WHY ONLY 4 IJN CARRIERS AT MIDWAY

[AginAf]

ADM YAMAMOTO, NEVER A VICTIM OF IJN'S VICTORY DISEASE IN 1942 BUT A REALIST, WELL AWARE OF THE USA's WAR MAKING SUPERORITY, NEEDED ALL THE COMBAT CARRIER POWER HE COULD GET AT MIDWAY SINCE THE PLAN WAS TO DRAW OUT ALL THE EXISTING USN CARRIERS IN THE PACIFIC, AND AMBUSH/ DESTROY THEM AT MIDWAY.

YAMAMOTO HAD TO CONCEDE THE SIMULTANEOUS CARRIER STRIKE AT DUTCH HARBOR IN THE ALEUTIANS SINCE THAT WAS THE CONDITION IMPOSED UPON HIM BY THE IJN GENERAL STAFF IN ORDER FOR THEM TO APPROVE HIS " RISKY" MIDWAY OPERATION. THAT CONDITION DENIED HIM THE AVAILIBILITY OF THE CONVERTED PASSENGER SHIP CARRIER CVs JUNYO AND HIYO, PLUS A CVL LIGHT CARRIER.

IJN's KIDO BUTAI'S CARRIER DIVISION 5, CONSISTING OF THE MODERN HEAVY CVS ZUIKAKO & SHOKAKO, ARGUABLY THE BEST CVs ON THE PLANET AT THAT TIME, HAD BEEN HEAVILY WORKED OVER BY THE AMERICANS AT THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA, BUT THEN SO HAD USS YORKTOWN BEEN DAMAGED HEAVILY BY THE IJN, AND YET NIMITZ GOT HER READY FOR MIDWAY.

NOW, SPECIFICALLY, ZUIKAKO'S AIR GROUP HAD BEEN DIMINSHED IN COMBAT, BUT THE CARRIER HERSELF HAD TAKEN NO HITS AND WAS READY FOR COMBAT. HER SISTER, SHOKAKO, HAD BEEN TOO HAVILY DAMAGED BY THE USN AT CORAL SEA, BUT HER AIR GROUP WAS LARGELY INTACT.

SO THE QUESTION IS, WHY DIDN'T YAMAMOTO COMBINE THE TWO AIR GROUPS FROM DIVISION 5, PUT THEM ABOARD ZUIKAKO, AND MAKE HER THE 5TH CARRIER ON HIS FORCE AT MIDWAY - A MOVE THAT MIGHT WELL HAVE TURNED THE TIDE.

THE AMERICANS NOT ONLY HAD ONLY 3 CARRIERS TO START WITH, BUT USS HORNET VIRTULALY DID NOT PARTICIPATE, DECIMATING HER AIR GROUP BY FLYING THEM ON THE FLIGHT TO NOWHERE, FORCING THE DITCHING OF MANY, AND LOSS OF 18 AIRCREW, PLUS THE LOSS OF ALL TORPEDO 8 AIRCRAFT, WHICH FOUND KIDO BUTAI, BUT HAD NO FIGHTER COVER - ALL 15 SHOT DOWN. THAT LEFT THE USN WITH ONLY ENTERPRISE AND THE DAMAGED YORKTOWN (1 1/2 CARRIERS) AGAINST WHATEVER THE IJN COULD PUT UP - POTENTIALLY 5 IJN CVs vs 1 1/2 USN CVs.

SOME SAY YAMAMOTO'S FAILURE TO TAKE 5 CVs TO MIDWAY WAS BECAUSE IN THE IJN, CARRIER AIR GROUPS WERE A PART OF CARRIER SHIP'S CREW, AND COULD NOT BE MOVED AROUND, WHEREAS IN THE USN, THE AIR GROUP WAS A SEPARATE COMMAND ABOARD THEIR ASSIGNED CARRIER, AND COULD BE MOVED AROUND TO SHORE OR OTHER CARRIERS.

I REJECT THAT ARGUMENT. YAMAMOTO WAS AN EXTRAORDINARILY INNOVATIVE JAPANESE ADMIRAL - IF HE HAD TO BREAK TRADITION TO GET 5 BATTLEWORTHY CARRIERS TO SEA TO DESTROY AMERICA'S CARRIER FLEET, HE WOULD HAVE DONE SO.

MY TAKE IS THAT YAMAMOTO WAS BOTH PHYSICALLY ILL, AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY DESPONDANT AT MIDWAY, AND MADE A NUMBER OF BAD DECISIONS AT THAT FIGHT BECAUSE OF HIS CONDITION - THE 5 CARRIER OPTION BEING REJECTED AS ONE OF THOSE BAD DECISIONS,

HE WAS DEATHLY ILL WITH A CASE OF ROUND WORMS EATING AT HIS GUT, PLUS HE WAS SEVERELY DESPONDANT, AS ONLY A JAPANESE WARRIOR CAN BE DESPONDANT, BECAUSE HIS NAVY HAD INEPTLY ALLOWED THE USAAF DOLITTLE RAID IN APRIL TO PENETRATE INTO THE SKIES OVER THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS, INCLUDING THREATENING THE EMPEROR'S LIFE BY BOMBING TOKYO.. SO THESE CONDITIONS INFLUENCED THE MAKING OF BAD DECISIONS

AFTER MIDWAY, I BELIEVE HE REALIZED THAT HIS HOPE OF ONE YEAR OF OFFENSIVELY RUNNING AMUCK DEFEATING THE AMERICANS HAD ONLY LASTED 6 MONTHS, AND WHILE THE TIDE HAD NOT TURNED, JAPAN'S OFFENSIVE INITIATIVE ERA WAS AT AN END.I DON'T THINK HE WAS EVER THE SAME BRILLIANT ADMIRAL HE HAD BEEN FROM DEC 1941 TO JUNE 1942. IN ESSENCE, WE ASSASSINATED A DEFEATED AND DESPONDANT LEADER IN 1943 - UNNESSARY. WE HAD THEM ON THEM ROPES IN WHICH EVEN A BLOODY AND COSTLY DEFENSE WOULD NOT SERVE TO GET ANERICA TO SEEK AN ARBITRATED CEASE FIRE, ONLY AN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER - WELL, BARELY. WE WERE ACTUALLY RUNNING OUT OF WILPOWER BY TIME OF OKINAWA.
THOUGHTS?
WAYNE LONG

[Kingfish]

SO THE QUESTION IS, WHY DIDN'T YAMAMOTO COMBINE THE TWO AIR GROUPS FROM DIVISION 5, PUT THEM ABOARD ZUIKAKO, AND MAKE HER THE 5TH CARRIER ON HIS FORCE AT MIDWAY - A MOVE THAT MIGHT WELL HAVE TURNED THE TIDE.

Because he didn't think he needed 5 carriers. His plans were predicated on the belief that 2 US carriers were sunk at Coral Sea and his own forces would arrive off Midway days ahead of the remaining US carriers.

[EwenS]

ADM YAMAMOTO, NEVER A VICTIM OF IJN'S VICTORY DISEASE IN 1942 BUT A REALIST, WELL AWARE OF THE USA's WAR MAKING SUPERORITY, NEEDED ALL THE COMBAT CARRIER POWER HE COULD GET AT MIDWAY SINCE THE PLAN WAS TO DRAW OUT ALL THE EXISTING USN CARRIERS IN THE PACIFIC, AND AMBUSH/ DESTROY THEM AT MIDWAY.

YAMAMOTO HAD TO CONCEDE THE SIMULTANEOUS CARRIER STRIKE AT DUTCH HARBOR IN THE ALEUTIANS SINCE THAT WAS THE CONDITION IMPOSED UPON HIM BY THE IJN GENERAL STAFF IN ORDER FOR THEM TO APPROVE HIS " RISKY" MIDWAY OPERATION. THAT CONDITION DENIED HIM THE AVAILIBILITY OF THE CONVERTED PASSENGER SHIP CARRIER CVs JUNYO AND HIYO, PLUS A CVL LIGHT CARRIER.

IJN's KIDO BUTAI'S CARRIER DIVISION 5, CONSISTING OF THE MODERN HEAVY CVS ZUIKAKO & SHOKAKO, ARGUABLY THE BEST CVs ON THE PLANET AT THAT TIME, HAD BEEN HEAVILY WORKED OVER BY THE AMERICANS AT THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA, BUT THEN SO HAD USS YORKTOWN BEEN DAMAGED HEAVILY BY THE IJN, AND YET NIMITZ GOT HER READY FOR MIDWAY.

NOW, SPECIFICALLY, ZUIKAKO'S AIR GROUP HAD BEEN DIMINSHED IN COMBAT, BUT THE CARRIER HERSELF HAD TAKEN NO HITS AND WAS READY FOR COMBAT. HER SISTER, SHOKAKO, HAD BEEN TOO HAVILY DAMAGED BY THE USN AT CORAL SEA, BUT HER AIR GROUP WAS LARGELY INTACT.

SO THE QUESTION IS, WHY DIDN'T YAMAMOTO COMBINE THE TWO AIR GROUPS FROM DIVISION 5, PUT THEM ABOARD ZUIKAKO, AND MAKE HER THE 5TH CARRIER ON HIS FORCE AT MIDWAY - A MOVE THAT MIGHT WELL HAVE TURNED THE TIDE.

THE AMERICANS NOT ONLY HAD ONLY 3 CARRIERS TO START WITH, BUT USS HORNET VIRTULALY DID NOT PARTICIPATE, DECIMATING HER AIR GROUP BY FLYING THEM ON THE FLIGHT TO NOWHERE, FORCING THE DITCHING OF MANY, AND LOSS OF 18 AIRCREW, PLUS THE LOSS OF ALL TORPEDO 8 AIRCRAFT, WHICH FOUND KIDO BUTAI, BUT HAD NO FIGHTER COVER - ALL 15 SHOT DOWN. THAT LEFT THE USN WITH ONLY ENTERPRISE AND THE DAMAGED YORKTOWN (1 1/2 CARRIERS) AGAINST WHATEVER THE IJN COULD PUT UP - POTENTIALLY 5 IJN CVs vs 1 1/2 USN CVs.

SOME SAY YAMAMOTO'S FAILURE TO TAKE 5 CVs TO MIDWAY WAS BECAUSE IN THE IJN, CARRIER AIR GROUPS WERE A PART OF CARRIER SHIP'S CREW, AND COULD NOT BE MOVED AROUND, WHEREAS IN THE USN, THE AIR GROUP WAS A SEPARATE COMMAND ABOARD THEIR ASSIGNED CARRIER, AND COULD BE MOVED AROUND TO SHORE OR OTHER CARRIERS.

I REJECT THAT ARGUMENT. YAMAMOTO WAS AN EXTRAORDINARILY INNOVATIVE JAPANESE ADMIRAL - IF HE HAD TO BREAK TRADITION TO GET 5 BATTLEWORTHY CARRIERS TO SEA TO DESTROY AMERICA'S CARRIER FLEET, HE WOULD HAVE DONE SO.

MY TAKE IS THAT YAMAMOTO WAS BOTH PHYSICALLY ILL, AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY DESPONDANT AT MIDWAY, AND MADE A NUMBER OF BAD DECISIONS AT THAT FIGHT BECAUSE OF HIS CONDITION - THE 5 CARRIER OPTION BEING REJECTED AS ONE OF THOSE BAD DECISIONS,

HE WAS DEATHLY ILL WITH A CASE OF ROUND WORMS EATING AT HIS GUT, PLUS HE WAS SEVERELY DESPONDANT, AS ONLY A JAPANESE WARRIOR CAN BE DESPONDANT, BECAUSE HIS NAVY HAD INEPTLY ALLOWED THE USAAF DOLITTLE RAID IN APRIL TO PENETRATE INTO THE SKIES OVER THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS, INCLUDING THREATENING THE EMPEROR'S LIFE BY BOMBING TOKYO.. SO THESE CONDITIONS INFLUENCED THE MAKING OF BAD DECISIONS

AFTER MIDWAY, I BELIEVE HE REALIZED THAT HIS HOPE OF ONE YEAR OF OFFENSIVELY RUNNING AMUCK DEFEATING THE AMERICANS HAD ONLY LASTED 6 MONTHS, AND WHILE THE TIDE HAD NOT TURNED, JAPAN'S OFFENSIVE INITIATIVE ERA WAS AT AN END.I DON'T THINK HE WAS EVER THE SAME BRILLIANT ADMIRAL HE HAD BEEN FROM DEC 1941 TO JUNE 1942. IN ESSENCE, WE ASSASSINATED A DEFEATED AND DESPONDANT LEADER IN 1943 - UNNESSARY. WE HAD THEM ON THEM ROPES IN WHICH EVEN A BLOODY AND COSTLY DEFENSE WOULD NOT SERVE TO GET ANERICA TO SEEK AN ARBITRATED CEASE FIRE, ONLY AN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER - WELL, BARELY. WE WERE ACTUALLY RUNNING OUT OF WILPOWER BY TIME OF OKINAWA.
THOUGHTS?
WAYNE LONG

Re Yorktown. She was patched up and still nursed the wounds she had received at Coral Sea when she sailed for Midway. Full repairs would have taken several months back on the West Coast. See these articles for a flavour of what was done.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-hi ... g-survival
https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/sto ... coral-sea/

Nimitz took a calculated risk sending her out.

In comparison the Shokaku had been damaged much more extensively. This from the Combined Fleet TROM:-

8 May 1942
"0907-0916 severely damaged by two bomb hits from YORKTOWN bombers. One tore open the port bow and started a fire in the forecastle. The anchor chains are severed and the anchors go plunging to the bottom. The second struck the end of the flight deck to starboard, killing all gunners at No.11 25 mm mount. At 0940 in a second attack a third bomb hit is scored by a LEXINGTON bomber, hitting the starboard side of the rear of the island, damaging gun tubs and the main signal mast which is left leaning forward. Lt. Sugiyama Juro is among those killed by this hit. The shocks disable the forward elevator and large fires break out, but SHOKAKU evaded all twenty torpedoes dropped against her successfully. Yet the carrier is rendered incapable of operating aircraft and 108 officers and men are killed by the fires and explosions, and another 40 wounded. Ten aircraft reported lost."

Those of her aircraft that were airborne at the time either ditched or, landed on Zuikaku with at least 2 heading for a seaplane base in the Shortlands. So I doubt that it can be said that her air group was anywhere near intact. In particular her forward flight deck had been seriously damaged to an extent far greater than that of Yorktown.

12 May 1942 while en route to Japan
Final leg home commences - successfully avoiding further submarines en-route; however, with the high speeds and gashed port bow, the ship takes on so much water she nearly capsizes en route.(Note: water entering the shattered bow apparently caused steep lists at speed, but the day or position of greatest crisis has not been found. Presumably in a time of heavy seas.)

Shokaku had to return to Japan to find the necessary repair facilities. Truk had no dry docks. Although she arrived at Kure on 17 May 1942 she was placed in the Reserve Unit of the Mobile Force and didn't enter dry dock for repairs until 16 June which weren't completed until 27 June.

Why the delay in docking her? Perhaps none was available when she arrived?

That TROM also has a note that:-
Despite the impending MI operation, pre-MO Operation plans to transfer a number of CarDiv 5's air crews to other units proceeds as planned, as replacement aircraft are not available.[1]

And note 1

Note 1: The pre-Coral Sea plans to transfers aviators of CarDiv 5 to other bases or carriers coupled with the lack of adequate ready replacement aircraft for Coral Sea losses was the main reason CarDiv 5 was not pressed to participate in the Midway Operation. No doubt this sentiment to proceed with the scheduled transfers was strengthened by the May 14 message sent to Combined Fleet that CarDiv 5's losses and that ZUIKAKU had lost 40% of her aviators precluded that carrier's ready use. At the time it was apparently felt that the addition of ZUIKAKU as a "one division ship" with weakened air complement was redundant and would raise more logistical and tactical problems than it would solve. Only hindsight makes it seem obviously a wrong decision.(The Japanese apparently did not think so even in hindsight, for after Midway. When a similar situation obtained after the Santa Cruz battle, the same choice was made and an opportunity to reinforce ZUIKAKU's weakened air group with HIYO's was not taken and she was instead sent home on November 4, 1942 two days after SHOKAKU, thus missing the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November.) As it was, ZUIKAKU was on May 25 allocated to the latter June phase of the projected Aluetians Operations should she be required.

Cardiv 5 (Shokaku & Zuikaku) air groups were never considered by the Japanese to be of the same standard as those of Cardiv 1 & 2 throughout this early war period. This was principally because they had only been formed in Sept/Oct 1941.

You refer to Yamamoto not having the services of "Junyo and Hiyo plus a CVL light carrier" at Midway.

Hiyo did not commission until 31 July 1942. Junyo had only commissioned on 3 May 1942 and her air group only formed on 8 May and joined her on 18 May. Even then it was incomplete. It lacked Kate torpedo bombers altogether (18 had been planned) and 12 of the 18 Zero fighters aboard had come from another air group (6th Kokutai). So very much a ship and an air group requiring time to work up as a single efficient entity. It was July 1942, after the reorganisation of the Combined Fleet, that she received her full airgroup, albeit one changed from the plans for her drawn up before PH.

[Eugen Pinak]

EwenS correctly answered your main questions.
And 5 cents more from me.

ADM YAMAMOTO, NEVER A VICTIM OF IJN'S VICTORY DISEASE IN 1942 BUT A REALIST, WELL AWARE OF THE USA's WAR MAKING SUPERORITY, NEEDED ALL THE COMBAT CARRIER POWER HE COULD GET AT MIDWAY SINCE THE PLAN WAS TO DRAW OUT ALL THE EXISTING USN CARRIERS IN THE PACIFIC, AND AMBUSH/ DESTROY THEM AT MIDWAY.

Not "carriers", but "fleet". And by the time of decisive battle against US Pacific Fleet all IJN CVs with air groups (save "Hosho" with obsolete planes, but plus two seaplane carriers and three land-based air groups) were to be ready to face Americans. And that's including "Zuikaku".

SOME SAY YAMAMOTO'S FAILURE TO TAKE 5 CVs TO MIDWAY WAS BECAUSE IN THE IJN, CARRIER AIR GROUPS WERE A PART OF CARRIER SHIP'S CREW, AND COULD NOT BE MOVED AROUND, WHEREAS IN THE USN, THE AIR GROUP WAS A SEPARATE COMMAND ABOARD THEIR ASSIGNED CARRIER, AND COULD BE MOVED AROUND TO SHORE OR OTHER CARRIERS.

I REJECT THAT ARGUMENT. YAMAMOTO WAS AN EXTRAORDINARILY INNOVATIVE JAPANESE ADMIRAL - IF HE HAD TO BREAK TRADITION TO GET 5 BATTLEWORTHY CARRIERS TO SEA TO DESTROY AMERICA'S CARRIER FLEET, HE WOULD HAVE DONE SO.

You are absolutely right here. Despite being an organic part of IJN CV crew, IJN carrier air groups, their parts and even individual air crews were moved around when necessary. There was a special provision on the IJN CV TO&E, which described how to make a detachment from its carrier air group.

MY TAKE IS THAT YAMAMOTO WAS BOTH PHYSICALLY ILL, AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY DESPONDANT AT MIDWAY, AND MADE A NUMBER OF BAD DECISIONS AT THAT FIGHT BECAUSE OF HIS CONDITION - THE 5 CARRIER OPTION BEING REJECTED AS ONE OF THOSE BAD DECISIONS,

I've yet to see any source confirming this. Any way the main decisions, influencing outcome of the battle, were made by him and his staff (AND supported by Navy General Staff) way before battle.

[Carl Schwamberger]

SO THE QUESTION IS, WHY DIDN'T YAMAMOTO COMBINE THE TWO AIR GROUPS FROM DIVISION 5, PUT THEM ABOARD ZUIKAKO, AND MAKE HER THE 5TH CARRIER ON HIS FORCE AT MIDWAY - A MOVE THAT MIGHT WELL HAVE TURNED THE TIDE.

Because he didn't think he needed 5 carriers. His plans were predicated on the belief that 2 US carriers were sunk at Coral Sea and his own forces would arrive off Midway days ahead of the remaining US carriers.

Note how the other carriers, one hanging back to cover the support or invasion fleet, and the two in the Alteutins operation could respectively join Nagumos group fairly quickly. The plan depended on a combination of signals intel, submarines pickets, and air reconnaissance to warn when the US fleet sortied from Oahu. Also route and speed. Yamamotos plan allowed for consolidation of five, and best case seven carriers, depending on how slow the USN was sortieing the fleet after the Japanese fleet was discovered at Midway.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
I've yet to see any source confirming this. Any way the main decisions, influencing outcome of the battle, were made by him and his staff (AND supported by Navy General Staff) way before battle.

As I recall Yamamoto made two decisions during the battle. One was to order the main fleet forward to locate and destroy the newly revealed USN fleet. The second was to order general retirement, and the bombardment mission of Midway by the cruisers to cover the retirement. All the other key tactical or operational decisions wereMade by Nagumo, or others.

[Delta Tank]

SO THE QUESTION IS, WHY DIDN'T YAMAMOTO COMBINE THE TWO AIR GROUPS FROM DIVISION 5, PUT THEM ABOARD ZUIKAKO, AND MAKE HER THE 5TH CARRIER ON HIS FORCE AT MIDWAY - A MOVE THAT MIGHT WELL HAVE TURNED THE TIDE.

Because he didn't think he needed 5 carriers. His plans were predicated on the belief that 2 US carriers were sunk at Coral Sea and his own forces would arrive off Midway days ahead of the remaining US carriers.

Note how the other carriers, one hanging back to cover the support or invasion fleet, and the two in the Alteutins operation could respectively join Nagumos group fairly quickly. The plan depended on a combination of signals intel, submarines pickets, and air reconnaissance to warn when the US fleet sortied from Oahu. Also route and speed. Yamamotos plan allowed for consolidation of five, and best case seven carriers, depending on how slow the USN was sortieing the fleet after the Japanese fleet was discovered at Midway.

IIRC in the book entitled “Shattered SWORD” the authors explain why they did not combine the two air groups from Zuikako and Shokaku into one air group. Unfortunately I can not remember the reason but, it didn’t make sense to me when I read it.

https://www.amazon.com/Shattered-Sword- ... 1574889249

Mike

[Eugen Pinak]

...
I've yet to see any source confirming this. Any way the main decisions, influencing outcome of the battle, were made by him and his staff (AND supported by Navy General Staff) way before battle.

As I recall Yamamoto made two decisions during the battle. One was to order the main fleet forward to locate and destroy the newly revealed USN fleet. The second was to order general retirement, and the bombardment mission of Midway by the cruisers to cover the retirement. All the other key tactical or operational decisions wereMade by Nagumo, or others.

Yes. As well as trying to lure US forces for the battle off Wake and continuing Aleutian operations after ordering retreat at Midway.
But none of those decisions was influencing the outcome of the battle.