, his Chief of Staff, his Deputy Chief of Staff, and his aide by
order of President Quezon (and approved by FDR)

Spector's book is a bunch of crap. Its a superficial one volume history, it says nothing new, and doesn't say it well. I assume its constantly being quoted because it gives a left-wing slant on the war. Or maybe its because a lot of people read one book on the Pacific war and they read this one because its so readily available.

It reminds me of the way people would constantly quote "death traps". Why they were always quoting it was never made clear, but they seemed to think it was the last word on the US Armor tactics and equipment in the ETO.

MacArthur had it written into his contract in Oct 1935 that he could recieve honorary payments from the philippine government. Sutherland got $ too, and Ike was offered $$. I have no idea why I'm supposed to be shocked or even care. Had MacArthur died on Coregidor or escapting to Austrailia, his family would've recieved some $. MacArthur wasn't motivated by $. If he was, he would've accepted the $100,000 advance from Doubleday to write his autobiography. Or took a job on Wall Street/Big Business after he left the COS.

[rcocean]

And I am surprised that while discussing MacArthur's fitness for command, no
one (I think) has mentioned EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN THE AMERICAN WAR WITH JAPAN,
by Ronald H. Spector (1985), especially the brief discussion in Chapter Five about the
cash awards to MacArthur, his Chief of Staff, his Deputy Chief of Staff, and his aide by
order of President Quezon (and approved by FDR)

Spector's book is a bunch of crap. Its a superficial one volume history, it says nothing new, and doesn't say it well. I assume its constantly being quoted because it gives a left-wing slant on the war. Or maybe its because a lot of people read one book on the Pacific war and they read this one because its so readily available.

It reminds me of the way people would constantly quote "death traps". Why they were always quoting it was never made clear, but they seemed to think it was the last word on the US Armor tactics and equipment in the ETO.

MacArthur had it written into his contract in Oct 1935 that he could recieve honorary payments from the philippine government. Sutherland got $ too, and Ike was offered $$. I have no idea why I'm supposed to be shocked or even care. Had MacArthur died on Coregidor or escapting to Austrailia, his family would've recieved some $. MacArthur wasn't motivated by $. If he was, he would've
accepted the $100,000 advance from Doubleday to write his autobiography. Or took a job on Wall Street/Big Business after he left the COS.

MacArthur's first wife wanted to stop playing soldier and get a well paying job on Wall street in the 1920s but Big mac wasn't interested.

[rcocean]

And if you think the Philippine Army was badly trained you can Blame Eisenhower. He was the one who came up with the plan. He was the primary mover along with Ord.

[daveshoup2MD]

Hello All ;

Mr. Jim Broshot stated :

And I am surprised that while discussing MacArthur's fitness for command, no
one (I think) has mentioned EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN THE AMERICAN WAR WITH JAPAN,
by Ronald H. Spector (1985), especially the brief discussion in Chapter Five about the
cash awards to MacArthur, his Chief of Staff, his Deputy Chief of Staff, and his aide by
order of President Quezon (and approved by FDR)

This is just more Anti-MacArthur BS by the Leftist Academia, and I am surprised that Mr. Spector
chose to repeat this long discredited story.

And I am surprised that while discussing MacArthur's fitness for command, no
one (I think) has mentioned EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN THE AMERICAN WAR WITH JAPAN,
by Ronald H. Spector (1985), especially the brief discussion in Chapter Five about the
cash awards to MacArthur, his Chief of Staff, his Deputy Chief of Staff, and his aide by
order of President Quezon (and approved by FDR)

Spector's book is a bunch of crap. Its a superficial one volume history, it says nothing new, and doesn't say it well. I assume its constantly being quoted because it gives a left-wing slant on the war. Or maybe its because a lot of people read one book on the Pacific war and they read this one because its so readily available.

Not to interrupt a good rant, but Spector is (IIRC) a Marine veteran (Vietnam) who rose to O-5; his posts - according to his CV https://history.columbian.gwu.edu/sites ... r%20CV.pdf, at least - have included:

• Director of Naval History and Curator for the Navy Department 1986-1989.

• Historian, Southeast Asia Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1971-1984. Acting Chief, Southeast Asia Branch, 1979-1980, 1982-1983

• Harold K. Johnson Visiting Professor of Military History, U.S. Army War College, 2005-2006

• Distinguished Visiting Professor of Strategy, National War College, 1995-1996

• U.S. Department of State, Advisory Committee on Diplomatic Documentation 1989-1991.

• USIA Visiting Lecturer, Taiwan, New Zealand, Fiji, 1985. China, Australia 2005

• USIA Visiting Lecturer, Philippines, Thailand, 1977

Yep, looks like a commie to me! :roll: