Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

[daveshoup2MD]

And what's intriguing is that even with MacArthur making bad decisions in 1936-41 regarding the PI, the US decision makers -

MacArthur wasn't making any "bad decsions". His only job from Nov 1935-July 1941 was training the Philippine army on $8 million a year, with ZERO help from FDR.

Every key decision from 1936-1941 regarding the West pacific, our position via Japan, and USA defense of Philippines was made by FDR with the advice of Marshall, Craig, and the Secretary of War. MacArthur had almost nothing to do with it.

MacArthur took the contract from the PC Government, did he not? If the resources were insufficient for the strategy he told Quezon et al was necessary, his course of action was obvious.

He chose not to take that action, of course, but that was his decision - in the same way that he took the contract in the first place. He was not drafted, was he?

Given the US did not lose the equivalent of four reinforced first-line infantry divisions and two-thirds of their fast capital ships in the defense of the PI in 1941-42, seems quite clear that FDR et al made exactly the right decision to not heavily reinforce a vulnerable outpost, one would think... if the US had thrown three more infantry divisions into Luzon (say, the 8th, 28th, and 29th) and lost a couple of front line capital ships (say, USS North Carolina and USS Washington, or even USS Idaho and USS Mississippi) in the island's defense, are you suggesting his critics would have accepted that result?

The problem I have with this version of events is that it ignores the US change of policy in July/Aug 1941. There was an intent to heavily reinforce the Philippines.

Between 31 July and 16 Aug 1941 plans were drawn up and approved for a substantial reinforcement of the Philippines. The first units involved in this arrived before the end of Sept and it was still ongoing when war broke out with even more planned to be sent out all the way through to early 1942. One element of this was the Pensacola convoy that left PH on 29th Nov, and on 9 Dec had its orders changed to send it to Australia where it arrived on 22 Dec. MacArthur himself seems to have gone very quickly from turning down the offer of an infantry division to asking for ever increasing amounts of equipment to equip more Philippine Army units and the War Dept agreeing to the dispatch over 23,000 personnel to back them up. Significant USAAC reinforcements were also planned. The problem was finding the transport to move all this to the Philippines. And for that reason the complete units being sent were being fed in piecemeal.

That most of this equipment and personnel didn’t arrive by 7 Dec 1941 simply suggests that the US dodged a bullet.

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/US ... -PI-3.html
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pensacola_Convoy

US Army policy changed - somewhat - in the late summer of 1941, largely because of the overly rosy accounts MacArthur and company were feeding Washington, but even then, the "reinforcements" were a mix of new equipment to replace what was already in the PI (B-17s and P-40s to replace B-10s and P-35s, for example) along with one infantry regiment (three battalions), a field artillery group (four battalions), two light tank battalions, and the 200th CA (AA) regiment, largely to fill out the existing US Army infantry division and corps-level troops; this was not a decision to send a corps equivalent of three more US Army infantry divisions to Luzon in 1941-42.

Doing so, of course, would free up some of the US Army Philippine Scout personnel to augment the understrength US Army/PS coast artillery organization, as well as the Philippine Commonwealth Army militia forces, and - possibly - get at least the PCA units on Luzon mobilized with cadre that knew something about soldiering, as opposed to the mass of the PCA officer corps and some cops TDY from the Philippine Constabulary.

The USN, of course, knew the PI were doomed. There's a reason the Asiatic Fleet went south, and managed to not lose any major units to air attack in Philippine waters - well done, Adm. Hart. That's also why the USN didn't send a batdiv to the PI in 1941 to become targets for the IJNAF, either.

[EwenS]

I think you are still reluctant to accept the scale of the reinforcement planned. The reinforcement plan was ongoing when war broke out. You also seem to be playing down the reinforcement that did occur.

For the moment I’ll stick to the USAAC units with which I’m more familiar.

In May 1941 the Philippine Dept Air Force consisted of the 4th Composite Group with 5 squadrons and c150 aircraft. The 3 pursuit units had swapped their P-26 (22 aircraft) for P-35A (56 aircraft) and there were 31 P-40B on hand awaiting the correct coolant before issue to one of the pursuit squadrons (20th PS). The single Bomb Squadron had 12 B-10 and there were 18 B-18 lying in crates to replace them. The final squadron, 2nd Observation squadron had a number of types on hand.

By 7th Dec there were 5 Pursuit Squadrons in 2 Pursuit Groups. 3 had newly delivered P-40E (deliveries of that model from the factory only began in Aug 1941), the 20th had its P-40B and the 34th had hand me down P-35A pending the arrival of more P-40E from the USA. The 28th BS had retired its B-10 and the B-18 was only being used for training and transport. Its crews had begun to convert to the B-17 being used by the 3 BS from the 19th BG that had arrived in Sept-Nov with 35 B-17C/D. And 2nd OS still had it’s miscellaneous aircraft. Total aircraft numbers had risen to c265.

Some of the P-26 and B-10 aircraft had been handed over to the nascent Philippine Air Force.

The Pensacola Convoy carried 52 A-24A dive bombers of the 27th BG(Light) (the personnel were already in the Philippines) and 18 more P-40E and pilots to bring the 35th Pursuit Group somewhere near full strength. And we know that the 7th BG, newly equipped in Nov with B-17E (production of which started in Sept 1941) had begun to deploy as some of its aircraft got caught up in the PH debacle. Oct/Nov had seen the dispatch of another 60+ P-40E from the US.


And look at Gen Arnold’s July proposal that was approved in Aug. 4 heavy bomber groups (272 aircraft plus 68 reserves) and 2 pursuit groups (260 aircraft). Dispatch of the 7th & 19th BG and 35th PG were clearly part of that reinforcement plan but any other units were having to await their equipment coming from the factories where production of these latest types had only begun in Aug/Sept. Delivery of the required B-17E was going to take into the Spring of 1942 to achieve and that was is detailed in the article I linked.

Just because it was not the 3 division corps you envisage does not mean that the US was not serious about reinforcing the Philippines. It seems to me that they were sending what was immediately to hand and was trained. More would have followed. The article I linked shows more troops following in mid-Dec (brought forward from mid-Jan). Remember the thread running about the experience of troops in Op Torch. There is information in there about just how quickly the US Army expanded in 1940/41 with it doubling in size in that time. Units being stripped of trained personnel to form other units. And add to that the Germany first policy. Better to train them in the US than send them poorly trained to the Philippines.

Actually the more you look at it the more I come to the conclusion that while the Japanese may have moved rapidly to the decision to go to war in autumn 1941, they did so at a time before the Allies could succeed in reinforcing the region. Had they left it till later the first 6 months of war might have been a lot harder for them.

As for your comments about the Asiatic Fleet, if it wasn’t going to fight in Philippine waters where else could it go other than south. It only had 2 tankers to support any retreat across the Pacific. To support 2 cruisers, 13 destroyers plus all the other miscellaneous vessels from PT boats up. South lay the support from the British and Dutch navies and fuel.

[rcocean]

US Army policy changed - somewhat - in the late summer of 1941, largely because of the overly rosy accounts MacArthur and company were feeding Washington, but even then, the "reinforcements" were a mix of new equipment to replace what was already >

What "overly rosy reports"? What information did MacArthur send to FDR/Stimson/Marshall in the "late summer" of 1941?

Name them. Provide dates. You can't - because they don't exist.

Marshall/FDR had all the information they needed to make their decisions. They didn't obtain any information from MacArthur that was "overly rosy". They had made the decision in July 1941 BEFORE MacArthur was recalled on July 26th, to base hundreds of B-17s in the Philippines to deter Japan.

[daveshoup2MD]

I think you are still reluctant to accept the scale of the reinforcement planned. The reinforcement plan was ongoing when war broke out. You also seem to be playing down the reinforcement that did occur.

For the moment I’ll stick to the USAAC units with which I’m more familiar.

In May 1941 the Philippine Dept Air Force consisted of the 4th Composite Group with 5 squadrons and c150 aircraft. The 3 pursuit units had swapped their P-26 (22 aircraft) for P-35A (56 aircraft) and there were 31 P-40B on hand awaiting the correct coolant before issue to one of the pursuit squadrons (20th PS). The single Bomb Squadron had 12 B-10 and there were 18 B-18 lying in crates to replace them. The final squadron, 2nd Observation squadron had a number of types on hand.

By 7th Dec there were 5 Pursuit Squadrons in 2 Pursuit Groups. 3 had newly delivered P-40E (deliveries of that model from the factory only began in Aug 1941), the 20th had its P-40B and the 34th had hand me down P-35A pending the arrival of more P-40E from the USA. The 28th BS had retired its B-10 and the B-18 was only being used for training and transport. Its crews had begun to convert to the B-17 being used by the 3 BS from the 19th BG that had arrived in Sept-Nov with 35 B-17C/D. And 2nd OS still had it’s miscellaneous aircraft. Total aircraft numbers had risen to c265.

Some of the P-26 and B-10 aircraft had been handed over to the nascent Philippine Air Force.

The Pensacola Convoy carried 52 A-24A dive bombers of the 27th BG(Light) (the personnel were already in the Philippines) and 18 more P-40E and pilots to bring the 35th Pursuit Group somewhere near full strength. And we know that the 7th BG, newly equipped in Nov with B-17E (production of which started in Sept 1941) had begun to deploy as some of its aircraft got caught up in the PH debacle. Oct/Nov had seen the dispatch of another 60+ P-40E from the US.


And look at Gen Arnold’s July proposal that was approved in Aug. 4 heavy bomber groups (272 aircraft plus 68 reserves) and 2 pursuit groups (260 aircraft). Dispatch of the 7th & 19th BG and 35th PG were clearly part of that reinforcement plan but any other units were having to await their equipment coming from the factories where production of these latest types had only begun in Aug/Sept. Delivery of the required B-17E was going to take into the Spring of 1942 to achieve and that was is detailed in the article I linked.

Just because it was not the 3 division corps you envisage does not mean that the US was not serious about reinforcing the Philippines. It seems to me that they were sending what was immediately to hand and was trained. More would have followed. The article I linked shows more troops following in mid-Dec (brought forward from mid-Jan). Remember the thread running about the experience of troops in Op Torch. There is information in there about just how quickly the US Army expanded in 1940/41 with it doubling in size in that time. Units being stripped of trained personnel to form other units. And add to that the Germany first policy. Better to train them in the US than send them poorly trained to the Philippines.

Actually the more you look at it the more I come to the conclusion that while the Japanese may have moved rapidly to the decision to go to war in autumn 1941, they did so at a time before the Allies could succeed in reinforcing the region. Had they left it till later the first 6 months of war might have been a lot harder for them.

As for your comments about the Asiatic Fleet, if it wasn’t going to fight in Philippine waters where else could it go other than south. It only had 2 tankers to support any retreat across the Pacific. To support 2 cruisers, 13 destroyers plus all the other miscellaneous vessels from PT boats up. South lay the support from the British and Dutch navies and fuel.

Not really, but yes, the USAAF was trying to build up a strategic bombardment force on Luzon, and the fighters to defend it; of course, the US actually had modern aircraft (B-17s and P-40s) to send - the RAF in Malaya got Buffalos and Blenheims. So, yes, if those reinforcements could be a) deployed; b) sustained (kind of tough when the USN was not in a position to provide ordnance, spares, and POL to Luzon, once the Japanese initiated hostilities) it c) raises the question of the bombers were supposed to bomb?

They still couldn't hit the Home Islands with B-17s from Luzon, and the problem, of course, is just like the 20th AF in China in 1944-45, the bases would have to be defended by the locals, and the PCA was not up to the task ... as was proven in 1942. So the USAAF deployments were, after all, pretty pointless. ... but at least Marshall didn't send three extra line infantry divisions into the sack. Good job, Gen. Marshall.

The point of comparison between the US and the British, in terms of reinforcements being sent into the Western Pacific in 1941-42, is the British DID send in a corps equivalent (8th Australian and 18th British divisions, and the 44th and 45th Indian brigades) and two modern capital ships, and lost them all - the US was able to go down fighting with one decent infantry division, and didn't lose any capital ships, (or cruisers, or even destroyers) in the PI because they all understood the correlation of forces.

The British - the ones defeated in Malaya, after all, hence the OP - most clearly did not.

[daveshoup2MD]

US Army policy changed - somewhat - in the late summer of 1941, largely because of the overly rosy accounts MacArthur and company were feeding Washington, but even then, the "reinforcements" were a mix of new equipment to replace what was already >

What "overly rosy reports"? What information did MacArthur send to FDR/Stimson/Marshall in the "late summer" of 1941?

Name them. Provide dates. You can't - because they don't exist.

Marshall/FDR had all the information they needed to make their decisions. They didn't obtain any information from MacArthur that was "overly rosy". They had made the decision in July 1941 BEFORE MacArthur was recalled on July 26th, to base hundreds of B-17s in the Philippines to deter Japan.

MacArthur was the one who, since 1936, had advocated for the entire concept of a PCA militia army defending Luzon (where those bombers were supposed to be based to do - what, exactly? - bomb Taiwan? They couldn't reach Tokyo) because someone's army had to defend Clark.

It's the same bull as Chennault et al peddled about the USAAF being based in China; turned out that the locals couldn't defend the bases, so what was the point?

The difference being Chennault was an airman; they got paid to believe their own smoke. MacArthur was allegedly a strategist of great renown; that's why he had four stars.

[EwenS]

You clearly haven’t heard that one of the roles for the USAAC bomber force in the 1930s, all the way up to the 4 engined B-17, was Coastal Defence. The bombers would have gone out beyond the range of the Army’s coastal artillery and sink any approaching enemy fleet. Page 402 onwards in this document will help.
https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/23/2 ... 23-007.pdf

In mid-1941 the USAAC had clearly not studied the effectiveness of RA and Luftwaffe level bombers (as opposed to the very successful dive bombers) against RN warships at sea!

B-17 raids were planned against Japanese airbases on Formosa, but the destruction of half the B-17 fleet on day 1 and then the Japanese landings on Luzon put paid to that. Instead they were dispatched to strike those landing forces on 10 Dec.

[rcocean]

B-17 raids were planned against Japanese airbases on Formosa, but the destruction of half the B-17 fleet on day 1 and then the Japanese landings on Luzon put paid to that. Instead they were dispatched to strike those landing forces on 10 Dec.

Its actually unclear what the B-17s were "planned" to do prior to Dec 8th. Attack the Airbases? Attack the Japanese fleet as it sailed to attack the NEI or Singapore? Bomb japan?

All these considered by Arnold and FDR when the plan for 250 B-17s in the Philippines was approved. However, there was no "plan" by FEAF command to bomb "airfields" on Dec 8th. Brett's original plan was to bomb Takao Harbor. Later at 10 Am that was changed to bombing airfields after a Photrecon since there were no photos of the airfields or bomb phase lines. Had the bombers gone on their mission to bomb Formosa AF's at Dusk, they would've accomplished nothing and probably lost quite a few planes to Japanese Fighters.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Mr. daveshoup2MD wrote:

MacArthur was the one who, since 1936, had advocated for the entire concept of
a PCA militia army defending Luzon (where those bombers were supposed to be based to
do - what, exactly? - bomb Taiwan? They couldn't reach Tokyo) because someone's army
had to defend Clark.

It's the same bull as Chennault et al peddled about the USAAF being based in China; turned
out that the locals couldn't defend the bases, so what was the point?

The difference being Chennault was an airman; they got paid to believe their own smoke.
MacArthur was allegedly a strategist of great renown; that's why he had four stars.

I am reminded of the story of the young boy who was found with a shovel, digging in a pile of horse
manure. He stated that, " with all this horseshit, there has to be a PONY buried here somewhere..."
Unfortunately, I can find not a trace of a pony.


Yes, MacArthur accepted the task of organizing and training an army for the Philippines. The reason
was very simple: The United States was accepting responsibility for helping the Philippines become
an independant nation, with a government and an army to safeguard the people of the Philippines.
Yes, MacArthur chose to follow the Swiss Model, of a Citizen Army, trained on the principles of the
Minutemen of 1775 and legacy of Cincinnatus. Mr. Daveshoup2MD, WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE
DIFFERENTLY, UNDER THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES ? With the same budget, the same limitations
on your manpower and equipment sources, the same problems dealing with the cultural issues in the
Philippines, WHAT, EXACTLY WOULD DAVESHOUP2MD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY THAT WOULD BE
BETTER THAN WHAT MACARTHUR DID ?

I want to hear your answer to this question, otherwise you are no better than a Monday Morning
Quarterback complaining because HIS NFL team lost the day before.

As for MacArthur relying on the U.S. Army to protect the Bomber Fields, the Philippines were STILL
a posession of the U.S.A. - which means that it was the U.S. Army's responsibility to protect it's
air assets in the Philippines, not that of the Philippine Army.


And as for Chennault in China, remember one little factoid: His was the first air force to successfully
resist the IJA and IJN air forces, blunting their attacks on Southern China and helping to keep the
Burma Road open so that supplies could continue to reach Chiang Kai Shek.

The basing of B-29s in China, while logistically almost impossible, did, in fact, carry out the FIRST
strategic raids against Japan. The heartbreaking work of the Chinese people in building the runways
for the B-29s BY HAND, and the sacrifices of the men who flew the aircraft, fuel, bombs, and spare
parts 'Over the Hump' from India to China, should never be forgotten. This work started in 1943,
long before the USN had taken the Mariannas, and long before it was known how long it would take
to build runways on those islands to carry the war to Japan.

The fact that the Japanese, upon finding out how dangerous the bases in China were to Japan,
immediately began an offensive to capture those bases, using hundreds of thousands of IJA soldiers,
hundreds of aircraft, and all the assets they had available in China, only shows how effective those
bases would have been in reducing Japan.


Finally, as for MacArthur having Four Stars, Mr. Daveshoup2MD, MacArthur had FIVE STARS - and he
got those stars as a brevet General of the Armies despite the animosity of his direct superior, Marshall,
and his President, Roosevelt. Both men hated and feared MacArthur because, when compared to
him, both of them seemed to shrink to insignificance.

And, as another little Factoid - when the Five Star Promotions were ' Regularized ' as promotions
in the Regular U.S. Army, MacArthur got his promotion FIRST, followed by Marshall and Eisenhower.
Thats right - both Marshall and Eisenhower would have been required to salute MacArthur when
they met on military business.


To Mr. Rcocean :

The General in charge of the USAAF in the Philippines in December, 1941, was Brereton, not Brett.
It was Brereton who screwed the pooch on the B-17 deployments, the failed Fighter Defense by the
P-40s and P-35s, and it was Brereton who, in the middle of the fighting in early 1942, got the wind
up and fled to India in a B-24. He also later screwed up the bombings in Normandy after D-day, for
which Doolittle accepted the blame.


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[daveshoup2MD]

You clearly haven’t heard that one of the roles for the USAAC bomber force in the 1930s, all the way up to the 4 engined B-17, was Coastal Defence. The bombers would have gone out beyond the range of the Army’s coastal artillery and sink any approaching enemy fleet. Page 402 onwards in this document will help.
https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/23/2 ... 23-007.pdf

In mid-1941 the USAAC had clearly not studied the effectiveness of RA and Luftwaffe level bombers (as opposed to the very successful dive bombers) against RN warships at sea!

B-17 raids were planned against Japanese airbases on Formosa, but the destruction of half the B-17 fleet on day 1 and then the Japanese landings on Luzon put paid to that. Instead they were dispatched to strike those landing forces on 10 Dec.

Well aware of why the USAAC was able to get funding from Congress for B-17s in the 1930s; why the heavy bombers were funded, and what they were expected to do in the event of war, were two very different things, as the USAAF leadership knew full well prewar. Craven & Cate, Holley's Green Books volume on aircraft procurement, and The Paths of Heaven, are all pretty clear on the difference.

As interesting as the Rex exercise was, for example, it was a PR effort; the Air Corps Tactical School was run by the bomber mafia, and the doctrine they developed was focused on strategic air campaigns against industry. Coastal defense was a blind.

[daveshoup2MD]

B-17 raids were planned against Japanese airbases on Formosa, but the destruction of half the B-17 fleet on day 1 and then the Japanese landings on Luzon put paid to that. Instead they were dispatched to strike those landing forces on 10 Dec.

Its actually unclear what the B-17s were "planned" to do prior to Dec 8th. Attack the Airbases? Attack the Japanese fleet as it sailed to attack the NEI or Singapore? Bomb japan?

All these considered by Arnold and FDR when the plan for 250 B-17s in the Philippines was approved. However, there was no "plan" by FEAF command to bomb "airfields" on Dec 8th. Brett's original plan was to bomb Takao Harbor. Later at 10 Am that was changed to bombing airfields after a Photrecon since there were no photos of the airfields or bomb phase lines. Had the bombers gone on their mission to bomb Formosa AF's at Dusk, they would've accomplished nothing and probably lost quite a few planes to Japanese Fighters.

Yes, USAAF planning for the defense of Luzon was fatally flawed; expecting the PCA's militiamen to defend the air bases against an IJA expeditionary force was - obviously - a failure in practice, driven by MacArthur's years of denying reality. Glad you're in agreement.

[daveshoup2MD]

Hello All :

Mr. daveshoup2MD wrote:

MacArthur was the one who, since 1936, had advocated for the entire concept of
a PCA militia army defending Luzon (where those bombers were supposed to be based to
do - what, exactly? - bomb Taiwan? They couldn't reach Tokyo) because someone's army
had to defend Clark.

It's the same bull as Chennault et al peddled about the USAAF being based in China; turned
out that the locals couldn't defend the bases, so what was the point?

The difference being Chennault was an airman; they got paid to believe their own smoke.
MacArthur was allegedly a strategist of great renown; that's why he had four stars.

Yes, MacArthur accepted the task of organizing and training an army for the Philippines. The reason
was very simple: The United States was accepting responsibility for helping the Philippines become
an independant nation, with a government and an army to safeguard the people of the Philippines.
Yes, MacArthur chose to follow the Swiss Model, of a Citizen Army, trained on the principles of the
Minutemen of 1775 and legacy of Cincinnatus. 1) Mr. Daveshoup2MD, WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE
DIFFERENTLY, UNDER THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES ? With the same budget, the same limitations
on your manpower and equipment sources, the same problems dealing with the cultural issues in the
Philippines, 2) WHAT, EXACTLY WOULD DAVESHOUP2MD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY THAT WOULD BE
BETTER THAN WHAT MACARTHUR DID ?

I want to hear your answer to this question, otherwise you are no better than a Monday Morning
Quarterback complaining because HIS NFL team lost the day before.

As for MacArthur relying on the U.S. Army to protect the Bomber Fields, the Philippines were STILL
a posession of the U.S.A. - which means that it was the U.S. Army's responsibility to protect it's
air assets in the Philippines, not that of the Philippine Army.


And as for Chennault in China, remember one little factoid: His was the first air force to successfully
resist the IJA and IJN air forces, blunting their attacks on Southern China and helping to keep the
Burma Road open so that supplies could continue to reach Chiang Kai Shek.

The basing of B-29s in China, while logistically almost impossible, did, in fact, carry out the FIRST
strategic raids against Japan. The heartbreaking work of the Chinese people in building the runways
for the B-29s BY HAND, and the sacrifices of the men who flew the aircraft, fuel, bombs, and spare
parts 'Over the Hump' from India to China, should never be forgotten. This work started in 1943,
long before the USN had taken the Mariannas, and long before it was known how long it would take
to build runways on those islands to carry the war to Japan.

The fact that the Japanese, upon finding out how dangerous the bases in China were to Japan,
immediately began an offensive to capture those bases, using hundreds of thousands of IJA soldiers,
hundreds of aircraft, and all the assets they had available in China, only shows how effective those
bases would have been in reducing Japan.


Finally, as for MacArthur having Four Stars, Mr. Daveshoup2MD, MacArthur had FIVE STARS - and he
got those stars as a brevet General of the Armies despite the animosity of his direct superior, Marshall,
and his President, Roosevelt. Both men hated and feared MacArthur because, when compared to
him, both of them seemed to shrink to insignificance.

And, as another little Factoid - when the Five Star Promotions were ' Regularized ' as promotions
in the Regular U.S. Army, MacArthur got his promotion FIRST, followed by Marshall and Eisenhower.
Thats right - both Marshall and Eisenhower would have been required to salute MacArthur when
they met on military business.


To Mr. Rcocean :

The General in charge of the USAAF in the Philippines in December, 1941, was Brereton, not Brett.
It was Brereton who screwed the pooch on the B-17 deployments, the failed Fighter Defense by the
P-40s and P-35s, and it was Brereton who, in the middle of the fighting in early 1942, got the wind
up and fled to India in a B-24. He also later screwed up the bombings in Normandy after D-day, for
which Doolittle accepted the blame.


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

1 and 2) Being honest about the absolute inability of the PI to defend itself against Japan in the 1930s and 1940s with the resources- manpower, industry, POL, and budget - available in the 1930s and 1940s, rather than advocating for strategic lunacy. In other words, be a George Grunert, rather than a Douglas MacArthur (or, in 1950, a John R. Hodge, rather than a Douglas MacArthur).

MacArthur didn't get his fifth star until 1944, and his date of rank post-dated GCM's by two days, so no, actually. ... at least according to the US Army; maybe they're wrong?

https://history.army.mil/html/faq/5star.html

As far as FDR and GCM and their opinion of MacArthur, okay, that's one take on it. Apparently the American people and the GOP shared the same opinion, at least in 1952, but what the hey...

[Richard Anderson]

MacArthur didn't get his fifth star until 1944, and his date of rank post-dated GCM's by two days, so no, actually.

Exactly, and this is why the ignore button can be your friend; it keeps you from being inundated by trolling posts from magical thinkers. No MacArthur did not rank both Marshall and Eisenhower, he ranked Eisenhower, but not Marshall.

Eisenhower, Dwight D.
Maj. Tank C, N.A. 18 July 18; accepted 24 July 18; vacated 12 Aug. 18; It. col. Tank C, U.S.A. I4 Oct. 18; accepted 20 Oct. 18; hon. dis. 30 June 20; col. A.U.S. 6 Mar. 4I; accepted 12 Mar. 4I: brig. gen. A.U.S. 29 Sept. 4I; accepted 3 Oct. 41; maj. gen. A.U.S. 27 Mar. 42; It. gen. A.U.S. 7 July 42; gen. A.U.S. 11 Feb. 43. -- Cadet M.A. 14 June 11; 2 It. of Inf. 12 June 15; 1It. 1 July 16; capt. 15 May 17; maj. (temp.) 17 June 18 to 19 Oct. 18; maj. 2 July 20; (Discharged as major and appointed captain Nov. 4, 22); capt. (Nov. 4, 22); maj. 26 Aug. 24; It. col. 1 July 36; brig. gen. 30 Aug. 43; maj. gen. 30 Aug. 43: (Authorized by act 14 Dec. 44) General of the Army 20 Dec. 44.

Marshall, George C.
Lt. col. of Inf. N.A. 6 Jan. 18; accepted 8 Jan. 18; col. of Inf. U.S.A. i7 Aug. 18; accepted 18 Sept. 18; hon. dis. 30 June 20. -- 2 It. of Inf. 2 Feb.0; accepted 3 Feb. 02; 1 It. 7 Mar. 07; capt. 1 July 16; maj. (temp.) 5 Aug. 17 to 7 Jan. 18; maj. 1 July 20; It. col. 21 Aug. 23; col. 1 Sept. 33; brig. gen. 1 Oct. 36; accepted 1 Oct. 36; maj. gen. 1 Sept. 39; accepted 1 Sept. 39; (Authorized by act Feb. 23. 1929) gen. 1 Sept. 39; (Authorized by Act 14 Dec. 44) General of the Army 16 Dec. 44.

MacArthur, Douglas A.
Col. of Inf. N.A. 6 Aug. 17; accepted 11 Aug. 17; brig. gen. N.A. 26 June 18; accepted 11 July 18; hon. dis. 28 Feb. 20; It. gen. A.U.S. 27 July 4I; accepted 29July 41; gen. A.U.S. 18 Dec. 41 (with rank from 16 Sept. 36); accepted 22 Dec. 41. -- Cadet M.A. 13 June 99; 2 It. Engrs. 11 June 03; 1 It. 23 Apr. 04; capt. 27 Feb. 11; maj. 11 Dec. 15; brig. gen. 20 Jan. 20; accepted 28 Feb. 20; maj. gen. 17 Jan. 25; accepted 17 Jan. 25; (Authorized by act Feb. 23, 29) gen. 21 Nov. 30 to 1 Oct. 35; retired with rank of gen. 31 Dec. 37; A.D. 26 July 41; (Authorized by Act 14 Dec. 44) General of the Army 18 Dec. 44.

[daveshoup2MD]

MacArthur didn't get his fifth star until 1944, and his date of rank post-dated GCM's by two days, so no, actually.

Exactly, and this is why the ignore button can be your friend; it keeps you from being inundated by trolling posts from magical thinkers. No MacArthur did not rank both Marshall and Eisenhower, he ranked Eisenhower, but not Marshall.

Eisenhower, Dwight D.
Maj. Tank C, N.A. 18 July 18; accepted 24 July 18; vacated 12 Aug. 18; It. col. Tank C, U.S.A. I4 Oct. 18; accepted 20 Oct. 18; hon. dis. 30 June 20; col. A.U.S. 6 Mar. 4I; accepted 12 Mar. 4I: brig. gen. A.U.S. 29 Sept. 4I; accepted 3 Oct. 41; maj. gen. A.U.S. 27 Mar. 42; It. gen. A.U.S. 7 July 42; gen. A.U.S. 11 Feb. 43. -- Cadet M.A. 14 June 11; 2 It. of Inf. 12 June 15; 1It. 1 July 16; capt. 15 May 17; maj. (temp.) 17 June 18 to 19 Oct. 18; maj. 2 July 20; (Discharged as major and appointed captain Nov. 4, 22); capt. (Nov. 4, 22); maj. 26 Aug. 24; It. col. 1 July 36; brig. gen. 30 Aug. 43; maj. gen. 30 Aug. 43: (Authorized by act 14 Dec. 44) General of the Army 20 Dec. 44.

Marshall, George C.
Lt. col. of Inf. N.A. 6 Jan. 18; accepted 8 Jan. 18; col. of Inf. U.S.A. i7 Aug. 18; accepted 18 Sept. 18; hon. dis. 30 June 20. -- 2 It. of Inf. 2 Feb.0; accepted 3 Feb. 02; 1 It. 7 Mar. 07; capt. 1 July 16; maj. (temp.) 5 Aug. 17 to 7 Jan. 18; maj. 1 July 20; It. col. 21 Aug. 23; col. 1 Sept. 33; brig. gen. 1 Oct. 36; accepted 1 Oct. 36; maj. gen. 1 Sept. 39; accepted 1 Sept. 39; (Authorized by act Feb. 23. 1929) gen. 1 Sept. 39; (Authorized by Act 14 Dec. 44) General of the Army 16 Dec. 44.

MacArthur, Douglas A.
Col. of Inf. N.A. 6 Aug. 17; accepted 11 Aug. 17; brig. gen. N.A. 26 June 18; accepted 11 July 18; hon. dis. 28 Feb. 20; It. gen. A.U.S. 27 July 4I; accepted 29July 41; gen. A.U.S. 18 Dec. 41 (with rank from 16 Sept. 36); accepted 22 Dec. 41. -- Cadet M.A. 13 June 99; 2 It. Engrs. 11 June 03; 1 It. 23 Apr. 04; capt. 27 Feb. 11; maj. 11 Dec. 15; brig. gen. 20 Jan. 20; accepted 28 Feb. 20; maj. gen. 17 Jan. 25; accepted 17 Jan. 25; (Authorized by act Feb. 23, 29) gen. 21 Nov. 30 to 1 Oct. 35; retired with rank of gen. 31 Dec. 37; A.D. 26 July 41; (Authorized by Act 14 Dec. 44) General of the Army 18 Dec. 44.

Yes, but education is a goal, hence the link added above...

Fiat Lux!

[Tom from Cornwall]

For all those interested in the complexity of decision-making under the pressures of war, rather than with the benefit of our perfect hindsight, I offer the following remarks made by Churchill on 15 Oct 40 at a UK War Cabinet Defence Committee at which a Future Strategy paper written by the Joint Planning Staff was discussed. (Source: CAB66/13 - which is available on-line for free)

CAB66-13 - WSC Comment on Future Strategy Paper - 15 Oct 40.JPG

...the situation was decisively affected from day to day by the swiftly moving events of war...

And, obviously, few of those "events of war" were as clearly defined or anticipated in advance by the contemporary decision maker as they are to the armchair general today.

Regards

Tom

[daveshoup2MD]

For all those interested in the complexity of decision-making under the pressures of war, rather than with the benefit of our perfect hindsight, I offer the following remarks made by Churchill on 15 Oct 40 at a UK War Cabinet Defence Committee at which a Future Strategy paper written by the Joint Planning Staff was discussed. (Source: CAB66/13 - which is available on-line for free)

CAB66-13 - WSC Comment on Future Strategy Paper - 15 Oct 40.JPG

...the situation was decisively affected from day to day by the swiftly moving events of war...

And, obviously, few of those "events of war" were as clearly defined or anticipated in advance by the contemporary decision maker as they are to the armchair general today.

Regards

Tom

Which is interesting, because if there was anyone who should have known the risks of poorly supported defenses of distant outposts against overwhelming enemy forces by 1941-42, it should have been Churchill... between Norway, the 2nd BEF, British Somaliland, Greece, and Crete, he had plenty of experience with evacuations, didn't he?