Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

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Achtung Panzer!
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#76

Post by Achtung Panzer! » 06 Sep 2005, 05:55

Steen Ammentorp wrote:
Achtung Panzer! wrote: 1) The British in Malaya had a incompetent general in Perceival
While fully agreing that Percival was the wrong man for the Malaya command I have never seen any evidence that he was incompetent. Please elaborate.

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Firstly, Percival presided over the largest fiasco in British military where a much larger commonweath(130 000)managed to succumb to the smaller Japanese force(30 000) where he has previously taken part in other British fiasco on the beaches of Dunkirk. Secondly, Percival proved to be a weak leader as compared to Yamashita during the negotiation of the surrender of Singapore, where Percival was overwhelmed and pressured by the lies of Yamashita.Furthermore, Percival was pressured into a counterattack by Wavell on 15 Feb 1942 which was unneccesary as the Japanese had already occupied theree strategic position in Singapore.

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#77

Post by Michael Emrys » 06 Sep 2005, 09:20

Achtung Panzer! wrote:7) The complete misunderstanding of Japanese war tatics that led to the battle guns being pointed towards the sea when the invasion force came from the north by land
It seems you didn't bother to read the rest of this thread. I'm sure that someone in it (if not more than one) laid that old chestnut to rest. The guns were on rotating mounts and were perfectly capable of being trained on inland targets. There were some other problems with them though, mainly that they were inadequately supplied with HE ammunition.

I would agree with the first part of your statement though. The British expected the attack to proceed mainly if not exclusively down roads and were content to set up roadblocks without adequately guarding their flanks. When the Japanese invaders hit one of those, they simply detoured through the jungle until they got behind the blocking force, compelling it to either withdraw or to surrender.


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#78

Post by Achtung Panzer! » 06 Sep 2005, 10:13

Grease_Spot wrote:
Achtung Panzer! wrote:7) The complete misunderstanding of Japanese war tatics that led to the battle guns being pointed towards the sea when the invasion force came from the north by land
It seems you didn't bother to read the rest of this thread. I'm sure that someone in it (if not more than one) laid that old chestnut to rest. The guns were on rotating mounts and were perfectly capable of being trained on inland targets. There were some other problems with them though, mainly that they were inadequately supplied with HE ammunition.

I would agree with the first part of your statement though. The British expected the attack to proceed mainly if not exclusively down roads and were content to set up roadblocks without adequately guarding their flanks. When the Japanese invaders hit one of those, they simply detoured through the jungle until they got behind the blocking force, compelling it to either withdraw or to surrender.
If you are talking bout the 15" guns , out of the 3 guns..2 could fire inland and the ramaining could onli rotate 180 degree.

You seemed to have misunderstood that particular point.What i was trying to say was that the British was caught by surprised with the tatics of the Japanese when they came from the North .The British military had always thought an invasion would come from the sea thus the reason for the guns pointing outwards. I was not directing that point to the British guns

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#79

Post by Achtung Panzer! » 06 Sep 2005, 10:25

Grease_Spot wrote:
Achtung Panzer! wrote:7) The complete misunderstanding of Japanese war tatics that led to the battle guns being pointed towards the sea when the invasion force came from the north by land
It seems you didn't bother to read the rest of this thread. I'm sure that someone in it (if not more than one) laid that old chestnut to rest. The guns were on rotating mounts and were perfectly capable of being trained on inland targets. There were some other problems with them though, mainly that they were inadequately supplied with HE ammunition.

I would agree with the first part of your statement though. The British expected the attack to proceed mainly if not exclusively down roads and were content to set up roadblocks without adequately guarding their flanks. When the Japanese invaders hit one of those, they simply detoured through the jungle until they got behind the blocking force, compelling it to either withdraw or to surrender.
I would like to add on on the other problems mentioned by grease spot.

The naval guns installed could manage full traverse and fire towards Malaya. Unfortunately there was little use in so doing. They were NAVAL guns with ammunition for firing at ships at sea over very long distances i.e. flat trajectory. That is totally different from firing at a bunch of infantry soldiers on pushbikes. As anti personnel weapons they were useless, regardless of which way they pointed.

The guns of Changi still covered the sea approaches to the now deserted naval base, but as the Japanese forced their way south towards Singapore in the weeks that followed there dawned the bitter realization that these guns could not fire effectively in the direction from which the attack would now surely come. Writing to Mr Churchill on 16th January, General Wavell was obliged to say that ‘although the fortress cannon of heaviest nature had all-round traverse, their flat trajectory made them unsuitable for counter battery work.’ He could certainly not guarantee to dominate enemy siege batteries with them. A further point which soon emerged was that most of the ammunition for these guns was of the armour piercing variety, quite unsuitable for the bombardment of ground forces.

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#80

Post by Graeme Sydney » 06 Sep 2005, 12:54

Grease_Spot wrote: I would agree with the first part of your statement though. The British expected the attack to proceed mainly if not exclusively down roads and were content to set up roadblocks without adequately guarding their flanks. When the Japanese invaders hit one of those, they simply detoured through the jungle until they got behind the blocking force, compelling it to either withdraw or to surrender.
"The British expected the attack to proceed mainly if not exclusively down roads ..." I think you should qualify "The British". There were some British units and all the Australian units that were comfortable and trained to operate in the jungle away from the roads. I don't believe the problem was a doctrine prob or a conceptual prob, it was a training (or lack of) prob. That is, a command prob (Percivel, and others, being 'asleep at the wheel'.)

"....and were content to set up roadblocks without adequately guarding their flanks." I don't like the word or the connotation of 'content'. I don't believe any of the local commanders were 'content' to simply block the roads. Most were aware of counter penetration techniques of patrolling and ambushing. They didn't do it because they didn't have the numbers and/or their troops weren't trained up for these ops.

“When the Japanese invaders hit one of those, they simply detoured through the jungle until they got behind the blocking force, compelling it to either withdraw or to surrender.”
An important addition here is that they pinned the blocking force with HMG, mortar and arty fire as well as aggressive inf attacks.

I don’t want to be seen defending the brits. I think the majority performance was poor but I believe this responsibility falls mainly to the higher comd rather than anywhere else. But I also believe that even with a good comdr, say Gen Slim, that the Brits were going to lose this campaign because of too few ground forces and a poor air force. These were factors outside the control of the local comdr.

Cheers, Graeme.

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#81

Post by major grubert » 06 Sep 2005, 13:56

I'd certainly say that while Percival made several irrevocable mistakes during the Malayan campaign, he was nevertheless a sound military commander.

Percival had a distinguished record, rising from the rank of lieutenant to that of a highly decorated lieutenant colonel during the First World War - at the very least, one could say that he was a personally brave man, with command experiences spanning everthing from a platoon to a brigade.

General Dill, another very sound soldier, knew of Percival's worth - ‘he has an outstanding ability, wide military knowledge, good judgement and is a very quick and accurate worker’; he has not altogether an impressive presence and one may therefore fail, at first meeting him, to appreciate his sterling worth.’

Percival also spent time as GSO1 under General Dobbie, once dubbed as Malaya's all-time best GOC, during the late '30s. As Malaya Command’s chief staff officer, Percival travelled extensively in the colony and examined the possibilities of an overland attack on Singapore from the north - which he summised in an ultimately prophetic report.

Percival wasn't too much enthusiastic about his new post GOC Malaya in 1941. His freedom of manoeuvre strategy, the operation deployment of his troops or attitudes of mind very limited. He found himself acting both as GOC and as army commander with a completely inadequate staff. Percival's appreciation of the problems regarding the defence of the Malayan Peninsular he faced in 1941 was undoubtedly influenced by the study he carried out in 1937; at the very least, Percival's 1937 appreciation made him pessimistic in 1941 about his chances of succesfully repelling a Japanese attack.

What Percival was, however, was a rather weak leader - indicated by his difficulties with his two senior subordinates, Lieutenant General Lewis Heathand the independent-minded Major General Gordon Bennet. By keeping Bennet, Percival avoided taking an unpleasant but neccessary decision, as in keeping with his overall amiable character. Even the Australian found him ‘unassuming, considerate and conciliatory’, noting later that Percival was ‘weak and hesitant though brainy'.

He did not have the looks or character to inspire troops a la Slim or Monty; nor did he have an agressive fighting spirit (no doubt caused by his pessimistic outlook on the campaign) to resist the enemy or to even deal with his own generals - although it's been a long while since I have read on the Malayan campaign, I think it would be correct to state that rarely did Percival try to interfere/overrule his subordinates/directly be in command of the battles that were enveloping the mainland.

Imho, the troops let Percival down as much as he had let them down, and all in all, it was really Whitehall and the negligent prewar policies (with perhaps the exceptions of the "reforms" of Gen. Dobbie) that had let everyone down.

I agree with Graeme - even with a Slim, the battle for Malaya and Singapore could not have been won, but only prolonged. Percival was certainly fit for duty in Malaya - but not as GOC, but a GSO. Serving under a commander like Slim, I should think that he would have performed commendably.

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#82

Post by Steen Ammentorp » 06 Sep 2005, 14:49

Perhaps we have a different understanding of the word incompetent but I don't see how the below qualifies him as being described as incompetent.
Achtung Panzer! wrote: Firstly, Percival presided over the largest fiasco in British military where a much larger commonweath(130 000)managed to succumb to the smaller Japanese force(30 000) where he has previously taken part in other British fiasco on the beaches of Dunkirk.
Even great commanders are sometimes forced to surrender and while the numbers themselves would indicate incompetence by the commander it is much more complicated than that. You yourself have pointed to nine other factors all of them beyond the control of Percival. Just taking part in (being BGS I Corps) in France does give him a share in or responsibility in disaster that befell on the BEF and does not prove incompetence on his part.
Achtung Panzer! wrote: Secondly, Percival proved to be a weak leader as compared to Yamashita during the negotiation of the surrender of Singapore, where Percival was overwhelmed and pressured by the lies of Yamashita.
Hard to see how this proves incompetence on the overall campaign. It is true that he was pressed by Yamashita and gave into this pressure but I don't see how this explains incompetence on his part loosing the campaign.
Achtung Panzer! wrote: Furthermore, Percival was pressured into a counterattack by Wavell on 15 Feb 1942 which was unneccesary as the Japanese had already occupied theree strategic position in Singapore.
I think there is a bit inconsistency here. As I read your comments you don't think that Percival should have given into Yamashita at the time of surrender but at the same time you argue that every thing was lost on the 15th February? Anyway let's say that it was unnecessary this does not make him incompetent. Several commanders have made mistakes without being incompetent.

However as I said in the beginning perhaps we have a different opinion of the word incompetent because as I mentioned in my previous post I agree that Percival was the wrong man for the job (or at least he became) as he lacked the personality of a commander which I find hard to describe as incompetent but this is open to debate. Had Percival been a true commander he would have sacked Heath and had Bennett removed asap since they had some very strained relationships which influenced the campaign. This however was a personality fault of Percival and had nothing to do with his military capabilities. But this has already been mentioned.

Btw. May I suggest reading Clifford Kinvig's "Scapegoat : General Percival of Singapore"

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#83

Post by Achtung Panzer! » 06 Sep 2005, 15:08

As I read your comments you don't think that Percival should have given into Yamashita at the time of surrender but at the same time you argue that every thing was lost on the 15th February?
The first of the passage was directed at Percival lacked of foresight and nerve as a general when he was led by Yamashita from start to finish during the negotiation . While the second part of the statement was a just a fact of history...Thus, there shouldn't be any inconsistencies

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#84

Post by Steen Ammentorp » 06 Sep 2005, 15:31

Okay. I see.


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#85

Post by Michael Emrys » 07 Sep 2005, 01:43

Graeme Sydney wrote:I think the majority performance was poor but I believe this responsibility falls mainly to the higher comd rather than anywhere else.
Where did I ever say otherwise? The fact that the BCE forces were unprepared to fight the kind of war they were faced with must rest with the upper echelon commanders, beginning with Churchill and the IGS and going all the way down to at least the level of divisional commanders. It seems to me that the latter might have used a little iniative in seeing that themselves and their subordinates were at least mentally prepared to fight. But I don't want to appear too harsh in that judgement either. Similarly, the American command was caught flat-footed at Pearl Harbor and Manilla. It was hard to shift from peacetime mode (which I take it Far East Command was in despite the ongoing war with Germany) to war fighting mode, and the transition took time. Unfortunately for Percival and his command, time was one of the things he was short of.

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#86

Post by TRose » 09 Sep 2005, 22:07

One advantage the Japanese had was that Japanese snipers quickly learned how to spot British officers ( And in Indian units was not very hard) and made them the main targets, destroying allied command and control among small units.
And as for the Brewster Buffalo. the Finns had a early model of the Buffalo, those at Singapore where the U.s navy model. The U.S,Navy had insisted on several modification that added to the weight of the Brewster buffalo which did not do much to help it in combat(except the extra armor plateing) but made it less maneuverability.
It should also be remembered that many of the of the Commonwealth officers and units were in Malaya because they could be spared from North Africa and other more important areas, which got the better Officers and units.
But as far as equipment goes, it is often said the Japanese soldier won in spite of his weapons, not because of them.

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#87

Post by garrifying » 24 Oct 2005, 17:39

Achtung Panzer! wrote:
As I read your comments you don't think that Percival should have given into Yamashita at the time of surrender but at the same time you argue that every thing was lost on the 15th February?
The first of the passage was directed at Percival lacked of foresight and nerve as a general when he was led by Yamashita from start to finish during the negotiation . While the second part of the statement was a just a fact of history...Thus, there shouldn't be any inconsistencies
Hello, it's my first post here!

Lt-Gen Percival forsaw the possibility of an invasion from the north, in a report written to the heads. Furthermore, he was abandoned by Winston Churchill when he did not send the essential reinforcements to Singapore. Those were held up in the the thick of fighting against the Nazis.
THE former Keeper of the Churchill archives has supported the interpretation by Singaporean military historian Dr Ong Chit Chung that British wartime leader Winston Churchill alone was responsible for the fall of Singapore to the Japanese during World War II.

"Churchill failed to take into account that the defence of Singapore depended on Operation Matador -- which called for the pre-emptive occupation of southern Thailand and its airfields -- to enable North Malaya to be held.

When General Percival arrived to take command, he found he had already lost, said Mr Barnett.

"Percival was a sound and intelligent soldier," he said. "He assessed the situation correctly, for it was cut-and-dried. He had no choice but to surrender. He had to, to save untold lives and suffering. The casualties would have been enormous, especially among the people of Singapore, and he could not accept that."

Taken from http://ourstory.asia1.com.sg/war/headline/agree.html
I think we should read go Lt-Gen Percival's Biography to see what he has to say.

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#88

Post by Steen Ammentorp » 24 Oct 2005, 18:10

I think we should read go Lt-Gen Percival's Biography to see what he has to say.
Sorry to say that it would be very difficult as he didn't write an autobiography but you may be referring to his: The War in Malaya. London, 1949, which I don't think provide that many revealing points of view on this though it does gives the impression of a man being let down.

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#89

Post by Acolyte » 18 Jan 2006, 13:55

Peter H wrote:Underestimating the enemy:
"We were told that the Japanese were small,wore glasses,had buck teeth,were unable to see in the dark,were poor soldiers and had aircraft that fell out of the sky if they went too fast.None of this was true:the Japanese were superbly equipped and trained".
Captain Butterworth 2/16th Punjabs quoted in Command in Disaster: Townshend at Kut, Percival at Singapore,article by Robin Neillands.

Australian troops were surprised to later see nearly 6 foot tall Japanese Guardsmen in action against them.
I recall seeing a British documentary about the Malaya campaign of 1941-42 (I think it was the 1st part of the series Hell in the Pacific). the film showed a caricature which appeared in some widely circulated British daily newspaper in Jan 1942. The caricature depicted Japanese troops as monkeys - wearing helmets and armed with machine guns - climbing from tree to tree towards Singapore. The fact that this appeared in a respected British newspaper tells a lot about about the general British attitude towards the Japanese.

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#90

Post by Michael Emrys » 18 Jan 2006, 20:15

Acolyte wrote:...a caricature which appeared in some widely circulated British daily newspaper in Jan 1942. The caricature depicted Japanese troops as monkeys - wearing helmets and armed with machine guns - climbing from tree to tree towards Singapore. The fact that this appeared in a respected British newspaper tells a lot about about the general British attitude towards the Japanese.
Not the British only. Plenty of posters showed up in the States that were almost as far off. Movies made at the time were full of stock stereotypes. I don't recall seeing any contemporary comic book depictions, but it wouldn't surprise me if they were that broad as well.

Michael

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