Did the US Navy directly attack the Japanese mainland?

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richardrli
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Did the US Navy directly attack the Japanese mainland?

#1

Post by richardrli » 29 Sep 2004, 16:34

Towards the end of the war when Japan was getting bombed bad, did any American surface vessels such as battleships, destroyers or cruisers shell Japan directly, and if they did, how often?

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Jack Nisley
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#2

Post by Jack Nisley » 29 Sep 2004, 17:27

July 15, 1945: TU 34.8.2 (3 BB, 2 CL, 8 DD) bombards steel works at Muroran, Hokkaido.
July 17, 1945: TU 34.8.2 (5 BB, 2 CL, 10 DD plus HMS King George V and 2 DD) bombards Hitachi, Honshu.
July 18, 1945: TG 35.4 (4 CL plus DDs) bombards radar installations at Nojima Saki, Honshu
July 22, 1945: TF 93 (2 CL, 5 DD) bombards Paramushu, Kurils.
July 24, 1945: TG 35.3 (4 CL, 6 DD) bombards Kushimoto seaplane base, Honshu.
July 29, 1945: TU 34.8.1 (3 BB, 4 CA, 10 DD plus KGV and 3 DD) bombards Hamamatsu, Honshu.
July 31, 1945: Destroyer Squadron 25 bombards Shimuzu, Japan.
August 9, 1945: TU 34.8.1 ( USN BB and cruisers plus 2 Royal Navy CL) bombards Kamaishi, Honshu.
August 12, 1945: TG 92 (2 CL and 12 DD) bombards Matsuwa and Paramushu, Kurils.

From "The Official Chronology of the U. S. Navy in World War II" by Cressman.

Jack Nisley


richardrli
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#3

Post by richardrli » 30 Sep 2004, 12:17

Thankyou, but how effective were they?

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Galahad
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effectiveness of BB bombardment

#4

Post by Galahad » 05 Oct 2004, 20:15

Finding specifics isn't easy, but this might at least help answer your question:

"The final raids against Japan, and the battleship bombardments, are difficult to evaluate for their usefullness. Losses, particularly in the 24th and 28th July strikes against the Imperial Fleet were heavy, and although all targets that were attacked were also severely damaged, it is to be presumed that in the final account, the Allied raids were unimportant. The fact is also, however, that this is only the case because the atomic bombs effectively negated all effects the raids might have had by ending the war. Several successes, for example, would have been critically important for the ability of Japan to wage war: the battleship bombardments of steel and iron works, which would have reduced output of Japanese steel factories by a quarter, and the destruction of the Hokkaido-Honshu ferry connection, which deprived most of Japan of the coal needed to keep factories working."

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R Leonard
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#5

Post by R Leonard » 08 Oct 2004, 05:05

Starting on Tuesday, July 10th 1945 the USN 3rd Fleet, spearheaded by Task Force 38 (TF 38), the fast carrier task force, began a summer season of attacks on the Japanese home islands, starting with strikes on airfields on the Tokyo plain. Preceded by a submarine sweep on the look out for enemy picket boats and with air barriers formed by patrol aircraft to prevent snooping, TF 38 arrived undetected at the launch point some 140 miles southeast of Honshu at 0400, having passed through frontal weather during the night. Fortunately the weather cleared sufficiently to allow the strikes to be launched at the appointed time. The primary targets for the strike were airfields and aircraft mainly in the Tokyo area, but extending from Koriyama in the north to Hamamatsu in the southwest. No airborne opposition was met, in fact only 13 airborne aircraft were seen, all of which avoided contact. In the TF operating area only 3 Japanese aircraft came close, the CAP shot down 2 of which and the 3rd was chased away before making contact. 1303 strike (includes strike, SubCAP, Rescue and Dumbo CAP, search, weather and photo planes) and 425 CAP (includes DayCAP, RapCAP, DadCAP, NightCAP, Zippers, and Hecklers) sorties were flown. Strike aircraft destroyed 109 airplanes on the ground and damaged an additional 231. Seven fighters (VF - either F6Fs or F4Us) and 6 torpedo bombers (VT - TBMs) were lost in combat. Operational losses were 4 and 2, respectively. Four VF pilots, 3 VT pilots and 6 VT crewmen were lost. 450 tons of bombs were expended and 1648 HVAR (5 inch High Velocity Air Rocket).

On July 14th, despite distinctly unfavorable weather, TF 38 launched strikes against Northern Honshu and Hokkaido from a position approximately 80 miles from land. Fog unfortunately covered the primary airfields, but the coastline and a few airfields near it were clear and the damage caused to shipping was worthy of note. Vessels totaling 41,000 tons were sunk and of 58,000 tons were damaged. The above figures include as sunk 1 Escort destroyer, 3 Coast Defense Vessels, 1 submarine chaser, 4 auxiliary minesweepers, 4 guard boats, 1 gunboat, 1 transport, 1 Army cargo vessel, 11 merchant/cargo vessels, and 7 train ferries. Vessels damaged included 1 destroyer, 2 Coast Defense Vessels, 1 auxiliary submarine chaser, 2 auxiliary minesweepers, 1 guard boat, 3 Army / Army cargo vessels, 3 train ferries, 15 merchant / cargo vessels, 6 merchant tankers and 1dredge. 859 strike and 532 CAP sorties were flown. One Japanese airplane was shot down and one damaged by the CAP. Weather hampered operations considerably against airfields, but nevertheless strike aircraft also destroyed 24 airplanes on the ground and damaged an additional 62. Six VF, four VT, and 6 dive-bombers (VB - SB2Cs) were lost in combat. Operational losses were six, two, and three respectively. Four VF pilots, two VT pilots and 4 VT crewmen, and four VB pilots and four VB crewmen were lost (although one VB-85 radio-gunner turned up in late September 1945 after hiding out for over two months). 336 tons of bombs were expended as well as 1809 HVAR. Poor visibility caused cancellation of strikes after 1300.

The next day the Task Force had moved approximately 30 miles to the southeast in order to be in warmer waters where there was less probability of fog. Even so, conditions were again poor, both at the carriers and in the target area, but fortunately the coastline was clear in places and again Japanese shipping suffered considerably - 17 ships of 30,000 tons being sunk and 13 ships of 18,600 tons damaged. Included as sunk were 1 minesweeper, 1 Coast Defense Vessel, 1 auxiliary submarine chaser, 1 guard boat, 6 merchant cargo, 1 train ferry, and 1 large fishing trawler. Damaged vessels included 3 escort destroyers, 4 coast defense vessels, 2 auxiliary submarine chasers, and 1 auxiliary minesweeper. Many land targets were hit and the toll of locomotives for the 2 days rose to 84 exploded and 41 damaged. 949 strike and 398 CAP sorties were flown. Strike aircraft destroyed 10 airplanes on the ground and damaged an additional 6. Eight VF and two VT were lost in combat. Operational losses were 6 VF and 1 VT. Six VF pilots, one VT pilots and one VT crewman were lost. Lack of Air Sea Rescue facilities in the way of lifeguard submarines and Dumbos made necessary the abandoning of 3 pilots shot down near Otaru.335 tons of bombs were expended as well as 2093 HVAR.

While the air operations were in progress on the 14th and 15th the surface ships were also enjoying themselves, with two bombardments by heavy ships and one cruiser and destroyer sweep taking place. On the 14th Task Unit (TU) 34.8.1 (Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth) with battleships South Dakota, Indiana, and Massachusetts; heavy cruisers Quincy and Chicago; and 9 destroyers bombarded the coastal city of Kamaishi, Honshu. This was the first naval gunfire bombardment of the Japanese homeland. The primary target was the Japan Ironworks plant. On the 15th, battleships Iowa, Missouri, and Wisconsin; light cruisers Dayton and Atlanta; and eight destroyers of TU 34.8.2 (Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger) bombarded the steel and iron works at Muroran on southern coast of Hokkaido, targeting the Nihon Steel Company and Wanishi Iron and Steel Manufacturing Company.

The results of indirect fire bombardments were disappointing. Photographic evidence showed that only 9% and 1% of roof damage respectively, had been done to the Kamaishi and Muroran targets. On the whole the lack of damage was due to bad air spotting under difficult conditions that led the ships to believe at the time that their salvoes were falling on the target. TF 38 staff, although realizing the moral effect of a ship bombardment both to the fleet and to those at the receiving end, were of the opinion that the dispersal of strength and the complications they entailed to any strike program made such bombardments unproductive especially as it was considered that more damage could have been inflicted to these plants by the total CAP flown to cover these three groups during their absences for TF38, that is 120 fighters sorties each carrying a 1000 lb bomb. These bombardment exercises became to be largely viewed by the air oriented TF 38 staff as make-work for the big gun club. The cruiser and destroyer sweep on the night of 13-114 July close in shore between latitudes 40 and 41 North in an area which had been covered by strike aircraft, drew the expected blank. Good ship recognition saved a heavy attack on the Bombardment group bombarding Muroran, as for an unexplained reason; one large strike suddenly saw them through the clouds when they had no idea friendly ships were in the area.

At 0350 on July 17th, from a position 100 miles east of the Japanese coast, TF 38 re-commenced its air attacks against the Tokyo Area. Adverse weather both at the target area and launch position caused cancellation of strikes after the first three and the cancellation of a major planned combined strike against the battleship Nagato at Yokosuka Naval Base. TF 37, covering the Northern portion of the strike area and having the best weather at the target, by the end of the day had destroyed 12 aircraft on the ground, a better performance than the whole of TF 38. TF 38 flew 230 strike and 396 CAP sorties, destroying on the ground 4 aircraft and damaging 5. 12 VF were lost, 7 in combat and 5 operationally, at a cost of 4 pilots. Sixteen tons of bombs were expended and 374 HVAR.

That evening, in ugly weather, battleships Iowa, Missouri, North Carolina, Alabama, and Wisconsin; light cruisers Dayton and Atlanta; and ten destroyers of a reinforced TU 34.8.2 (Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger) with the Royal Navy’s HMS King George V carried out a bombardment of the Engineering Works near Hitachi. Spotting, Radar Picket aircraft and CAP were provided by the night operations carrier, Bon Homme Richard. Under the prevailing weather conditions it was not surprising that 2 aircraft were not heard of again. The damage done by the bombardment, as with previous locations, was slight. Of note was that the bombardment group navigated entirely on Loran and Radar, without any visual references.

On July 18th TF 38 tried again, this time the weather after a poor start cleared sufficiently to allow strikes to be launched just before noon. The Nagato at Yokosuka was the target for one large combined strike but fighter sweeps were made over enemy airfields extending 200 miles north and 120 miles west of Tokyo. The Nagato strike was launched in poor visibility, but groups formed up and were soon on their way. No air opposition was encountered, but the flak in the vicinity of Yokosuka was both heavy and accurate. Because of the restricted line of approach to Nagato, approximately 30 degrees either side of her port beam, and the heavy AA defense which was to be expected, 153 aircraft of the 360 taking part were to concentrate on AA positions and were armed with the 260 lb VT fused bombs. The flak suppressing fighter aircraft were able to keep AA fire down to a minimum. Nagato was lying along side a dockyard wall at Yokosuka in about 40 feet of water in a position that precluded the use torpedoes (in fact, during the entire July-August 1945 strike period TF 38 TBM did not use torpedoes in any attack). As all armor piercing bombs (including 1600 AP had insufficient penetrating power to pierce her armor if dropped in a normal dive bombing attack, it was decided to attack with 1000 lb General Purpose bombs fused with a water discriminating fuse in the nose and a delay fuse in the tail. The point of aim was give as the center of the waterline on her outboard side and it was hopped that a sufficient number of bombs would explode beside her to rupture the hull and possibly capsizing her. The normal bomb pattern to be expected would also cause damage to her upper works. All SB2Cs, 100 in number and carrying 1000 lb bombs were to participate in the attack. Nagato was soon obscured by smoke, but some hits and near misses were seen. A few photographs taken during and after the bombing showed some pretty wild bombing, but showed that the ship had been hit amidships. Nevertheless she remained on even keel and did not sink. TF 38 losses were very much less than expected, 5 aircraft out of a total of 13 lost that day. This was considered to be due to the effectiveness on the VT fused fragmentation bombs as well as the liberal use of window and the work of RCM aircraft. TF 38 aircraft also sink a training ship, an escort destroyer, a submarine, a submarine chaser, and 3 auxiliary patrol vessels and damaged, besides Nagato, a motor torpedo boat, a target ship, and an auxiliary submarine chaser. They shared the sinking of a motor torpedo boat with FAA aircraft. TF 38 flew 596 strike and 184 CAP sorties. Thirty Japanese planes were destroyed on the ground and 42 damaged. Combat losses were 6 VF, 3 VT, and 4 VB. Operational losses were 1, 0, and 1 respectively. Six VF pilots, 3 VT pilots and 4 VT crewmen, and 3 VB pilots and 3 VB crewmen were lost. 217 tons of bombs were dropped and 635 HVAR expended. TF 38 moves off to the replenishment area and remains there from the 19th through the 22nd.

Task Group (TG) 35.4 (Rear Admiral Carl F. Holden), made up of the four light cruisers of CruDiv 17 (Topeka, Atlanta, Duluth, and Oklahoma City) and DesRon 62, conducted an anti-shipping sweep off the entrance to Sagami Nada and then bombarded the Japanese radar installations at Cape Nojima. En route, two destroyers are detached to take a radar contact under fire, and mistakenly shell (but do not damage) the submarine USS Gabilan, making for some tense moments.

Late on the night 22 July DesRon 61, on anti-shipping sweep in vicinity of Sagami Bay, detects and attacks Japanese convoy about five miles west of Nojima Zaki, sinking one ship and damaging four others.

Air strikes were launched on the 24th July against warships at Kure and airfields in Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu. These attacks were coordinated with heavy attacks by land-based aircraft from Iwo, the Marianas and Okinawa; at least 3000 allied aircraft were over Japan during the course of the day.

At Kure, the enemy warships were found in the positions expected and were attacked as planned by 2 large strikes from each of the three Task Groups. The warships in the Kure Area had been divided as targets amongst the Task Groups and an Air Coordinator from each Task Group adjusted the weight of attack on each ship as necessary. Vessels sunk are a battleship-carrier hybrid, a heavy cruiser, a training ship, a target ship and a guardboat. Damaged are 2 carriers, a battleship-carrier hybrid, a battleship, a light cruiser, a heavy cruiser, an escort destroyer, a fast transport, a torpedo cruiser, 2 destroyers, 2 escort destroyers, 2 coast defense vessels, and a transport. TF 37 aircraft damage an aircraft carrier. TF 38 flew 1354 strike and 393 CAP sorties. Thirteen Japanese planes were shot down and two damaged. Forty Japanese planes were destroyed on the ground and 80 damaged. Combat losses were 17 VF, 6 VT, and 9 VB. Operational losses were 5, 4, and 8 respectively. Twelve VF pilots, 5 VT pilots and 8 VT crewmen, and 7 VB pilots and 7 VB crewmen were lost. 558 tons of bombs were dropped and 1707 HVAR expended.

That night TG 35.3 (Rear Admiral J. Cary Jones, Jr.) made up of four light cruisers, Pasadena, Springfield, Astoria, and Wilkesbarre (from TG 38.3) and six destroyers (from TG 38.4) makes a high-speed anti-shipping sweep across Kii Suido. Only one target is detected and is fired on by a destroyer. In a repeat of July 18th, then intended victim was a US submarine, USS Toro. Toro was not damaged in this second case of mistaken identity.

On the 25th July TF 38 continued striking in the Kure - Kobe area from a position 110 miles south of Shikoku. Bad weather in the target area precluded strikes against most of the warship targets and caused the cancellation of the day’s last 2 strikes. Fighter sweeps against targeted fields the North coast of Japan very productive, finding fields with closely parked aircraft. TF 38 planes sink 3 guard boats, 2 tankers, and a cargo ship and damage a heavy cruiser, a coast defense ship, a tanker and 3 cargo ships. As the Task Force was retiring to the Southward just prior to sunset, Japanese air activity became pronounced and it was obvious that the Japanese were attempting a night attack. This attack consisted of 12 torpedo planes in 3 groups. Three of the attackers were shot down by TF 37 dusk fighters and the remainder driven off, with one more loss, by TF 38 night fighters while still some 40 mile from the Task Force. Heavy ships dropped radar decoys at dusk. Japanese search aircraft were overheard to report the decoys as locating the Task Force. Pilot losses for the day were small due to the work of the ASR Submarines and Aircraft. The latter specially distinguished themselves during these strike days, performing rescues within the Inland Sea and close to shore. A PBM on Air-Search-Rescue (ASR) duty flew across Japan, landed twice under fire from coastal batteries and carried out successful rescues. It did not have enough gas for its return to base and was force to make an at sea landing in an unpleasant swell in the center of a Task Group; all were successfully picked up. TF 38 flew 640 strike and 419 CAP sorties. Eighteen Japanese planes were shot down and four were reported damaged. Sixty-one Japanese planes were destroyed on the ground and 68 damaged. Combat losses were 10 VF. Operational losses were 6 VF and 1 VB. Five VF pilots and 1 VB pilot were lost. 185 tons of bombs were dropped and 1162 HVAR expended.

That evening TG 35.3 (Rear Admiral J. Cary Jones, Jr.) conducts an anti-shipping sweep in the Kii Suido and later bombarded targets at the Kushimoto Seaplane Base inflicting little damage.

26 and 27 July were spent in the replenishment area. On Saturday the 28th aircraft from TF 38 struck the Inland Sea area, between Nagoya, and Northern Kyushu; principally targeting the Kure Naval Base. The newly arrived Wasp air group was noted for distinguished itself by some very accurate bombing. TF 38 planes sink a battleship, a battleship-carrier hybrid, a heavy cruiser, a light cruiser, 2 escort destroyers, 4 guard boats, a training ship, a submarine, a submarine depot ship, a provisions stores ship, an auxiliary minesweeper, a naval auxiliary, 4 cargo ships and 2 tankers. TF 38 planes also damage 2 aircraft carriers, a torpedo cruiser, a destroyer, a submarine, 3 coast defense vessels, a submarine chaser, an escort destroyer, 2 guard boats, 2 auxiliary minesweepers, a passenger ship, 3 cargo ships and 3 tankers. Additionally, 21 Japanese airplanes were shot down and 115 were destroyed on the ground; 156 were damaged on the ground. Strike sorties were 1394; CAP sorties were 396. Combat losses were 10 VF, 6 VT, and 13 VB. Operational losses were 3 VF, 2 VT, and 3 VB. Flight crew losses were 7 VF pilots, 5 VT pilots and 8 crewmen, and 9 VB pilots and 9 VB crewmen. Bomb tonnage delivered was 605 and 2050 HVAR were expended.

On the night of 29-29 July battleships South Dakota, Indiana, and Massachusetts; heavy cruisers Quincy, Chicago, Boston, and St. Paul; and ten destroyers of TU 34.8.1 (Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth) shelled production shops, an aircraft factory, and other facilities at Hamamatsu. British battleship HMS King George V and three destroyers operating independently nearby join in the bombardment. USS Bon Homme Richard supplied precautionary night combat air patrols and spotter aircraft. This was the most successful bombardment of the period with an assessed 20% roof damage in the target area.

On July 30th strike aircraft from TF 38 bombed airfields and industrial targets in central Honshu, and flew sweeps against Japanese shipping in Maizuru Bay. Some 30 airfields were attacked. TF 38 planes sink an escort destroyer, a submarine chaser, a minelayer, 4 auxiliary submarine chasers, 2 guard boats, and 3 merchant ships. Damaged are an escort destroyer, 2 submarines, a submarine depot ship, 2 coast defense vessels, a minelayer, an auxiliary submarine chaser, a guard boat, and 2 merchant vessels. Because of the poor weather many bombs were dropped on targets of opportunity. Accordingly, industry railways and transportation facilities received more than usual attention. During the course of this strike day the Task Force closed to within forty miles of the Japanese coast without challenge. Strike sorties were 1224; CAP sorties were 414. One Japanese plane was reported as damaged in aerial combat; 115 were destroyed on the ground and 142 damaged. Combat losses were 9 VF and 2 VT. Operational losses were 3 VF and 2 VT. Flight crew losses were 6 VF pilots, 2 VT pilots, and 3 VT crewmen. Four hundred seventeen tons of bombs were dropped and 2596 HVAR were expended. The Task Force retired slowly to the south as evening came on but remained within covering distance for an over-night destroyer (DesRon 25) sweep into Suguru Wan. No shipping was found, but the destroyers shelled the railroad yards and industrial area of Shimuzu. One destroyer in the squadron complained of having been strafed during the night by a friendly fighter, but upon investigation it was determined that the interloper was Japanese.

For a variety of reasons, including typhoons, atomic bombs, and finally fog, TF 38 did not strike again until 9th August. This interval was spent replenishing stores and conducting flying and gunnery exercises. A typhoon passing close to Okinawa and west of Kyushu, was successfully avoided, but its aftereffects caused a postponement of an planned strike on Northern Kyushu and Korea on the 4th August. This plan was finally cancelled entirely because the flying restrictions in the area due to the impending atomic bomb operation. A plan to strike the Tokyo area from the Southeast before the Task Force commenced its scheduled returned to Eniwetok was also changed at the last moment by a CinCPac directive to strike Hokkaido and Northern Honshu on the 8th August. This direct ordering of strikes by CincPac resulted from radio intercepts that indicated the presence of large-scale airborne forces preparing for operations against the Marianas. Within the Task Force it was widely presumed that the change was because of the expected Russian entry into the war.

Upon arriving at the launch area for the 8 August strikes, as had been expected fog was prevalent over the whole area and flying operations could not take place. Conditions were so bad that TF 38 was caught with no aircraft airborne and 3 enemy aircraft over head. Fortunately they were unable to make contact. Finally at 0915 the Task Force turned to the south and, presumably, better conditions. Shortly thereafter it was possible to fly off a limited CAP that promptly shot down 2 Japanese snoopers. Fortunately the Task Force’s position appeared to remain unknown to the Japanese.

The launch point for strikes on the 9 August was 120 miles to the east of Kinkasan, and was clear from fog. Reconnaissance planes, however found that enemy airfields in northern Kyushu were mainly fogbound. The Task Force flew six small strikes alternating between fighter bomber sweeps of 12 aircraft and escorted strikes of 15 bombers and 16 fighters from each CV, providing some insurance against the possibility of fog closing down unexpectedly and having large numbers of aircraft in the air which is what a normal strike program would have entailed. For the first time during the entire period of strike operations the Japanese made a serious attempt at hitting back. The usual radar bogey activity developed at about 1215 and was dealt with effectively by the outer CAP. None of theses snoopers penetrated much nearer than 40 miles. At 1315, however, two attack groups of 3 planes each were not intercepted by the fighters controlled by the southern fighter direction. In a subsequent attack by these Japanese, the destroyer Borie was hit by a suicider in the after side of the bridge and suffered 50 casualties, 20 of whom were killed or missing. Although her bridge steering disabled, the ship remained on station until nightfall. After dark, Borie made its was to the replenishment group, Task Group 30.8. Later in the afternoon a single Kamikaze worked its way through the screen by tagging on to a returning strike. This attacker had actually initiated its final run when spotted by fighters and shot down, splashing some 400 yards astern of USS Wasp.

TF 38 had a busy time, dropping 588 tons of bombs and firing 2258 rockets. Off Hamada, 3 auxiliary submarine chasers, 2 minesweepers, a tanker, and a merchant vessel were sunk. TF 37 and TF 38 aircraft shared in the destruction of two escort vessels off Onagawa. Flying 1468 strike and 419 CAP sorties, 7 Japanese airplanes were shot down; 189 were destroyed on the ground and an additional 102 damaged. Airfields, especially those at Matsushima and Koriyama suffered severely. Combat losses were 5 VF and 2 VB; operational losses were 10 VF, 1 VT, and 4 VB. Flight personnel losses were 5 VF pilots, 2 VB pilots and 2 VB crewmen.

A second shelling of the steel works and other industrial targets at Kamaishi was made at 1300 by the battleships and cruisers of TU 34.8.1 (Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth).

The next day was a repeat of the previous with TF 38 planes pounding Japanese shipping, airfields and railroads in the same areas of northern Honshu. Another good day was had by all. New airfields were covered and the almost total lack of air and ground opposition made the day highly profitable. Admiral McCain reported to Admiral Halsey: “Damage was too enormous and widespread to be reported in detail. We didn’t need any atoms.” Airfields were well smothered with strikes and even TBM turret gunners managed to “flame” aircraft on fields as the absence of ground fire made it possible for aircraft to cover fields systematically in a series of low level runs. Shipping also suffered, sunk were a submarine chaser, a minesweeper, an auxiliary minesweeper, an auxiliary submarine chaser, a tanker, and 3 merchant cargo ships going down at various locations. Also damaged were an auxiliary minelayer and another merchant cargo ship. 150 Aircraft were destroyed on the ground and 105 damaged for the loss of 16 aircraft but only 8 pilots. Strike sorties numbered 1369 and CAP sorties were 411. One hundred-fifty planes were destroyed on the ground and another 105 damaged. Combat losses were 11 VF, 2 VT, and 1 VB; operational losses amounted to 2 VT. Pilots and crewmen lost were 7 VF pilots, 1 VT pilot and 2 VT crewmen. Bomb tonnage dropped was 520 and HVAR expended was 3245.

The fast carrier force moved off to the replenishment area on 11 August. Strikes planned for the 12th had to be cancelled due to maneuvering to avoid a typhoon approaching from the south. Due to indefinite news on an end to hostilities it the previous plan to withdraw the entire force to for rest was abandoned and it was decided by CinCPac that the Task Force would remain in their present area for the foreseeable future. Commander Third Fleet, Admiral Halsey, decided to continue a strike program of every other day commencing on 13th August. TF 37, reduced for logistical reasons to a token force of one carrier, one battleship, 2 cruisers and 8 destroyers was reorganized as Task Group 38.5 under Admiral Rawlings.

After an initial midnight canceling the scheduled strikes for the 13th, this decision was reversed in the early morning. A full day’s strike program was again laid on for the day. It was recognized the Japanese would be expecting strikes and a hot reception anticipated. The ubiquitous snoopers soon made their appearance and attempted to loiter in the vicinity of the pickets for the remainder of the day. At sunset an attack group of 6 torpedo planes was intercepted and broken up when still 50 miles from the force, no attack developed. With coordinated fighter direction work, 19 aircraft were shot down in the vicinity of the force. In spite of poor weather in the Tokyo area that once again frustrated McCain's plan to hit electronic plants, strikes penetrated well inland and found airfields with plenty of targets. For the first time since the Philippine operations, the percentage of “flamers” destroyed on the ground visibly increased, indicating that the Japanese were not de-gassing their planes, probably due to holding them in a higher state of action readiness.

Strike sorties flown were 1167; CAP sorties were 484. In aerial combat 19 Japanese airplanes were shot down and 2 damaged. On the ground, 254 planes were destroyed and 149 damaged. Combat losses were 7 VF, 2 VT, and 1 VB; operational losses were 3 VF, 1 VT, and 2 VB. Aircrew losses were 5 VF pilots, 1 VT pilot and 2 VT crewmen. Three hundred-eighty tons of bombs were delivered and 2175 HVAR launched. An Army Air Force OA-10A (army version of the PBY) plucked a downed TBM crew of Ticonderoga’s VT-87 from the interior of Tokyo Bay between Yokohama and Kizarazu. This is the first successful rescue from those waters. Nine ships were sunk including 1 submarine and 22 smaller craft were damaged.

Amidst rumors and counter rumors on peace negotiations, TF 38 returned to the replenishment area and refueled on the 14th. In the absence of any definite news on an end of the war, strikes were scheduled on the 15th for the same general vicinities as struck on the 13th. At 0630 word of the end of hostilities was received, but by that time 2 strikes had been launched and a Japanese C6N snooper shot down. The second strike was recalled before attacking, but the Able strike was already in progress. This last strike of the war came up against the strongest opposition encountered in the last few months. It was possible to re-call the 2nd wave but the first wave came up against the strongest opposition encountered in the last 3 months. The opposition was made up of some 45 Jap fighters. 26 were shot down for the loss of 6 aircraft. Elsewhere the strike program launched consisted of 240 strike and 537 CAP sorties. In the course of the day a total of 39 Japanese planes were shot down and 9 driven away with damage. Ten planes were destroyed on airfields and 13 damaged. Combat losses totaled 7 VF, and 1 VT; operational losses were 4 VF. Flight personnel losses were 5 VF pilots and 1 VT pilot. Twelve tons of bombs were dropped on targets and 284 HVAR fired.

The Fast Carrier Force retired to the southeast maintaining a strong CAP overhead. Snoopers and attackers, in singles or pairs, harassed it, well on in the afternoon. One of these, a B6N dived without warning on HMS Indefatigable and was only just shot down in time by a division of US fighters from USS Wasp, one of the last Japanese planes shot down in the war.

Box score for Task Force 38 between 10 July and 15 August 1945 was:
Strike sorties - 12793; CAP sorties - 5408
Japanese planes shot down in combat - 117, damaged - 19
Japanese planes destroyed on the ground - 1111, damaged - 1161
Ships sunk - 119
Ships damaged - 110
Tons of bombs - 4619
HVAR - 22036
Combat losses were 109 VF, 34 VT, and 36 VB
Operational losses were 56 VF, 17 VT, and 22 VB
Flight personnel losses were 75 VF pilots, 24 VT pilots and 39 VT crewmen, and 26 VB pilots and 25 VB crewmen.

Regards,

Rich

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Sewer King
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#6

Post by Sewer King » 11 Oct 2004, 06:44

There was report of an ironic twist to the naval gun bombardments of Japan late in the war.

Despite the destruction of the air raids, some Japanese citizens still tended to believe what propaganda was still being inculcated into them. They were told that the enemy was taking as heavy casualties as he was giving. Also, those who survived the raids in any one particular place did not always comprehend how bad the damage was nationwide.

When Allied gun warships began to appear off the Japanese coast for all to see, seemingly unchallenged -- only then did some fully realize that the war was most truly lost. Only a psychological blow, but a powerful one just the same. Hostile warships had not fired on the Japanese home islands for 81 years.

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#7

Post by JamesL » 28 Oct 2004, 20:29

Aha! I see my father's ship was mentioned - USS BOSTON (CA69).

BOSTON fired 225 8-inch shells at Hammamatsu and 411 shells at Kamaishi.

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