Should the 4th Marines have been on Corregidor?

[kordts]

I have read a few books on Corregidor and Bataan. This is the first I have realized that Macarthur kept the 4th Marines on "the Rock" as beach defense. Most of the Philippine units were green and didn't have proper training before the invasion started. There were provisional infantry units made up of air corps ground crews and other non combat arms, all untried and untrained, quite a few performing about as well as could be expected, or worse, while the Marines were on Corregidor, waiting for the Japanese landing. Could the 4th Marines have made a difference on Bataan? I also wonder if anybody else has an opinion about the last offensive MacA ordered wainwright to launch, even as his own front was crumbling. I do believe that MacA was a military genius, his fighting withdrawal down the Bataan peninsula was great. But he changed his mind about how to defend the P.I. , the plan was basically what happened, withdraw down Bataan to Corregidor and hold out to help arrived. But before the war, he he decided to try and destroy the invading forces at the beaches, especially counting on the B-17's. so all the supplies and stores were moved out of Bataan and staged all over the P.I. When the B-17's and P-40's were destroyed on the ground, despite the air corps desire to launch a strike against Formosan airfields, there went that plan. So the fighting retreat became the plan, but now supplies were scarce.

I will stop and wait for responses and corrections.

[ChristopherPerrien]

MacCarthur was more treasonous than Genius in the Phillipines and besides giving the Japanese the first strike, he was out-manuvered quite badly , which is why they quickly retreated to the Battaan Penisula in without being able to stock up supplies. The Japanese moved way too fast and MacCarthur had somehow convinced himself that his Filipino army was an army at all , when it was really just a poorly trained provisional militia. Personally I think he went "native", besides a few other things, and calling him back into the US Army was a BAD IDEA. I forget how many American combat troops were present 11000-17000? but I doubt a Regiment of Marines would have made much difference , except to have depleted the meagers supplies that they had, quicker.

Also you run into command and control problems if you have an Army General commanding Marines. Neither the Army nor the Navy like that , and beach defense was considered a task more capably done by Marines. Without them on Corregidor , it would not have held out as long as it did, and perhaps could have been siezed by "suprise attack", earlier.

[kordts]

Thanks for replying, I appreciate your opinion.

Kordts

[Tom Houlihan]

I'm about halfway through "Odyssey of a Philippine Scout," about a US Army officer who fought in the PI. He often has less than glowing things to say about the defense forces there.

[kordts]

The Scouts seem to have done pretty well in combat. Some accounts say the Japanese were extremely sadistic to surrendered Filipino Scouts, most never made it to captivity.

[Peter H]

It should also be remembered that the 4th Marines only numbered 1,200 men,not the 3,600 or so that made up a reinforced Marine Regiment circa 1943.

[Delta Tank]

To all,

First of all the first book you should read is:
United States Army in World War II
The War in the Pacific
The Fall of the Philippines
Louis Morton
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-PI/

After you read that book, you will find out what happened with the Army Air Corps being caught on the ground. No it was not treachery or incompetence, mostly just bad luck (yes, luck plays a part in war). The next thing you will discover that there was plenty of food for the defense of Bataan and Corregidor, except there were more men and civilians in the perimeter than had been planned for, therefore we immediately ran into a problem with too many mouths to feed. However the garrison basically held out for 6 months which was the plan, but the relief force took 2+ years to arrive. The 4th Marines were being evacuated from China when the war broke out. About half of the regiment was still in China and had to surrender, they really had no choice.

ChristopherPerrien wrote:Also you run into command and control problems if you have an Army General commanding Marines. Neither the Army nor the Navy like that ,

I don't believe that this is true and if it is I believe you can place most of the blame on General "Howlin Mad" Smith and Robert Sherrod. The 10th Army was in command at Okinawa, two Marine Divisions there. MacArthur had the 1st Marine Division work for him in taking Cape Gloucester (I beleive that was the name) In fact MacArthur loved Marines and Admiral Halsey. Read William Manchester's book entitled "American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964"

After the relief of Major General Ralph Smith (USA) during the battle of Saipan by LTG Holland Smith (USMC), the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General George C. Marshall, stated that no US Army division would serve under Marine command. He made this decision after an investigation into the relief of Major General Ralph Smith, and from that point forward no Army division did. General Marshall felt that this was the best way to handle a situation in a time of war when service cooperation was needed to defeat the enemy.

Mike
please forgive all spelling errors, I am away from my computer and no spell check !

[kordts]

Thanks for your response. This is the kind of discussion I was after.

Jeff

[Camp Upshur]

Mike,

The problem is that General Marshall shortly thereafter had a US Marine placed in command of one of his armies, the 10th US Army! ( Roy Geiger)

Cheers
Camp Upshur

[Barrett]

George Marshall (and a great many Army generals plus Harry Truman) cordially detested the US Marine Corps. It was the residual of WW I when "the damn Marines" got a great deal of favorable PR out of Belleau Wood, courtesy of correspondent Floyd Gibbons. The 5th and 6th Marines were brigaded in the 2nd ID but the doughboys hardly got an acknowledgement. Marshall never forgot that. ADM Tom Moorer, whom I knew, said that during a 1944 briefing on possible means to defeat V-1s with USMC night fighters, Marshall got up and walked out. He said, "There'll never be a marine in the ETO as long as I'm chief of staff." Apparently the army would've really-really liked to have 600,000 top-notch recruits who became Uncle Sam's Misguided Children. Getting the 6th MarDiv approved almost was done over GCM's cold corpse!

Ref. MacArthur & his AF caught on the ground: that was in fact partly bad luck owing to weather over Formosa. But it was also the result of arrogance and very poor staff work. I knew some guys in the 19th Bomb Group, whose B-17s were largely destroyed at Clark Field. The air commander, Gen. Brereton, had only arrived in Oct or November, and could not get a timely audience (I use the word advisedly) with MacA owing to the insufferable chief of staff, Sutherland. The airmen wanted to build dispersal fields to prevent or at least mitigate what happened on 8 December but couldn't get permission or the equipment to do so.

I think that any competent general could've done what Mac did in the Pacific. He paid for himself at Inchon.

[Le Page]

George Marshall (and a great many Army generals plus Harry Truman) cordially detested the US Marine Corps. It was the residual of WW I when "the damn Marines" got a great deal of favorable PR out of Belleau Wood, courtesy of correspondent Floyd Gibbons. The 5th and 6th Marines were brigaded in the 2nd ID but the doughboys hardly got an acknowledgement. Marshall never forgot that. ADM Tom Moorer, whom I knew, said that during a 1944 briefing on possible means to defeat V-1s with USMC night fighters, Marshall got up and walked out. He said, "There'll never be a marine in the ETO as long as I'm chief of staff." Apparently the army would've really-really liked to have 600,000 top-notch recruits who became Uncle Sam's Misguided Children. Getting the 6th MarDiv approved almost was done over GCM's cold corpse!

Ref. MacArthur & his AF caught on the ground: that was in fact partly bad luck owing to weather over Formosa. But it was also the result of arrogance and very poor staff work. I knew some guys in the 19th Bomb Group, whose B-17s were largely destroyed at Clark Field. The air commander, Gen. Brereton, had only arrived in Oct or November, and could not get a timely audience (I use the word advisedly) with MacA owing to the insufferable chief of staff, Sutherland. The airmen wanted to build dispersal fields to prevent or at least mitigate what happened on 8 December but couldn't get permission or the equipment to do so.

I think that any competent general could've done what Mac did in the Pacific. He paid for himself at Inchon.

All this time I hadn't even noticed a Pacific/Asia section on the forum. Good posts.

In regards Inchon (Operation Bluehearts), I think it bears pointing out that Macarthur did not conceive of that invasion himself; it was an already-existing contingency plan that the JCS had at their disposal, and Macarthur chose it.

[Gungnir]

I do believe that MacA was a military genius, his fighting withdrawal down the Bataan peninsula was great.

It was really more Wainwright than MacArthur...

withdraw down Bataan to Corregidor and hold out to help arrived.

War Plan Orange (1921) - the military deemed that the American-Filipino force on the Philippines were not powerful enough to repel a determiend Japanese assualt. The defender must retret into the mountains of Bataan and fight until help arrived from the Pacific. Under this plan, the military determined that the defenders could hold for 6-months during which Americans, fighting from the mainland would destyroy the Japanese and retake the Philippines.

...yeah, MacArthur ignored this strategy... he wanted to fight the Japanese with a 100,000+ army... never happened
1.Filipino forces not fully trained
2.necessary armaments/equipment not arrived from the U.S.
3.War Plan Orange emphasized that the enough ammo, supplies, food, etc. be stored for at least 6-months... MacArthur ignored this and thus Bataan not fully stocked (At all). I beleive War Plan Orange called supplies for 43,000 ... i think 80,000 and 20,000 Filipino civilians.

MacArthur's... ego ad hubris costed American and Filipino lives (dead or POWs), the Philippines and a great leader, Wainwright.

Then MacArthur had the gall to criticize Wainwright and opposed his MOH because of his surrender (ignoring his brilliant leadership and defensive withdrawal) and the fact that Wainwright was a "fighting general" (unlike MacArthur).
MacArthur left the Philippines (granted for political reasons) where as Wainwright was on the frontlines.

[Barrett]

LePage is correct: the Inchon plan had been ginned up by the marines as a contingency but the JCS considered it too risky (not without reason--the tides were a real problem.) But MacA, one of the few Army generals who appreciated the Corps' phib capability, backed it when probably no one else would have. The behind the scenes story has to do with Bradley's 5th star--not as a result of WW2. When he became chairman, it was recognized that he needed the 5th one just to get Mac to answer his calls. MacA had already been chief of staff before WW 2 and was 12 years senior to OB! Beyond that, the year before, OB had stated that phib ops were outdated in the nuke era because they necessarily required large concentrations of troops & hardware.

[cazna]

From my readings and general pick up from veterans, historical sources and post war public opinion, MacArthur was a very poor leader, commander and tactician, however it was all that America had available at the time, I think a latrine orderly in the Cuban Army could of done a better job and that reflects on the US Congress of the time.
Wainwright should of returned to command the Allied forces and MacArthur would of been better off cleaning latrines in a Manila brothel, thats my opinion and I am entitled to it, there is no need for any response to my post, thanks in advance.

[kordts]

At the risk of going off-topic on my own thread; Gen. Walker, the 8th Army C/O wanted the amphib landing on the east side of the Korean peninsula. Many historians agree with him. I think MacA was a military genius, but that he had shot his bolt by about 44. If you look at his casualty figures from 42-44, he was very sparing of his men's lives. His landings were usually fairly uneventful, he wanted his troops to gain a solid beachhead and perimeter around an airfield and let the Japaneses come to him. He didn't like the Marine way of hitting the beaches and then fighting for every inch of ground. But then again, the marines belong belong to the admirals who aren't marines. So the casualties probably didn't bother them as much. MacA's Philippine liberation campaign was pretty costly and uninspired. I believe his motivations weren't military but personal. I also like and admire "Skinny" Wainwright. MacA denigrated and backstabbed him. Too bad he got captured, I bet he would have emerged as an outstanding army commander. His job record as a corps commander was pretty good. He didn't get to command an army until the game(Bataan) was over, so we can't judge him for surrendering.

Jeff