Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

[Lethl215]

Minutes:

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[Lethl215]

Minutes cont.

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[Lethl215]

Cont to RKT’s remarks:

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See post 101.

[Lethl215]

Post RKT comments in post 101:

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[Lethl215]

Cont.

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[Lethl215]

Cont.

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[Lethl215]

Cont.

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Finish with 30 Jun 41 meeting when I can.
Condolences to all the UK and Commonwealth.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Looks like I have some reading to do.

[EwenS]

Here is a link to the Bureau of Ships Reports for Nov/Dec 1941 circulated to FDR amongst others, showing the expected completion dates of the ships then on order. I think it helps give some context to the above posts. Note it uses the original ship’s names. Many were changed before launch to perpetuate those of ships lost.

https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16618988

If you compare these dates with actual completion dates you can see just how far wartime production rates were speeded up. For example, the carrier Essex contractual completion date April 1944. Expected per this report Jan 1944. Actual completion date Dec 1942.

11 Essex class planned by the end of 1945. The last of these 11 completed historically in Oct 1944. Historically there were 19 by the end of 1945.

[Lethl215]

Here is a link to the Bureau of Ships Reports for Nov/Dec 1941 circulated to FDR amongst others, showing the expected completion dates of the ships then on order. I think it helps give some context to the above posts. Note it uses the original ship’s names. Many were changed before launch to perpetuate those of ships lost.

https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16618988

If you compare these dates with actual completion dates you can see just how far wartime production rates were speeded up. For example, the carrier Essex contractual completion date April 1944. Expected per this report Jan 1944. Actual completion date Dec 1942.

11 Essex class planned by the end of 1945. The last of these 11 completed historically in Oct 1944. Historically there were 19 by the end of 1945.

Excellent idea!

Here’s the one for 1 July 1941 around the time of the GB meeting.

https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16618980

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

If you compare these dates with actual completion dates you can see just how far wartime production rates were speeded up. For example, the carrier Essex contractual completion date April 1944. Expected per this report Jan 1944. Actual completion date Dec 1942.

Klien in his 800 page primer on US industrial mobilization WWII 'A Call to Arms' has a few points on this acceleration, across the board in equipment production beyond the Naval program. Reading Kliens summary is useful for understanding the limits on what the Federal government could do from 1938 to December 1941. Both US business and Congress were opposed to any changes from traditional procurement contracts and practices. That left production of military equipment through 1941 at effectively a peace time basis.