"A date which will live in infamy"

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
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R Leonard
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#16

Post by R Leonard » 24 Dec 2004, 05:41

Oh yes, and here's the evil imperialist agreement the perfidious and dastardly Americans had the effrontery to propose to the Japanese in a transparent attempt to keep the Japanese from interferring with the US subjugation of Central and South America:

November 26, 1941.


OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN


SECTION I - Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other, governments are based

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed ram excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

SECTION II - Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement where under each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.


Source: Peace And War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943

Man, if that isn't a clever way of forcing one nation to go to war against another, I don't know what is.

Regards,

Rich

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BethBrown
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#17

Post by BethBrown » 25 Dec 2004, 09:53

R Leonard wrote:.

Ah, the benefits of the American education.

Regards,

Rich
Such benefits normally include the ability to rationally discuss the multiple sides of an event, rather just hiding in hyberbolye and jingoistic ranting. Or actually considerings facts rather just using "The Fighting Marines" comics as your guide to history.

That the Japanese commited atrocities is quite true. that the foreign policy of Japan was an agressive one is also not in doubt. But neitehr of those things change the fact the United states embarked on policies that made a negotiated settlement nearly impossible.

There was nothing inherently evil in the policy of the US. It was the same level of self serving that all nations engage in. That's how the real world works after all. I've never claimed there was. My position is that America holds its own share of responsibility for the matters that led to the war.

Of course it might make some minds sleep easier to think the USA of somehow blessed by God and smelling of roses in all things it did. I simply pity them for such a narrow minded view of the world and for the damage such blind adherence to fiction causes.

Being a historian however requires that one look at events not burdened by knee jerk emotions. Being a rational productive human requires much the same.


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Steve
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#18

Post by Steve » 25 Dec 2004, 17:20

My quote from Stimpson is from his personal diary not the record of the Defense Committee meeting. Another quote from Stimpsons diary on October 21st "An extraordinarily favourable strategic situation has just developed in the South West Pacific. All the strategic options open to us during the last 20 years have been totally transformed in the last six months. Whereas we were unable before to change the course of events, suddenly we find ourselves possessed of enormous potential, whose full possabilities we are as yet unable to appreciate". Clearly the Americans believed the Japanese had put their foot in an enormous pile of dog du du and they were now going to take advantage of it.

The Americans were expecting war in the Pacific because of the embargo as were the British who sent Naval re-enforcements at the end of October and dicussed war with Japan at Chief of Staff meetings. What would happen in the event of imposing an oil embargo on Japan had been discussed as far back as 1931 between the Americans and British and the conclusion had been it would mean war (Liddell Hart - History Of World War 2). There is no doubt war was expected by everyone but compare the situation with 1939 in Europe when frantic diplomatic activity was taking place to avoid war, the only frantic diplomatic activity taking place was by the Japanese.

The Japanese did offer to withdraw from Indo China but also demanded the Americans cease supplying arms to the Nationalist Chinese. The American counter proposals of Nov.26 demanded they also withdraw from all of China plus other demands. One has the impression that if the Japanese agreed to withdraw from China the Americans would then maybe demand disarmament.

The argument that the Americans wanted a diplomatic solution is not borne out by a communication from Secretary of the Navy Knox to his department heads on November 27th two days prior to the Japanese date of the 29th for ending diplomatic efforts which of course the Americans knew about "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilisation of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days".

The Japanese played into the hands of the Americans by their aggression giving the Americans the opportunity to place them in a situation where they had to face a humiliation to end all humiliations or to fight. Roosevelt played his cards brilliantly, it is a shame that the myth that the Japanese bend on world conquest in league with the Nazis got out of bed the wrong side one morning and launched an attack on America that they had no idea was coming and had done nothing to cause the Japanese to do has become the accepted truth. The truth, that America wanted to bring the Japanese down and outplayed the Japanese in cold blooded diplomacy just as they outfought them is a far better story then the myth.

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R Leonard
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#19

Post by R Leonard » 27 Dec 2004, 19:51

Great big sigh of disappointment

Well, geez, BethBrown, what can I say, here you are with more politically correct, moral relativist revisionism claptrap and, of course, the obligatory personal insults. I suppose it should be expected.

Certainly, it warms my heart that study of history is safely in your hands since any who would disagree with you are such obvious mental midgets (oops, I guess that wasn't very PC, was it).

Thanks for playing.

R

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"A date which will live in infamy"

#20

Post by JamesNo1 » 28 Dec 2004, 03:41

I started this Pearl Harbor thread in the context of continuing efforts by revisionists to mitigate Japan’s guilt for what is still widely viewed as the act of treachery that opened the Pacific War. The topic is important because Japan’s long dominant Liberal Democratic Party has never admitted Japan’s war guilt or its countless horrible war crimes. To keep debate on the issue alive and young people from being misled, I have contributed essays on Japan’s path to the Pacific War at:

http://www.users.bigpond.com/pacificwar/pearlindex.html

and

http://www.users.bigpond.com/battlefora ... Index.html

In effect, Beth Brown and Steve have played the role of devil’s advocates by producing arguments either excusing Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor or accusing the United States of deliberately provoking it.

If they are right, then I would need to revise the on-line essays mentioned above. Accordingly, I would like to persuade them to flesh out their arguments with more historical substance.

I will try to recapitulate their arguments briefly.

In effect, Steve has argued that United States provoked the sneak attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor while Japanese diplomats were going through the motions of peace talks in Washington. In support of this argument, Steve points to (a) the American insistence that Japan halt its brutal and unprovoked war on China and withdraw its troops from China and French Indo-China, and (b) the American embargo on shipments of war-related materials to Japan, including oil and rubber. Steve claims that America’s refusal to compromise on Japan’s brutal and unprovoked military aggression in East Asia would have forced an unacceptable humiliation on Japan.

Beth Brown joins Steve in placing responsibility on the United States for provoking the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and Australia. She argues:

“My position is that America holds its own share of responsibility for the matters that led to the war. Of course it might make some minds sleep easier to think the USA of somehow blessed by God and smelling of roses in all things it did. I simply pity them for such a narrow minded view of the world and for the damage such blind adherence to fiction causes.”

In responding to the thrust of their arguments, I pointed out that the Americans had tried diplomacy with the Japanese since 1937 and it had failed. When Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the gunboat USS Panay as it was escorting a convoy of American oil tankers up the Yangtse River, and then machine-gunned the American crew as they swam for shore, America only lodged a stiff protest. If Steve is right about America wanting war with Japan prior to Pearl Harbor, the Americans could surely have used the Panay incident as a pretext for initiating war against the Japanese. It was only after the Japanese began to humiliate Americans and force American businesses out of Chinese territory that the Japanese had forcibly occupied that the first economic sanction was introduced.

The Prime Minister of Japan, Prince Konoye, announced prior to Japan’s occupation of French Indo-China that the Japanese intended to incorporate all of the countries of South-East Asia, including the Philippines, into Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and that any country refusing to be incorporated would be treated as an enemy of Japan. The pressing threat to the security of the Philippines, and to British, Dutch and American economic and colonial interests in South-East Asia could not be ignored when the Japanese invaded and occupied French Indo-China. The Americans, British and Dutch responded to the Japanese threat to their survival in South-East Asia with economic embargoes on war-related exports to Japan.

I feel that it is reasonable to invite Steve and Beth Brown to nominate what compromise the United States should have been willing to accept without betraying basic humanitarian principles, the people of China, the people of the Philippines, and America’s legitimate economic interests in East Asia.

Having argued that the United States was responsible for Pearl Harbor because it refused to compromise in its dispute with Japan over Japan’s military aggression, Steve then goes one step further and claims that the American’s were expecting war in the Pacific and wanted “to push the Japanese into starting (the war)”. He goes on to say:

“The Japanese played into the hands of the Americans by their aggression giving the Americans the opportunity to place them in a situation where they had to face a humiliation to end all humiliations or to fight. Roosevelt played his cards brilliantly, it is a shame that the myth that the Japanese bend on world conquest in league with the Nazis got out of bed the wrong side one morning and launched an attack on America that they had no idea was coming and had done nothing to cause the Japanese to do has become the accepted truth.
The truth, that America wanted to bring the Japanese down and outplayed the Japanese in cold blooded diplomacy just as they outfought them is a far better story then the myth”.

Steve is fully entitled to engage in conspiracy theories, but there is no credible historical evidence to support his theory that the diabolically cunning Americans wanted to push Japan into a war against the United States. His quotations of Secretary for War Stimson’s diaries do not support his conspiracy argument. They are quoted out of context and the meaning of his words is equivocal.

I have pointed out two compelling arguments against Steve’s theory.

In the first place, there is no evidence that President Roosevelt wanted war with Japan in December 1941. As a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt was very well aware that the Imperial Japanese Navy was much more powerful than the American Pacific Fleet which had been allowed to run down over two decades of isolationism….At that time (i.e. December 1941), the American navy was still largely composed of elderly warships dating from the World War I era, and as the self-appointed "arsenal of democracy", American industry was very heavily committed to supplying weapons and equipment for use by the British and Australians against Germany and Italy in North Africa and the Middle East. The Americans did not want war with Japan in December 1941 because, in the event of war with the Axis powers, the Rainbow 5 war plan (subsequently confirmed by Britain and America as the “Germany First” war strategy) would have required America to abandon everything west of Hawaii to the Japanese, including the American army in the Philippines. Roosevelt was well aware of the political dangers raised for his Democrats by the “Germany First” war strategy. It follows logically that the American government would have been mad to want war with Japan in 1941.

Having acquired the capability to decrypt Japanese diplomatic messages, the Americans were anticipating war in the Pacific in November 1941, but there is no credible evidence to support a view that the Americans knew before Pearl Harbor where the Japanese blow would fall. The US Navy war warning of 27 November 1941 stressed that "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days". This alert warned commands that the most likely focus for an attack was Borneo, the Kra peninsula (Malaya-Thailand), or the Philippines. The warning did not mention Pearl Harbor.”

My second point, was the unprecedented step taken by President Roosevelt when he sent a personal cable to Emperor Hirohito on the afternoon of 6 December 1941. In that cable, Roosevelt urged the Japanese emperor to explore a peaceful resolution of the tensions that had arisen between Japan and the United States. It appears that the military-dominated government of Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo took extraordinary administrative steps to ensure that the cable did not physically reach Hirohito until after the attack on Pearl Harbor had taken place. The delaying of the cable reaching the emperor is not surprising because Hirohito, as hands-on commander in chief of Japan’s military, had personally approved the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the receipt of a personal entreaty for peace from Roosevelt would have been deeply embarrassing for Hirohito at that point of time.”

If Steve has clear evidence that President Roosevelt wanted to provoke a war with Japan in December 1941, I would be interested to hear about it.

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BethBrown
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#21

Post by BethBrown » 28 Dec 2004, 10:13

America's interactions with Japan before the war served to poison relations between the nations and had a direct effect on the increasing radicalization of the situation in Japan. This why I say that America must recognize it holds some responsibility for the events that led to the outbreak of WW2 in the Pacific.
Japan began the century well deposed to the United States and the other allies (barring Russia). There were considerable economic and political links between them. Japanese troops were deployed alongside those of the Western Powers in 1900 to deal with Boxer rebellion in China and two years later the Anglo Japanese naval alliance was signed. The United States was Japan’s largest trading partner by 1910. During this time Japan was willing to accept American mediation of its conflict with Russia and showed a willingness to continue with open door trading policies in China. During the Great War Japan entered on the side of the Allies, and sent troops to support the missions to Vladivostok after the Russian revolution.
Troubles began after the end of the Great War. Japan’s efforts to include a clause recognizing racial equality in the Leuge of Nations covenant was blocked, souring Japan’s relationship with the UK and France. In a similar vein Japan’s protests of US immigration policy were rebuffed out of hand as West Coast politicians were riding a wave of anti Asian feelings at the time. Japan began to increasingly feel as if its friends would not treat it as a developed nation worthy of respect.
In the 1920’s Japan began investing heavily in Latin America, particularly Mexico and Peru. the United States responded to this by a series of diploamtic notes informing Japan that such actions would be viewed as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and would be met with force if continued. Blocked from further involvement in the western hemisphere market for booth goods and raw materials Japan turned to further expansion of its Asian holdings.
Japan did continue to make efforts at working with the west. She signed the Washington Naval conference (a very unpopular move in Japanese domestic politics, where it was viewed as an effort at containment by the US and UK) and the nine powers treaty. However these actions were taken against a growing sense of isolation. American pressure on the UK led to the end of the Anglo Japanese naval alliance in 1923 and no renewal. By the time of the 1930 London Naval conference Japan felt is it was being forced by the US and UK to compromise both its own security and economic future.
The growing troubles in China and the Southeast Asian areas were met by a hard line approach in the United States, driven heavily by the “old china faction” in the state department. What the US saw as a tough line showing determination was perceived in Japan as proof that the west was willing to starve them of everything they needed. Even a cursory glance at the situation would have revealed this, but men like Cordell Hull refused to accept the possibility that Japan might choose to stand up against the US and urged increasing measures.
I do not subscribe to the idea that FDR was trying to push Japan into war, rather he and his staff showed an amazing lack of political astuteness or understanding of logical reactions. In fact there was no concerted policy at all in his administration, when the 1941 embargo was discussed FDR was not in favor of an all inclusive block of all fuels, instead Dean Acheson took it upon himself to put that into place. Roosevelt then decided he couldn’t back down and let it stand.
There were some last efforts by the Japanese to avoid conflict, including an offer made to Ambasador Grew for a mediated withdraw from Indochina by PM Konoye, but the US failed to reply. the US discussed terms to negotiate an end to the embargo, but nothing came of them due to unwillingness on the part of Tojo and the intervention in the state department by Owen Lattimore.
Japan clearly made the final choices that led to war. There is no question of that. But the US could have avoided the situation by a better handeling of its diplomacy and policies in the inter war years. There are those who find any insinuation that US could make an error to somehow mean I argue the Japanese were innocent of wrongdoing, this is not the case. But it took more than just greed or some inborn streak of treachery to turn Japan from a willing partner of the western democracies into an opponent in war. It took a series of mistakes, blunders and deliberately insulting actions on the part of the US (and to a lesser degree the UK) to create the environment in which Japan would find itself considering war.
It saddens me to see that any effort to consider the real politic of the situation or that there are two sides to a coin brings out taunts of political correctness or insinuations of a liberal bias. I suppose there will always be those whose egos cannot take any questioning of the pedestal upon which they view their nation, I simply feel that a discussion of history deserves better than blind patrotism.

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"A date which will live in infamy"

#22

Post by JamesNo1 » 30 Dec 2004, 08:34

I appreciate the attention that Beth Brown has given to this important issue of the historical background to Pearl Harbor. I have personally tried to provide an historical background to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in essays to be found at:

http://www.users.bigpond.com/battlefora ... Index.html

and

http://www.users.bigpond.com/pacificwar/pearlindex.html

I have been told that history students in the United States and Australia are consulting the material on those two web-sites and I appreciate any assistance that will enable them to receive correct information.

So I would appreciate Beth Brown’s assistance to clear up the following points that she made in her last posting.

“Japan began the century well deposed to the United States and the other allies (barring Russia).”

I think that Japanese hostility towards the United States began a little earlier than the turn of the century. The defeat of Spain in 1898 in the Spanish-American War brought a new and powerful player into the western Pacific region. As part of the fruits of its victory over Spain, the United States acquired the Philippines as a colony. Japan viewed this development with hostility. The United States possessed a powerful navy, and military planners in Japan realised that an American presence in the western Pacific could hinder Japan's plans for further territorial expansion. To meet this potential challenge, Japan began to prepare for the possibility of armed conflict between the two countries. For their part, American military planners recognised the risk to the Philippines from Japan's expansionist foreign policy and they also began planning for possible armed conflict with Japan.

“In a similar vein Japan’s protests of US immigration policy were rebuffed out of hand as West Coast politicians were riding a wave of anti Asian feelings at the time.”

America was not the only country on the Pacific rim to take steps to limit a flood of cheap labor from China and Japan in the early years of the twentieth century. Labor unions in America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were strongly opposed to Japanese and Chinese immigration on the grounds that cheap oriental labor would undermine their wages and take their jobs. I think all of those countries took legislative steps to restrict entry of immigrants from Asian countries in the early part of the twentieth century.

“In the 1920’s Japan began investing heavily in Latin America, particularly Mexico and Peru. the United States responded to this by a series of diploamtic notes informing Japan that such actions would be viewed as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and would be met with force if continued.”

This is an interesting issue. I can’t locate any reference in my own library or on the internet to the United States threatening to use force to prevent Japanese commercial investment in Central or South America. I would appreciate any references Beth Brown can provide.

“There were some last efforts by the Japanese to avoid conflict, including an offer made to Ambasador Grew for a mediated withdraw from Indochina by PM Konoye, but the US failed to reply.”

I think you will find that the United States actually did reply to Konoye’s offer to take part in talks at an agreed Pacific venue with President Roosevelt. Professor Bix has pointed out (in his “Hirohito”) that the Japanese offer was rejected largely because Prince Konoye was only prepared to indicate that Japan would withdraw its troops from French Indo-China “after the China Incident had been resolved”. I think the Americans took the view that the talks were pointless unless the Japanese were prepared to discuss withdrawal of their troops from French Indo-China and halting their brutal and unprovoked war against China. There was concern on Roosevelt’s part that the agenda proposed by Konoye would damage Chinese morale and leave him open to allegations that he had participated in another Munich. With the benefit of hindsight, it now appears that Roosevelt was right to refuse to meet Konoye on the terms proposed by the Japanese Prime Minister. As early as 1936, Japan’s government had secretly resolved to incorporate all of China into the Japanese empire.

“Japan clearly made the final choices that led to war. There is no question of that. But the US could have avoided the situation by a better handeling of its diplomacy and policies in the inter war years.”

In responding to the thrust of this argument, I pointed out in an earlier posting:

“that the Americans had tried diplomacy with the Japanese since 1937 and it had failed. When Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the gunboat USS Panay as it was escorting a convoy of American oil tankers up the Yangtse River, and then machine-gunned the American crew as they swam for shore, America only lodged a stiff protest…It was only after the Japanese began to humiliate Americans and force American businesses out of Chinese territory that the Japanese had forcibly occupied that the first economic sanction was introduced.”

I also said:

“The Prime Minister of Japan, Prince Konoye, announced prior to Japan’s occupation of French Indo-China that the Japanese intended to incorporate all of the countries of South-East Asia, including the Philippines, into Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and that any country refusing to be incorporated would be treated as an enemy of Japan. The pressing threat to the security of the Philippines, and to British, Dutch and American economic and colonial interests in South-East Asia could not be ignored when the Japanese invaded and occupied French Indo-China. The Americans, British and Dutch responded to the Japanese threat to their survival in South-East Asia with economic embargoes on war-related exports to Japan.”

Faced with this situation, I would like to invite Beth Brown to nominate what compromise the United States should have been willing to accept without betraying basic humanitarian principles, the people of China, the people of the Philippines, and America’s legitimate economic interests in East Asia.

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#23

Post by David Thompson » 30 Dec 2004, 20:08

For readers interested in the American policies to counter Japanese aggression in Manchuria and China:

Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/PaW/

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Re: "A date which will live in infamy"

#24

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 31 Dec 2004, 00:21

JamesNo1 wrote:

but there is no credible historical evidence to support his theory that the diabolically cunning Americans wanted to push Japan into a war against the United States. .
Roosevelt ordered the US navy to commission some "bait" ships to sail out of the Phillipines shortly before ( first days of Dec 1941) the war started in hopes that they would run into the Japanese invasion convoys heading to invade "BRITISH" Malaysia and be fired upon so he would have a legitamate reason to propose declaring war on Japan. I.E creating a second "Panay Incident"

These commisionings and orders are in Navy Department records for our South China sea fleet stationed in the Philipines at the time and there are numerous statements by Navy officers who were given these orders and what they did, even their jokes about being "bait".

Needless to say after Pearl , all this was swept under the rug. As it could have easily been used against Roosevelt in the next election. Especially by that treasonous bastard and potential presidential candidate Douglas Macathur if his criminal deriliction of duty in the Philipines had been the subject of a military inquiry.

If this doesn't confirm that we could read their codes somewhat and Roosevelt wanted war against Japan and that he was a total "Anglo-phile', then you might consider joining the "flat-earth society".


Check out- "Days of Infamy" John Costello

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Galahad
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#25

Post by Galahad » 31 Dec 2004, 02:02

Out of curiosity, since I've not seen any comment on it, is anyone familiar with the recently declassified McCollum Memorandum?

It was a strategic analysis of the war situation as it affected the United States, by Lt Commander Arthur McCollum, of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and was sent to the Director of Naval Intelligence on 7 October 1940.

Basically it said that Britain was in trouble and would be in worse trouble if Japan should enter the war against Britain, that Britain was in effect the forward shield of the United States, that any action we could take to keep Britain in the war was in our interest and that such action included a war with Japan. It further said that politically we couldn't start a war, but that we COULD provoke Japan, and perhaps induce them to start one. It then listed 8 actions that we could take towards that end. It finished with the warning that if they WERE taken, that we should be prepared for war at any time.

There is no proof that Roosevelt saw the memorandum, yet, at the same time, after it was written, the US government put into effect 7 of the 8 suggestions. The only one not put into effect was that of adding a division of cruisers to the Asiatic Fleet. And it's known that Admiral Leahy said he was damned if he was going to sacrifice a division of heavy cruisers.

Still, reading the memorandum, and its suggested courses of action--which same WERE intended to be provocations aimed at distracting Japan from a focus on Britain--and then looking at the actions actually taken by the US government, you can't escape the thought that here is cause and effect. And a situation where the US took advantage of the Japanese mentality to induce them to do what the US wanted.

If so, then you have to admire the Machiavellian maneuvering of a government that most people tended to think of as naive.

Here's the text of the memorandum. Read it and see what conclusion you tend to come to regarding it and US policy, with especial attention to item 10. In one place it gets a little confusing in the cut and paste, due to the original listing of advantages and disadvantages in side by side columns, so here's a link to a site where you can read the photocopies of the original document if you want to:
http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/McCollum/

0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
Memorandum for the Director

Subject: Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and
Recommendations for Action by the United States.

1. The United States today finds herself confronted
by a hostile Germany and Italy in Europe and by an equally
hostile Japan in the Orient. Russia, the great land link between
these two groups of hostile powers, is at present neutral, but
in all probability favorably inclined towards the Axis powers,
and her favorable attitude towards these powers may be expected
to increase in direct proportion to increasing success in their
prosecution of the war in Europe. Germany and Italy have been
successful in war on the continent of Europe and all of Europe
is either under their military control or has been forced into
subservience. Only the British Empire is actively opposing by
war the growing world dominance of Germany and Italy and their
satellites.

2. The United States at first remained coolly aloof
from the conflict in Europe and there is considerable evidence
to support the view that Germany and Italy attempted by every
method within their power to foster a continuation of American
indifference to the outcome of the struggle in Europe. Paradoxically,
every success of German and Italian arms has led to further
increases in United States sympathy for and material support of
the British Empire, until at the present time the United States
government stands committed to a policy of rendering every
support short of war the changes rapidly increasing that
the United States will become a full fledged ally of the British
Empire in the very near future. The final failure of German
and Italian diplomacy to keep the United States in the role of
a disinterested spectator has forced them to adopt the policy of
developing threats to U.S. security in other spheres of the world,
notably by the threat of revolutions in South and Central America
by Axis-dominated groups and by the stimulation of Japan to further
aggressions and threats in the Far East in the hope that by these
mean the Unites States would become so confused in thought
and fearful of her own immediate security as to cause her to
become so preoccupied in purely defensive preparations as to
virtually preclude U.S. aid to Great Britain in any form. As a
result of this policy, Germany and Italy have lately concluded
a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States
If the published terms of this treaty and the pointed
utterances of German, Italian and Japanese leaders can be believed,
and there seems no ground on which to doubt either, the three
totalitarian powers agree to make war on the United States,
should she come to the assistance of England, or should she
attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the Orient and,
[2]
furthermore, Germany and Italy expressly reserve the right to
determine whether American aid to Britain, short of war, is a
cause for war or not after they have succeeded in defeating
England. In other words, after England has been disposed of
her enemies will decide whether or not to immediately proceed
with an attack on the United States. Due to geographic conditions,
neither Germany nor Italy are in a position to offer any
material aid to Japan. Japan, on the contrary, can be of much
help to both Germany and Italy by threatening and possibly even
attacking British dominions and supply routes from Australia,
India and the Dutch East Indies, thus materially weakening
Britain's position in opposition to the Axis powers in Europe.
In exchange for this service, Japan receives a free hand to seize
all of Asia that she can find it possible to grab, with the
added promise that Germany and Italy will do all in their power
to keep U.S. attention so attracted as to prevent the United
States from taking positive aggressive action against Japan.
Here again we have another example of the Axis-Japanese
diplomacy which is aimed at keeping American power immobilized,
and by threats and alarms to so confuse American thought as to
preclude prompt decisive action by the United States in either
sphere of action. It cannot be emphasized to strongly that
the last thing desired by either the Axis powers in Europe
or by Japan in the Far East is prompt, warlike action by the
United States in either theatre of operations.

3. An examination of the situation in Europe leads
to the conclusion that there is little that we can do now,
immediately to help Britain that is not already being done.
We have no trained army to send to the assistance of England,
nor will we have for at least a year. We are now trying to
increase the flow of materials to England and to bolster the
defense of England in every practicable way and this aid will
undoubtedly be increased. On the other hand, there is little
that Germany or Italy can do against us as long as England
continues in the war and her navy maintains control of the
Atlantic. The one danger to our position lies in the possible
early defeat of the British Empire with the British Fleet falling
intact into the hands of the Axis powers. The possibility of
such an event occurring would be materially lessened were we
actually allied in war with the British or at the very least
were taking active measures to relieve the pressure on Britain
in other spheres of action. To sum up: the threat to our security
in the Atlantic remains small so long as the British Fleet
remains dominant in that ocean and friendly to the United States.

4. In the Pacific, Japan by virtue of her alliance
with Germany and Italy is a definite threat to the security
of the British Empire and once the British Empire is gone the
power of Japan-Germany and Italy is to be directed against the
United States. A powerful land attack by Germany and Italy
through the Balkans and North Africa against the Suez Canal
with a Japanese threat or attack on Singapore would have very
serious results for the British Empire. Could Japan be diverted
or neutralized, the fruits of a successful attack on the Suez
Canal could not be as far reaching and beneficial to the Axis
powers as if such a success was also accompanied by the virtual
elimination of British sea power from the Indian Ocean, thus
[3]
opening up a European supply route for Japan and a sea route for
Eastern raw materials to reach Germany and Italy, Japan must be
diverted if the British and American ( ) blockade of Europe
and possibly Japan (?) is to remain even partially in effect.

5. While as pointed out in Paragraph (3) there is
little that the United States can do to immediately retrieve
the situation in Europe, the United States is able to effectively
nullify Japanese aggressive action, and do it without lessening
U.S. material assistance to Great Britain.

6. An examination of Japan's present position as
opposed to the United States reveals a situation as follows:

Advantages Disadvantages

1. Geographically strong position 1. A million and a half men
of Japanese Islands. engaged in an exhausting war
on the Asiatic Continent.
2. A highly centralized strong 2. Domestic economy and food
capable government. supply severely straightened.

3. Rigid control of economy on 3. A serious lack of sources of
a war basis. raw materials for war. Notably
oil, iron and cotton.
4. A people inured to hardship 4. Totally cut off from supplies
and war. from Europe.
5. A powerful army. 5. Dependent upon distant overseas
routes for essential supplies.
6. A skillful navy about 2/3 6. Incapable of increasing
the strength of the U.S. Navy. manufacture and supply of war
materials without free access
to U.S. or European markets.
7. Some stocks of raw materials. 7. Major cities and industrial
centers extremely vulnerable
to air attack.
8. Weather until April rendering
direct sea operations in the
vicinity of Japan difficult.

7. In the Pacific the United States possesses a very strong
defensive position and a navy and naval air force at present
in that ocean capable of long distance offensive operation. There
are certain other factors which at the present time are strongly
in our favor, viz:

A. Philippine Islands still held by the United States.
B. Friendly and possibly allied government in control
of the Dutch East Indies.
C. British still hold Hong Kong and Singapore and
are favorable to us.
D. Important Chinese armies are still in the field
in China against Japan.
E. A small U.S. Naval Force capable of seriously
threatening Japan's southern supply routes
[4]
already in the theatre of operations.
F. A considerable Dutch naval force is in the
Orient that would be of value if allied to U.S.

8. A consideration of the foregoing leads to the
conclusion that prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by
the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any
help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England and that
Japan itself would be faced with a situation in which her navy
could be forced to fight on most unfavorable terms or accept
fairly early collapse of the country through the force of blockade.
A prompt and early declaration of war after entering into suitable
arrangements with England and Holland, would be most effective
in bringing about the early collapse of Japan and thus eliminating
our enemy in the pacific before Germany and Italy could strike
at us effectively. Furthermore, elimination of Japan must surely
strengthen Britain's position against Germany and Italy and, in
addition, such action would increase the confidence and support
of all nations who tend to be friendly towards us.

9. It is not believed that in the present state of
political opinion the United States government is capable of
declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely
possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the
Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following
course of action is suggested:

A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of
British bases in the Pacific, particularly
Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of
base facilities and acquisition of supplies
in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government
of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to
the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in
the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese
demands for undue economic concessions,
particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan,
in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed
by the British Empire.

10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an
overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully
prepared to accept the threat of war.

A. H. McCollum
CC-0p-16
0p-16-F
File
[5]
0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
Summary
1. The United States is faced by a hostile combination of
powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific.

2. British naval control of the Atlantic prevents hostile
action against the United States in this area.

3. Japan's growing hostility presents an attempt to open sea
communications between Japan and the Mediterranean by an
attack on the British lines of communication in the
Indian Ocean.

4. Japan must be diverted if British opposition in Europe is
to remain effective.

5. The United States naval forces now in the Pacific are
capable of so containing and harassing Japan as to nullify
her assistance to Germany and Italy.

6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate
Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity
by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan.

7. In the absence of United States ability to take the
political offensive, additional naval force should be
sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland
and England that would serve as an effective check against
Japanese encroachments in South-eastern Asia.
[6]
Comment by Captain Knox

It is unquestionably to our general interest
that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate
and probably can't do better. We ought to make it certain
that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably
need from us substantial further destroyers and air reinforcements
to England. We should not precipitate anything in the
Orient that should hamper our ability to do this - so long as
probability continues.

If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious
in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic
is also protection to her and us in the Orient.

However, I concur in your courses of action
we must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough
to care for both.
D.W.K.
Re your #6: - no reason for battleships not
visiting west coast in bunches.

JamesNo1
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"A date which will live in infamy"

#26

Post by JamesNo1 » 31 Dec 2004, 07:12

ChristopherPerrien asks me to check out “Days of Infamy” by John Costello. I have actually read Costello’s earlier work “The Pacific War 1941-1945” and he makes no reference at all in that book to American “bait” ships being sent in harm’s way off Philippine waters in the first days of December 1941.

I think it is pretty clear that the American government (based on MAGIC intercepts) believed that there was a very real possibility of a Japanese attack on American territory towards the end of November or early December 1941. If not, why did the US Navy issue the war warning to all American commands on 27 November 1942. That warning suggested that the Japanese might strike at the Philippines, the Kra peninsula or Borneo. It also appears that the American government wanted the first aggressive act to be that of Japan and clearly seen to be so. If, and I am not assuming it to be true, one or more “bait” ships were sent into international waters off the Philippines in the first week of December 1941, I don’t see how that can reasonably be viewed as an attempt by the American government to “push” Japan into starting a war with the United States. I have not heard any suggestion that these so-called “bait” ships were supposed to act provocatively towards a Japanese invasion fleet, for example, by attempting to ram a Japanese troop transport or firing a shot across its bows!

Sensational histories with titles like “Days of Infamy” tend to sell well, and I suppose writers of popular histories need to earn an income, one way or another. Before I even think about contributing to Costello’s income stream by buying “Days of Infamy”, I would be obliged if Christopherperrien would refer me to the primary sources that are alleged to support this new claim by Costello.

ChristopherPerrien
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Re: "A date which will live in infamy"

#27

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 31 Dec 2004, 11:40

JamesNo1 wrote:ChristopherPerrien asks me to check out “Days of Infamy” by John Costello. I have actually read Costello’s earlier work “The Pacific War 1941-1945” and he makes no reference at all in that book to American “bait” ships being sent in harm’s way off Philippine waters in the first days of December 1941.


I would be obliged if Christopherperrien would refer me to the primary sources that are alleged to support this new claim by Costello.
Funny how you dismiss simple facts as a "claim" , besides Costello does not suppose or claim anything. He presents what is in government records and statements that are undenialbly authentic, and you can decide for yourself what to think. This little tidbit about "Fishbait missions" is only about 4 pages of this book, an aside really.


There is about a 20 year span of de-classified government records that make up the bulk of "Days of infamy" that were not accesible when he wrote his great book "The Pacific War".

Anyway the government records for this are in the National Archives , Suitland federal Center, Suitland Maryland , I can give you directions as I used to work at that center.


In the EXACT order quoting: Adm . Stark (CNO) to Adm. Hart (Cmr. Asiatic Fleet)

"The President directs that the following be done " " charter three vessels" with "the minimum requirements to establish identity as US MEN-OF -WAR"

The three vessels were the USS ISABEL, USS MOLLY MOORE, USS LANIKAI.

This order can be found in the national archives

OPNAV to CINCAF 1 DEC 1941 , PHLO , BOX 45, RG 80, NAW



Costello is no revisonist, in fact in this book he debunks alot of the Roosevely haters/ revisonist bull that has been published .
I highly recoomend buying it, as now, Costello is the premier scholar on that war , this is only my opinion and the opinion of many other WWII experts . I myself own 100's of books on that war and I consider few are equal to " Days of Infamy".

As to Pearl Harbor itself , I think Roosevelt knew that it could occur , however I think that he truely thought the Japanese would not do it , and
looking back it is easy to say that the entire "Peal Harbor attack" was the dumbest possible strategic action the Japanese could have done , as it guaranteed their total defeat and destruction by summoning the entire national will and half the armed might of the most powerful country on the planet against them. No other outcome was possible , personally I see the Japanese though that entire war, as having no grasp of strategic thought at all.

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Galahad
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#28

Post by Galahad » 31 Dec 2004, 20:58

There are quite a few indicators that Washington knew the attack on Pearl Harbor was coming.

First, on 26 November, Churchill sent a secret warning message to FDR, mentioning it in his history of WW 2. What was in it, we don't know, because of all the correspondence between the two leaders, that particular message is still classified, on grounds of national security.....it's the only such that's still classified.

But there are indicators as to what it said.

William Casey, who was in the OSS in 1941 and was later Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in his book, THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HITLER, p 7, wrote "The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii." Aside from that telegram, nothing has surfaced that would contain what Casey wrote about.

And Admiral Stark testified that "On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese intention to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States." Again, the only evidence we have for that seems to be tied to that telegram.

And the memoirs of Frances Perkins have a very curious comment. She was Secretary of Labor in FDR's cabinet. She tells of a special cabinet meeting that was called to discuss the world situation on 6 December 1941, one that met for most of the day and late into the night. She says they were having dinner around 8pm when Roosevelt was called out. When he returned, he said "Well, the war begins tomorrow".

There are various other bits and pieces of testimony that give more indications that official Washington knew matters were about to come to a head, and when.

In his testimony to the Pearl Harbor Committee, Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who was head of the Navy's War Plans Division on 7 December 1941, stated that shipping in the North Pacific was diverted in early December, to "avoid the Japanese task force".

In his memoirs, Captain Johan Ranneft, the Dutch naval attaché in Washington, mentions visiting the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) on 2 December. Ranneft, who was later awarded the Legion of Merit for his service to the United States, was inquiring about conditions in the Pacific. An American officer pointed to a map on the wall and said, "This is the Japanese Task Force proceeding East." It was then at a spot midway between Japan and Hawaii. On December 6th, Ranneft returned and asked where the carriers were. He was shown a position on the map about 300-400 miles northwest of Pearl Harbor. Ranneft wrote of this: "I ask what is the meaning of these carriers at this location: whereupon I receive the answer that it is probably in connection with Japanese reports of eventual American action ... I myself do not think about it because I believe that everyone in Honolulu is 100 percent on the alert, just like everyone here at O.N.I."

Like I said, there are quite a few indicators that official Washington knew what was coming. Further, that it wanted it to happen, ie, for the Japanese to fire the first shot. But somehow, if this is so, I doubt they had any idea just how deadly that first shot would be.

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#29

Post by Goldfish » 01 Jan 2005, 06:50

I'd like to offer my two cents on this:

1) America provoking Japan to war.

I would disagree that the United States in any way provoked Japan to war. The actions taken by the US from 1940 to 1941 were entirely justifiable based on Japan's actions prior to that point. On the contrary, I would say that Japan's actions from the 1920's on provoked the United States into taking the action it did (military expansion, embargoes).

For example:

Japan allowed all naval arms limitation treaties to lapse and refused to consider any further arms limitations treaties.

Japan had expanded its armed forces exponentially from 1937 on, going from 250,000 men to nearly 3,000,000 men under arms, as well as considerable air and naval expansion. Interestingly, as China's military grew weaker and less effective, Japan did not slow its military growth, but instead picked up the pace.

Japan had been waging aggressive war in Asia for more than a decade before Pearl Harbor. Japan had attacked China (many times), the Soviet Union (twice), and the US (the USS Panay). Japan had also taken French territory by force. It should be noted that Japan carried out this aggression with particular brutality and callousness, killing and enslaving millions.

Japan had leveled "embargoes" of its own against the US. Japan insisted that all trade with China be directed through Japan, strangling American business interests in Asia, and limited what could and could not be traded. This was a clear violation of America's rights to conduct trade with other sovereign nations, an echo of the trade embargoes of the Napoleonic wars that had led to war between the US and England in 1812. Japan could not argue that China was a belligerent, because it was Japan's contention that they were not at war because no formal declaration of war with China had been issued. Just as important, Japan backed its "embargoes" with threats of violence if they were not obeyed (Japan had threatened to attack Burma if the British did not close the Burma Road, one of the few land lines to China), hardly the policy of a peaceful nation or one looking for a peaceful solution.

Japan also insisted that the US suppress anti-Japan protests and boycotts by members of the Chinese-American community in the US. Japan had attacked China on several occasions before 1937 in response to such protests by Chinese students.

Japan had been planning other aggressive actions in the Pacific and Asia long before the US embargoes. Japan had long planned to invade the Soviet Union to take resource-rich Siberia. Their failed offensives there caused them to abandon that plan temporarily, but Japan maintained many of its best divisions in Manchuria in expectaion of a German victory that Japan could exploit. Japan's military leaders debated whether or not to pursue a "northern" strategy (attacking Russia) or a "southern" strategy (attacking southeast Asia and India). This was long before any American embargoes. Japan's military leaders also talked about not "missing the boat" and allowing the opportunity to gobble up Europe's colonies while Europe was embroiled in war to slip away. In other words, Japan was eying Southeast Asia, Siberia, and India long before any embargoes began. Japan was eager to take advantage of the weakness of the European powers (and the expected German victory) to forge a great Empire in Asia.

I think from the above that it was the United States that was provoked, not Japan. It took three years for Japan's brutal aggression in China to finally prod the US into action. In my opinion, it is America's great shame that so many millions of Chinese were killed by American scrap steel and oil. If there is anything for America to be ashamed about in its relations with Japan it is that.

2) Japan's "self defense"

Japan claimed in this aggression that they were always acting in "self defense" and honestly believed this to be true. This was because the Japanese saw expansion in Asia as their national right and saw that Asia was theirs in the way that Africa belonged to Europe. Therefore, any threat to Japanese colonial expansion in Asia (even if that opposition was from Asians, such as China) was seen as a threat to Japan itself and therefore any military action they took was in "self defense".

Japan had invaded Manchuria in 1931 because the Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang (also known as the "Young Marshal") had joined the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party, led by Chiang Kai-shek) and become Chiang's second in command. Zhang's father, Zhang Xiaolin (also known as the "Old Marshal"), had been assassinated by the Japanese in an attempt to force Zhang Xueliang into compliance with Japanese policies there, but when this instead convinced him to join the Nationalists, Japan invented an incident and took over Manchuria.

Japan's military aggression in China was largely prompted by the emergence of Chinese nationalism (starting with the May Fourth Movement of 1919) and the rise of Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang. In 1926, Chiang had begun the unification of China and the removal of warlords from power. By 1931, Most of eastern China was either under Chiang's control or allied with the Guomindang. The stated goal of the Guomindang was to unite the country, end the unequal treaties, and end foreign colonialism in China. This was an unacceptable threat to the Japanese, who hoped to forge a colonial empire in China. In this sense, the Japanese could be said to be acting in "self defense" because they were fighting for a core national goal (the colonization of China), but to say that this justified their invasion (or their brutal treatment of Chinese civilians) would be like saying that had Great Britain killed Gandhi and millions of Indians because those Indians wanted to end British rule of their country, such actions could be called "self defense".

Japan said that it had invaded China to fight communism and justified (and still justifies, according to Japanese diplays at the Yasukuni Shrine Museum) the invasion of China by saying that Chiang had allied with the Chinese Communists following the Xi'an Incident of 1936. However, the Japanese aimed the bulk of their war effort in China against the Nationalist central government, not Mao's Communists. The Japanese did launch brutal pacification campaigns against Communists in areas they controlled (called the "Three Alls"-Kill All, Burn All, Loot All), but they ignored Mao's base in Yan'an, not bombing it until 1944.

Japan did seek a peaceful solution to the "China Incident" but only one that would have left China as a de facto colony of Japan. Japan was certainly not willing to adopt a peace plan that would save China's "face" or that would avoid humiliating China. The United States had a simple solution, withdraw from China (that is, those parts of China not ceded to Japan by treaty-ie excluding Shandong) and French Indo-China and the US would lift all embargoes. If Japan wanted a peaceful end to the war in China, that was it. The US did not demand that Japan change its government, reduce its military, surrender any part of Japan, etc. Only that Japan withdraw from the sovereign nation of China. However, Japan was not willing to give up its hard-won colonial empire and chose to widen the war (by attacking the US, UK, and Netherlands) instead. Japan might have viewed American terms as "humiliating", but the Japanese cared little for the humiliation suffered by the Chinese and others.

Japan also viewed America's growing military as a threat. It was certainly true that the longer Japan waited, the harder it would be to win a war with the US. However, US military expansion was based on the threat posed to the US and its interests by the war in Europe and Asia. It is unreasonable that Japan should insist that the US not prepare for its defense in the face of worldwide conflict.

3) "America knew what was coming"

I have heard this stated many times. That Roosevelt and others provoked Japan into war and allowed them to attack Pearl Harbor in order to unify the American people. There are many reasons for this "conspiracy". Anti-Semites claim that Roosevelt wanted a war with Germany to help the Jews and that a war with Japan was a "back door" to war with Germany. The Japanese themselves claim that Roosevelt did it to improve the US economy. What all of these conspiracy theories assume is that the US was predestined to win the war, no matter what happened, and that Roosevelt knew that. In fact, this was far from the case. Germany was in complete control of mainland Europe (and its industial capacity) and on the verge (or so it seemed) of defeating the Soviet Union and the British.

Roosevelt could not have predicted that the Japanese would only launch one raid on Pearl Harbor (even Yamamoto was furious at Adm. Nagumo for this) and that the oil tanks, sub pens, repair yards and various smaller ships at Pearl would be spared or that the carriers (in Hawaiian waters at the time of the attack and forced to return to Pearl by lack of fuel) would survive. He could also not have known that the USSR would survive the winter, that the Japanese would be checked at Midway only six months after Pearl, and that the Pearl Harbor raid would unite the country. He would have to have been the greatest military strategist in history to hae predicted that a surprise attack on the US Navy on the eve of war would ultimately help the US more than it hurt it.

There are also many smaller points. If Roosevelt knew the Japanese were planning to attack Pearl Harbor and he planned to allow the attack, why weren't Kimmel and Short in on it (or replaced by those that were)? Why weren't the carriers and many crucial cruisers and destroyers moved to safer waters? The carriers were not removed to safety, as is commonly assumed. Rather, they were in Hawaiian waters en route to Pearl Harbor during the raid and had no choice but to head for Pearl due to lack of fuel. Had Nagumo launched a second raid, they might have been found and sunk in deep water. It was luck that saved the carriers, not deliberate planning in Washington. As for other stuff, like the British telegram that stated they were tracking the Japanese across the Pacific, are nonsense. How were the British supposed to be tracking them, as the Japanese sent only one radio signal on the way to Pearl? Unless the British had a submarine that could travel underwater as fast as the Japanese on the surface (and radio without being detected) or an airplane that was invisible, there is no way that the British could have tracked the Japanese on their way to Pearl.

I think that America was taken by surprise because it was deemed inconceivable that Japan could travel across the Pacific unseen and hit the US that hard. Consider that Macarthur, in the Phillipines, had eight hours warning and was still taken by surprise. There was an institutional arrogance in the US military regarding the Japanese and their capabilities in 1941. The Japanese plan was shocking even to the IJN high command, it is not surprising that the US could fail to imagine that Japan would do such a thing.

In conclusion, I feel that it was Japan's brutal, unrepentant aggression in Asia that led to America's embargoes and military expansion. If these then provoked Japan into attack, it must still be remembered that it was Japan's policies that had led to America's. China's position is often forgotten in all of this. As if China mattered for nothing and it was acceptable that millions of Chinese should die or be enslaved so that Japan could hold its head up in international relations and that the United States should stand by and watch in order to preserve US-Japan peace.

America's greatest shame is that it stood by so long and watched as millions died. Even the Nazis, Fascist Italians, and Soviets did more to help China in the early days of the Japanese invasion than the Western democracies did. I travel in China often and study the wartime relationship between the US and China. Many Chinese celebrate the US-China relationship after 1941 (the Flying Tigers, Hump pilots, etc.), but I always get the embarassing questions like "Why did the US continue to sell scrap steel, oil, and military technology to Japan even when Americans knew what was happening in China?". The US made millions of dollars from these sales and millions of Chinese died. I have no easy answers for these questions, but I would never simply answer "well, there was Japan's 'face' to consider" or "that would have been humiliating for Japan." Somehow, I don't think the Chinese would sympathize.

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"A date which will live in infamy"

#30

Post by JamesNo1 » 02 Jan 2005, 05:45

ChristopherPerrien is getting hot under the collar about this topic without any justification. My first thought on reading his two posts of 31 December were that it is a great pity that a civilized discussion cannot take place without being derailed by unnecessary rudeness.

ChristopherPerrien said in his first post on 31 December:

“If this doesn't confirm that we could read their codes somewhat and Roosevelt wanted war against Japan and that he was a total "Anglo-phile', then you might consider joining the "flat-earth society".“

Ignoring the gratuitous suggestion that I consider joining the “flat-earth society”, I replied to ChristopherPerrien as follows:

“If, and I am not assuming it to be true, one or more “bait” ships were sent into international waters off the Philippines in the first week of December 1941, I don’t see how that can reasonably be viewed as an attempt by the American government to “push” Japan into starting a war with the United States. I have not heard any suggestion that these so-called “bait” ships were supposed to act provocatively towards a Japanese invasion fleet, for example, by attempting to ram a Japanese troop transport or firing a shot across its bows!”

Obviously having no counter to my defence of Roosevelt, ChristopherPerrien wisely dropped that particular hot brick, and hotly attacked my reference to “claims” made by Costello in his book “Days of Infamy”.

He said:

“Funny how you dismiss simple facts as a "claim", besides Costello does not suppose or claim anything. He presents what is in government records and statements that are undenialbly authentic, and you can decide for yourself what to think.”

Any sensible person with a full grasp of the English language should appreciate that use of the word “claim” is not equivalent to suggesting that Costello has made one or more false statements in his book “Days of Infamy”. The book has a very provocative title, and if Costello has made no claims or assertions in this book, then it would have to be a very unusual history book!

The topic of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is bedevilled by revisionism mostly based on wild conspiracy theories, and any sensible person needs to be cautious about accepting statements in a book, article, or documentary on that topic as facts until he/she has read them. So that is why I prefer to use the word “claim” until I am satisfied that an assertion is based on fact or likely to be so.

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