japenese thoughts on australian troops

[digger-RAinf]

Can anyone give me an indication as to what the average Japenese thought about the preformance of the Australian soldier, did this have any bearing on how they planned their attacks.

[Peter H]

If my memory's correct John Coates' Bravery above Blunder,about the 9th Division in New Guinea,mentions that Australian artillery was feared for its accuracy and firepower.

An assessment by Colonel Tsuji as well:

In UNDERGROUND ESCAPE, published in 1952, he ranked the fighting qualities of all the armies he had opposed. The Japanese of course were highest, with one Japanese soldier the equivalent of 10 Chinese--the army he rated second, given equivalance in equipment and training. Following in order were 3) Russians, 4) Ghurkas in British service, 5) Americans, 6) Australians, 7) Indians in British service, 8 ) British, 9) Filipinos, 10) Burmese, 11) Thai, 12) Vietnamese, and 13) French.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/tsuji.htm

[Michael Tapner]

I suspect that one will find a variety of opinions of the Australian fighting quality from the Japanese. For example the Japanese who encountered them in Malaya at Gemas and Muar were impressed by them. Those that fought them on Singapore, Ambon, Koepang, and Rabaul (and accepted their surrender) were utterly dismayed by them because they surrendered rather than fought to the death.

However they were very impressed by individual acts of extreme bravery - such as one event in late 42 - an Australian Beaufort was disabledby AA fire. The pilot, knowing he was doomed, succeeded in crashing his aircraft into a Japanese transport. The Japanese who saw this were full of admiration for the fighting qualities of that Australian.

Likewise the Japanese in Bouganville and New Guinea feared the Australian troops more than the American troops, but this was because of different operating policies. The Americans were working on a policy of securing a base and accompanying perimeter. The Australians in New Guinea and Bouganville in 1945 were pursuing a career of wiping the Japanese out. The Japanese in this instance learned to fear the Australians and their attached Papuan formations.

I suspect that because of the different view of troops that you will not find an absolute answer, as the result will be an almost individual answer based on the different world view of the Japanese soldier of the time.

[Larso]

The following comments are taken from Mark Johnston's 'Fighting the Enemy: Australian soldiers and their adversaries in WWII' (Cambridge Uni Press, 2000). These are from a mixture of official documents and diaries/letters -

The author - Japanese propaganda fostered hatred and demonisation and naturally Australians were a target. There is evidence that many Japanese raged against the 'arrogance' and 'impudence' of the Aust and US troops. An officer wrote that every man churned with desire to "massacre all AMERICANS and AUSTRALIANS'.

Like all troops the Japanese criticised their foes though some comments note Australians 'resisting like wounded boars' and 'desperate resistance... not to be despised' (from AyerMemban, Malaya) and in a progandistic film, 'defying death, strangely and impudently counter-attacking with bayonets' (the author notes these are rather more generous than Australians would have been of the Jananese themselves)

Regarding Papua in 42 - 'The fighting spirit of the Australian soldier is strong'. Marksmanship, use of cover and grenade use was also praised. An officer on Kokoda commented "although the Australians are our enemies, their bravery must be admired'

A report probably from Milne Bay - Australian soldiers 'will to resist is strong' and from a diary, 'strength of Aust soldier is superior to that of Nippon soldier'. Yet from more official levels the Japanese issued information regarding Australian weaknesses identified during the Milne Bay fighting - 'Enemy lacks fighting spirit in hand to hand combat'. While a 1943 pamphlet states "The enemy cannot stand up to hand-to-hand fighting or charges', 'neither can they make them'.

In the later campaigns the Japanese were 'horrified' not just by air power and artillery but by automatic fire and especially the mortar (!)


OK me again. Some of these comments are contradictory. I guess each depends on the context, victory or defeat, they were made from. I hope these were interesting.

[chino]

I find Tsuji's ranking of various enemy's fighting skills to be absurd.

The Chinese ranked No 2? That's ridiculous. The fighting skill and warrior spirit of the Chinese soldier during that period must rank somewhere very near the bottom. Most of the time they avoided fighting the Japs completely. And when they do fight they usually lose.

There was a ridiculous incident where when the Japs first invaded Shanghai: Nationalist Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek ordered his troops not to engage the Japanese for "fear of angering" them.

There was, however, one Nationalist troop from Kwangtung that happened to be at the railway station either on transit or something. They either didn't hear CKS's order or they chose to ignore it as being unbelievable.

This Kwangtung troop immediately took up an aggressive defence of the railway station as any decent soldier would.

They resisted the Japanese fiercely and the Japanese were taken aback by their tenacity. This Kwangtung troop sent urgent messages to the Generalissimo CKS for reinforcements and resupply as they were taking heavy casualty.

So were the Japanese.

They resisted countless Japanese counter-attacks for six days, not one single reinforcement or one grain of rice arrived. The traitor Chiang Kai Shek refused to resupply them again for "fear of angering" the Japanese.

In the end, what little is left of this Kwantung army managed to escape.

This is however a rare heroic action by Chinese troops of that time. Not just the Nationalist but the Communists also avoided fighting the Japs. Both sides were conserving their strength to fight each other when the war is over.

Sure there were some heroic actions. But what defeated China wasn't just the foreign invaders. China at that time had leaders like CKS, what hope can there be of Chinese troops fighting effectively?

Perhaps Tsuji was referring to the great fighting skills of the Chinese serving in the Japanese Imperial Army?

His low assessment of the British and Australian must be coloured by the easy victory he scored in Malaya. I did read, however, a book on the fall of Singapore titled "SINGAPORE 1942 - Britain's Biggest Defeat" written by Alan Warren.

He basically blamed the fall of Malaya and Singapore on the British High Command, Australian troops and Indian sepoys. Basically, he said the Australians started retreating pretty early. Many Indian troops surrendered en masse to go over to the Japanese side via the Indian National Army. He didn't say it but he implied that the British (Scots, Welsh etc) were the only ones whom were steadfast.

Australians in Malaya had a very varied fighting record according to this book by Alan Warren. In some instances the Australians were terrifc with one AT gun destroying 8 Japanese tanks in one engagement and hand-tohand fighting. But soon afterwards, their morale collapsed and did a disgraceful retreat where they threatened Australian and British officers alike with shootings and grenades. They also forced civilians off ships departing Singapore so they could escape.

Another author gave a reason for this. He said that during peacetimes, AIF (Australian) troops and officers were viewed as second class Europeans by the Brits in Singapore. Most of the AIF were sent north to less glamorous Malaysia and even AIF officers were denied entry to British officers' clubs. This must have caused some resentment from AIF personnel which might provide a clue as to why they acted as they did. Their attitude was to run back to Singapore and let the Brits take care of this mess.

Another reason provided by Warren was that AIF troops quickly lost confidence in the (mainly British) high command whom made a series of grave tactical errors early in the campaign in Malaya which led to unnecessary defeats of Allied troops.

Did the Thais ever fight the Japanese even? Thailand collaborated with Japan and just happily let Japan use their territory to launch their invasion of Malaya.

[chino]

There was another tragic last stand and this was conducted by a platoon of Malay troopers from the Royal Malay Regiment in Singapore at Pasir Panjang Ridge. They were led by a Malay Lt Adnan Saidi from Selangor, Malaysia.

Allied troops were holding that area and the Lt Adnan's reinforced platoon of the Malay Regiment was among them.

After an initial engagement where they shot about 20 Japs, Lt Adnan observed a troop of "punjabi" soldiers in turbans approaching his position moving in fours. But Lt Adnan knew that British troops moved in threes. He ordered his men to open fire and as it turned out, they were Japs disguished as sikhs.

They held up the Japanese advance for 48 hours till they ran out of ammo. Then they engaged the Japanese in hand-to-hand combat. They inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese. Lt-Gen Bennet refused to give the order for a nearby Australian artillery to fire in support of these native troops, preferring to reserve the ammo only for troops under his command.

Lt Adnan was armed with a Lewis gun and he fought till mortally wounded. Still he continued to inspire his men with his motto "Death before dishonour". Die they did, nearly everyone of the 42 men were killed as survivors were massacred. The Japanese found the dead or dying Lt Adnan and strung up his body upside down from a tree. Instead of respecting brave adversaries they bayonet and cut up his body and refused to let anyone take his body down or bury him. Apparently they also started hunting for his family in Malaysia with the intention of exacting more revenge.

[Peter H]

Stop using the J word.

Refer to the guidelines here:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=57065

[Peter H]

This indicates that the Chinese were good fighters.

The first major Japanese military defeat in modern history occured at the Battle of Taierchwang in 1938 :

Early in 1938, the Japanese began another major offensive to link up their forces in the Shanghai-Nanking area with those in north-eastern China. While one large army fought north from Naking, another pushed south toward the major railroad center of Suchow. Although the Chinese were unable to stop the invaders, they fought stubbornly and continually harassed the Japanese rear areas and lines of communications with guerrilla attacks.

Then, as the northern Japanese spearhead approached Suchow, Chiang Kai-Shek ordered a surprise counterattack at Taierchwang. There the Chinese succeeded in cutting off and surrounding a Japanese force of 60,000. After several days of bitter fighting, the Japanese fought their way out of the Chinese encirclement, but left more than 20,000 dead behind them.

An aside on Japanese deployments and mortality figures shows that China was no sideshow either.

Japanese army ground deployment from the US Air Offensive Against Japan Strategic Study 1947:

The Japanese built up their army ground forces from a strength of approximately 1,700,000 at the outbreak of war, to a peak strength of approximately 5,000,000. Japanese army medical records indicate that the aggregate number deployed in the Solomons, New Guinea, Marshalls, Gilberts, Carolines, Marianas, Philippines, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and the Aleutians was approximately 668,000, of whom 316,000 were killed in action; some 220,000 were deployed in Burma, of whom 40,000 were killed; and 1,100,000 were deployed in China, of whom 103,000 were killed. Most of the remainder were in Manchuria, Korea, or the home islands, and did not actively participate in the decisive campaigns of the war.

[chino]

I have no doubts that in action against the Japanese invaders, some Chinese soldiers Comunist or Nationalist performed admirably. The defence of Shanghai at the Railway Station by a single troop of Nationalist Tsai Ting-Kai is a good example.

But for the most part they have very ineffectual leaders and discipline - especially in the Nationalist ranks - were usually poor.

And both sides suffer from this attitude that while it is important to fight the Japanese, the most important fight would be the one which will decide if Nationalist or Communist will rule China after the WW2.

This attitude is mainly the initiative of the Nationalist. They started attacking the Communist very early. After eradicating the warloads Chiang Kai Shek turned his attention to eradicating the Communists in 1928. He nearly defeated the Communists but they escaped - The Long March - and successfully regrouped.

When the Japanese invaded, Chiang was still more interested in fighting the Communists rather than the Japanese and this resulted in a lot of disatisfaction among Nationalist officers and troops. Some Nationalist troops refused to attack the Communists. And when Chiang went to investigate why, he was kidnapped by his own Nationalist officers who demanded he go back to fighting the Japanese!

He agreed and some kind of anti-Japanese pact with the Communists developed. But in the end, old habits die hard. One Communist troop under Nationalist command was attacked by Nationalist and this ended the fragile pact. In the end, both sides just more or less sat the whole thing out from 1941 knowing full well the Japanese will eventually lose.

Sure the Chinese continued fighting with the Japanese, but as you can guess there wasn't a real co-ordinated effort and definitely without the full support of Central Command ie Chiang Kai Shek and thus rather ineffective.

The battle for Shanghai is a classic case of how the Nationalist handled the war. Some badly wanted to fight the Japanese, but the high command had other ideas.

Still, Chinese troops tied down a huge number of Japanese troops in China which could otherwise cause trouble elsewhere in the Pacific.