'Fighting on Guadalcanal'

[Peter H]

Thanks,then he later went to the ETO.

Of interest a Russian connection to the campaign,related in Edward Drea's Japan's Imperial Army,page 229,on why the understrength Ichiki Detachment was sent in,in August 1942:

The high command took the American landing lightly owing partly to its assumption that a major Allied counteroffensive would not begin until late 1943 and partly to faulty intelligence.After the battle of Savo Island,fought in the early hours of August 9,naval reconnaissance pilots reported that the American fleet had vanished and the island seemed deserted.A few days later,the Soviet naval attache in Tokyo reportedly told informants that the US objective was a reconnaissance-in-force to destroy the airfield and he expected an imminent withdrawal...Ichiki believed...he [only] faced a small enemy reconnaissance unit..

[Delta Tank]

Thanks,then he later went to the ETO.

Of interest a Russian connection to the campaign,related in Edward Drea's Japan's Imperial Army,page 229,on why the understrength Ichiki Detachment was sent in,in August 1942:

The high command took the American landing lightly owing partly to its assumption that a major Allied counteroffensive would not begin until late 1943 and partly to faulty intelligence.After the battle of Savo Island,fought in the early hours of August 9,naval reconnaissance pilots reported that the American fleet had vanished and the island seemed deserted.A few days later,the Soviet naval attache in Tokyo reportedly told informants that the US objective was a reconnaissance-in-force to destroy the airfield and he expected an imminent withdrawal...Ichiki believed...he [only] faced a small enemy reconnaissance unit..

Never read that before! Thanks! And yes Major General J. Lawton Collins went on to command the VIIth Corps in the ETO and was probably the best corps commander (not my opinion others, but I agree) in the American Army. Later, he became the Chief of Staff of the US Army. I got to meet him at VMI (Virginia Military Academy) in April or May of 1981 at the George C. Marshall Conference.

Mike

[Peter H]

Some mention the understrength Ichiki move as a sign of Japanese martial arrogance but it appears the Japanese estimate was that (only at best) 2,000 Americans were on the island.

Drea also relates that the Japanese decision to give up the fight in early January 1943 was due to a lack of merchant shipping---they couldn't get the men or supplies required in.Even as late as the end of December 1942 IJA plans called for another two Japanese divisions,"the force required to retake the island",to be sent in but the shipping capacity was just not there.

[Peter H]

GRAPHIC,photos of the Japanese Tenaru river dead.

From: http://www.chinajunzheng.com/bbs/


http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y195/v ... enaru1.jpg

http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y195/v ... enaru2.jpg

[Peter H]

From ebay,seller therebelslacker

"Crashed Japanese Zero,Guadalcanal"

[Peter H]

Same source

"Captured Japanese roller,Guadalcanal"

[Carl Schwamberger]

Some mention the understrength Ichiki move as a sign of Japanese martial arrogance but it appears the Japanese estimate was that (only at best) 2,000 Americans were on the island.

Most books give the Japanese estimate given to Ichiki as 5,000. It is logical to assume they would have regarded half or more as support units, so 2,000 infantry might be correct. In any case Ichiki's experience was fighting poorly led and trained Chinese.

Drea also relates that the Japanese decision to give up the fight in early January 1943 was due to a lack of merchant shipping---they couldn't get the men or supplies required in.Even as late as the end of December 1942 IJA plans called for another two Japanese divisions,"the force required to retake the island",to be sent in but the shipping capacity was just not there.

When the embargos went into effect in mid 1941 Japan was left approx 50% short of the cargo ship capacity it needed for commercial purposes. Captured and newly built ships in 1942 only slightly exceeded losses. By the end of 1942 Japans industry was suffering from raw material shortages as bad as those imposed by the embargos. The ship problem went beyond just reinforcing and supplying Guadacanal. Keeping up air support at the Rabaul base, and mantaining warships there drew heavily from the cargo capacity.

[cuscus]

I have heard two stories about the Ichiki detachment and their breif foray on Guadalcanal.

The first is that Ichiki himself was that confident of taking the airstrip he had asked for permission to then go across and recapture Tulagi.
The second might be a bit more controversial. It is that Sir jacob Vouza did not actually chew through the ropes tying him to the tree. He was tortured as the Japanese asked for information on the American forces. Vouza had been in the perimeter and he knew how many Americans were there. He agreed to guide the Japanese to the eastern perimeter and when they got close he slipped away and warned the Americans of the Japanese approach.

adam

[Peter H]

From ebay,seller dixie_auctions

"Marines Take Over a Japanese Horse on Guadalcanal "

[Carl Schwamberger]

I wonder how long before that poor horse was eaten?

[Peter H]

Didnt the US Army also use pack mules on Guadalcanal?

[Peter H]

From ebay,seller bsbbooksjrp

10th Marines(2nd Mar Div) on Guadalacanal

[Peter H]

More

[Kingfish]

Didnt the US Army also use pack mules on Guadalcanal?

One interesting experiment in transportation in jungle warfare was the use of mules. The 97th Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm. pack howitzers) which supported the advance up the north coast had mules. The presence of the animals complicated rather than simplified the logistical problem. Mules could not traverse all the types of terrain that a man on foot could negotiate. They could not get over boggy ground or cross muddy banks and stream beds. Although able to cover from four to five miles per hour over favorable terrain, the mules could cover only one mile per hour over Guadalcanal's roads and trails. As a result they caused traffic jams and impeded the trucks. Nor could the battalion easily supply itself. Each firing battery had 193 men and 117 mules. This entire strength was required to transport the four 75 mm. pack howitzers and 200 rounds of ammunition allotted to each battery. To assist in moving ammunition forward, one ammunition section from the Service Battery�including 43 pack mules and 23 riding mules�was attached to the firing battery, to increase its strength to 212 men and 182 mules. But each mule required eight pounds of oats and 14 pounds of hay per day for feed. Thus, keeping four guns in action required the services of 212 men and 182 mules. To feed the mules necessitated hauling 1,500 pounds of oats and 2,600 pounds of hay to the front daily by some agency other than the firing battery, for the mules could not haul feed as well as howitzers and ammunition. The experiment was unsuccessful.

Source: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/GuadC/GC-fm.htm

[Carl Schwamberger]

Eating that poor horse, or the mules?