Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
cstunts
Member
Posts: 604
Joined: 17 Aug 2006 04:45
Location: USA

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by cstunts » 19 Apr 2022 16:02

"Imagine that the US adds a second heavy cruiser with Houston, a second Omaha class light cruiser with Marblehead, and the Erie and Charleston (both "expendable"), along with two more destroyer squadrons of 4 pipers. A second destroyer tender and a seaplane tender are sent to Manila. That would have given the Asiatic Fleet some real teeth versus the Japanese while doing relatively little to US naval readiness elsewhere."

IMHO, this would not have made any difference. Especially in view of non-existent air support. Manila/Cavite was indefensible. These ships would only have been additional (highly vulnerable) targets.
Basing them in the NEI was a non-option. And, as events proved, Port Darwin was too removed from the important combat zones.
The tiny Asiatic Fleet as it existed in reality had constant fuel problems in the NEI. PECOS and TRINITY were not adequate for the severe task at hand.
Logistical support for the AF in the NEI was virtually non-existent.
By the first week in Feb, Surabaja--where most of the naval fuel oil was stored--for all intents & purposes was becoming more untenable by the day as a base.

Given the scale & aggressiveness of IJN air ops in the NEI by early Feb. '42 (which is not properly understood even now), if these US ships go into the Java Sea in late February--whatever remained of them at that point--they're even more likely to be lost.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Banned
Posts: 3255
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Apr 2022 18:42

cstunts wrote:
19 Apr 2022 16:02
"Imagine that the US adds a second heavy cruiser with Houston, a second Omaha class light cruiser with Marblehead, and the Erie and Charleston (both "expendable"), along with two more destroyer squadrons of 4 pipers. A second destroyer tender and a seaplane tender are sent to Manila. That would have given the Asiatic Fleet some real teeth versus the Japanese while doing relatively little to US naval readiness elsewhere."

IMHO, this would not have made any difference.
Agreed, far too little.
cstunts wrote:Basing them in the NEI was a non-option. And, as events proved, Port Darwin was too removed from the important combat zones.
Basing in the NEI, Darwin, or Trincomalee was rejected out of hand by a USN that functionally assumed the Malay Barrier would fall within a few months but did not communicate this evaluation to its allies (nor, in many cases, to itself).
cstunts wrote:By the first week in Feb, Surabaja--where most of the naval fuel oil was stored--for all intents & purposes was becoming more untenable by the day as a base.
The Allied coalition outnumbered Axis in major naval combat assets by ~3:1. An early February timeline leaves two months after the shooting starts to assemble a force capable of wrecking Japan by mounting a credible defense of the Malay Barrier and denying it oil.
https://twitter.com/themarcksplan
https://www.reddit.com/r/AxisHistoryForum/
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

Lethl215
Member
Posts: 59
Joined: 19 Mar 2019 00:00
Location: Texas

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by Lethl215 » 21 Apr 2022 00:03

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
14 Mar 2022 00:18
Lethl215 wrote:
13 Mar 2022 20:22
Turner shut the door hard on the British delegation.
The question is whether one declining alcoholic's strategic evaluation reflected a full analytical treatment of all global options.
I have no idea what you’re talking about.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Apr 2022 18:42
[quote=cstunts post_id=2404376 time=<a href="tel:1650380577">1650380577</a> user_id=20384]
"Imagine that the US adds a second heavy cruiser with Houston, a second Omaha class light cruiser with Marblehead, and the Erie and Charleston (both "expendable"), along with two more destroyer squadrons of 4 pipers. A second destroyer tender and a seaplane tender are sent to Manila. That would have given the Asiatic Fleet some real teeth versus the Japanese while doing relatively little to US naval readiness elsewhere."

IMHO, this would not have made any difference.
Agreed, far too little.

Both Richardson, Leahy and Yarnell said as much wrt AF reinforcements.
cstunts wrote:Basing them in the NEI was a non-option. And, as events proved, Port Darwin was too removed from the important combat zones.
Basing in the NEI, Darwin, or Trincomalee was rejected out of hand by a USN that functionally assumed the Malay Barrier would fall within a few months but did not communicate this evaluation to its allies (nor, in many cases, to itself).

Assume Miller is the source?
cstunts wrote:By the first week in Feb, Surabaja--where most of the naval fuel oil was stored--for all intents & purposes was becoming more untenable by the day as a base.
The Allied coalition outnumbered Axis in major naval combat assets by ~3:1. An early February timeline leaves two months after the shooting starts to assemble a force capable of wrecking Japan by mounting a credible defense of the Malay Barrier and denying it oil.
[/quote]

Source?

Give us a quick swag of your estimate of the situation, coarse of action and resources for Feb 41 before hostilities, or Feb 42 post PH. I don’t believe any 3-1 correlation of forces can possibly exist at either point.

cstunts
Member
Posts: 604
Joined: 17 Aug 2006 04:45
Location: USA

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by cstunts » 21 Apr 2022 15:44

And we may add that none of these what-if fantasies are even remotely plausible given the historical reality of Japanese air superiority, for which the Allies had no remedy.

Delta Tank
Member
Posts: 2512
Joined: 16 Aug 2004 01:51
Location: Pennsylvania

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by Delta Tank » 22 Apr 2022 17:33

Paulward wrote “ The U.S. began, even as the Japanese were occupying IndoChina, to carry out this plan.
On July 27, MacArthur was re-activated in the Army, and the following day was promoted
to Lt. General ( This was done so that he would NOT outrank Marshall ! )”

This doesn’t make sense to me could you explain? Marshall was COS, his duty position determined that he was in command of the US Army.

Mike

Delta Tank
Member
Posts: 2512
Joined: 16 Aug 2004 01:51
Location: Pennsylvania

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by Delta Tank » 22 Apr 2022 17:36

glenn239 wrote:
13 Mar 2022 14:29
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Mar 2022 02:28
The Atlantic offered no opportunity for the USN's fleet battle groups to contribute decisively against Germany...
But it did. The American strategic incoherence you outline was actually deeper than what you suggest. The US fleet did have a decisive role to play in a Germany first strategy in 1942 under bold and decisive Allied leadership. But the Allies had neither in 1942, it was war by committee with muddling results that year. (I wouldn't want to exaggerate Anglo-American strategic blunders in 1942 because in part the caution underpinning them reflected the overwhelming long term inevitability of Allied victory. Not taking risks in 1942 such as defending the Malay Barrier was a logical departure from the Rainbow concepts you outline because it did not matter in the long run whether Japan got the oil or not, it would still lose).

The opportunity the Allies had in Europe in 1942 were a better concept for Torch aimed at Toulon and Marseilles. To contemplate a direct landing there, the Allies would need the bulk of the US Pacific Fleet carriers, and all the British carriers. If successful the Germans would be out of France before the end of 1943, as a drive from the south would allow a 1943 invasion in the north.
glenn239,

So where are these army divisions to carry out an attack in southern France in 1942 and then 1943 in northern France?

Mike

paulrward
Member
Posts: 665
Joined: 10 Dec 2008 20:14

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by paulrward » 22 Apr 2022 23:06

Hello All :

To Mr. Delta Tank :

You posted :
This doesn’t make sense to me could you explain? Marshall was COS,
his duty position determined that he was in command of the US Army.

It only makes sense if you know what the political situation was in Washington in 1920-41.

First of all, MacArthur had been COS, first under Hoover, and then under Roosevelt, who
extended MacAthur's term because there was no other officer of his caliber available to take
the job. Despite this, Roosevelt HATED MacArthur, who blocked Freewheelin' Franklin's plans
to effectively disband the Army, and make it part of the CCC, as well as shutting down the
Service Academies and laying off more than half of the Army's officers. Yeah....

Next, we must remember that Marshall was Roosevelt's ' Boy ' . To men like MacArthur, who
had spent the Great War fighting in the Trenches with their men, Marshall, who spent the war
hanging out at Chateau Chaumont, well to the rear of the lines, in safety and comfort, was
part of what were called ' The Chaumont Gang ' - and were looked down upon in consequence.

In addition, Marshall was a political animal as a general, and, when Roosevelt had taken office,
Marshall was appointed to command a Regiment, as well as having responsibilities with the CCC.
He spent all his time managing his CCC duties, and let his Regimental duties slide, with the result
that, after a year, it was found that his regiment did NOT meet the norms of training, discipline,
or readiness. He was then transferred to the National Guard at the rank of Colonel, in what was
expected to be a ' Tombstone ' job. In other words, his chances of making General were effectively
zero....

Then, as soon as MacArthur had been moved out to the Philippines, Roosevelt plucked Marshall
from the list of Colonels, and had him promoted to Brigadier General. Marshall realized his career
depended on Roosevelt, and was quick to toe the Party Line in testimony to Congress and his dealings
with the Press. Then, on September 1, 1939, Roosevelt promoted him to COS of the Army - and
Marshall was promoted to Major General, with a ' Spot Promotion Rank ' of Full General ( in The
Army of The United States, which was DIFFERENT from the United States Army ! )

Now, MacArthur had held the rank of Major General as a regular rank in the Army, and had the
'Spot Promotion Rank ' of Full General while he was COS. He reverted to two star rank when
he went to the Philippines, and then, when he retired, he retired as a Full General on the
Retired List as of January 1, 1938.

It is customary at that time,, when a retired officer was recalled to duty, that he is given either
the highest rank held in the Regular Army, or his Retirement Rank, whichever was higher. In short,
MacArthur, when he was Reactivated on July 26, 1941, SHOULD, by custom and precedent, have
been re-activated at his four star rank. However, that meant that he would have outranked
Marshall, as his seniority as a four star general would have dated from January 1, 1938, while
Marshall's dated from September 1, 1939.

Roosevelt and Marshall, who both hated MacArthur, would NOT allow that to happen ! So, in
spite of precedent and tradition, MacArthur was reactivated at the rank of Major General, and
promoted the next day to Lieutenant General in the Army of the United States, which meant that
Marshal outranked him. MacArthur took a deep breath, swallowed his resentment, and ' soldiered
on ' without complaint. But he was pissed off.

Then came Pearl Harbor. And Suddenly MacArthur was promoted to Full General, with a date
of rank of September 16, 1936 ! Now, again, MacArthur OUTRANKED Marshal by date of Seniority.
And, to serving military officers, that is important. It is why, every year, West Point, Annapolis,
and Colorado Springs graduates are commissioned ONE DAY ahead of the ROTC graduates - so
that they have that one day of seniority on the promotion list getting started.

In other words, even though both MacArthur and Marshall were four star Generals, and Marshall
was COS, MacArthur still Outranked Marshall on the permanent Promotion list. By about
three years. And, when they met in 1943, it was Marshall who travelled to MacArthur's
headquarters to meet him, rather than MacArthur going to Australia for the meeting.


As the war was winding down, Roosevelt arranged for Marshall, Eisenhower, and Admiral's King and
Leahy to be promoted to Five Star Rank. However, certain Republicans in Congress threatened to
hold up the promotions unless MacArthur was added to the list. So, MacArthur's name was added,
and all five men became Five Stars.

Now, Roosevelt and Leahy arranged that Leahy got his promotion FIRST, and so became the first
five star in U.S. history, outranking ( by date of seniority ) King and Nimitz. This was in spite of
the fact, throughout the war, he was essentially Roosevelt's military ' Go-fer '.
Stick close to your desks and never go to sea,
And you all may be rulers of the Queen's Navee !
The following days, the others were promoted the ' brevet ' ranks as Five Stars in The Army of The
United States. In Marshall's case, his promotion dated from December 16th, 1944, MacArthur's was
December 18th, and Eisenhower's was December 20th. So, once again, Roosevelt had arranged
for Marshall to outrank MacArthur.

This was the way it was when the war ended. But, in the intervening months, Freewheelin' Franklin
had gone to that Big WheelChair in the Sky. Truman was President. And, with the war ended, and
the Army of the United States in the process of being deactivated, some people in Congress thought
it would be a good idea to make the Five Star Ranks into Permanent ranks, in the case of the Generals,
ranks in the United States Army.

Congress passed the Law, Harry the Haberdasher signed it, and promotions started. But, SOMEHOW....
MacArthur got the word first, and got his promotion to five star signed off on March 23, 1946. At that
time, Marshall was in China, selling out Chiang Kai Chek and condemning a billion chinese to life
sentences under communist tyrrany, and so he didn't get his promotion actived until April 11, 1946,
the same day that Eisenhower's came through - I have always had the suspicion that Ike suddenly
realized what MacArthur had done, and, as the new COS, had finished the paperwork on his and
Marshall's promotions.

But, regardless, now, once again, MacArthur outranked Marshall ( and Ike ) and that was the way
it would stay until the days they died.

Douglas MacArthur was the First Five Star General in the United States Army.


Hope this answers your question.


Respectfully:

Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

Delta Tank
Member
Posts: 2512
Joined: 16 Aug 2004 01:51
Location: Pennsylvania

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by Delta Tank » 23 Apr 2022 02:06

paulrward wrote:
22 Apr 2022 23:06
Hello All :

To Mr. Delta Tank :

You posted :
This doesn’t make sense to me could you explain? Marshall was COS,
his duty position determined that he was in command of the US Army.

It only makes sense if you know what the political situation was in Washington in 1920-41.

First of all, MacArthur had been COS, first under Hoover, and then under Roosevelt, who
extended MacAthur's term because there was no other officer of his caliber available to take
the job. Despite this, Roosevelt HATED MacArthur, who blocked Freewheelin' Franklin's plans
to effectively disband the Army, and make it part of the CCC, as well as shutting down the
Service Academies and laying off more than half of the Army's officers. Yeah....

Next, we must remember that Marshall was Roosevelt's ' Boy ' . To men like MacArthur, who
had spent the Great War fighting in the Trenches with their men, Marshall, who spent the war
hanging out at Chateau Chaumont, well to the rear of the lines, in safety and comfort, was
part of what were called ' The Chaumont Gang ' - and were looked down upon in consequence.

In addition, Marshall was a political animal as a general, and, when Roosevelt had taken office,
Marshall was appointed to command a Regiment, as well as having responsibilities with the CCC.
He spent all his time managing his CCC duties, and let his Regimental duties slide, with the result
that, after a year, it was found that his regiment did NOT meet the norms of training, discipline,
or readiness. He was then transferred to the National Guard at the rank of Colonel, in what was
expected to be a ' Tombstone ' job. In other words, his chances of making General were effectively
zero....

Then, as soon as MacArthur had been moved out to the Philippines, Roosevelt plucked Marshall
from the list of Colonels, and had him promoted to Brigadier General. Marshall realized his career
depended on Roosevelt, and was quick to toe the Party Line in testimony to Congress and his dealings
with the Press. Then, on September 1, 1939, Roosevelt promoted him to COS of the Army - and
Marshall was promoted to Major General, with a ' Spot Promotion Rank ' of Full General ( in The
Army of The United States, which was DIFFERENT from the United States Army ! )

Now, MacArthur had held the rank of Major General as a regular rank in the Army, and had the
'Spot Promotion Rank ' of Full General while he was COS. He reverted to two star rank when
he went to the Philippines, and then, when he retired, he retired as a Full General on the
Retired List as of January 1, 1938.

It is customary at that time,, when a retired officer was recalled to duty, that he is given either
the highest rank held in the Regular Army, or his Retirement Rank, whichever was higher. In short,
MacArthur, when he was Reactivated on July 26, 1941, SHOULD, by custom and precedent, have
been re-activated at his four star rank. However, that meant that he would have outranked
Marshall, as his seniority as a four star general would have dated from January 1, 1938, while
Marshall's dated from September 1, 1939.

Roosevelt and Marshall, who both hated MacArthur, would NOT allow that to happen ! So, in
spite of precedent and tradition, MacArthur was reactivated at the rank of Major General, and
promoted the next day to Lieutenant General in the Army of the United States, which meant that
Marshal outranked him. MacArthur took a deep breath, swallowed his resentment, and ' soldiered
on ' without complaint. But he was pissed off.

Then came Pearl Harbor. And Suddenly MacArthur was promoted to Full General, with a date
of rank of September 16, 1936 ! Now, again, MacArthur OUTRANKED Marshal by date of Seniority.
And, to serving military officers, that is important. It is why, every year, West Point, Annapolis,
and Colorado Springs graduates are commissioned ONE DAY ahead of the ROTC graduates - so
that they have that one day of seniority on the promotion list getting started.

In other words, even though both MacArthur and Marshall were four star Generals, and Marshall
was COS, MacArthur still Outranked Marshall on the permanent Promotion list. By about
three years. And, when they met in 1943, it was Marshall who travelled to MacArthur's
headquarters to meet him, rather than MacArthur going to Australia for the meeting.


As the war was winding down, Roosevelt arranged for Marshall, Eisenhower, and Admiral's King and
Leahy to be promoted to Five Star Rank. However, certain Republicans in Congress threatened to
hold up the promotions unless MacArthur was added to the list. So, MacArthur's name was added,
and all five men became Five Stars.

Now, Roosevelt and Leahy arranged that Leahy got his promotion FIRST, and so became the first
five star in U.S. history, outranking ( by date of seniority ) King and Nimitz. This was in spite of
the fact, throughout the war, he was essentially Roosevelt's military ' Go-fer '.
Stick close to your desks and never go to sea,
And you all may be rulers of the Queen's Navee !
The following days, the others were promoted the ' brevet ' ranks as Five Stars in The Army of The
United States. In Marshall's case, his promotion dated from December 16th, 1944, MacArthur's was
December 18th, and Eisenhower's was December 20th. So, once again, Roosevelt had arranged
for Marshall to outrank MacArthur.

This was the way it was when the war ended. But, in the intervening months, Freewheelin' Franklin
had gone to that Big WheelChair in the Sky. Truman was President. And, with the war ended, and
the Army of the United States in the process of being deactivated, some people in Congress thought
it would be a good idea to make the Five Star Ranks into Permanent ranks, in the case of the Generals,
ranks in the United States Army.

Congress passed the Law, Harry the Haberdasher signed it, and promotions started. But, SOMEHOW....
MacArthur got the word first, and got his promotion to five star signed off on March 23, 1946. At that
time, Marshall was in China, selling out Chiang Kai Chek and condemning a billion chinese to life
sentences under communist tyrrany, and so he didn't get his promotion actived until April 11, 1946,
the same day that Eisenhower's came through - I have always had the suspicion that Ike suddenly
realized what MacArthur had done, and, as the new COS, had finished the paperwork on his and
Marshall's promotions.

But, regardless, now, once again, MacArthur outranked Marshall ( and Ike ) and that was the way
it would stay until the days they died.

Douglas MacArthur was the First Five Star General in the United States Army.


Hope this answers your question.


Respectfully:

Paul R. Ward
Holy Cow!! I will have to read this several times to get the full meaning of what you wrote!! I never read any of this before!!

Thanks!?

Mike

reedwh52
Member
Posts: 116
Joined: 31 Mar 2014 20:42

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by reedwh52 » 23 Apr 2022 17:13

One "Minor" missed point.

Date of rank and precedence under the provisions of PL 79-333 (March 23, 1946) were based on precedence based on PL 78-482 (Dec 14, 1944) which created the General of the Army rank.

Per US Army registers and other documents, the dates of rank for the the Army, in 1948 the dates of rank for the three Army appointees were:
1) Marshall (on the retired list) DOR was December 16, 1944.
2) MacArthur's date of rank was December 18, 1944.
3) Eisenhower's date of rank was December 20, 1944.
4) Arnold's date of rank was December 21, 1945.

If MacArthur had actually beleived that he was senior, he would have raised hell over his DOR/precedence being wrong; He did not.

Not an actual issue.

paulrward
Member
Posts: 665
Joined: 10 Dec 2008 20:14

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by paulrward » 23 Apr 2022 20:35

Hello All :

Mr. Reedwh52 posted :
Date of rank and precedence under the provisions of PL 79-333 (March 23, 1946)
...........
4) Arnold's date of rank was December 21, 1945.
.....................
Not an actual issue.

I am only going to cite the case of General Hap Arnold, as it applies equally to everyone on your list.
Arnold's date of rank for Five Star General rank was December 21, 1944 . ( NOT 1945 ! ) But this
was in The Army of The United States. NOT The United States Army ! It was a temporary
promotion,
not a permanent promotion, which would have been the case had it been in The United
States Army. In fact, at the end of WW2, Arnold's permanent rank was Major General - and if he had
left the position of head of the USAAF, he would have reverted to that rank. Just as MacArthur had,
after serving as a Full General while COS in the 1930s, reverted to his permanent rank of Major General
in the USA when he went to the Philippines.

Arnold's Five Star Rank was made Permanent on March 23, 1946- the same day that MacArthur got his rank
made permanent, and about three weeks ahead of Eisenhower and Marshall. ( It must be noted: MacArthur
was in Japan at the time, which is on the other side of the International Date Line, so he, by signing off on
his promotion papers as quickly as possible, probably got his permanent five star ranking a few hours
ahead of Arnold - and yes, MacArthur would have done exactly that ! He was that kind of a guy ! )

Now, the matter of Temporary Rank vs. Permanent Rank , in terms of seniority, differs from wartime to
peacetime. In wartime, a person's rank is his Temporary Rank. But these promotions often ( usually )
disappear at the end of the war. Everyone reverts to their Peacetime Permanent Rank. So, you might
have two lieutenants, Lt. A who was commissioned a day before Lt. B, serving at the start of the war. In
peacetime, Lt. A outranked Lt. B by one day worth of Seniority - and this matters in terms of who salutes
who ! But, then the war breaks out, and promotions start to occur. In the course of the mobilization, Lt. A
gets promoted to Captain, but Lt. B gets bumped up to Major. Thus, while the war is going on, Major B
outranks Captain A .

But, while the war is going on, Capt. A has his Permanent Rank raised to Captain, effective May 1. Maj. B's
Permanent Rank is raised to Captain, but becomes effective on May 2. - and, as soon as the
war ends, both officers revert to their Permanent Ranks, and once again, Captain A outranks Captain B
by one day !

Thus, a superior officer in peacetime became a subordinate in wartime, but reverted to the superior rank
when peace returned.

Two incidents with Eisenhower come to mind. During the North African Campaign, Eisenhower had to
relieve General Friedendall. He did so carefully, making sure that there were NO public statements
implying Friedendall was incompetent. Why ? Because Friedendall's Permanent Rank was HIGHER than
Eisenhower's - and Ike was smart enough not to take any chances. ( Friedendall's rank in the Regular
Army was Brigadier General, and Eisenhower's, until August 30, 1943, was Lt. Colonel ! That's right !
If Ike had messed up in early 1943, and been sent back to the USA, he would have dropped in rank from
Full General to Lt. Colonel ! Four Star to Light Bird in one drop ! )


Later, in the runup to D-Day, Eisenhower had to relieve Maj.Gen. Henry Miller for getting drunk and talking
in an unwise manner. At that time, Miller's Permanent Rank was ... Major ! Miller pleaded with Eisenhower,
who had been his classmate, ( AND ROOMATE ! ) at West Point, and Eisenhower arranged for Miller to be
returned to the USA with the Permanent Rank of Lt. Colonel. Miller served at that rank until the end of
1944, and then retired due to ' Ill Health ' - getting a Retirement Promotion to Full Colonel. He was a
Retired Colonel until December, 1948, when he was promoted on the Retired List to Brigadier General.
Miller died a few weeks later, in January, 1949, but Eisenhower had made sure that he was one of the
members of the class of 1915 ' On Whom the Stars Fell ' .


And here is the Fundamental Lesson that all Officers Learn: Be wary in how you deal with your Fellow
Officers - The Ass You KICKED Today, Might be Ass You Are Required to KISS Tomorrow !



" Is this an Issue, Captain ? "

" Only if you want it to be one, Admiral ."


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

reedwh52
Member
Posts: 116
Joined: 31 Mar 2014 20:42

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by reedwh52 » 23 Apr 2022 21:36

Thank you for correcting my typo on Arnold.

As shown, the four 5-star appointments were made to ensure a separation between DoR. The legislative intent of the authorizing legislation was, and did, preserve the differences in DoR.

Until he retired, Marshall had MacArthur by DoR. After he retired, MacArthur continued to have DoR on Eisenhower but was subordinated to him as Eisenhower was CoS.

I do understand the difference between AUS and RA. The four Army/Army AF Generals of the Army had the same DoR as AUS or RA.

Delta Tank
Member
Posts: 2512
Joined: 16 Aug 2004 01:51
Location: Pennsylvania

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by Delta Tank » 24 Apr 2022 02:41

reedwh52 wrote:
23 Apr 2022 21:36
Thank you for correcting my typo on Arnold.

As shown, the four 5-star appointments were made to ensure a separation between DoR. The legislative intent of the authorizing legislation was, and did, preserve the differences in DoR.

Until he retired, Marshall had MacArthur by DoR. After he retired, MacArthur continued to have DoR on Eisenhower but was subordinated to him as Eisenhower was CoS.

I do understand the difference between AUS and RA. The four Army/Army AF Generals of the Army had the same DoR as AUS or RA.
However, thankfully, the Army did away with permanent and temporary ranks. I think it happened in the 1970’s?? Long time ago, when I was much younger and in better shape I was an aide to a division commander, his ORB (Officer Record Brief) would come across my desk every now and then. On his ORB were his dates of rank, permanent and temporary, which I found interesting, because my ORB did not have the temporary column!
Hmmm, I do remember guys getting “Frocked” to take command before their promotion dates, this was not common, and it was only for a few months.

Mike
Mike

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Banned
Posts: 3255
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 24 Apr 2022 04:10

Lethl215 wrote:I have no idea what you’re talking about.
Clearly. Research is your friend.
Lethl215 wrote:Assume Miller is the source?
Miller here is an analyst who partially agrees with my take. The sources are... WW2 primary/secondary documents and general knowledge...

There was no respectable strategy to hold the Malay Barrier, neither was there a strategic reckoning with the foreseeable consequences of losing the Malay Barrier (Germany First being hampered), neither was there agreement among the coalition partners (or within individual constituent countries) regarding the whether the Barrier would be lost.

If you have counterarguments to any of the foregoing, please present them.
Lethl215 wrote:And we may add that none of these what-if fantasies
Just what AHF needs - another old man hostile to, and/or uncomfortable with, counterfactual reasoning.
https://twitter.com/themarcksplan
https://www.reddit.com/r/AxisHistoryForum/
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

OpanaPointer
Financial supporter
Posts: 5593
Joined: 16 May 2010 14:12
Location: United States of America

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by OpanaPointer » 25 Apr 2022 12:25

Didn't Marshall personally ask MacArthur to go back to the PI and play panjandrum?
Come visit our sites:
hyperwarHyperwar
World War II Resources

Bellum se ipsum alet, mostly Doritos.

Lethl215
Member
Posts: 59
Joined: 19 Mar 2019 00:00
Location: Texas

Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

Post by Lethl215 » 25 Apr 2022 22:32

TheMarcksPlan aka, DOA Pamphlet no. 20-261a,
Clearly. Research is your friend.
Really? You want to go there? Obviously, you didn't rely on Miller for your assessment of RKT, because he's generally fair. You discount RKT's strategic analysis and war planning abilities because you know for sure he was an alcoholic? You might want to re-read pages 268-9 again.
Miller here is an analyst who partially agrees with my take. The sources are... WW2 primary/secondary documents and general knowledge...
Well, unless you helped Miller write a book that took 20 years of research and was published 31 years ago, you are agreeing with "some" of his "takes." But let me help you out here with sources, and we'll do it with RKT to make a point. Spouting off the above isn't going to cut it if you want to be taken seriously. Yup, rumors and post war memoirs can be rough, and many excellent authors have tried to humanize the larger-than-life heroes of WW2. RKT is a convenient target since his nickname was "Terrible." But his bosses had a pretty good opinion of the man, and one doesn't end up with 4-stars and commander of all PACFLT amphibious forces as a drunk fool. From Amphibians Came to Conquer
RKT Drinking 1.jpg
RKT Drinking 2.jpg
Yes, guys like Lundstrom and Prange could be harsh as noted by Frank:

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-hi ... ng-winners

But you'll also notice that he was rated very highly by the guys that mattered, and he obviously is someone quite revered to this day in the Navy, otherwise, the NHHC would not have put out a whole publication about RKT and war planning last year:

[url}https://www.history.navy.mil/content/da ... er_508.pdf[/url]

There's more. If you truly believe RKT should be disregarded, maybe read some of the guy's own papers from the NWC. But remember, it's 1937 were talking about - no internet:

https://usnwcarchives.org/repositories/ ... objects/77

https://usnwcarchives.org/repositories/ ... objects/78
There was no respectable strategy to hold the Malay Barrier, neither was there a strategic reckoning with the foreseeable consequences of losing the Malay Barrier (Germany First being hampered), neither was there agreement among the coalition partners (or within individual constituent countries) regarding the whether the Barrier would be lost.

If you have counterarguments to any of the foregoing, please present them.
Now, let's go back to your original post. For those that have WPO, I'll do your job for you; quote #1, p 284; #2, p.317; #3, p277. Yet, there is so much more meat in WPO than just a few snippets from Ch.24 and a small blurb from Ch.26. Perhaps re-reading Ch.22 and 23 devoted to Rainbow 2 and 3 planning along with ABC-1 will help with the above. That pesky section on RKT is in there too. Maybe look at the charts on p.278 and 279 for USN dispositions and timetables along with NTS requirements on p.238.

Now, being that WPO is over 30 years old, some much smarter guys than myself have produced some pretty good material. Boyd's The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters is one such book that may help. Ch.4 should clear up that haze. And for as much as I love Miller, I agree with Boyd's "take" on WPO, endnote 65, p.451:"The book is important for the range of its coverage and command of detail and sources. It has two failings. The structure lacks logic and coherence. It is neither chronological, nor built around consistent themes. This often makes Miller's core arguments hard to follow and less powerful than they deserve. He also adopts dismissive, even frivolous, style, which sometimes overcomes proper historical analysis. This applies especially to aspects of the American-British engagements through 1940/41, so is particularly irritating to British readers."
Lethl215 wrote:And we may add that none of these what-if fantasies
Now your just being sloppy. You credit me with a quote from cstunts in post #19. I only wish I had been so eloquent.
Just what AHF needs - another old man hostile to, and/or uncomfortable with, counterfactual reasoning.
Now, I've helped you out here Mr. lawyer, I guess "research was my friend." Is it yours? Can you show me those 3-1 correlation of forces? I know OpanaPointer is a huge source of links and documentation while being a man of few words. Maybe less "hostile" than me, but since he's my dad's age (probably even knew him in the Fleet) I guess that makes him really old if I'm just old. I don't know what it is about young whipper snappers and the warm blanket of Wikipedia and internet anonymity that produces such opinionated arrogance and the inability to back their positions with at least a few documents supporting their position. Maybe just stick with Barbarossa.
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.

Return to “WW2 in the Pacific & Asia”