Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

[Tom from Cornwall]

The covering letter to the report:

CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Covering Letter p.1 (2).JPG

CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Covering Letter p.2 (2).JPG

[Tom from Cornwall]

And finally, the JPS report on it:

CAB79-14-2 - JP(41) 693 - 25 Aug 41 - JPS report on ADB2 p.1.JPG

CAB79-14-2 - JP(41) 693 - 25 Aug 41 - JPS report on ADB2 p.1.JPG

I'll look out to see whether there are any COS or Defence committee minutes in response to this.

Regards

Tom

[OpanaPointer]

It is worth looking at the Memorandum that is being quoted in the above posts.
It's available for free downloading at the UK national archives.

If you send me good quality images I can convert them into a html file. I'd like that for Hyperwar. Don't have to be perfect, I use the organic processor under my hair for the hard spots.

[histan]

Hi OpanaPointer

I can send you the original download - it's in a pdf file. It's an attachment to a memorandum produced by the Chiefs of Staff that contains some more information. Missing from this copy is an Annex on the Mediterranean. I can send you a download of that as well.

If I send you what I have got on this paper and correspondence around it, you can decide what you want to use.

PM me with an e-mail address .

Regards

John

[Tom from Cornwall]

What had changed in Europe on Dec. 7 to enable concentration of 75% of RN in the Pacific?

A great question, although

What had changed in Europe on Dec. 7 to enable concentration of 75% of RN heavy units in the Indian Ocean?

But did the RN actually concentrate 75% of its heavy units in the Indian Ocean after the outbreak of the war with Japan?

And I should say here a massive thank you to AHF member Mescal - great work!

For RN battleships, see here:

viewtopic.php?f=114&t=150412&p=1307856& ... y#p1307856

For RN Carriers, see here:

viewtopic.php?f=114&t=159459&p=1391022& ... y#p1391022

For RN heavy cruisers, see here:

viewtopic.php?f=114&t=147623&p=1292975& ... y#p1292975

Simple answer is - no.

Regards

Tom

[Lethl215]

The incoherent timeline of this discussion is more interesting than TMP's original topic title. If anything, the document dumps, links and sources are getting fleshed out to such an extent that a more sympathetic "appreciation" should become more apparent. I look forward to OpanaPointer getting all this stuff in one spot:-)

A couple more from the UK Archives:

CAB 99-5, or the ABC-1 report. It's more fleshed out and detailed than the one reproduced in the PHA. Some of the text's edges are cut off so Opana will have to interpolate. It's also big at 111MB but can be downloaded free after making an account:

https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov. ... r/C4209153

CAB 99-18 RIVIERA Conference (9-12 Aug and the 20 Aug report papers) which amplifies the later report in CAB 79-14-2.

https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov. ... r/C4209166

At some point it may be worth summarizing all of the source links in one post, but I'm too lazy to do it.

[histan]

Guys

I have made a start on putting together a list of UK sources - covering the meetings of the War Cabinet, the Defence Committee Operations, the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chief of Staff Committee (Operations). All are available for free download from the National Archives. To get at these, follow the link provide above and then browse by hierarchy.
War Cabinet files are in CAB 65
Defence Committee files are in CAB 69
Chiefs of Staff Committee files are in CAB 79
Chiefs of Staff Committee (Operations) files are in CAB 80

Hope to produce this list quite soon.

There is a large amount of relevant information, in the form of input papers to the meetings that need sifting through to provide a timeline of relevant documents.

So far, I have looked at the Naval side of things - the defence of Malaya and responses to other possible actions will require significant further work.

Regards

John

[Fatboy Coxy]

I have been following this thread with great interest, on whether the US Navy could have done more to defend the Malay Barrier. There seems to be three periods to look at, firstly the original US Navy v IJN war plans, as a simple one on one war, which in my mind seems about right. Then there is the period of flux, with President Roosevelt steadily applying the economical stranglehold on Japan, while MacArthur pushes hard to reinforce the Philippines, and the US Navy is left seemingly out of step with these far more aggressive moves. And finally, war, and how little the US Navy does in defence of the Malay Barrier, generally withdrawing down to Australia. I've put that very simplistically, apologies.

While writing my Malaya What If, we've had quite a discussion on the defence of the Dutch East Indies, and I've been shown a real gem, worthy of sharing, regarding the evolving Dutch Naval Tactics.

Parma
''Navalisme nekt onderzeeboot'' by Jaap Anten
ISBN 978 90 5260 378 0 e-ISBN 978 90 4851 435 9 NUR 680
It is in Dutch but the last chapter summarize the book in English

and

HJ Tulp
https://scholarlypublications.universit ... 62914/view

Its, as they say, in Dutch with an English summary from page 673, running to 704. From about 702 it mentions interactions with the British and Americans, and I highly recommend reading it.

[cstunts]

RE-edit.

[cstunts]

The paper correctly analyzes the errors of Furstner & Helfrich's thinking (along w/their arrogance),but is not without its own flawed assertions.

"The earlier Dutch strategy – keeping the Dutch submarines to defend Java where the ABDA headquarters were also situated – would have fitted into Rainbow Five very well. It would not have been beyond the bounds of possibility that both the Japanese transport fleets dispatched against this island would have been sunk." (p. 702)

This is not realistic at all. Submarines were not going to destroy both Japanese invasion convoys.

How the Dutch were to operate their boats from the small & poorly defended naval bases on Java against Japanese air superiority is not addressed. That same quandary applies if he imagines that Asiatic Fleet or RN subs were also to operate from Java.
The paucity of minor vessels for basic port security at Surabaja in the first week of January was still a significant concern. Fuel would quickly become a problem, too, as Tarakan had stopped all production by Jan. 8, and Balikpapan reduced to 1/3rd.

And the destruction of Force Z emboldened both IJN surface ships and their air units as well. Not that Force Z would have stopped the IJN naval operations in the NEI either.
A perhaps interesting aspect for alt-hist buffs, postwar IJN scholars in Japan long ago admitted, the British really would have been better off to have sent a handful of the old 'R'-class BBs to Singapore rather than Force Z. That could have upset Japan's First Stage operations more effectively (including Pearl Harbor), and with more ramifications to subsequent phases.

FWIW

[Lethl215]

RADM Turner discussed the strategic situation with the General Board on 27 June 1941 just after RAINBOW 5 was massaged to reflect ABC-1. The meeting that Friday and following Monday was in the context for the combatant building program for 1943.

7090FD7E-A916-4223-B29A-42CB0D2611D2.jpeg

2E61AF95-68EF-4C29-B05D-37C46B6BCE2A.jpeg

9F9A4F09-C54F-4C4D-A99C-26C911757B61.jpeg

9FE4FED9-2033-40A7-898D-697A8627EF34.jpeg

3F2BAE77-CB50-4418-B4EB-6441BDBB8BC8.jpeg

There follows a detailed discussion of the ships and their particulars that I can post later.

[Fatboy Coxy]

Thank you for this Lethl215, a most interesting read.

Coming after the ABC-1 conference, as you say, it reflects well the concentrated thoughts towards Germany First. something that caught my eye was on the Fourth page, paragraph before last he talks about the importance of aircraft carriers, with regard to providing a mobile air asset that can be used around the coasts of Europe and Africa.

I suppose because he's using a broad brush in discussing strategy, he doesn't discuss the U-boat threat and how the USN will deal with that.

What's most interesting to me is when we get to page 5, para 2, and Japan. with him seemingly advocating for a strong fleet based in Hawaii, offensive actions against Japan through the Mandates, what the Japanese called their South Seas, and no mention of any defence of the Philippines.

What are we to make of this?

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

What's most interesting to me is when we get to page 5, para 2, and Japan. with him seemingly advocating for a strong fleet based in Hawaii, offensive actions against Japan through the Mandates, what the Japanese called their South Seas, and no mention of any defence of the Philippines.

What are we to make of this?

Spitballing off the top of my head this sounds like War Plan ORANGE, & its reiteration in the RAINBOW plans or Adm Kimmels WPP-46. None of those thought much about defending PI.

[Lethl215]

...

What's most interesting to me is when we get to page 5, para 2, and Japan. with him seemingly advocating for a strong fleet based in Hawaii, offensive actions against Japan through the Mandates, what the Japanese called their South Seas, and no mention of any defence of the Philippines.

What are we to make of this?

Spitballing off the top of my head this sounds like War Plan ORANGE, & its reiteration in the RAINBOW plans or Adm Kimmels WPP-46. None of those thought much about defending PI.

More like the RAINBOWs, with RAINBOW 1 as the basis of all of them with hemispheric defense being the principle prerequisite. I'll post the remainder of the meeting when I can. Really covers the projected makeup of the fleet from 1943 onward. RKT's "estimates of the situation" and "courses of action" from late June 1941 and the mindset of the GB is what makes the discussion so interesting.

[Lethl215]

General Board and various Bureau attendees:

01F3386B-326E-46CC-BB26-A9420FFC72E6.jpeg

D7153966-A897-4937-BED7-478DD9FDC3BC.jpeg

48B56C41-A902-43E2-9609-7665EDD3986F.jpeg

4F1707AA-DB9D-4CE1-9103-B8B16E6A7D12.jpeg