Why did Southeast Asia fall in 1941-1942?

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
Michael Tapner
Member
Posts: 82
Joined: 24 May 2004, 02:06
Location: Sydney, Australia

#16

Post by Michael Tapner » 07 Jun 2004, 15:01

I will try and be more careful with my numerical quotes in future, as many of our readers and contributors are not native English speakers. I will just make two comments in defence of the figures from Woodburn Kirby that I quoted earlier. First the numbers listed are for FORCE totals and are not front line infantry component only. As FORCE totals he points out that this includes air crews and the relevant ground complements. Obviously not all this manpower is going to be based in Malaya and does not need to be moved there for the Japanese. Secondly I listed the quote as referring to the MALAYA campaign. They are not specific for the Singapore action. They are also based on the initial force comparison and do not include reinforcements or withdrawals.

Yes, Yamashita may have conducted his Singapore operation with only 30,000, but these are 30,000 combat troops from the Guards, 5th and 18th divisions (all of which did an outstanding job throughout the campaign) It would presumably not include the 'tail' of the divisions, of which the later two were square divisions and would have had full divisional strengths in excess of 21,000 men, with a frontline rifleman strength of roughly 9,500. However comparing this figure to the total number of Allied casualties by making a straight numerical comparison is opening one up to the same tactic that Churchill used in a cable to Wavell in February just prior to SIngapore falling. A majority of the Allied personnel were not front line combat personnel. Using the Australian 8th division by way of example: At the commencement of the Singapore operation the Australian contingent numbered over 17,000. Yet the unit was a 2 brigade division, which equates to a front line rifleman strength of roughly 3,000 only. Scratch battalions, such as the Snake Gully Rifles, were made up out of some of the corps personnel such as the Signallers. But this still left many thousands of non-combat personnel such as nurses going into the bag.

I would also like to take a look at the Casualty figures that Mars lists.
About 8000 allied troops were killed in the Malasyia-Singapore campaign, the Japaness loss were minimal, they only lossed about 1700 killed and 3400 wounded.
These figures for the Allies cover the entire Malaya/ Singapore losses for the Allies but cover only the Singapore campaign losses for the Japanese.
Full Japanese Battle casualties for the Malaya/Singapore campaign were 9,824 (Killed & wounded). Of this the Japanese losses in the assault on Singapore amounted to 1,714 killed and 3,378 wounded. The Allied losses during the campaign were a little over 8,000 but this total includes killed and wounded, not just killed. For example the losses of the Australian contingent were 1,306 wounded and 1,789 killed. (Source: Wigmore, 'The Japanese Thrust')

Yamashita could not land 110,000 troops by sea due to a shortage of transports.
The vast majority of the Imperial Guards division arrived by train through Thailand. This lessened the need on transports!

Having said all that, I still think it is hats off to the Japanese. They fought a brilliant campaign against the inept one fought by the Allies.

ohrdruf
Member
Posts: 862
Joined: 15 May 2004, 23:02
Location: south america

#17

Post by ohrdruf » 12 Jun 2004, 23:35

Unknown to the British, a full set of defence plans for Singapore fell into German hands when the freighter "Automedon" was captured by the raider "Atlantis". A German naval officer brought the plans to Tokyo. (See U Mohr: Atlantis)


ninoo
Member
Posts: 489
Joined: 10 Nov 2003, 09:08
Location: manado

#18

Post by ninoo » 17 Jun 2004, 14:59

Hi,

In case of Dutch East Indies, it is largely fault of Dutch colonial government themselves. In some books I read that the colonial gov. repeatedly turned down Indonesian MPs in colonial parliament-like to form and armed a native militia because they worried that someday Indonesian nationalist will use the militia to throw them for their's paradise colony. Even when the Japanese intention to East Indies had been clear, the Dutch still against the idea about native militia. Like one of their's high officers said to Indonesian students that ask why Dutch only want to recruit 3,500 volunteers not 35,000, "because 35,000 mean we need 10 years to train and armed them properly."
But, who could blame the Dutch thinking? After all, for more than 100 years, excluding fighting in colonial wars, they never fought against a formidable enemy like Japannese. Contrary, like many Westerners during the time, they loath Japanese and didn't believe that this yellow race could defeat them all in one stroke (just like an American admiral that said Japanese fleet only a bath-tub navy)
:D
In British case, it's clear that they didn't have enough power to defended their's colony because they put more attention with their's own survival.
Then, in American case there are always many discussion about it. Even some historians accussed that American intentionally to forced Japan to attack them, thus they could enter the war in Allied side to fight the Axis. And even some American top-brass like MacArthur accused Roosevelt allowed him to swallowed a defeat in Phillipine by send reinforcement that really needed by him to Europe. BTW, MacArthur-Roosevelt different opinions are product of an old American battling foreign policies: Europe first or Pasific first?

Best Regards

Bless the people who like help others

http://oktorino.tripod.com
http://stostruppen39-45.tripod.com

mars
Member
Posts: 1174
Joined: 03 Oct 2002, 20:50
Location: Shanghai

#19

Post by mars » 21 Jun 2004, 03:01

I just got a copy of Alan Warren's "Singapore 1942", in his book, Alan brought the casualities of British and Commonwealth in Malaya-Singapore camapign, detail to batallion level: about 7500 killed and 10000 wounded. Japanes casualities in Malya-Singapore were 3506 killed and 6150 wounded

chino
Member
Posts: 8
Joined: 01 Jul 2004, 14:05
Location: Shanghai, Singapore

Truth, the first casualty of war - especially in defeat

#20

Post by chino » 05 Jul 2004, 08:25

The loss of Malaya and Singapore had often been cited as one of the most major defeat of the Allies in WW2.

Because it was an embarrassing and complete rout, 60 years later I still get the impression that the finger-pointing continues in the form of different historical accounts published by authors depending on their sympathies.

The victors often get to write their version of history but in the case of the Malaya campaign, the mistakes were too glaring even for the eventual victors to hide. And if not for the atomic bombs dropped on Japan, retaking Malaya by Allied forces would make Iwo Jima etc look like a dress rehearsal.

Some British authors today still blame the Australians for the failure and vice versa.

What everyone seems to agree was that the Indian Army was next to useless. (To confirm this many of them joined the Japanese-backed Indian National Army (INA) though - to their credit - none fought against their former allies.) The Indian Army was the bulk of the fighting force, so their collapse was a major deciding factor.

The most serious accusation is from the author of one book I read which cited that the Australians had no will to fight and even accused the Australians of looting as they retreated towards the Singapore harbour. Furthermore, he accused the Australians of forcing civilians off ships leaving Singapore at gunpoint so they can board the escaping vessels in their place.

This is a very serious accusation and I wonder if there is any basis to it. I can't remember the author or the title of the book.

Further this same author described an action taken by a local company or platoon of the Singapore Malay Regiment led by a Lieutenant Adnan. They had switched to bayonets after running out of ammo to stubbornly repulse Japanese attacks. They fought to the last man. The author alleged that a nearby Australian unit had refused to resupply them or come to their aid.

Of course, the Australians would often accuse the British of arrogance, inflexibility, ignorance and incompetence.

And then it was alleged that the Thais had a dirty hand in the whole thing. Apparently they had a very powerful and modern army and airforce and they attacked French Indochina over some territorial disputes prior to Jap invasion of SEA. The French were in no shape to fight anyone so they sued for peace. Japan stepped in as a peace broker and ended up gaining access to airbases in Vietnam. The Thais got next to nothing. It was from these Jap-held airbases in Vietnam that (I think) the aircrafts were launched to sink the HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales. These airbases also provided all the aircover the invasion needed. And then the Thais chose not to repulse the Japs when they landed their forces in the South of Thailand to invade Malaya. It wasn't so much that the British didn't repulse the landings but the majority of the Jap forces came across the Thai borders. Ir wasn't as if a Japanese "D-Day" amphibious assault happened at Kota Bahru in Malaysia and everyone just stood around scratching their balls.

Some of the people I think should have been severely punished after the war are the British High Command who should've been tried and punished for incompetence of the highest order. And then the Thais really shouldn't have gotten off completely scot-free for collaboration with the Japs.

But in a strange way - the Jap excuse for invasion: to help SEA shake off the european colonists - did in the end happen. The defeat of the British in a mere 2 months after a lifetime of colonialism in Singapore and Malaya must've sow the seeds of independence in many minds.

Unlike Malaya, the Indonesians had always fought the Dutch colonialists so when they came back unashamedly after WW2, they again found no welcome.

Michael Tapner
Member
Posts: 82
Joined: 24 May 2004, 02:06
Location: Sydney, Australia

#21

Post by Michael Tapner » 05 Jul 2004, 14:52

Chino, you raise many interesting points in your last post! I would like to address some of them, and I'm sureothers will also raise other points of view as there is a great deal of untapped knowledge on the subject!

On the Brit/Australian Blame laying, yes this is quite evident. The Australian histories and Major General Gordon Bennett's own account point the finger - although at slightly different things. Australians tend to blame the Indian troops for not holding the flanks - perhaps with some justification in the Malayan Campaign too. Part of the problem seems to have been that the Allies were never in the position to have a front wide defense from competent troops. When units with promise acted to hold the Japanese successfully, the weaker flanks would all to easily give way.

Incidently, the earliest predicition of disaster that I have read came about in Mid December. One of the senior Air officers commented that if the Allied high command did not send substantial modern air units and extra quality fighting forces that Singapore would be lost in 6 weeks. He was seen as pessimistic by High command in England - but he was right.

As for deserting Aussies, this is a case where one story is multiplied and multiplied and multiplied. I have read one account which lists over 6,000 Australians as trying to flee recklessly on comandeered boats. This is not the case. Some Australians did leave the Island - entirely legally as a number of units - both Australian and British were redeployed to Java. But of the 18,000 Australians to serve in Singapore/Malaya, 2,000 died or were evacuated injured, 1,800 were evacuated due to troop redeployment/withdrawal of air assets while 14,000 were captured in an isolated pocket surrounded by Japanese to the North west side of Singapore harbor. They were actually fairly removed from the opportunity to wildly comandeer boats and flee. Yes some did attempt this, but many of these were of corps support forces and were not part of the regular soldiery of the 8th division.

Yes the British would call it looting. Australians would call it destruction of territory before surrendering it to the enemy or (if in friendly territory) borrowing :) . By way of example Such a thing happened with artillery pieces. In mid December the Australian artillery was upgraded from 18 pdrs to 25 pounders. Now the Australian battalions took on a full quota of 25 pounders and failed to return all the 18 pounders, as they were sufficiently over strength in personnel to man an extra 2 batteries. The Australian OH refers to this as initiative on the part of the commander. The British OH's refer to it as looting. The Indian OH's were just glad they did it as the extra fire power was used to help their troops.

Don't know about the Australian / Malay regiment position. The Australian OH actually praises the fighting quality of the 1st Malayan brigade - which was fighting on the left flank of the Australian formation during the later days of the Singapore campaign. As for not handing over ammo, it could very simply be a case (as all defenders were short on supplies) that they actually had none to give. However it could also have been the province of a small minded local commander.

How high up does the blame on the Allied side go? Percival? or should it go higher to Winston Churchill himself, who just did not have (or make available due to shipping limitations?) the resources that the commanders were crying out for. Can the lack of equipment be traced back to the British dumping it all at Dunkerque??

Just my 2 cents!

Mike

chino
Member
Posts: 8
Joined: 01 Jul 2004, 14:05
Location: Shanghai, Singapore

#22

Post by chino » 06 Jul 2004, 18:56

Actually, the odds were always against the Allies. The Japs planned the invasion so thoroughly they simply deserved to win - from a purely military perspective. They had all their spies hard at work photographing installations, defences. They got their hands on Indochinese airbases without firing a single shot thanks to the bloody Thais.

And then the troops they deployed were were drawn from the battle-hardened, blood-thirsty Kwangtung Army that had fought successfully in China for years!

But there is a myth that bothers me everytime I hear it.

It's about the blooming naval guns. Everyone goes on about how dumb it was to have guns pointing out to sea. And then someone would point out "but they CAN point to the north" and then someone else would say they only had armour-piercing shells etc etc.

No offense to anyone and these are all correct facts.

But so what if the entire naval battery did turn around and fired HE shells at the Japanese invaders? Yeah, the casualty rates would definitely have risen to very high levels. Would that turn the tide of the battle? I doubt so... Naval guns are huge but they do not have the high volume and speed of fire to be devastating to a mobile invasion force. They're good for shooting something slow moving. Infantry would just scatter or spread out or dig in to minimise the damage.

But unfortuantely, the British don't seem to have much field artillery pieces either, right?

The British actually HAD a sound defence strategy of Malaya. they had the naval guns to cover the weak underbelly in the South which is Singapore. They actually have little to worry about as far as a seaborne invasion of Singapore is concerned. This is right, this is good. This leaves them free to concentrate on defending against a land-based invasion from the North. And this they did, also.

In the North they have all these battalions of infantry etc. Tanks even.

(This is another myth I am still checking. Apparently the Allied troops did have tanks and the Australian anti-tank gunners reported nearly shooting retreating Indian tanks. Maybe they meant Bren gun carriers?)

What's wrong with this strategy? Nothing.

Even today, Singapore's defence strategy is to defend the island from Malaysia (Forward Defence) should the threat come from the North. In the event of an invasion from the North, Singapore will rush troops to occupy a line of defence somewhere in Malaysia.

Just as the Allies did in WW2.

The only things wrong is of course the Allies had next to no airforce, poorly coordinated ground troops and a hopeless High Command.

They also had no navy they could mobilise to counter an amphibious landing force that could choose to land anywhere on the Malay peninsula.

I am also curious about the allegations that the Indians were bad troops. According to some accounts the Indian troops like the Punjabs and Gurkhas fought bravely as did many other Aliied troops. Many post-war commentators like to say how poor a fight the Allied soldiers put up as a way of explaining to themselves how the Japs could possibly reach Singapore in 2 months? The Japanese were simply too good. They were probably the most excellent fighting force ever, morality issues aside.

Everyone talks about how spectacular the German Blitzkrieg was but I'm very sure the Japs had a much harder job but they did move like lightning through thick and heavily-defended tropical jungles. This would make the Germans driving through their European neighbours with weak armies look like a walk in the park.


Check this Australian site of the 4th Anti-tank Regiment:
http://home.vicnet.net.au/~antitank/index.htm

chino
Member
Posts: 8
Joined: 01 Jul 2004, 14:05
Location: Shanghai, Singapore

#23

Post by chino » 06 Jul 2004, 19:28

Oh no, found this very bad report on the Punjabi turncoats:


Reports of people who were there and other reliable sources indicate that source of many of the beatings was actually the Sikhs who had gone over to the Japanese and were used as guards. It is recorded that the Japanese stopped the abuses fairly quickly.

Then again there were the guards. Most were Sikhs who had succumbed to Japanese pressure and had gone over to the enemy. These Sikhs, who were regarded as traitors by the prisoners, took advantage of their position to make increasingly absurd demands on the prisoners and eventually even the Japanese realised that they were going too far. Consequently in November 1942 the Japanese tried to remove the causes of the trouble by rdering the Indians to recognize all forms of salutation, not to enter the prisoner-of-war area except when on duty, and not to strike the prisoners who failed to salute. Forbidden to use violence, the Sikhs now resorted to forcing the escorting officers to strike the prisoners, and they also took any opportunity to drill alleged offenders and to make them stand to attention for long periods.  

Michael Tapner
Member
Posts: 82
Joined: 24 May 2004, 02:06
Location: Sydney, Australia

#24

Post by Michael Tapner » 09 Jul 2004, 16:17

I am also curious about the allegations that the Indians were bad troops. According to some accounts the Indian troops like the Punjabs and Gurkhas fought bravely as did many other Aliied troops.
Chino, the best way to find out how any nationality soldiers do is to read about them in somebody elses Official History. For example the American OH's say how wonderful the American forces were, the British OH's say how well the British soldier fought, while the Australian OH's will say how well the Australian soldiers fought and the New Zealand OH's will say how well the Kiwi's fought. Even the Papuan Histories say how well the Green Berets fought. The same is not the case for the Indians. Even the Indian OH for the campaigns in SE Asia do not speak favourably of the overall performance of Indian troops. They provide a very long list of why they were below par. The main reasons were poor officer/men relationship (due to expansion of Indian army in 1941 drawing experienced ranking soldiers to Africa and the Middle East. This was an issue that was also very relevant in Burma in 1941/42. Then there was the issue of inadequate training at higher than battalion level. Finally the last major issue, as has been mentioned by others, was a lack of familiarity and experience with support weaponry. The Indian OH listed some other reasons why they did not do well - but these are the main ones!

Yes the 28th Brigade (Gurkhas) did do better than the others, however they were unable to make good their losses suffered on Malaya and the brigade suffered accordingly in the fighting on Singapore.

Cheers,

Mike

acedguy
Member
Posts: 16
Joined: 29 Aug 2004, 07:30
Location: Cheju Island,South Korea

#25

Post by acedguy » 01 Sep 2004, 06:43

Good flash of Asia pacific war -its very much easy to understand the progress of the war visibly.

Click the play button(再生) after it completes downloading flash file.

http://www31.tok2.com/home2/teiteitah/emp_jp-2.html
http://www31.tok2.com/home2/teiteitah/emp_jp-1.html

User avatar
Jack Nisley
Member
Posts: 357
Joined: 19 Dec 2002, 03:37
Location: Atlanta, Georgia, USA

#26

Post by Jack Nisley » 04 Sep 2004, 18:20

Recommend "Empires in the Balance" by H. P. Willmott as a godd analysis and history of the Japanese conquest of SE Asia.

Jack Nisley

User avatar
Kurt_Steiner
Member
Posts: 3980
Joined: 14 Feb 2004, 14:52
Location: Barcelona, Catalunya

#27

Post by Kurt_Steiner » 06 Sep 2004, 18:59

Some info about the Forze Z can be found at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/ ... s_01.shtml

Best regards

Post Reply

Return to “WW2 in the Pacific & Asia”