Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
I obviously know who Ernst Kaltenbrunner is, but there aren't really any books out there soley about him. I did find this book by Peter R. Black entitled Ernst Kaltenbrunner: ideological soldier of the third reich. I am interested in purchasing the book, but it comes with a hefty price tag for a used book. Can anyone give details on the book and if you would recommend it, or have other books in mind??? Thank you all
Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
The Peter Black book is good and I highly recommend it. Although I think it is over 30 years old and that is the last time I read the book I don't think there is anything remotely better out there. In fact I don't think there is anything else out there !
Try contacting the publisher (Princeton Uni) direct. You might be surprised.
Try contacting the publisher (Princeton Uni) direct. You might be surprised.
Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Awesome thanks!!
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Michael Miller
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Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Here is some general information on Kaltenbrunner from my and Andreas Schulz's Leaders of the SS & German Police, Volume II (R. James Bender Publishing, 2015).
Best wishes,
~ Mike
(I’m attempting to format this post now- italicizing book titles, adding spaces where appropriate, etc.- but it’s taking too long, so I’ll just leave it as is for now. Any typos or other errors are mine.)
Dr. jur.
Ernst Kaltenbrunner
SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS und der Polizei
Born: 04.10.1903 in Ried / Innkreis / Oberösterreich.
Executed: 16.10.1946 at Nürnberg Prison (hanged by U.S. Army Master-Sergeant John C. Woods). His last words on the scaffold were:
“I have loved my German people and my fatherland with a warm heart. I have done my duty by the laws of my people and I am sorry this time my people were led by men who were not soldiers and that crimes were committed of which I had no knowledge. Germany, good luck.”
NSDAP-Nr.: 300 179 (Joined 18.10.1930)
SS-Nr.: 13 039 (Joined 31.08.1931)
Promotions:
31.08.1931 SS-Mann
00.00.1931 SS-Truppführer
25.09.1932 SS-Sturmhauptführer
20.04.1936 SS-Standartenführer
20.04.1937 SS-Oberführer
13.03.1938-30.04.1939 Staatssekretär
21.03.1938 SS-Brigadeführer (mit Wirkung vom 12.03.1938)
11.09.1938 SS-Gruppenführer
20.06.1940-06.01.1941 Polizeipräsident
01.07.1940 SS-Untersturmführer d. R. der Waffen-SS
15.04.1941 Generalleutnant der Polizei (mit Wirkung vom 01.04.1941)
30.01.1943-08.05.1945 Staatssekretär
21.06.1943 SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei
10.12.1944 General der Waffen-SS und Polizei (mit Wirkung vom 01.12.1944)
Career:
00.00.1909-00.00.1913 Attended Volksschule in Raab.
12.09.1913-00.00.1921 Attended the Staatsrealgymnasium in Linz (passed his Matura [= Abitur], Summer 1921). Together with seven other students, he boarded with Frau Berta Kalzer, a lawyer’s widow, during this period, as his parents continued to reside in Raab until moving to Linz in 1918. He befriended his future subordinate Adolf Eichmann at this school. At Nürnberg, Kaltenbrunner denied any close association with Eichmann, however a number of sources stand in contrast to that assertion (see entry of 22.03.1944, below).
00.00.19__-00.00.19__ Member of the anticlerical, pan-German Pennalburschenschaft “Hohenstaufen”.
00.10.1921-00.00.1922 Studied chemistry at the Technischen Hochschule in Graz.
03.10.1921 Joined the Burschenschaft “Arminia” in Graz (a völkisch-nationalist, anti-Semitic, and arms-bearing student alliance identified by the colors “Schwarz-Rot-Gold” (black, red, and gold) of the “Ur-Burschenschaft”). His membership in this group automatically placed him in the Studentenbataillon (students’ battalion) of the “Steirischen Heimatschutzes”.
00.00.1921 Honorary member of the Bulgarian student association “Rodina” in Graz. Wendell R. Houston writes:
“… during his years at Graz, Kaltenbrunner became interested in the Balkans and made friends with a group of conservative, royalist Bulgarian students, one of whom was a colonel in the Bulgarian army.” (Houston, Ernst Kaltenbrunner: A Study of an Austrian SS and Police Leader, p. 21)
00.00.1922-00.00.1926 Switched his major from chemistry to law, which he then studied at the "Karl-Franzens-Universität" in Graz. He also worked as a miner during this period.
00.00.1924-00.00.1925 Committee chairman of the Graz branch of the "Deutschen Burschenbundes".
00.00.192_-00.00.192_ Speaker for the "nationalistischen Studenten" (Nationalist students) at the University of Graz.
00.07.1926 Received his doctorate (Dr. jur.) at the University of Graz.
00.00.1926-00.00.1926 Referendar (law clerk) to the Landesgericht and Bezirksgericht in Linz.
00.00.1926-00.00.1928 Referendar in the law office of Dr. Vilas, Salzburg.
00.00.1928-00.00.1929 Rechtsanwaltsanwärter (lawyer applicant) in the law office of Dr. Franz Lasser in Linz-Urfahr.
00.12.1928 Joined the "Deutsch-Völkischen Turnverein" in Linz.
00.07.1929-00.10.1930 Relinquished his job in the legal profession and became a member of “Heimwehr”. He was also a member of the “Unabhängigen Bewegung für ein Freies Österreich” (Independent Movement for a Free Austria) during this period.
00.00.1929-00.00.1933 Rechtsberater (legal advisor) to the "österreichischen SS".
18.10.1930 Joined the NSDAP / Ortsgruppe Linz.
00.01.1931 Appointed as a Bezirksredner (dvjistrict speaker) of the NSDAP in Oberösterreich.
31.08.1931 Joined the SS.
00.00.1931-00.00.1932 Führer of the Linz Sturm of 37.SS-Standarte "Oberösterreich" (Base: Linz).
00.00.1932 Entered employment with his father's legal practice in Linz.
00.00.1932 Became head of the pan-Germanic and, from 1933, outspokenly National-Socialist “Juristen Bund” (lawyers’ league) of Linz.
16.06.1932-12.03.1938 Assigned to the Stab SS-Abschnitt VIII (HQ: Linz).
00.10.1932-00.00.1933 Rechtsberater to SS-Abschnitt VIII.
19.06.1933 NSDAP and Party formations in Austria banned by order of Bundeskanzler Engelbert Dollfuss.
14.01.1934 Arrested by Austrian authorities.
17.01.1934-00.05.1934 Imprisoned for conspiracy, together with Anton Reinthaller, in the detention camp at Kaisersteinbruch. During his imprisonment, he instigated and led a hunger strike among his fellow National-Socialist prisoners, thus forcing the Dollfuss government to release 490 of them. Under interrogation at Nürnberg, Kaltenbrunner stated: “Over 500 National Socialists had been put into this camp without any concrete charge, the only aim being to hinder any activity of the National Socialist Party for a length of time.” (Transcript of interrogation by Colonel Howard A. Brundage, JAGD, on 11.09.1945, in Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records: Kaltenbrunner, Ernst; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238)
15.06.1934-15.06.1935 Führer of the [illegal] 37.SS-Standarte (Base: Linz). Succeeded Johann von Feil. Succeeded by Dr. Ferdinand von Sammern-Frankenegg.
Late Summer 1934 Secretary to Anton Reinthaller, in his capacity as “NS-Bauernführer” (Nazi Farmers’ Leader) in Austria.
00.05.1935-00.05.1935 Arrested and jailed on suspicion of high treason, and committed to the Militärgerichtshof (military court) in Wels / Oberösterreich. Following a lengthy investigation, the high treason charge was dismissed, however he was convicted of "Geheimbündelei" (conspiracy) and sentenced on to 6 months' imprisonment as well as suspension of his license to practice law.
00.05.1935-00.11.1935 Imprisoned by Austrian authorities.
15.06.1935-21.03.1938 Führer of the [illegal] SS-Abschnitt VIII (Ober- und Niederösterreich; HQ: Linz), appointed by Himmler to succeeded Karl Taus, despite the fact that he- Kaltenbrunner- was in prison at that time. After his release, he made many visits to Germany where he established contacts with Heinrich Himmler, Reinhard Heydrich, and the “Chef des SD-Ausland”, Heinz Jost. He was succeeded by Otto Jungkunz.
20.01.1937-21.03.1938 Führer of the [illegal] SS-Oberabschnitt Österreich (HQ: Linz). Succeeded Karl Taus. In this assignment, he worked to ensure discipline and calm in accordance with the German-Austrian agreement of 11.07.1936.
22.05.1937-00.09.1937 Arrested by Austrian authorities on the suspicion that he was in charge of the illegal NS-Hilfswerk organization in Oberösterreich.
11.03.1938 On orders from Hermann Göring, led 500 Austrian SS men in surrounding the Bundeskanzlei (federal chancellery) in Wien.
13.03.1938-30.04.1939 "Staatssekretär für öffentliche Sicherheit" (State Secretary for Public Security) in the short-lived Austrian cabinet of Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart. Succeeded Dr. Michael Skubl, who was loyal to the government of Chancellor Schuschnigg and was consequently ousted by Himmler. Skubl was also replaced as Polizeipräsident in Wien by Otto Steinhäusl (a participant in the failed Nazi Putsch of July 1934).
21.03.1938-30.01.1943 Führer of SS-Oberabschnitt Österreich (redesignated SS-Oberabschnitt Donau, 11.09.1938) (HQ: Wien), with effect from 12.03.1938 (m.d.F.b. until 11.09.1938, then permanent).
10.04.1938-08.05.1945 Member of the Reichstag (Land Österreich).
24.05.1938-30.04.1939 Leiter of Abteilung III (Ordnungspolizei und Sicherheitspolizei) in the “Amt des Reichsstatthalters” and the “Ministerium für innere und kulturelle Angelegenheiten” (Ministry for Internal and Cultural Affairs).
00.06.1938-00.00.1939 Member of the "Kommission zur geschichtlichen Feststellung der Begebenheiten der Erhebung des 25. Juli 1934 in Österreich” (Commission to assess the historical events leading to the Uprising of 25 July 1934 in Austria) of the SS (also known as the "Historische Kommission des RFSS" [Historical Commission of the Reichsführer-SS], and under the chairmanship of SS–Gruppenführer Wilhelm Koppe).
11.09.1938-30.01.1943 "Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer bei den Reichsstatthaltern in Wien, in Ober- und Niederdonau im Wehrkreis XVII” (HQ: Wien). Short title: HSSPF Donau. First holder of this post. Succeeded by Rudolf Querner.
00.00.1938 Appointed as a member of the Aufsichtsrat of “Erste Gemeinnützige Baugesellschaft für Kleinwohnungen Ges. mbH,” Wien I and the “Berliner Verein-Krankenkasse auf Gegenseitigkeit”.
03.02.1939 Appointed as a Ratsherr of the city of Linz/Donau
22.09.1939-15.11.1942 Member of the Verteidigungsausschuss (Defense Committee) for Wehrkreis XVII.
17.10.1939-30.01.1943 Gerichtsherr of “SS- und Polizeigericht VII", Wien.
20.06.1940-06.01.1941 Polizeipräsident in Wien. Succeeded the late SS-Oberführer Dr. Otto Steinhäusl. The duties of this post were actually performed by Kaltenbrunner’s deputy, the Polizeivizepräsident Dr. Leo Gotzmann (who officially succeeded Kaltenbrunner in the office on 06.01.1941).
00.00.1942-00.05.1945 Member of the Präsidium, "Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft (SOEG)" in Wien.
01.03.1942 Visited KL-Mauthausen together with Heinrich Himmler and Gauleiter August Eigruber.
30.01.1943-08.05.1945 "Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD" (CdS) and "Chef des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes " (RSHA). Succeeded Heinrich Himmler who had held interim leadership of the RSHA after the death of Reinhard Heydrich on 04.06.1942.
30.01.1943-08.05.1945 Staatssekretär in the "Reichsministerium des Innern".
30.01.1943-08.05.1945 Präsident of the "Internationalen Kriminalpolizeilichen Kommission" (IKPK, International Criminal Police Commission) (HQ: Berlin, Am kleinen Wannsee 16).
30.01.1943-08.05.1945 Member of the "Obersten Prüfungshofes für Volkszugehörigkeitsfragen in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten beim Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums-Stabshauptamt" (Supreme Examination Court for Ethnic Group Membership Questions in the Annexed Eastern Territories attached to the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood-Staff Main Office, under the chairmanship of Heinrich Himmler).
25.05.1943 Inspected KL-Mauthausen-Gusen, together with Oswald Pohl and Georg Lörner (SS-WVHA) and his successor as HSSPF Donau, Rudolf Querner.
21.06.1943 Attended a conference chaired by the Reichsführer-SS, during which Erich von dem Bach was appointed as “Chef der Bandenkampfverbände” and the “Bandenkampfgebiete" (partisan combating regions) were delineated. The following SS and Polizei leaders were also in attendance: Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger, Oswald Pohl, Hans-Adolf Prützmann, Fritz Katzmann, Kurt Knoblauch (in his capacity as"Chef des Kommandostabs RFSS"), and Dr. Otto Winkelmann (as representative of the Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Kurt Daluege).
Summer 1943 According to the sworn affidavit of Hans Maršálek (an inmate at Mauthausen from 29.09.1942 to 00.04.1945, assigned as “second clerk” in the camp), given in Nürnberg on 08.04.1946, conducted yet another inspection of KL-Mauthausen. The following are Maršálek’s recollections of this event:
“In early summer of 1943, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner visited the Concentration Camp Mauthausen. The Camp Commandant [Franz] Ziereis, Gauleiter Eigruber, first leader of the Protective Custody camp Bachmeyer and several others accompanied Kaltenbrunner. I saw Dr. Kaltenbrunner and the people who accompanied him with my own eyes. According to the testimony of the ‘Corpse Carriers’ of that time, the former prisoners Albert Tiefenbacher… Johann Polster… about fifteen prisoners of the arrest class were selected by [ SS-]Unterscharführer Winkler, in order to show Dr. Kaltenbrunner three ways of extermination, by a shot in the neck, hanging, and gassing. Women whose hair had been cut were among the executed and they were killed by shots in the neck. Above-mentioned ‘Corpse Carriers’ were present at the execution and had to carry the corpses to the Crematorium. Dr. Kaltenbrunner went to the Crematorium after the execution and later went into the quarry.” (Translation of Document 3870-PS, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VI)
30.06.1943 Issued a circular letter concerning the “Verfolgung der Kriminalität unter den polnischen und sowjetischen Zivilarbeitern” (Prosecution of Crime Among the Polish and Soviet Civilian Workers) (see also 04.12.1944, below)
11.10.1943 In a radio transmission to SS-Obersturmbannführer Herbert Kappler, Kommandeur of the SD-Aussenstelle in Rome, intercepted by the British “Ultra” decoding system (but not released until 2000), issued the following order (after Kappler had warned that deporting the Jews would rob the Reich of potential intelligence assets among Jews connected with the Allies, as well as a source of labor):
“To KAPPLER. It is precisely the immediate and thorough eradication of the Jews in Italy [sofortige und gründliche
Ausrottung der Juden in Italien] which is the special interest of the present internal political situation and the general
security in ITALY. To postpone the expulsion of the Jews until the CARABINIERI and the Italian army officers have
been removed can no more be considered than the idea mentioned in calling up the Jews in ITALY for what would
probably be very improductive [sic] labor under responsible direction by Italian authorities. The longer the delay, the
more the Jews who are doubtless reckoning on evacuation measures have an opportunity by moving to the houses of
pro-Jewish Italians of disappearing completely. [Undecoded – Eichmann?] has been instructed in executing the RFSS
orders to proceed with the evacuation of the Jews without further delay. KALTENBRUNNER.” (Copy of radio
intercept in Robert Katz, Fatal Silence. The Pope, the Resistance and the German Occupation of Rome, p. 77)
On the night of 15./16.10.1943, Kappler’s 365 SS and Police men began the roundup of 1,259 Jews in Rome, of whom 1,007 were deported by train to Auschwitz on 18.10.1943. A further 7,000 Roman Jews had succeeded in hiding during Kappler’s Aktion.
12.02.1944 Issuance of a “Führerbefehl” concerning the unification of political and military intelligence, which read as follows:
“I order:
1. A unified German secret service is to be created.
2. I appoint the Reichsführer-SS to head it.
3. In so far as it touches on military intelligence and Abwehr, the Reichsführer-SS and head of OKW will take the necessary measures in bilateral agreement.” (Michael Mueller & Geoffrey Brooks, Canaris: The Life and Death of Hitler’s Spymaster, p. 241)
On 14.05.1944, Himmler and the chief of the OKW, Generalfeldmarschall Keitel signed a negotiated compromise in which the Amt Abwehr was dissolved, by an order of Kaltenbrunner dated 23.05.1944, on 01.06.1944 and its functions allocated to Walter Schellenberg’s Amt VI (foreign intelligence office of the RSHA) and a new office, the “Militärisches Amt” (also known as “Amt Mil” of “Amt M”) was formed (from the former Abwehr I and II) under Oberst Georg Hansen. Even before his appointment as Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner had exhibited a passion for intelligence and counterintelligence; these steps led to his assuming authority, under Himmler, over Germany’s military intelligence apparatus.
26.03.1944 Following “The Great Escape”, on the night of 24./25.03.1944, of 76 RAF and other Commonwealth air force officers from the Stalag Luft III prisoner of war camp at Sagan in Niederschlesien, and Hitler’s order that more than half of the fugitives were to be shot, directed Heinrich Müller to issue a teleprint order for the murder of these men. The following is the approximate text, as recollected by Paul Mohr (a former Kripo official and witness in the postwar trial of certain Gestapo members involved in the crime), of the “Sagan-Befehl”:
"The frequent mass escapes of officer prisoners constitute a real danger to the security of the State. I am disappointed by the inefficient security measures in various prisoner of war camps. The Führer has ordered that as a deterrent, more than half of the escaped officers will be shot. The recaptured officers will be handed over to Amt IV for interrogation. After interrogation the officers will be transferred to their original camps und will be shot on the way. The reason for the shooting will be given as 'shot whilst trying to escape' or 'shot whilst resisting' so that nothing can be proved at a future date. Prominent persons will be exempted. Their names will be reported to me and my decision will be awaited whether the same course of action will be taken." (The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume XI (62. Trial of Max Wielen and 17 others, British Military Court, Hamburg, Germany [lst September, 1947])
As a result of this order, 50 of the escapees were summarily shot by the Gestapo.
05.04.1944 Issued a circular stating that the police should not intervene against the lynching of Allied airmen who had bailed out over Reich territory.
06.06.1944 Attended a meeting in Klessheim with Himmler, Reichsmarschall Göring, and Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop during which it was decided that in cases of Allied airmen captured on German soil, “Lynchjustiz als die Regel zu gelten habe” (“Lynch Justice would have to be the rule). He agreed to ensure the “Übergabe an den SD zur Sonderbehandlung” (Transfer [of Allied Airmen] to the SD for Special Treatment [execution]).
20.07.1944 At 1315 hours, just half-an-hour after the explosion of a bomb meant for Hitler in the Führer’s conference room, Himmler summoned Kaltenbrunner to Führer headquarters and directed him to fly to Berlin. There, with the assistance of Otto Skorzeny, he was to take charge of suppressing the revolt by the anti-Nazi plotters. At approximately 2000 hours, he reported to the Reich Propaganda Ministry where he obtained an understanding of the situation in the Reich capital. By the time of his arrival there, the coup was already collapsing, largely due to Hitler’s radio announcement that the assassination attempt had failed. Kaltenbrunner’s work was not done, however. He was to oversee the investigation into the conspiracy, and on 20.08.1944 submitted the so-called “Kaltenbrunner-Bericht” (report) to Reichsleiter Martin Bormann. Kaltenbrunner, in a civilian suit, also attended at least one session of the trials against the conspirators by Roland Freisler’s Volksgerichtshof.
24.07.1944 By Führer order, command of the Zollgrenzschutz (customs border guards), previously administered by the Reich Ministry of Finance, passed to Himmler, who delegated it to Kaltenbrunner.
04.10.1944 Counsel for the prosecution in the treason trial of Generalleutnant Dr. Hans Speidel before the “Ehrenhof des Heeres” (Court of Honor of the Army).
17.02.1945 Together with Walter Schellenberg, greeted the Vice President of the Swedish Red Cross, Count Folke Bernadotte, on his arrival in Berlin. Kaltenbrunner and Schellenberg then held a discussion with Bernadotte in Berlin-Wannsee, of which the Count later wrote:
“The Chief of the Security Police, Obergruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, was courteous enough as he offered me
Chesterfield cigarettes and Dubonnet… but the eyes that he fixed on me were cold and inquisitorial. The meeting,
which had been arranged by the Swedish Legation, took place at Kaltenbrunner’s luxurious home at Wannsee on the
day following my arrival in Berlin. My immediate object was to convince Kaltenbrunner, Himmler’s second-in-
command in the Gestapo, that it was imperative for me to meet his chief…
At our meeting he was polite, cool, and inquisitive. He was anxious to know why I wished to see Himmler.
As he sipped his Dubonnet he pointed out how extremely difficult it was to arrange a meeting. He suggested that
instead I should explain my purposes to him, whereupon he would transmit them to his chief. This alternative was, of
course, quite unacceptable to me. It was therefore necessary to get him sufficiently interested in arranging a meeting
with Himmler, and to do it without giving away the real object of my visit. [Bernadotte then asserted that his purpose
was to forge better relations- soured by Nazi brutality in neighboring Norway- between Germany and Sweden, as
“Reichsminister Himmler occupies a position that would make it possible for him to adopt measures calculated to
improve Swedish-German relations.”]
As the discussion went on, Kaltenbrunner did his best to pump me about my proposals to Himmler and asked
if I had any concrete suggestions. I said that I had not, and generally tried to avoid going too deeply into matters with
him, for if he were to disapprove of my objectives, he could easily wreck my hopes of meeting his chief. I told him,
however, that there were two principal concessions I wanted. One was the issue of exit permits to Swedish women
married to Germans, and to their children, particularly women whose homes had been bombed or whose husbands were
killed or missing. The other was permission to the Swedish Red Cross to work in the internment camps in Germany.
Oddly enough, Kaltenbrunner showed himself reasonable and understanding on these points, and I asked him
if he now saw how important it was that I should see Himmler personally… Kaltenbrunner assured me emphatically that
he quite agreed.
When I left him I felt that I had made good progress and had reason to be hopeful about my chances of a talk
with Himmler…” (Bernadotte, The Curtain Falls: Last Days of the Third Reich, pp. 25-30)
On 05.03.1945, Kaltenbrunner met again with Bernadotte. The following is based on his testimony regarding this conference:
“About two weeks after his first visit, Bernadotte returned to Berlin and invited K. and Schellenberg to lunch. He
thanked them for their help in carrying out his requests and discussed details of the Bergen-Belsen camp for
Scandinavian prisoners. K.’s attempt to learn more about the Himmler-Bernadotte conversation failed again. He only
found out that a second meeting was to be held. Afterwards Himmler mentioned to Kaltenbrunner that Bernadotte had
shown a clearly anti-Russian attitude and had said that Sweden would like to see an understanding between Germany
and the Western Allies.” (ibid)
08.03.1945-23.03.1945 At his residence- the Villa Kerry- on the outskirts of Altaussee / Steiermark. It was actually owned by the 55-year-old artist Christel Kerry (died December 1978).
12.03.1945 Meeting with the President of the International Red Cross (IRC), Carl J. Burckhardt, in Feldkirch (Vorarlberg) near the Swiss border concerning humanitarian efforts for concentration camp inmates. The following is based on Kaltenbrunner’s recollections of the meeting, and excerpted from “Annex No. XIV – Kaltenbrunner’s Contacts with the Swiss Red Cross”, in the 28.06.1945 “Intermediate Interrogation Report” prepared at Headquarters 12th Army Group Interrogation Center:
“1. Events leading to Kaltenbrunner’s meeting with Burckhardt
Late in Feb 45 Burckhardt, the President of the Swiss Red Cross, requested a meeting with Himmler. When K. heard
of this he realized that it was an opportunity for him to contact diplomatic circles abroad. At the time Himmler was at
the Vistula front. Since Burckhardt was not permitted to visit Himmler at the front, by the Fuehrer’s specific orders, K. suggested that he meet
Burckhardt in place of Himmler. His suggestion was accepted and an official answer sent to Burckhardt. This letter was drafted
by K. but he is not sure who signed it. A few days later K. wrote a personal letter to Burckhardt suggesting Feldkirch as a
meeting place. He chose this Austrian border town because it gave him a chance to meet some of his Austrian friends at the same
time.
On the way to Feldkirch K. met either [Wilhelm] Hoettl or Goettsch at Innsbruck while Scheidler, K.’s adjutant went
ahead to Feldkirch to make the necessary preparations.
2. Kaltenbrunner-Burckhardt meeting on 12 Mar 45
During the first part of the meeting, which lasted from1 400 to 1700 hours, Dr. [Hans Bachmann], General Secretary of the Red
Cross, and Scheidler, K.’s adjutant, were present, but did not actively participate in the discussion. It was obvious that Burckhardt
had prepared himself well for the talk. He had brought detailed suggestions and plans concerning the exchange of civilian
internees and the sending of food and other supplies to prison camps in Germany. He mentioned that he would soon be
appointed Swiss Minister in Paris. He seemed particularly anxious to obtain concessions for French civilian internees, since this
would give him a very good start in his new post in France. He also talked about an exchange of military prisoners. K. agreed to
most of Burckhardt’s suggestions, but pointed out that Himmler’s approval would have to be obtained before they could be
carried out.
During the second part of the conversation Burckhardt and K. were alone. This talk lasted from 1700 to 1800 hours.
K. claimed that it was Burckhardt who began to speak about the war in general, expressing Swiss fears concerning the rapid
Russian advance into Central Europe. K. outlined his own views about the chances of coming to an agreement with the Western
Allies against Russia. He also spoke of his Austrian plan. He mentioned Dulles in this connection, but did not tell Burckhardt
how the contact with Dulles had been established.
Burckhardt next spoke bitterly of Ribbentrop’s stubborn ‘Prussian’ type of diplomacy, which he blamed for the
disastrous developments. He said a ‘Western’ diplomat would have found much smoother methods and would have been able to
come to terms with Britain and the United States. He added, much to K.’s joy, that when he spoke of ‘Western diplomacy’ he
included Austria.
These remarks gave K. hope that Burckhardt would do something to promote his Austrian plan. He definitely felt that
excellent personal connections had been established, and found this confirmed by Burckhardt’s final words, ‘I do hope that I shall
meet you often’. Nothing definite was said, however, but an early meeting between K. and Dr. [Bachmann] was agreed upon.
During the second part of the talks Burckhardt also brought up two personal requests. One concerned the release of a
close relative of Gen. De Gaulle, Genevieve (?) de Gaulle, and the other the release of a personal friend of Burckhardt’s, the
Polish Countess [Karolina von] Lan[koranska].
3. Developments between 12 March and 23 April
Upon his return to Berlin, K. reported the results of his talks to Ribbentrop and sent his adjutant Maiz to Himmler to inform the
latter of Burckhardt’s requests. All Burckhardt’s suggestions, with the exception of the exchange of prisoners of war, were
approved. The latter subject, Burckhardt was informed, was already under discussion between the German Foreign Office and
Switzerland as the protecting power.
During the second half of March and early April a number of letters were exchanged between K. and Burckhardt
concerning details of the exchange plan. Matters of political nature were, however, not touched upon in this correspondence.
There was also set up in Konstanz a small committee which dealt with the technical details of the Burckhardt exchange plan. The
German representative on this committee was Oberregierungsrat Groening of Amt IV.
K. later heard from Schellenberg (who had received a letter from his contact man Frank in Switzerland) that Burckhardt
had spoken to Dulles about the meeting and had expressed himself very favorably about K.’s personality and ideas. K. was very
happy to learn about this positive reaction on Burckhardt’s part. However, since Schellenberg was not supposed to know
anything about the Dulles affair, K. was not too pleased to get the story from him. K. suspects that Frank’s letter was actually
addressed to him, and that Schellenberg failed to give it to him because he wanted to keep it as evidence against K.
About 19 April K. asked Burckhardt for another meeting with representatives of the Red Cross.” [see entry of
23.04.1945, below] (Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC
Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records: Kaltenbrunner, Ernst; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238)
18.04.1945 Informed by Himmler that, if Allied forces managed to split Germany in two, he [Kaltenbrunner] was to be granted plenipotentiary powers in the southern portion of the country.
19.-22.04.1945 According to the “Intermediate Interrogation Report” of 28.06.1945, Kaltenbrunner’s movements during this period were as follows:
“19 April Dresden-Prague-Kremsmuenster-Alt Aussee-Linz.
19 April, or Visited Gauleiter Eigruber in Linz, participated shortly in a meeting. Present were leading
possibly 12 April officials, including possibly Skorzeny and Winkelmann. Subjects of army and police discussion:
Reestablishment of a resistance line in the East, refugee questions, food problems, etc.
20 April Strobl. With his family.
21 April Salzburg. Met Scheel, Glaise-Horstenau, Waneck, Hoettl.
22 April Vain effort to get to Innsbruck, prevented by air raids.” (ibid)
23.04.1945 Meeting with Drs. Hans Bachmann and Hans Mayer of the Swiss Red Cross in Innsbruck. The following is based on Kaltenbrunner’s recollections of the meeting, and excerpted from “Annex No. XIV – Kaltenbrunner’s Contacts with the Swiss Red Cross”, in the 28.06.1945 “Intermediate Interrogation Report” prepared at Headquarters 12th Army Group Interrogation Center:
“4. Meeting with Drs [Bachmann] and M[a]yer on 23 April 1945
On 23 April K. met Burckhardt’s two representatives in Innsbruck. He knew [Bachmann] already from the Feldkirch
meeting
and he had, in the meantime (about 20 March) met M[a]yer in Berlin. The talks lasted from 1600 to 2200 hours, the first 2½
hours being devoted to Red Cross matters. K. promised to continue his efforts to carry out the arrangements made at the
Feldkirch meeting. He offered to contact Kesselring to obtain permission for the passage of internees through the lines and he
actually radioed Kesselring about this.
The second part of the meeting was spent in the discussion of political matters. K. repeated the statements he had made
to Burckhardt and asked [Bachmann] and M[a]yer to report to Burckhardt that he had not changed his opinions in any way since
the meeting of 12 March. He added that he had been very pleased to hear that Burckhardt had spoken to Dulles about their talks.
Both [Bachmann] and M[a]yer expressed the same fear concerning Russia which Burckhardt had voiced in the earlier
meeting. Meyer seemed to agree with all of K.’s ideas, while [Bachmann] had some reservations on questions of ‘social
philosophy’.
This political discussion did not bring any tangible results but K. felt that he had won new friends, and that Burckhardt
would now be even more convinced of the sincerity of his Austrian plans than before.
A Swiss request to permit the children of the Belgian King to proceed to Switzerland was also discussed at this
meeting. K. acceded immediately and on the following day went to Strobl, where he contacted Lurker, the German caretaker of
the castle in which King Leopold was living. The King, however, replied that he preferred to have his children stay with him.
His request was to fall into the hands of the Western Allies and not into the hands of the Russians. K. transmitted the King’s
reaction to Dr [Bachmann].
There was no further contact between K. and Red Cross representatives after 23 April. (Interrogation Records
Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records:
Kaltenbrunner, Ernst; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238)
The report also indicates that Kaltenbrunner met with Gauleiter Franz Hofer on this date, then “return[ed] to Salzburg” where he met with Josef Spacil (head of Amt II of the RSHA).
25.- 29.04.1945 According to the “Intermediate Interrogation Report” of 28.06.1945, Kaltenbrunner’s movements during this period were as follows:
“25 April Salzburg. Meeting with Glaise-Horstenau.
26 April Koenigssee. Meeting with Kesselring, Winter and Neubacher. Attempts to send W/T report to
Himmler via Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab station, re Red Cross arrangements.
27 April Strobl. Discussion with Hoettl who reports on his trip to Switzerland.
28 April Alt Aussee with Hoettl. Meeting with Neubacher and [SS-Oberführer Dr. Kajetan] Muehlmann at Fuschl.
Decision to have Neubacher make renewed attempt to reach Western Allies, possibly through the exiled
governments in Kitzebuehel [sic, Kitzbühel]. Sent Fegelein’s adjutant Mueller to Hitler with report about
Austrian situation.
29.04.1945 Meeting with Muehlmann. Move to Alt Aussee [in face, this occurred on 01.05.1945; see below]. Remained
till his capture on 12 May.” (ibid)
30.04.1945 Temporarily appointed to, but never assumed, the posts of Karl Wolff, due to Wolff’s roll in initiating
negotiations for the surrender of Heeresgruppe C on the Italian Front. These posts included those of
“Bevollmächtigten General der Deutschen Wehrmacht in Italien” (Plenipotentiary General of the German
Armed Forces in Italy), “Befehlshaber im rückwärtigen Frontgebiet” (Commander in the Rear Area Region
of the [Italian] Front), “Leiter der Militärverwaltung Italien”, and “Höchster SS- und Polizeiführer in Italien”.
01.05.1945 Upon learning of Hitler’s suicide the previous day, left Salzburg and moved his headquarters to Altaussee /
Steiermark.
07.05.1945 Fled with three other SS officers, including his adjutant, SS-Obersturmbannführer Arthur Scheidler to the
Wildensee Hütte in the Toten Gebirge near Altaussee.
Best wishes,
~ Mike
(I’m attempting to format this post now- italicizing book titles, adding spaces where appropriate, etc.- but it’s taking too long, so I’ll just leave it as is for now. Any typos or other errors are mine.)
Dr. jur.
Ernst Kaltenbrunner
SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS und der Polizei
Born: 04.10.1903 in Ried / Innkreis / Oberösterreich.
Executed: 16.10.1946 at Nürnberg Prison (hanged by U.S. Army Master-Sergeant John C. Woods). His last words on the scaffold were:
“I have loved my German people and my fatherland with a warm heart. I have done my duty by the laws of my people and I am sorry this time my people were led by men who were not soldiers and that crimes were committed of which I had no knowledge. Germany, good luck.”
NSDAP-Nr.: 300 179 (Joined 18.10.1930)
SS-Nr.: 13 039 (Joined 31.08.1931)
Promotions:
31.08.1931 SS-Mann
00.00.1931 SS-Truppführer
25.09.1932 SS-Sturmhauptführer
20.04.1936 SS-Standartenführer
20.04.1937 SS-Oberführer
13.03.1938-30.04.1939 Staatssekretär
21.03.1938 SS-Brigadeführer (mit Wirkung vom 12.03.1938)
11.09.1938 SS-Gruppenführer
20.06.1940-06.01.1941 Polizeipräsident
01.07.1940 SS-Untersturmführer d. R. der Waffen-SS
15.04.1941 Generalleutnant der Polizei (mit Wirkung vom 01.04.1941)
30.01.1943-08.05.1945 Staatssekretär
21.06.1943 SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei
10.12.1944 General der Waffen-SS und Polizei (mit Wirkung vom 01.12.1944)
Career:
00.00.1909-00.00.1913 Attended Volksschule in Raab.
12.09.1913-00.00.1921 Attended the Staatsrealgymnasium in Linz (passed his Matura [= Abitur], Summer 1921). Together with seven other students, he boarded with Frau Berta Kalzer, a lawyer’s widow, during this period, as his parents continued to reside in Raab until moving to Linz in 1918. He befriended his future subordinate Adolf Eichmann at this school. At Nürnberg, Kaltenbrunner denied any close association with Eichmann, however a number of sources stand in contrast to that assertion (see entry of 22.03.1944, below).
00.00.19__-00.00.19__ Member of the anticlerical, pan-German Pennalburschenschaft “Hohenstaufen”.
00.10.1921-00.00.1922 Studied chemistry at the Technischen Hochschule in Graz.
03.10.1921 Joined the Burschenschaft “Arminia” in Graz (a völkisch-nationalist, anti-Semitic, and arms-bearing student alliance identified by the colors “Schwarz-Rot-Gold” (black, red, and gold) of the “Ur-Burschenschaft”). His membership in this group automatically placed him in the Studentenbataillon (students’ battalion) of the “Steirischen Heimatschutzes”.
00.00.1921 Honorary member of the Bulgarian student association “Rodina” in Graz. Wendell R. Houston writes:
“… during his years at Graz, Kaltenbrunner became interested in the Balkans and made friends with a group of conservative, royalist Bulgarian students, one of whom was a colonel in the Bulgarian army.” (Houston, Ernst Kaltenbrunner: A Study of an Austrian SS and Police Leader, p. 21)
00.00.1922-00.00.1926 Switched his major from chemistry to law, which he then studied at the "Karl-Franzens-Universität" in Graz. He also worked as a miner during this period.
00.00.1924-00.00.1925 Committee chairman of the Graz branch of the "Deutschen Burschenbundes".
00.00.192_-00.00.192_ Speaker for the "nationalistischen Studenten" (Nationalist students) at the University of Graz.
00.07.1926 Received his doctorate (Dr. jur.) at the University of Graz.
00.00.1926-00.00.1926 Referendar (law clerk) to the Landesgericht and Bezirksgericht in Linz.
00.00.1926-00.00.1928 Referendar in the law office of Dr. Vilas, Salzburg.
00.00.1928-00.00.1929 Rechtsanwaltsanwärter (lawyer applicant) in the law office of Dr. Franz Lasser in Linz-Urfahr.
00.12.1928 Joined the "Deutsch-Völkischen Turnverein" in Linz.
00.07.1929-00.10.1930 Relinquished his job in the legal profession and became a member of “Heimwehr”. He was also a member of the “Unabhängigen Bewegung für ein Freies Österreich” (Independent Movement for a Free Austria) during this period.
00.00.1929-00.00.1933 Rechtsberater (legal advisor) to the "österreichischen SS".
18.10.1930 Joined the NSDAP / Ortsgruppe Linz.
00.01.1931 Appointed as a Bezirksredner (dvjistrict speaker) of the NSDAP in Oberösterreich.
31.08.1931 Joined the SS.
00.00.1931-00.00.1932 Führer of the Linz Sturm of 37.SS-Standarte "Oberösterreich" (Base: Linz).
00.00.1932 Entered employment with his father's legal practice in Linz.
00.00.1932 Became head of the pan-Germanic and, from 1933, outspokenly National-Socialist “Juristen Bund” (lawyers’ league) of Linz.
16.06.1932-12.03.1938 Assigned to the Stab SS-Abschnitt VIII (HQ: Linz).
00.10.1932-00.00.1933 Rechtsberater to SS-Abschnitt VIII.
19.06.1933 NSDAP and Party formations in Austria banned by order of Bundeskanzler Engelbert Dollfuss.
14.01.1934 Arrested by Austrian authorities.
17.01.1934-00.05.1934 Imprisoned for conspiracy, together with Anton Reinthaller, in the detention camp at Kaisersteinbruch. During his imprisonment, he instigated and led a hunger strike among his fellow National-Socialist prisoners, thus forcing the Dollfuss government to release 490 of them. Under interrogation at Nürnberg, Kaltenbrunner stated: “Over 500 National Socialists had been put into this camp without any concrete charge, the only aim being to hinder any activity of the National Socialist Party for a length of time.” (Transcript of interrogation by Colonel Howard A. Brundage, JAGD, on 11.09.1945, in Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records: Kaltenbrunner, Ernst; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238)
15.06.1934-15.06.1935 Führer of the [illegal] 37.SS-Standarte (Base: Linz). Succeeded Johann von Feil. Succeeded by Dr. Ferdinand von Sammern-Frankenegg.
Late Summer 1934 Secretary to Anton Reinthaller, in his capacity as “NS-Bauernführer” (Nazi Farmers’ Leader) in Austria.
00.05.1935-00.05.1935 Arrested and jailed on suspicion of high treason, and committed to the Militärgerichtshof (military court) in Wels / Oberösterreich. Following a lengthy investigation, the high treason charge was dismissed, however he was convicted of "Geheimbündelei" (conspiracy) and sentenced on to 6 months' imprisonment as well as suspension of his license to practice law.
00.05.1935-00.11.1935 Imprisoned by Austrian authorities.
15.06.1935-21.03.1938 Führer of the [illegal] SS-Abschnitt VIII (Ober- und Niederösterreich; HQ: Linz), appointed by Himmler to succeeded Karl Taus, despite the fact that he- Kaltenbrunner- was in prison at that time. After his release, he made many visits to Germany where he established contacts with Heinrich Himmler, Reinhard Heydrich, and the “Chef des SD-Ausland”, Heinz Jost. He was succeeded by Otto Jungkunz.
20.01.1937-21.03.1938 Führer of the [illegal] SS-Oberabschnitt Österreich (HQ: Linz). Succeeded Karl Taus. In this assignment, he worked to ensure discipline and calm in accordance with the German-Austrian agreement of 11.07.1936.
22.05.1937-00.09.1937 Arrested by Austrian authorities on the suspicion that he was in charge of the illegal NS-Hilfswerk organization in Oberösterreich.
11.03.1938 On orders from Hermann Göring, led 500 Austrian SS men in surrounding the Bundeskanzlei (federal chancellery) in Wien.
13.03.1938-30.04.1939 "Staatssekretär für öffentliche Sicherheit" (State Secretary for Public Security) in the short-lived Austrian cabinet of Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart. Succeeded Dr. Michael Skubl, who was loyal to the government of Chancellor Schuschnigg and was consequently ousted by Himmler. Skubl was also replaced as Polizeipräsident in Wien by Otto Steinhäusl (a participant in the failed Nazi Putsch of July 1934).
21.03.1938-30.01.1943 Führer of SS-Oberabschnitt Österreich (redesignated SS-Oberabschnitt Donau, 11.09.1938) (HQ: Wien), with effect from 12.03.1938 (m.d.F.b. until 11.09.1938, then permanent).
10.04.1938-08.05.1945 Member of the Reichstag (Land Österreich).
24.05.1938-30.04.1939 Leiter of Abteilung III (Ordnungspolizei und Sicherheitspolizei) in the “Amt des Reichsstatthalters” and the “Ministerium für innere und kulturelle Angelegenheiten” (Ministry for Internal and Cultural Affairs).
00.06.1938-00.00.1939 Member of the "Kommission zur geschichtlichen Feststellung der Begebenheiten der Erhebung des 25. Juli 1934 in Österreich” (Commission to assess the historical events leading to the Uprising of 25 July 1934 in Austria) of the SS (also known as the "Historische Kommission des RFSS" [Historical Commission of the Reichsführer-SS], and under the chairmanship of SS–Gruppenführer Wilhelm Koppe).
11.09.1938-30.01.1943 "Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer bei den Reichsstatthaltern in Wien, in Ober- und Niederdonau im Wehrkreis XVII” (HQ: Wien). Short title: HSSPF Donau. First holder of this post. Succeeded by Rudolf Querner.
00.00.1938 Appointed as a member of the Aufsichtsrat of “Erste Gemeinnützige Baugesellschaft für Kleinwohnungen Ges. mbH,” Wien I and the “Berliner Verein-Krankenkasse auf Gegenseitigkeit”.
03.02.1939 Appointed as a Ratsherr of the city of Linz/Donau
22.09.1939-15.11.1942 Member of the Verteidigungsausschuss (Defense Committee) for Wehrkreis XVII.
17.10.1939-30.01.1943 Gerichtsherr of “SS- und Polizeigericht VII", Wien.
20.06.1940-06.01.1941 Polizeipräsident in Wien. Succeeded the late SS-Oberführer Dr. Otto Steinhäusl. The duties of this post were actually performed by Kaltenbrunner’s deputy, the Polizeivizepräsident Dr. Leo Gotzmann (who officially succeeded Kaltenbrunner in the office on 06.01.1941).
00.00.1942-00.05.1945 Member of the Präsidium, "Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft (SOEG)" in Wien.
01.03.1942 Visited KL-Mauthausen together with Heinrich Himmler and Gauleiter August Eigruber.
30.01.1943-08.05.1945 "Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD" (CdS) and "Chef des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes " (RSHA). Succeeded Heinrich Himmler who had held interim leadership of the RSHA after the death of Reinhard Heydrich on 04.06.1942.
30.01.1943-08.05.1945 Staatssekretär in the "Reichsministerium des Innern".
30.01.1943-08.05.1945 Präsident of the "Internationalen Kriminalpolizeilichen Kommission" (IKPK, International Criminal Police Commission) (HQ: Berlin, Am kleinen Wannsee 16).
30.01.1943-08.05.1945 Member of the "Obersten Prüfungshofes für Volkszugehörigkeitsfragen in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten beim Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums-Stabshauptamt" (Supreme Examination Court for Ethnic Group Membership Questions in the Annexed Eastern Territories attached to the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood-Staff Main Office, under the chairmanship of Heinrich Himmler).
25.05.1943 Inspected KL-Mauthausen-Gusen, together with Oswald Pohl and Georg Lörner (SS-WVHA) and his successor as HSSPF Donau, Rudolf Querner.
21.06.1943 Attended a conference chaired by the Reichsführer-SS, during which Erich von dem Bach was appointed as “Chef der Bandenkampfverbände” and the “Bandenkampfgebiete" (partisan combating regions) were delineated. The following SS and Polizei leaders were also in attendance: Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger, Oswald Pohl, Hans-Adolf Prützmann, Fritz Katzmann, Kurt Knoblauch (in his capacity as"Chef des Kommandostabs RFSS"), and Dr. Otto Winkelmann (as representative of the Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Kurt Daluege).
Summer 1943 According to the sworn affidavit of Hans Maršálek (an inmate at Mauthausen from 29.09.1942 to 00.04.1945, assigned as “second clerk” in the camp), given in Nürnberg on 08.04.1946, conducted yet another inspection of KL-Mauthausen. The following are Maršálek’s recollections of this event:
“In early summer of 1943, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner visited the Concentration Camp Mauthausen. The Camp Commandant [Franz] Ziereis, Gauleiter Eigruber, first leader of the Protective Custody camp Bachmeyer and several others accompanied Kaltenbrunner. I saw Dr. Kaltenbrunner and the people who accompanied him with my own eyes. According to the testimony of the ‘Corpse Carriers’ of that time, the former prisoners Albert Tiefenbacher… Johann Polster… about fifteen prisoners of the arrest class were selected by [ SS-]Unterscharführer Winkler, in order to show Dr. Kaltenbrunner three ways of extermination, by a shot in the neck, hanging, and gassing. Women whose hair had been cut were among the executed and they were killed by shots in the neck. Above-mentioned ‘Corpse Carriers’ were present at the execution and had to carry the corpses to the Crematorium. Dr. Kaltenbrunner went to the Crematorium after the execution and later went into the quarry.” (Translation of Document 3870-PS, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VI)
30.06.1943 Issued a circular letter concerning the “Verfolgung der Kriminalität unter den polnischen und sowjetischen Zivilarbeitern” (Prosecution of Crime Among the Polish and Soviet Civilian Workers) (see also 04.12.1944, below)
11.10.1943 In a radio transmission to SS-Obersturmbannführer Herbert Kappler, Kommandeur of the SD-Aussenstelle in Rome, intercepted by the British “Ultra” decoding system (but not released until 2000), issued the following order (after Kappler had warned that deporting the Jews would rob the Reich of potential intelligence assets among Jews connected with the Allies, as well as a source of labor):
“To KAPPLER. It is precisely the immediate and thorough eradication of the Jews in Italy [sofortige und gründliche
Ausrottung der Juden in Italien] which is the special interest of the present internal political situation and the general
security in ITALY. To postpone the expulsion of the Jews until the CARABINIERI and the Italian army officers have
been removed can no more be considered than the idea mentioned in calling up the Jews in ITALY for what would
probably be very improductive [sic] labor under responsible direction by Italian authorities. The longer the delay, the
more the Jews who are doubtless reckoning on evacuation measures have an opportunity by moving to the houses of
pro-Jewish Italians of disappearing completely. [Undecoded – Eichmann?] has been instructed in executing the RFSS
orders to proceed with the evacuation of the Jews without further delay. KALTENBRUNNER.” (Copy of radio
intercept in Robert Katz, Fatal Silence. The Pope, the Resistance and the German Occupation of Rome, p. 77)
On the night of 15./16.10.1943, Kappler’s 365 SS and Police men began the roundup of 1,259 Jews in Rome, of whom 1,007 were deported by train to Auschwitz on 18.10.1943. A further 7,000 Roman Jews had succeeded in hiding during Kappler’s Aktion.
12.02.1944 Issuance of a “Führerbefehl” concerning the unification of political and military intelligence, which read as follows:
“I order:
1. A unified German secret service is to be created.
2. I appoint the Reichsführer-SS to head it.
3. In so far as it touches on military intelligence and Abwehr, the Reichsführer-SS and head of OKW will take the necessary measures in bilateral agreement.” (Michael Mueller & Geoffrey Brooks, Canaris: The Life and Death of Hitler’s Spymaster, p. 241)
On 14.05.1944, Himmler and the chief of the OKW, Generalfeldmarschall Keitel signed a negotiated compromise in which the Amt Abwehr was dissolved, by an order of Kaltenbrunner dated 23.05.1944, on 01.06.1944 and its functions allocated to Walter Schellenberg’s Amt VI (foreign intelligence office of the RSHA) and a new office, the “Militärisches Amt” (also known as “Amt Mil” of “Amt M”) was formed (from the former Abwehr I and II) under Oberst Georg Hansen. Even before his appointment as Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner had exhibited a passion for intelligence and counterintelligence; these steps led to his assuming authority, under Himmler, over Germany’s military intelligence apparatus.
26.03.1944 Following “The Great Escape”, on the night of 24./25.03.1944, of 76 RAF and other Commonwealth air force officers from the Stalag Luft III prisoner of war camp at Sagan in Niederschlesien, and Hitler’s order that more than half of the fugitives were to be shot, directed Heinrich Müller to issue a teleprint order for the murder of these men. The following is the approximate text, as recollected by Paul Mohr (a former Kripo official and witness in the postwar trial of certain Gestapo members involved in the crime), of the “Sagan-Befehl”:
"The frequent mass escapes of officer prisoners constitute a real danger to the security of the State. I am disappointed by the inefficient security measures in various prisoner of war camps. The Führer has ordered that as a deterrent, more than half of the escaped officers will be shot. The recaptured officers will be handed over to Amt IV for interrogation. After interrogation the officers will be transferred to their original camps und will be shot on the way. The reason for the shooting will be given as 'shot whilst trying to escape' or 'shot whilst resisting' so that nothing can be proved at a future date. Prominent persons will be exempted. Their names will be reported to me and my decision will be awaited whether the same course of action will be taken." (The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume XI (62. Trial of Max Wielen and 17 others, British Military Court, Hamburg, Germany [lst September, 1947])
As a result of this order, 50 of the escapees were summarily shot by the Gestapo.
05.04.1944 Issued a circular stating that the police should not intervene against the lynching of Allied airmen who had bailed out over Reich territory.
06.06.1944 Attended a meeting in Klessheim with Himmler, Reichsmarschall Göring, and Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop during which it was decided that in cases of Allied airmen captured on German soil, “Lynchjustiz als die Regel zu gelten habe” (“Lynch Justice would have to be the rule). He agreed to ensure the “Übergabe an den SD zur Sonderbehandlung” (Transfer [of Allied Airmen] to the SD for Special Treatment [execution]).
20.07.1944 At 1315 hours, just half-an-hour after the explosion of a bomb meant for Hitler in the Führer’s conference room, Himmler summoned Kaltenbrunner to Führer headquarters and directed him to fly to Berlin. There, with the assistance of Otto Skorzeny, he was to take charge of suppressing the revolt by the anti-Nazi plotters. At approximately 2000 hours, he reported to the Reich Propaganda Ministry where he obtained an understanding of the situation in the Reich capital. By the time of his arrival there, the coup was already collapsing, largely due to Hitler’s radio announcement that the assassination attempt had failed. Kaltenbrunner’s work was not done, however. He was to oversee the investigation into the conspiracy, and on 20.08.1944 submitted the so-called “Kaltenbrunner-Bericht” (report) to Reichsleiter Martin Bormann. Kaltenbrunner, in a civilian suit, also attended at least one session of the trials against the conspirators by Roland Freisler’s Volksgerichtshof.
24.07.1944 By Führer order, command of the Zollgrenzschutz (customs border guards), previously administered by the Reich Ministry of Finance, passed to Himmler, who delegated it to Kaltenbrunner.
04.10.1944 Counsel for the prosecution in the treason trial of Generalleutnant Dr. Hans Speidel before the “Ehrenhof des Heeres” (Court of Honor of the Army).
17.02.1945 Together with Walter Schellenberg, greeted the Vice President of the Swedish Red Cross, Count Folke Bernadotte, on his arrival in Berlin. Kaltenbrunner and Schellenberg then held a discussion with Bernadotte in Berlin-Wannsee, of which the Count later wrote:
“The Chief of the Security Police, Obergruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, was courteous enough as he offered me
Chesterfield cigarettes and Dubonnet… but the eyes that he fixed on me were cold and inquisitorial. The meeting,
which had been arranged by the Swedish Legation, took place at Kaltenbrunner’s luxurious home at Wannsee on the
day following my arrival in Berlin. My immediate object was to convince Kaltenbrunner, Himmler’s second-in-
command in the Gestapo, that it was imperative for me to meet his chief…
At our meeting he was polite, cool, and inquisitive. He was anxious to know why I wished to see Himmler.
As he sipped his Dubonnet he pointed out how extremely difficult it was to arrange a meeting. He suggested that
instead I should explain my purposes to him, whereupon he would transmit them to his chief. This alternative was, of
course, quite unacceptable to me. It was therefore necessary to get him sufficiently interested in arranging a meeting
with Himmler, and to do it without giving away the real object of my visit. [Bernadotte then asserted that his purpose
was to forge better relations- soured by Nazi brutality in neighboring Norway- between Germany and Sweden, as
“Reichsminister Himmler occupies a position that would make it possible for him to adopt measures calculated to
improve Swedish-German relations.”]
As the discussion went on, Kaltenbrunner did his best to pump me about my proposals to Himmler and asked
if I had any concrete suggestions. I said that I had not, and generally tried to avoid going too deeply into matters with
him, for if he were to disapprove of my objectives, he could easily wreck my hopes of meeting his chief. I told him,
however, that there were two principal concessions I wanted. One was the issue of exit permits to Swedish women
married to Germans, and to their children, particularly women whose homes had been bombed or whose husbands were
killed or missing. The other was permission to the Swedish Red Cross to work in the internment camps in Germany.
Oddly enough, Kaltenbrunner showed himself reasonable and understanding on these points, and I asked him
if he now saw how important it was that I should see Himmler personally… Kaltenbrunner assured me emphatically that
he quite agreed.
When I left him I felt that I had made good progress and had reason to be hopeful about my chances of a talk
with Himmler…” (Bernadotte, The Curtain Falls: Last Days of the Third Reich, pp. 25-30)
On 05.03.1945, Kaltenbrunner met again with Bernadotte. The following is based on his testimony regarding this conference:
“About two weeks after his first visit, Bernadotte returned to Berlin and invited K. and Schellenberg to lunch. He
thanked them for their help in carrying out his requests and discussed details of the Bergen-Belsen camp for
Scandinavian prisoners. K.’s attempt to learn more about the Himmler-Bernadotte conversation failed again. He only
found out that a second meeting was to be held. Afterwards Himmler mentioned to Kaltenbrunner that Bernadotte had
shown a clearly anti-Russian attitude and had said that Sweden would like to see an understanding between Germany
and the Western Allies.” (ibid)
08.03.1945-23.03.1945 At his residence- the Villa Kerry- on the outskirts of Altaussee / Steiermark. It was actually owned by the 55-year-old artist Christel Kerry (died December 1978).
12.03.1945 Meeting with the President of the International Red Cross (IRC), Carl J. Burckhardt, in Feldkirch (Vorarlberg) near the Swiss border concerning humanitarian efforts for concentration camp inmates. The following is based on Kaltenbrunner’s recollections of the meeting, and excerpted from “Annex No. XIV – Kaltenbrunner’s Contacts with the Swiss Red Cross”, in the 28.06.1945 “Intermediate Interrogation Report” prepared at Headquarters 12th Army Group Interrogation Center:
“1. Events leading to Kaltenbrunner’s meeting with Burckhardt
Late in Feb 45 Burckhardt, the President of the Swiss Red Cross, requested a meeting with Himmler. When K. heard
of this he realized that it was an opportunity for him to contact diplomatic circles abroad. At the time Himmler was at
the Vistula front. Since Burckhardt was not permitted to visit Himmler at the front, by the Fuehrer’s specific orders, K. suggested that he meet
Burckhardt in place of Himmler. His suggestion was accepted and an official answer sent to Burckhardt. This letter was drafted
by K. but he is not sure who signed it. A few days later K. wrote a personal letter to Burckhardt suggesting Feldkirch as a
meeting place. He chose this Austrian border town because it gave him a chance to meet some of his Austrian friends at the same
time.
On the way to Feldkirch K. met either [Wilhelm] Hoettl or Goettsch at Innsbruck while Scheidler, K.’s adjutant went
ahead to Feldkirch to make the necessary preparations.
2. Kaltenbrunner-Burckhardt meeting on 12 Mar 45
During the first part of the meeting, which lasted from1 400 to 1700 hours, Dr. [Hans Bachmann], General Secretary of the Red
Cross, and Scheidler, K.’s adjutant, were present, but did not actively participate in the discussion. It was obvious that Burckhardt
had prepared himself well for the talk. He had brought detailed suggestions and plans concerning the exchange of civilian
internees and the sending of food and other supplies to prison camps in Germany. He mentioned that he would soon be
appointed Swiss Minister in Paris. He seemed particularly anxious to obtain concessions for French civilian internees, since this
would give him a very good start in his new post in France. He also talked about an exchange of military prisoners. K. agreed to
most of Burckhardt’s suggestions, but pointed out that Himmler’s approval would have to be obtained before they could be
carried out.
During the second part of the conversation Burckhardt and K. were alone. This talk lasted from 1700 to 1800 hours.
K. claimed that it was Burckhardt who began to speak about the war in general, expressing Swiss fears concerning the rapid
Russian advance into Central Europe. K. outlined his own views about the chances of coming to an agreement with the Western
Allies against Russia. He also spoke of his Austrian plan. He mentioned Dulles in this connection, but did not tell Burckhardt
how the contact with Dulles had been established.
Burckhardt next spoke bitterly of Ribbentrop’s stubborn ‘Prussian’ type of diplomacy, which he blamed for the
disastrous developments. He said a ‘Western’ diplomat would have found much smoother methods and would have been able to
come to terms with Britain and the United States. He added, much to K.’s joy, that when he spoke of ‘Western diplomacy’ he
included Austria.
These remarks gave K. hope that Burckhardt would do something to promote his Austrian plan. He definitely felt that
excellent personal connections had been established, and found this confirmed by Burckhardt’s final words, ‘I do hope that I shall
meet you often’. Nothing definite was said, however, but an early meeting between K. and Dr. [Bachmann] was agreed upon.
During the second part of the talks Burckhardt also brought up two personal requests. One concerned the release of a
close relative of Gen. De Gaulle, Genevieve (?) de Gaulle, and the other the release of a personal friend of Burckhardt’s, the
Polish Countess [Karolina von] Lan[koranska].
3. Developments between 12 March and 23 April
Upon his return to Berlin, K. reported the results of his talks to Ribbentrop and sent his adjutant Maiz to Himmler to inform the
latter of Burckhardt’s requests. All Burckhardt’s suggestions, with the exception of the exchange of prisoners of war, were
approved. The latter subject, Burckhardt was informed, was already under discussion between the German Foreign Office and
Switzerland as the protecting power.
During the second half of March and early April a number of letters were exchanged between K. and Burckhardt
concerning details of the exchange plan. Matters of political nature were, however, not touched upon in this correspondence.
There was also set up in Konstanz a small committee which dealt with the technical details of the Burckhardt exchange plan. The
German representative on this committee was Oberregierungsrat Groening of Amt IV.
K. later heard from Schellenberg (who had received a letter from his contact man Frank in Switzerland) that Burckhardt
had spoken to Dulles about the meeting and had expressed himself very favorably about K.’s personality and ideas. K. was very
happy to learn about this positive reaction on Burckhardt’s part. However, since Schellenberg was not supposed to know
anything about the Dulles affair, K. was not too pleased to get the story from him. K. suspects that Frank’s letter was actually
addressed to him, and that Schellenberg failed to give it to him because he wanted to keep it as evidence against K.
About 19 April K. asked Burckhardt for another meeting with representatives of the Red Cross.” [see entry of
23.04.1945, below] (Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC
Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records: Kaltenbrunner, Ernst; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238)
18.04.1945 Informed by Himmler that, if Allied forces managed to split Germany in two, he [Kaltenbrunner] was to be granted plenipotentiary powers in the southern portion of the country.
19.-22.04.1945 According to the “Intermediate Interrogation Report” of 28.06.1945, Kaltenbrunner’s movements during this period were as follows:
“19 April Dresden-Prague-Kremsmuenster-Alt Aussee-Linz.
19 April, or Visited Gauleiter Eigruber in Linz, participated shortly in a meeting. Present were leading
possibly 12 April officials, including possibly Skorzeny and Winkelmann. Subjects of army and police discussion:
Reestablishment of a resistance line in the East, refugee questions, food problems, etc.
20 April Strobl. With his family.
21 April Salzburg. Met Scheel, Glaise-Horstenau, Waneck, Hoettl.
22 April Vain effort to get to Innsbruck, prevented by air raids.” (ibid)
23.04.1945 Meeting with Drs. Hans Bachmann and Hans Mayer of the Swiss Red Cross in Innsbruck. The following is based on Kaltenbrunner’s recollections of the meeting, and excerpted from “Annex No. XIV – Kaltenbrunner’s Contacts with the Swiss Red Cross”, in the 28.06.1945 “Intermediate Interrogation Report” prepared at Headquarters 12th Army Group Interrogation Center:
“4. Meeting with Drs [Bachmann] and M[a]yer on 23 April 1945
On 23 April K. met Burckhardt’s two representatives in Innsbruck. He knew [Bachmann] already from the Feldkirch
meeting
and he had, in the meantime (about 20 March) met M[a]yer in Berlin. The talks lasted from 1600 to 2200 hours, the first 2½
hours being devoted to Red Cross matters. K. promised to continue his efforts to carry out the arrangements made at the
Feldkirch meeting. He offered to contact Kesselring to obtain permission for the passage of internees through the lines and he
actually radioed Kesselring about this.
The second part of the meeting was spent in the discussion of political matters. K. repeated the statements he had made
to Burckhardt and asked [Bachmann] and M[a]yer to report to Burckhardt that he had not changed his opinions in any way since
the meeting of 12 March. He added that he had been very pleased to hear that Burckhardt had spoken to Dulles about their talks.
Both [Bachmann] and M[a]yer expressed the same fear concerning Russia which Burckhardt had voiced in the earlier
meeting. Meyer seemed to agree with all of K.’s ideas, while [Bachmann] had some reservations on questions of ‘social
philosophy’.
This political discussion did not bring any tangible results but K. felt that he had won new friends, and that Burckhardt
would now be even more convinced of the sincerity of his Austrian plans than before.
A Swiss request to permit the children of the Belgian King to proceed to Switzerland was also discussed at this
meeting. K. acceded immediately and on the following day went to Strobl, where he contacted Lurker, the German caretaker of
the castle in which King Leopold was living. The King, however, replied that he preferred to have his children stay with him.
His request was to fall into the hands of the Western Allies and not into the hands of the Russians. K. transmitted the King’s
reaction to Dr [Bachmann].
There was no further contact between K. and Red Cross representatives after 23 April. (Interrogation Records
Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records:
Kaltenbrunner, Ernst; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238)
The report also indicates that Kaltenbrunner met with Gauleiter Franz Hofer on this date, then “return[ed] to Salzburg” where he met with Josef Spacil (head of Amt II of the RSHA).
25.- 29.04.1945 According to the “Intermediate Interrogation Report” of 28.06.1945, Kaltenbrunner’s movements during this period were as follows:
“25 April Salzburg. Meeting with Glaise-Horstenau.
26 April Koenigssee. Meeting with Kesselring, Winter and Neubacher. Attempts to send W/T report to
Himmler via Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab station, re Red Cross arrangements.
27 April Strobl. Discussion with Hoettl who reports on his trip to Switzerland.
28 April Alt Aussee with Hoettl. Meeting with Neubacher and [SS-Oberführer Dr. Kajetan] Muehlmann at Fuschl.
Decision to have Neubacher make renewed attempt to reach Western Allies, possibly through the exiled
governments in Kitzebuehel [sic, Kitzbühel]. Sent Fegelein’s adjutant Mueller to Hitler with report about
Austrian situation.
29.04.1945 Meeting with Muehlmann. Move to Alt Aussee [in face, this occurred on 01.05.1945; see below]. Remained
till his capture on 12 May.” (ibid)
30.04.1945 Temporarily appointed to, but never assumed, the posts of Karl Wolff, due to Wolff’s roll in initiating
negotiations for the surrender of Heeresgruppe C on the Italian Front. These posts included those of
“Bevollmächtigten General der Deutschen Wehrmacht in Italien” (Plenipotentiary General of the German
Armed Forces in Italy), “Befehlshaber im rückwärtigen Frontgebiet” (Commander in the Rear Area Region
of the [Italian] Front), “Leiter der Militärverwaltung Italien”, and “Höchster SS- und Polizeiführer in Italien”.
01.05.1945 Upon learning of Hitler’s suicide the previous day, left Salzburg and moved his headquarters to Altaussee /
Steiermark.
07.05.1945 Fled with three other SS officers, including his adjutant, SS-Obersturmbannführer Arthur Scheidler to the
Wildensee Hütte in the Toten Gebirge near Altaussee.
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Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Postwar Prosecution:
After an intensive hunt for Kaltenbrunner, U.S. Army CIC officer Robert Eliot Matteson traced his location to the Wildensee Hütte in the Toten Gebirge, arresting him and his companions on 12.05.1945. Interned in Wiesbaden, then at the Central Continental Prisoner of War Enclosure No. 32 (known as “Ashcan”) at the Palace Hotel at Mondorf-les-Bains, Luxembourg, 00.05.1945-00.07.1945. He was then transferred to Interrogation Center 020 near London, where he underwent 10-weeks of intensive interrogation from July through September. After his arrival in Nürnberg, Kaltenbrunner was formally indicated on 19.10.1945 for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and conspiracy to commit these crimes. In November 1945, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice submitted a request- which was denied- to the International Military Tribunal (IMT), Nürnberg, for Kaltenbrunner's extradition to Austria. On 18.11.1945, three days before the opening of the Nürnberg Trials, he suffered a spontaneous subarachnoid hemorrhage and was hospitalized until 06.12.1945. He then returned to jail and first attended a session of the trial on 10.12.1945, when he entered his plea as follows: “I plead not guilty. I do not believe that I have made myself guilty” After several days, however, his condition worsened and he was again hospitalized. Kaltenbrunner spent the entire month of January in bed, but finally reappeared in court in February 1946. Throughout his trial, he denied responsibility for virtually all of the crimes of which he was accused, asserting that he had only visited a concentration camp (Mauthausen) on one occasion; that he had never seen a gas chamber; that he had never issued an order for the deportation of Jews; that his signature on numerous incriminating documents was forged; and that he had no real power or influence. All of the blame, he asserted, rested with Heinrich Himmler, Heinrich Müller, and his predecessor at the RSHA, Reinhard Heydrich. As noted above, despite the existence of orders for “Schutzhaft” (protective custody)- which resulted in the transfer of specific individuals to concentration camps- bearing his signature, he claimed to have never sent a single person to a camp. He stated: “I do not feel guilty of any war crimes. I have only done my duty as an intelligence organ and I refuse to serve as an Ersatz [substitute] for Himmler.” However, the evidence against him was vast.
Convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity, he was sentenced to death by hanging on 01.10.1946. The judgment of the International Military Tribunal against Kaltenbrunner, and his final statement to the court, read as follows:
“Kaltenbrunner is indicted under Counts One, Three and Four. He joined the Austrian Nazi Party and the SS in 1932. In 1935 he became leader of the SS in Austria. After the Anschluss he was appointed Austrian State Secretary for Security and when this position was abolished in 1941 he was made Higher SS and Police Leader. On 30th January, 1943, he was appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD and Head of the Reich Security Head Office (RSHA), a position which had been held by Heydrich until his assassination in June, 1942. He held the rank of Obergruppenführer in the SS.
Crimes against Peace
As leader of the SS in Austria Kaltenbrunner was active in the Nazi intrigue against the Schuschnigg Government. On the night of 11th March, 1938, after Goering had ordered Austrian National Socialists to seize control of the Austrian Government, 500 Austrian SS men under Kaltenbrunner's command surrounded the Federal Chancellery and a special detachment under the command of his adjutant entered the Federal Chancellery while Seyss-Inquart was negotiating with President Miklas. But there is no evidence connecting Kaltenbrunner with plans to wage aggressive war on any other front. The Anschluss, although it was an aggressive act, is not charged as an aggressive war, and the evidence against Kaltenbrunner under Count One does not in the opinion of the Tribunal show his direct participation in any plan to wage such a war.
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
When he became Chief of the Security Police and SD and Head of the RSHA on 30th January, 1943, Kaltenbrunner took charge of an organization which included the main offices of the Gestapo, the SD and the Criminal Police. As Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner had authority to order protective custody to and release from concentration camps. Orders to this effect were normally sent over his signature. Kaltenbrunner was aware of conditions in concentration camps. He had undoubtedly visited Mauthausen and witnesses testified that he had seen prisoners killed by the various methods of execution, hanging, shooting in the back of the neck and gassing, as part of a demonstration. Kaltenbrunner himself ordered the execution of prisoners in those camps and his office was used to transmit to the camps execution orders which originated in Himmler's office. At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner participated in the arrangements for the evacuation of inmates of concentration camps, and the liquidation of many of them, to prevent them from being liberated by the Allied armies.
During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was Head of the RSHA, it was engaged in a widespread programme of war crimes and crimes against humanity. These crimes included the mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war. Einsatz Kommandos operating under the control of the Gestapo were engaged in the screening of Soviet prisoners of war. Jews, commissars, and others who were thought to be ideologically hostile to the Nazi system were reported to the RSHA, which had them transferred to a concentration camp and murdered. An RSHA order issued during Kaltenbrunner's regime established the " Bullet Decree," under which certain escaped prisoners of war who were recaptured were taken to Mauthausen and shot. The order for the execution of commando troops was extended by the Gestapo to include parachutists while Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the RHSA. An order signed by Kaltenbrunner instructed the Police not to interfere with attacks on bailed out Allied fliers. In December, 1944, Kaltenbrunner participated in the murder of one of the French Generals held as a prisoner of war.
During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was Head of the RHSA, the Gestapo and SD in occupied territories
continued the murder and ill-treatment of the population, using methods which included the torture and confinement in concentration camps, usually under orders to which Kaltenbrunner's name was signed.
The Gestapo was responsible for enforcing a rigid labour discipline on the slave labourers and Kaltenbrunner
established a series of labour reformatory camps for this purpose. When the SS embarked on a slave labour programme of its own, the Gestapo was used to obtain the needed workers by sending labourers to concentration camps.
The RSHA played a leading part in the " final solution " of the Jewish question by the extermination of the Jews. A special section under the Amt IV of the RSHA was established to supervise this programme. Under its direction approximately six million Jews were murdered, of which two million were killed by Einsatzgruppen and other units of the Security Police. Kaltenbrunner had been informed of the activities of these Einsatzgruppen when he was a Higher SS and Police Leader, and they continued to function after he had become Chief of the RSHA.
The murder of approximately four million Jews in concentration camps has heretofore been described. This part of the programme was also under the supervision of the RSHA when Kaltenbrunner was head of that organisation, and special missions of the RSHA scoured the occupied territories and the various Axis satellites arranging for the deportation of Jews to these extermination institutions. Kaltenbrunner was informed of these activities. A letter which he wrote on 30th June, 1944, described the shipment to Vienna of 12,000 Jews for that purpose, and directed that all who could not work would have to be kept in readiness for " special action," which meant murder. Kaltenbrunner denied his signature to this letter, as he did on a very large number of orders on which his name was stamped or typed, and, in a few instances, written. It is inconceivable that in matters of such importance his signature could have appeared so many times without his authority.
Kaltenbrunner has claimed that when he took office as Chief of the Security Police and SD and as Head of the RSHA he did so pursuant to an understanding with Himmler under which he was to confine his activities to matters involving foreign intelligence, and not to assume overall control over the activities of the RSHA. He claims that the criminal programme had been started before his assumption of office; that he seldom knew what was going on; and that when he was informed he did what he could to stop them. It is true that he showed a special interest in matters involving foreign intelligence. But he exercised control over the activities of the RSHA; was aware of the crimes it was committing and was an active participant in many of them.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Kaltenbrunner is not guilty on Count One. He is guilty under Counts Three and Four." (Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the German Major War Criminals, Nuremberg, 30th September and 1st October, 1946)
Decorations & Awards:
15.11.1944 Ritterkreuz des Kriegsverdienstkreuzes mit Schwertern as SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei and Chef of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, based on the following recommendation from Reichsführer-SS Himmler:
“SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei Dr. K a l t e n b r u n n e r was, until 30. January 1943, Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer in Wien, and was appointed on this date as Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in succession to SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei Heydrich. He thereby took over a difficult and complicated apparatus, which he found at this time to be disorganized [from the standpoint of] combat effectiveness. Since then, SS-Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner has worked to unite the three basic divisions [of the RSHA]: The Geheime
Staatspolizei, Kriminalpolizei, and Sicherheitsdienst. With the transformation of the former Amt Abwehr/Ausland in the OKW as the ‘Militarisches Amt’, he expanded his jurisdiction into the sector of the military secret intelligence service. Countering often insurmountable difficulties he has experienced, he has succeeded in implementing the Führerbefehl [Führer order] to merge the military and political intelligence services. By assuming command, as Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, of the Zollgrenzschutz [border customs protection service], he has taken responsibility for the security of Germany’s borders.” (award recommendation in his SS file)
22.10.1943 Deutsches Kreuz in Silber as SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei and Chef of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, based on the following recommendation, dated 03.10.1943, from Reichsführer-SS Himmler:
“SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei Dr. K a l t e n b r u n n e r has been Chef of the Sicherheitspolizei since succeeding the fallen SS-Obergruppenführer H e y d r i c h on 30. January 1943. He has directed, with the best results, the intelligence apparatus of the Security Services, and combated the ideological and nationalist sabotage and partisan groups throughout Europe.
He showed exceptional merit after the subversion in Italy of 25. July 1943 and the [resulting] arrest of the Duce. The reporting provided by the intelligence apparatus in Italy, which he built up, proved to be correct in every form. Without his work and leadership, the liberation of the Duce would not have been possible.
I request, in recognition of his service, that he be awarded the German Cross in Silver.” (award recommendation in his SS file)
30.01.1943 Kriegsverdienstkreuz I. Klasse mit Schwertern
11.03.1942 Kriegsverdienstkreuz II. Klasse mit Schwertern
ca. 1939 Spange "Prager Burg" zur Medaille zur Erinnerung an den 1. Oktober 1938
ca. 1939 Medaille zur Erinnerung an den 1. Oktober 1938
ca. 1938 Medaille zur Erinnerung an den 13. März 1938
30.01.1939 Goldenes Ehrenzeichen der NSDAP
31.05.1942 Blutorden der NSDAP (Nr. 4017)
00.00.194_ Dienstauszeichnung der NSDAP in Silber
00.00.194_ Dienstauszeichnung der NSDAP in Bronze
30.01.1943 Ehrenring der Stadt Wien
00.00.193_ Ehrendolch der SS
[01.12.1938] Ehrendegen des Reichsführers-SS
[01.12.1938] Totenkopfring der SS
00.00.193_ SS-Zivilabzeichen (Nr. 160 180)
16.12.1935 Julleuchter der SS
00.02.1934 Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer
Notes:
* Parents:
- Dr. jur. Hugo Kaltenbrunner (an attorney, born 22.08.1875 in Grieskirchen, died 00.00.1938; he was himself the son of the attorney Dr. Karl Kaltenbrunner and his wife Maria Josefa Augustin).
- Theresia Elisabeth, née Utwardy (born 07.11.1875 in Eferding / Oberösterreich, died 00.03.1943 in Linz), daughter of Ferdinand Josef Udwardy and his wife Barbara Listner (from Böhmen).
* Brothers:
- Dr. jur. Werner Kaltenbrunner (born 26.07.1905 in Ried, still living as of 25.03.1977). He became an attorney in Vöcklabruck and was also an SS member (SS-Nr. 487 762 (V), holding the rank of SS-Untersturmführer with the SS-Hauptamt.
- Dr. jur. Roland Kaltenbrunner (born 02.01.1910 in Raab) rose to become Secretary of Commerce for Gau Oberdonau of the NSDAP in Linz, as well as an SS-Obersturmführer with the Hauptamt SS-Gericht (SS-Nr. 309 461; Commissioned SS-Untersturmführer on 09.11.1938).
* Religion: Catholic; left church with his wife, and they subsequently declared themselves “gottgläubig”.
* Married on 14.01.1934 to Elisabeth ("Lisl") Eder (born 20.10.1908 in Linz; NSDAP-Nr. 301 490; Member of the NS-Frauenschaft), daughter of a grocery store owner. With his wife he fathered one son (born 28.02.1935) and two daughters (born 25.07.1937 and ca. 1944). In 1943, he became acquainted with his eventual mistress Gisela Gräfin von Westarp (born 27.06.1920 in Wittenberg an der Elbe, Died 02.06.1983 in Munchen), who was then working in Himmler’s Berlin headquarters. A widow, she had been married on 16.11.1940 to Paul Wolf (born 25.02.1912 in Etterbeek, Belgium; died 07.04.1943 as an Oberfähnrich in Tunis). With his mistress, he had a son (Wolfgang) and a daughter (Ursula), twins, born on 12.03.1945. In his postwar recollections of the capture of Kaltenbrunner, “The Last Days of Ernst Kaltenbrunner”, former U.S. Army officer Robert Eliot Matteson writes of von Westarp (whom he met and interrogated in Alt Aussee on 09.05.1945): “On March 12, 1945, she bore [the] twins…, in a cowshed in Alt Aussee. I still have a letter she wrote to her mother describing the event, declaring that she ‘almost deserved the Mother Cross,’ and pointing out that Mrs. Kaltenbrunner had taken twelve years to produce only three children. One of the twins' godfathers, Gisela told me proudly, was Hitler's personal physician, Dr. Karl Brandt.” All of Kaltenbrunner’s children survived the war.
* Foreign language proficiency: English.
* His face was badly scarred as the result of an auto accident.
* Film & television portrayals: Edward Underdown (“The Two-Headed Spy”, 1958 British film); Branko Plesa (“Nirberski epilog”, 1971 Yugoslav television production; Alain Nobis (“La Tragédie de Vérone”, 1972 French television production; Mikhail Zharkovsy (“Semnadtsat mgnoveniy vesny”, 1973 Russian television miniseries; Hans Meyer (“Holocaust”, U.S. TV miniseries; John Moffatt (“Private Schulz”, 1981 British TV series; Hans Meyer (“Inside the Third Reich”, 1982 U.S. TV production; Christopher Heyerdahl (“Nuremberg”, 2000 US/Canadian TV production).
* The following is excerpted from the Final Interrogation Report (dated 11.07.1945 and conducted at Headquarters US Forces European Theater Interrogation Center) of former SS-Obersturmbannführer Arthur Scheidler, Kaltenbrunner’s administrative aide from 1943-1945:
“SCHEIDLER claims that his purely administrative position gave him only a sketchy knowledge of KALTENBRUNNER’s confidential affairs, but that he is familiar with K’s personal life as well as his official and private contacts. He never participated in conferences but learned of confidential matters from dinner-table conversations and occasional remarks by K[altenbrunner] and his guests. SCHEIDLER’s long association with RSHA makes him familiar with the names of many persons prominent in the organization….
c. KALTENBRUNNER’s Private Life
S[cheidler] describes K as a retiring individual who does not readily make friends, hesitant about confiding in people and reluctant to express his innermost thoughts. He was often criticized by HIMMLER for being too easy-going.
S recalls a letter from HIMMLER in 1943 telling K to forget his Austrian softness and to be more firm in his decisions.
K spent most of his time in BERLIN, where he attended few social gatherings. He saw his family for a day or two in STROBL during his frequent trips to Austria. Occasionallly he spent an evening at the home of an editor named ANDERMANN in BERLIN, or with H/Stuf JOEBSTL, a medical officer with a Waffen SS unit n[ea]r ORANIENBURG. His closest friends were in VIENNA, among them Dr NEUBACHER whome he saw frequently either in VIENNA or BERLIN; others were WALDSHOC, owner of the Stadtkrug Wirtshaus; Frau NEUBACHER, a cousin of Dr NEUBACHER; and Frau SCHULTZ. His mistress was a 24-year-old countess, Gisela von WESTARP, whom he had known for about a year and a half. She left for ALT AUSSEE in Jan 45 and gave birth to twins there in March.
According to S, K had no personal fortune and owned no real estate. When he came to BERLIN in 1943 his debts amounted to RM 12,000; when he last left the city he had a bank balance of RM 17,000.
d. KALTENBRUNNER’s Routine as Chief of RSHA
After Jan or Feb 45, K’s living quarters and officers were located at Am Kleinen Wannsee 16, BERLIN-WANNSEE and he seldom used his apartment at Giesebrechtstr 12, BERLIN-CHARLOTTENBURG. His working day started at 1030 hrs. Lunch with his department heads was a daily institution and was usually followed by conferences with individuals. K invariably went to the Reichs Kanzlei at 1600 hrs, often staying there until late into the night.
(1) Daily Conferences.
Lunch time discussions centered on personnel and appointments. OHLENDORF usually reported on civilian morale, the extent and effect of bombing and evacuation problems. There was frequent criticism of the Party and its personalities, especially of BORMANN….
(3) Meetings at the Reichs Kanzlei.
[After Dec 44] K attended the two military situation conferences held at the Reichs Kanzlei daily at 1600 and 2300 hrs. Among those usually present were KEITEL, MODEL, DOENITZ, GOERING, KOLLER, HIMMLER, and FEGELEIN. K frequently conferred with Brigf RATTENHUBER of the RS, Gruf BAUER of the Luftwaffe [sic! BAUR, Hitler’s personal pilor], [Julius] SCHAUB; [Walter] HEWEL, the liason officer from the Foreign Office to the Reichs Kanzlei; and with SUNDERMANN, Chief of Staff of the Reich Press Chief….
f. KALTENBRUNNER’s Relations with HIMMLER and BORMANN
K reported to HIMMLER at the Reichs Kanzlei or occasionally at the Fuehrer Haupt Quartier in RASTENBURG every two weeks after Dec 44. O/Stubaf Dr MALZ, who was familiar with the subjects to be discussed, accompanied K in place of S.
K disliked BORMANN intensely. When the Gestapo once arrested a certain Kreis Leiter VILLECHNER, BORMANN was angered to the point of trying to persuade HITLER to have the Sipo dissolved. Nothing came of this attempt, but K and BORMANN were on bad terms with one another for months afterward….
h. Foreign Personalities
K seems to have taken a personal interest in prominent foreigners interened in Germany. He went to see King LEOPOLD of the Belgians, but S does not know the purpose of this trip. K visited CIANO in Sep 43 and saw Francois PONCET late the same year, probably on the subject of the latter’s children….
i. The Austrian Project
‘Herzog’ was the code name used for K’s Austrian Independent Government project. S first heard of it in Mar 45, and thinks it received added impetus in April with the Allies’ failure to recognize the Russian-sponsored VIENNA government. The following persons were to take part in the government: KALTENBRUNNER, Dr NEUBACHER, [Edmund] GLAISE-HORSTENAU, [Franz] HAYLER, and [Oberfuhrer Dr. Kajetan] MUEHLMANN. [RSHA officers] [Wilhelm] WANECK, [Werner] GOETTSCH, and [Wilhelm] HOETTL were also active in promoting the project… S heard that a friend of GOETTSCH (DOPLER or WESTEN), a 33d-degree Mason, was to go to the United States to negotiate with President ROOSEVELT. He believes that HITLER and HIMMLER were ignorant of K’s efforts. K once implied that HIMMLER and SCHELLENBERG had their own channels to the Allies, perhaps meaning Count BERNADOTTE of the Swedish Red Cross.
The following is “ANNEX NO. I – KALTENBRUNNER’s Conferences”, from the above report:
“Before MID APRIL 45 SCHEIDLER remembers the following trips or conferences attended by KALTENBRUNNER. IN many instances listed below, he is uncertain as to dates and place names. An asterisk indicates that the confences was held on HIMMLER’s special train [Sonderzug “Heinrich”].
DATE PLACE PERSONS CONFERRED WITH
1943 PARIS [Fernand] de BRINON
Summer 44 unknown Gauleiters RAINER and UIBERREITHER
PRAGUE O/Gruf Karl [Hermann] FRANK
DRESDEN King LEOPOLD of the Belgians
Jul 44 unknown Several conferences with Gen R[E]INECKE of OKW (member of the
Volksgerichtshof)
BIESENTHAL nr BERLIN Gen [Alfred] WUENNENBERG, Chief of Orpo
20 Jul 44 RASTENBURG K flew to HIMMLER to discuss the 20 July affair
Aug 44 BERLIN Two confences with Gen/Feldm KEITEL
Sep 44 VIENNA and LINZ [Baldur] Von SCHIRACH and NEUBACHER
Local Sipo agencies.
VIENNA Attended dinner with Minister of Slovakia. [SA-]O/Gruf [Hanns Elard] LUDIN, HSSPF for Hungary WINKELMANN, BdS O/Fuehrer [Oberführer] GESCHKE, HUBER, WANECK, O/Gruf QUERNER, Dr HOETTL. Also spoke with von SCHIRACH
Sep-Dec 44 BERLIN O/Gruf BERGER; [Reichsminister Walter] FUNK; Gauleiter
FORSTER; Gruf [Prof. Dr. Karl] GEBHARDT; GOEBBELS; Gruf HAYLER, twice; O/Gruf [Maximilian von] HERFF, Chef personal Amt SS; Staats Rat Gruf [Hans] HINKEL; O/Gruf JUETTNER, twice; Robert LEY; Reichsbischof MUELLER; NEUBACHER several times; O/Gruf [Hans Adolf PRUETZ]MANN, once or twice; Gruf [Rudolf] QUERNER; von RIBBENTROP; SEYSS-INQUART; Staats Sekr STEENGRACHT, once or twice; O/Gruf WINKELMANN; O/Gruf WOYRSCH, formerly HSSPF DRESDEN. O/Gruf OBERG
HAMELN HIMMLER
INNSBRUCK Gauleiter [Franz] HOFER
KARINHALL GOERING
KLAGENFURT Attended marriage of Gruf GLOBOCZNICK [sic, GLOBOCNIK]
SALZBURG GOERING
SALZBURG and STROBL BODOTZKI, HOETTL, WANECK and [Gauleiter and O/Gruf Dr. Gustav Adolf] SCHEEL
STETTIN Gauleiter SCHWEDE-COBURG and O/Gruf [Emil] MATZOW [sic, MAZUW], HSSPF STETTIN
VIENNA NEUBACHER
VIENNA HIMMLER
WESTERN FRONT HIMMLER
WUERTTEMBERG HIMMLER
(10 Nov 44) BERLIN RSHA party
Dec 44 VIENNA (6 or 7 day trip)
BRATISLAVA von SCHIRACH, SCHIMANA, WANECK, HOETTL and NEUNTEUFFEL [HSSPF O/Gruf Hermann] HOEFLE, O/Gruf LUDIN, KdS [Dr. Josef] WITISKA, WINKELMANN
OEDENBURG/HUNGARY WANECK, HOETTL, WINKELMANN
Hungary BdS O/Fuehrer GESCHKE
ESTERHAZY Castle/
Hungary Gen WOEHLER, CG of an Army Gp [sic, OB 8.Armee]
Jan 45
SALZBURG SCHEEL (?)
LINZ Gauleiter [August] EIGRUBER
STETTIN The Gauleiter [Franz Schwede] and HSSPF [Emil Mazuw] STETTIN
Feb 45 DRESDEN King Leopold of the Belgians
WUERZBURG Leiters of all Kripo Stellen, called together by PANZINGER
POMMERN * HIMMLER
FELDKIRCH BURCKHARDT Discussed exchange of French, Belgian and other nationals in German concentration camps for German civilians interned in France. Arranged the release of [General Charles] de GAULLE’s daughter.
BERLIN RIBBENTROP
Feb –Apr 45 Various conferences with NEUBACHER, HOETTL, WANECK and
GOETTSCH, occurred before the FELDKIRCH meeting with BURCKHARDT
BERLIN O/Gruf FRANK
HOHENLYCHEN HIMMLER and O/Gruf [sic, Gruf] GEBHARDT
PFAUENINSEL nr SCHELLENBERG and Danish (?) Minister
POTSDAM
RUDOLSTEIN Conference concerning the discussions with John Foster DULLES; present were O/Gruf [Karl] WOLFF & Gruf HARSTER, both of BdS Italy [sic, WOLFF was HöSSPF Italien, with Harster- the BdS- under his command], SCHELLENERG, STEIMLE, and PAEFFGEN
STARGARD * HIMMLER
Unknown Gen [Reinhard] GEHLEN; Staatsekr NAGEL; O/Fuehrer MUEHLMANN; Gen VLASOW; and SEYSS-INQUART
In mid April 1945, K was given authority by HIMMLER to act in his behalf. K was to coordinate his actions with the
Gauleiters and the HSSPF in Austria in stemming the disorganized retreat before the advancing Russian armies. S
believes that K decided at this time to establish an independent Austria. About 16 Apr 45, K returned to BERLIN for
the last time to attend several conferences at the Reichskanzlei. K remained three days, but before he left, HIMMLER
gave him a wider power of authority in writing.
DATE PLACE PERSONS CONFERRED WITH
Apr 45
10-15 LINZ/Donau K called a meeting to discuss the problem. Personalities present were: BdS
Hungary KNOCHEN [?]; O/Gruf WINKELMANN, HSSPF Niederdonau [sic]; O/Fuehrer PIFFRADER; O/Stubaf SPANN, KdS LINZ; Standf ZIEREIS, OC Concentration Camp MAUTHAUSEN; Staf GAHRMANN, OC SD-Abschnitt LINZ; O/Fuehrer PLACKHOLM, Polizei Praesdient LINZ; WANECK; SKORZENY and two unnamed majors, OC Orpo LINZ and OC Gendarmerie LINZ
WALSEE (?) WINKELMANN and EIGRUBER
SALZBURG Conference in office of O/Stubaf Dr HUEBER with BERLIN RSHA people.
Gauleiter SCHEEL, Gen GLAISE[-]HORSTENAU…
INNSBRUCK Dr BACHMANN of the Red Cross concerning topics discussed with BURCKHARDT Feb 45 [Gauleiters] SCHEEL and HOFER
ALT-AUSSEE Countess WESTARP; WANECK, HOETTL and GOETTSCH (K received a
telegram at this time to report to HIMMLER in BERLIN)
16 BERLIN HIMMLER. Also attended conferences at Reichskanzlei
19 K left BERLIN for LINZ via DRESDEN-PRAGUE
20 LINZ O/Fuehrer PIFFRADER, KdS LINZ
KREMSMUENSTER WANECK
21 ALT-AUSSEE WANECK and GOETTSCH
STROBL unknown
22 SALZBURG SCHEEL and O/Fuehrer MUEHLMANN
23 BERCHTESGADEN Meeting at Berghof concerning GOERING affair
24 SALZBURG RODE
25-26 ALT-AUSSEE unknown
Late in Apr, K received a telegram from HIMMLER: ‘You have been given missions by BORMANN. What are they?”
27 ENNS Discussed supply problems with Gen[eraloberst Dr. Lothar] RENDULIC
28 EFERDING (?) WINKELMANN and GESCHKE, in farm house. Telephone conversation with
nr LINZ EIGRUBER
ATTERSEE MUEHLMANN
May 1 ALT AUSSEE NEUBACHER arrived
2 Gruf HAYLER arrived: Left same day for KOENIGSSEE with NEUBACHER
2 KOENIGSSEE Gen WINTER, NEUBACHER, HAYLER and MUEHLMANN to discuss new
Austrian government (?)
3 STROBL Visited Gauleiter RAINER; Also conference with Gen GLAISE-] HORSTENAU,
NEUBACHER, MUEHLMANN, WANECK, HOETTL, Possibly SKORZENY
4 ALT-AUSSEE Until arrest [on 12.05.1945]”
(Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records: Scheidler, Arthur; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238)
* The following are xcerpts from an Interrogation Report on Kaltenbrunner’s close friend Dr. Ing. Hermann Neubacher (born 24.06.1893 in Wels / Oberösterreich, died 01.07.1960 in Wien) by 1st Lieutenant George Wenzel (United States Forces European Theater – Military Intelligence Service Center, dated 29.01.1946):
“Neubacher’s associations with Kaltenbrunner were on a personal basis. Both men came from Upper Austria and shared the same political outlook. Neubacher was interested in Kaltenbrunner’s political activities, but did not concern himself with the latter’s functions as chief of the RSHA…
While he made no attempt to interfere with Kaltenbrunner’s handling of matters of purely intelligence interest, he admits having influenced the RSHA chief in questions of politics.
[…]
Kaltenbrunner’s unexpected appointment as Heydrich’s successor was in strict accordance with Himmler’s slogan, ‘Nie mehr ein Heydrich!’ (‘Never again a Heydrich!’). Neubacher believes that aside from this general background, the following causes were decisive in determining Kaltenbrunner’s appointment:
(a) Kaltenbrunner had been on poor terms with Heydrich and had opposed Bormann and his Party clique. Himmler wished to prevent at all costs a revival of an alliance between Bormann and the chief of the RSHA. Bormann was Himmler’s only rival while Hitler was Fuehrer, and the only man to contest Himmler’s aspirations to succeed Hitler.
(b) Kaltenrunner had neither lofty ambitions nor desire for power. Himmler therefore had no fear that the old Heydrich machine would be used in the same manner by Kaltenbrunner. In Himmler’s opinion, the offices which had been under Heydrich required a drastic reorganization. With Kaltenbrunner as the head of the RSHA, Himmler could carry out these plans at will. As a matter of fact, Himmler’s orders by-passed Kaltenbrunner more than once. As a result, Kaltenbrunner was never really master of his huge office. It was common knowledge that [Heinrich] Mueller, for instance, received his orders directly from Himmler and ruled his Gestapo men without much interference from Kaltenbrunner. It seemed to Neubacher that Schellenberg also did as he pleased, except in dealings with Waneck’s VI-E.
(c) Kaltenbrunner was considered a loyal and fair co-worker. Himmler, then, was certain to be safe from foul play. Kaltenbrunner never complained about the awkwardness of his position, and he seemed to dislike speaking to Neubacher about internal RSHA problems. He did, however, mention many times that he had resolved to retire from his post as soon as the war was over. Neubacher believes that Kaltenbrunner was none too fond of his chief and that there were undoubtedly misunderstandings between them. However, Kaltenbrunner never criticized Himmler openly.
(d) According to Neubacher, Kaltenbrunner had little interest in the Gestapo. Himmler was convinced that Kaltenbrunner would never attempt to rule the Gestapo in the Heydrich manner. Mueller was in the habit of contacting Himmler directly, and this was in absolute conformity with the latter’s intentions. Kaltenbrunner showed little skill or interest in his job as HSSPF of Wien. At that time he offered his services to Neubacher. He asked to be taken along to the Caucasus when Neubacher was supposed to become the ‘special envoy for oil’ in that district.
(e) Because he came from Upper Austria, Kaltenbrunner was rather liked by Hitler. However, in view of the afore-mentioned factors, this did not constitute any potential threat to Himmler.
Kaltenbrunner’s rather humiliating position in the RSHA may have been one of the causes for his growing interest in foreign affairs. This, coupled with his ever stronger Austrian leanings, resulted in his one-sided interest in Waneck’s section of the RSHA. It seems that Waneck’s office was the only one in which the chief of the RSHA was in reality the ruler.
For a long time Himmler did not interfere with either of Kaltenbrunner’s hobbies: Austria and foreign affairs. Later, however, Himmler ordered Kaltenbrunner to rid himself of all his Swiss connections. Neubacher knows nothing of those connections…
(7) Amt VI
Late in Autumn 1943 Kaltenbrunner offered Neubacher the services of Amt VI in obtaining information on SE Europe. Such an alliance would have been very much against Ribbentrop’s wishes, but Neubacher decided to disregard his chief’s personal wishes and the order which forbade any agency of the Auswaertige Amt to contact any other organization without previously obtaining permission. He knew very well that Kaltenbrunner and his men also were interested in keeping such an association secret. Acceptance of Kaltenbrunner’s offer was prompted by two considerations.
(a) Under the rules of the Auswaertige Amt Neubacher was not supposed to collect information concerning countries outside his sphere of interest.
(b) Through contact with the appropriate offices of RSHA he could influence intelligence reports to highest headquarters insofar as they concerned his own sphere of operations and could thereby indirectly guide RSHA policies in such a way that they did not counteract his own.
… The further [Neubacher] drifted away from Ribbentrop’s favor, the closer he became allied with Kaltenbrunner, who placed all his services at Neubacher’s disposal. The RSHA chief even authorized him to give orders to men of Amt VI whenever their activities overlapped with those of the Plenipotentiary for SE Europe. Neubacher succeeded in having Gruf Meyssner [ SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei August Edler von Meyszner], HSSPF Serbia.., who did not cooperate in his pro-Serbian policy, removed and replaced by the more cooperative Gruf [Hermann] Behrends…
[…]
Neubacher met Kaltenbrunner for the first time in connection with the so-called ‘Action Rheinthaler’ [in 1934]. This was the time after the failure of… Habicht’s putsch which had threatened an imminent breakdown of the Nazi Party in Austria. This crisis called for a change of Party policy and consequently now men who were willing to compromise were sought. Neubacher does not remember what Kaltenbrunner’s exact functions were during that period. At any rate Kaltenbrunner was always present at the office of the ‘Aktion Rheinthaller’, Radetzky Str, 3rd District, Wien.
Their relations became more intimate after the Anschluss when Kaltenbrunner, then a power in the Party supported Neubacher, then Mayor of Wien, in his struggle with Gauleiter Buerckel. Both Neubacher and Kaltenbrunner held Buerckel responsible for the revival of Austrian separatism, this time within the Party. This aim was in sharp contrast to the supposed aspirations of Buerckel’s mission of amalgamation (Wiedervereinigung).
Neubacher regards Kaltenbrunner as a typical, sturdy, kind-hearted Austrian who had no flair for what Neubacher terms ‘police work’. He was interested in politics with the usual Austrian leaning toward the traditional Austrian sphere of interest in SE Europe. In this respect Neubacher and Kaltenbrunner concurred. Both of them came from Upper Austria, according to Neubacher the most ‘Austrian-conscious’ part of the nation. Although they envisaged an Austria within a greater Germany, both considered themselves to be ardent Austrian patriots. Consequently they had a traditional hatred for ‘Prussian, (i.e. N German) overbearing arrogance.’ They agreed on the principle that no Prussian or any N German was fit to deal with Balkan questions because of the difference in their mentalities and the N German’s lack of understanding for the peoples concerned… Although Neubacher does not say so, it seems apparent that Neubacher did not consider Kaltenbrunner a very clever politician, but rather a man who relied mostly on Neubacher’s political ideas and suggestions…”
[…]
Kaltenbrunner’s Intended Contacts with the Allies
Neubacher thinks that Kaltenbrunner’s intentions to win over the Western Allies for a common fight against the USSR existed as early as 1943. It is possible that Kaltenbrunner’s Swiss contacts originated because of these intentions. Later these contacts also had to serve other purposes (‘saving of Austria’) but were discontinued by order of Himmler… Neubacher gathered from his talks with Kaltenbrunner that the latter hoped to use Schellenberg for the purpose of strengthening the contacts in Switzerland. He understood that Kaltenbrunner put out some feelers in Sweden. He remembers only that there were hints and even a faint hope that an indirect contact with US presidential candidate [Thomas] Dewey might be effected. He knows no further details.
Neubacher thinks that Kaltenbrunner regarded him as the most suitable man to establish better Allied-German relations for the purpose of a common fight against the USSR. Kaltenbrunner based his belief on Neubacher’s good relations with pro-Western Allies groups in the Balkans. Neubacher had already established some contact with the British and Americans in the Balkans even though it was poor and indirect. There were no tangible results...
Neubacher remembers one instance of Kaltenbrunner’s endeavors to get in touch with the Western Allies. The Polish count, Potocki who was on his way to Switzerland together with his mother had been approached by Kaltenbrunner in March or April 1945. Potocki came from Lancut and may be the brother of the former Polish Ambassador in Washington. (It is possible that he, himself, was the ambassador, but this is considered improbable.) Kaltenbrunner discussed with him the necessity of persuading the Western Allies that there was a danger of a sovietization of W Europe and spoke of its consequences and possible remedies. Neubacher met Potocki and Kaltenbrunner in the Oesterreichischer Hof in Salzburg but he does not remember many details. He does recall that he told Potocki to contact immediately the British ambassador in Bern, who was known to Neubacher as a convinced anti-Communist.
(c) ‘Save Austria’ Activities
Neubacher decided to start convincing Kaltenbrunner of Germany’s inevitable fate as soon as the results of the Yalta conference became known. At first he was afraid of speaking too freely to Kaltenbrunner since the latter was still under Hitler’s influence and still believed that Hitler’s career would parallel that of Frederick the Great and end in eventual triumph. However, Kaltenbrunner’s realistic outlook, common sense, and affection for Austria made the task of convincing him rather easy, Neubacher states. He agreed with Neubacher that everything should be done to save Austria from utter destruction, and moreover from sovietization. Since Himmler had appointed Kaltenbrunner Ueber Reichsverteidigungs Kommissar for Austria, it was much easier to executed the plans upon which he and Neubacher agreed.
... Neubacher suggested that Kaltenbrunner order Gen Obst Loehr, CG of Heeresgruppe E, to move with his army from Croatia to Carinthia and as far into Austria as possible. This was to be done in order to forestall any Communist uprising and in order to surrender to the Western Allies as an ‘Austrian’ army. The army might then be permitted to remain temporarily armed, Neubacher thought, so that it could keep ‘order’ in the country under Western Allied rule.
Neubacher suggested to Kaltenbrunner that Volkssturm members of Austrian origin be recalled to Austrian territory. He further suggested that any policy which might exist for demolitions within Austrian territory should be abandoned. In other words, all necessary steps were to be taken to prevent interior subversive elements from utilizing the transition phase to their own advantage. Neubacher held also that neither the Volkssturm nor Loehr’s units should under any circumstances oppose any occupation armies, not even the Russians. Kaltenbrunner entirely agreed with Neubacher and as far as Neubacher knows issued the appropriate orders. However, Neubacher heard that Loehr had been captured by Tito. (Later he apparently reached Austria and was arrested near Ludwigsburg). Neubacher regards Loehr as one of the most efficient and able German generals of Austrian origin. Loehr had succeeded von Weichs in the ‘Suedslavischer Restraum’. When Neubacher met Loehr for the last time Salonika, Summer 1944, the latter was sufficiently sobered to regard the situation as hopeless.
Some time after Easter (Neubacher thinks it was appr[oximately] 15 Apr 45) Kaltenbrunner summoned Neubacher to attend a meeting at Feursteinstr 16 in Gmunden. Present at the meeting in addition to Kaltenbrunner were Waneck, Goltsch, [ SS-Oberführer Dr. Kajetan] Muehlmann, and an Austrian who was unknown to Neubacher…
Contrary to Kaltenbrunner’s wish, Neubacher at first refrained from speaking frankly of the general and particularly the Austrian situation because of the presence of the strange Austrian. However, he did so as soon as Kaltenbrunner assured him of the stranger’s trustworthiness. This was the first time that Neubacher told a larger gathering of his opinion on the imminent downfall of the 3rd Reich. The meeting settled no conclusive issues or any issues worth mentioning. As Neubacher stresses, it should be kept in mind that a certain uneasiness prevailed over all minds at that time. The non-stop bombings and the rapid course of developments rendered any sober and mature workings of the mind impossible. Neubacher claims that this is the reason why he is unable to remember exact dates and facts of that period.
A second meeting took place some days later… in Alt-Aussee. Kaltenbrunner, Neubacher, Waneck, Goltsch, Muehlmann and perhaps the aforementioned unknown Austrian were present. Again much was said and no conclusive settlement of issues was achieved…”
[…]
(e) Kaltenbrunner-Ribbentrop-Himmler Relations
Kaltenbrunner was far more interested in foreign politics than in his RSHA position. He realized Ribbentrop’s unfitness for the post of Foreign Minister and the resulting inefficiency of the Foreign Office, and the ineptitude of German foreign policy. Kaltenbrunner had a flair for foreign politics and was in permanent opposition to Ribbentrop.
Kaltenbrunner had some definite political ideas although they were mainly influenced by Neubacher, the latter states… [He] regarded Kaltenbrunner as the malefactor of the 3rd Reich, and Neubacher thinks that Kaltenbrunner did all in his power to unsaddle Ribbentrop.” (Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records: Neubacher, Hermann; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238)
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The Curtain Falls: Last Days of the Third Reich (translated by Eric Lewenhaupt). Alfred A. Knopf, 1945.
Black, Peter R.:
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The Red Cross and the Holocaust. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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The Order of the Death’s Head. Martin Secker & Warburg, 1969.
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The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg. Harper & Brothers, 1956.
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After an intensive hunt for Kaltenbrunner, U.S. Army CIC officer Robert Eliot Matteson traced his location to the Wildensee Hütte in the Toten Gebirge, arresting him and his companions on 12.05.1945. Interned in Wiesbaden, then at the Central Continental Prisoner of War Enclosure No. 32 (known as “Ashcan”) at the Palace Hotel at Mondorf-les-Bains, Luxembourg, 00.05.1945-00.07.1945. He was then transferred to Interrogation Center 020 near London, where he underwent 10-weeks of intensive interrogation from July through September. After his arrival in Nürnberg, Kaltenbrunner was formally indicated on 19.10.1945 for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and conspiracy to commit these crimes. In November 1945, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice submitted a request- which was denied- to the International Military Tribunal (IMT), Nürnberg, for Kaltenbrunner's extradition to Austria. On 18.11.1945, three days before the opening of the Nürnberg Trials, he suffered a spontaneous subarachnoid hemorrhage and was hospitalized until 06.12.1945. He then returned to jail and first attended a session of the trial on 10.12.1945, when he entered his plea as follows: “I plead not guilty. I do not believe that I have made myself guilty” After several days, however, his condition worsened and he was again hospitalized. Kaltenbrunner spent the entire month of January in bed, but finally reappeared in court in February 1946. Throughout his trial, he denied responsibility for virtually all of the crimes of which he was accused, asserting that he had only visited a concentration camp (Mauthausen) on one occasion; that he had never seen a gas chamber; that he had never issued an order for the deportation of Jews; that his signature on numerous incriminating documents was forged; and that he had no real power or influence. All of the blame, he asserted, rested with Heinrich Himmler, Heinrich Müller, and his predecessor at the RSHA, Reinhard Heydrich. As noted above, despite the existence of orders for “Schutzhaft” (protective custody)- which resulted in the transfer of specific individuals to concentration camps- bearing his signature, he claimed to have never sent a single person to a camp. He stated: “I do not feel guilty of any war crimes. I have only done my duty as an intelligence organ and I refuse to serve as an Ersatz [substitute] for Himmler.” However, the evidence against him was vast.
Convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity, he was sentenced to death by hanging on 01.10.1946. The judgment of the International Military Tribunal against Kaltenbrunner, and his final statement to the court, read as follows:
“Kaltenbrunner is indicted under Counts One, Three and Four. He joined the Austrian Nazi Party and the SS in 1932. In 1935 he became leader of the SS in Austria. After the Anschluss he was appointed Austrian State Secretary for Security and when this position was abolished in 1941 he was made Higher SS and Police Leader. On 30th January, 1943, he was appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD and Head of the Reich Security Head Office (RSHA), a position which had been held by Heydrich until his assassination in June, 1942. He held the rank of Obergruppenführer in the SS.
Crimes against Peace
As leader of the SS in Austria Kaltenbrunner was active in the Nazi intrigue against the Schuschnigg Government. On the night of 11th March, 1938, after Goering had ordered Austrian National Socialists to seize control of the Austrian Government, 500 Austrian SS men under Kaltenbrunner's command surrounded the Federal Chancellery and a special detachment under the command of his adjutant entered the Federal Chancellery while Seyss-Inquart was negotiating with President Miklas. But there is no evidence connecting Kaltenbrunner with plans to wage aggressive war on any other front. The Anschluss, although it was an aggressive act, is not charged as an aggressive war, and the evidence against Kaltenbrunner under Count One does not in the opinion of the Tribunal show his direct participation in any plan to wage such a war.
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
When he became Chief of the Security Police and SD and Head of the RSHA on 30th January, 1943, Kaltenbrunner took charge of an organization which included the main offices of the Gestapo, the SD and the Criminal Police. As Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner had authority to order protective custody to and release from concentration camps. Orders to this effect were normally sent over his signature. Kaltenbrunner was aware of conditions in concentration camps. He had undoubtedly visited Mauthausen and witnesses testified that he had seen prisoners killed by the various methods of execution, hanging, shooting in the back of the neck and gassing, as part of a demonstration. Kaltenbrunner himself ordered the execution of prisoners in those camps and his office was used to transmit to the camps execution orders which originated in Himmler's office. At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner participated in the arrangements for the evacuation of inmates of concentration camps, and the liquidation of many of them, to prevent them from being liberated by the Allied armies.
During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was Head of the RSHA, it was engaged in a widespread programme of war crimes and crimes against humanity. These crimes included the mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war. Einsatz Kommandos operating under the control of the Gestapo were engaged in the screening of Soviet prisoners of war. Jews, commissars, and others who were thought to be ideologically hostile to the Nazi system were reported to the RSHA, which had them transferred to a concentration camp and murdered. An RSHA order issued during Kaltenbrunner's regime established the " Bullet Decree," under which certain escaped prisoners of war who were recaptured were taken to Mauthausen and shot. The order for the execution of commando troops was extended by the Gestapo to include parachutists while Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the RHSA. An order signed by Kaltenbrunner instructed the Police not to interfere with attacks on bailed out Allied fliers. In December, 1944, Kaltenbrunner participated in the murder of one of the French Generals held as a prisoner of war.
During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was Head of the RHSA, the Gestapo and SD in occupied territories
continued the murder and ill-treatment of the population, using methods which included the torture and confinement in concentration camps, usually under orders to which Kaltenbrunner's name was signed.
The Gestapo was responsible for enforcing a rigid labour discipline on the slave labourers and Kaltenbrunner
established a series of labour reformatory camps for this purpose. When the SS embarked on a slave labour programme of its own, the Gestapo was used to obtain the needed workers by sending labourers to concentration camps.
The RSHA played a leading part in the " final solution " of the Jewish question by the extermination of the Jews. A special section under the Amt IV of the RSHA was established to supervise this programme. Under its direction approximately six million Jews were murdered, of which two million were killed by Einsatzgruppen and other units of the Security Police. Kaltenbrunner had been informed of the activities of these Einsatzgruppen when he was a Higher SS and Police Leader, and they continued to function after he had become Chief of the RSHA.
The murder of approximately four million Jews in concentration camps has heretofore been described. This part of the programme was also under the supervision of the RSHA when Kaltenbrunner was head of that organisation, and special missions of the RSHA scoured the occupied territories and the various Axis satellites arranging for the deportation of Jews to these extermination institutions. Kaltenbrunner was informed of these activities. A letter which he wrote on 30th June, 1944, described the shipment to Vienna of 12,000 Jews for that purpose, and directed that all who could not work would have to be kept in readiness for " special action," which meant murder. Kaltenbrunner denied his signature to this letter, as he did on a very large number of orders on which his name was stamped or typed, and, in a few instances, written. It is inconceivable that in matters of such importance his signature could have appeared so many times without his authority.
Kaltenbrunner has claimed that when he took office as Chief of the Security Police and SD and as Head of the RSHA he did so pursuant to an understanding with Himmler under which he was to confine his activities to matters involving foreign intelligence, and not to assume overall control over the activities of the RSHA. He claims that the criminal programme had been started before his assumption of office; that he seldom knew what was going on; and that when he was informed he did what he could to stop them. It is true that he showed a special interest in matters involving foreign intelligence. But he exercised control over the activities of the RSHA; was aware of the crimes it was committing and was an active participant in many of them.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Kaltenbrunner is not guilty on Count One. He is guilty under Counts Three and Four." (Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the German Major War Criminals, Nuremberg, 30th September and 1st October, 1946)
Decorations & Awards:
15.11.1944 Ritterkreuz des Kriegsverdienstkreuzes mit Schwertern as SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei and Chef of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, based on the following recommendation from Reichsführer-SS Himmler:
“SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei Dr. K a l t e n b r u n n e r was, until 30. January 1943, Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer in Wien, and was appointed on this date as Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in succession to SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei Heydrich. He thereby took over a difficult and complicated apparatus, which he found at this time to be disorganized [from the standpoint of] combat effectiveness. Since then, SS-Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner has worked to unite the three basic divisions [of the RSHA]: The Geheime
Staatspolizei, Kriminalpolizei, and Sicherheitsdienst. With the transformation of the former Amt Abwehr/Ausland in the OKW as the ‘Militarisches Amt’, he expanded his jurisdiction into the sector of the military secret intelligence service. Countering often insurmountable difficulties he has experienced, he has succeeded in implementing the Führerbefehl [Führer order] to merge the military and political intelligence services. By assuming command, as Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, of the Zollgrenzschutz [border customs protection service], he has taken responsibility for the security of Germany’s borders.” (award recommendation in his SS file)
22.10.1943 Deutsches Kreuz in Silber as SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei and Chef of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, based on the following recommendation, dated 03.10.1943, from Reichsführer-SS Himmler:
“SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei Dr. K a l t e n b r u n n e r has been Chef of the Sicherheitspolizei since succeeding the fallen SS-Obergruppenführer H e y d r i c h on 30. January 1943. He has directed, with the best results, the intelligence apparatus of the Security Services, and combated the ideological and nationalist sabotage and partisan groups throughout Europe.
He showed exceptional merit after the subversion in Italy of 25. July 1943 and the [resulting] arrest of the Duce. The reporting provided by the intelligence apparatus in Italy, which he built up, proved to be correct in every form. Without his work and leadership, the liberation of the Duce would not have been possible.
I request, in recognition of his service, that he be awarded the German Cross in Silver.” (award recommendation in his SS file)
30.01.1943 Kriegsverdienstkreuz I. Klasse mit Schwertern
11.03.1942 Kriegsverdienstkreuz II. Klasse mit Schwertern
ca. 1939 Spange "Prager Burg" zur Medaille zur Erinnerung an den 1. Oktober 1938
ca. 1939 Medaille zur Erinnerung an den 1. Oktober 1938
ca. 1938 Medaille zur Erinnerung an den 13. März 1938
30.01.1939 Goldenes Ehrenzeichen der NSDAP
31.05.1942 Blutorden der NSDAP (Nr. 4017)
00.00.194_ Dienstauszeichnung der NSDAP in Silber
00.00.194_ Dienstauszeichnung der NSDAP in Bronze
30.01.1943 Ehrenring der Stadt Wien
00.00.193_ Ehrendolch der SS
[01.12.1938] Ehrendegen des Reichsführers-SS
[01.12.1938] Totenkopfring der SS
00.00.193_ SS-Zivilabzeichen (Nr. 160 180)
16.12.1935 Julleuchter der SS
00.02.1934 Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer
Notes:
* Parents:
- Dr. jur. Hugo Kaltenbrunner (an attorney, born 22.08.1875 in Grieskirchen, died 00.00.1938; he was himself the son of the attorney Dr. Karl Kaltenbrunner and his wife Maria Josefa Augustin).
- Theresia Elisabeth, née Utwardy (born 07.11.1875 in Eferding / Oberösterreich, died 00.03.1943 in Linz), daughter of Ferdinand Josef Udwardy and his wife Barbara Listner (from Böhmen).
* Brothers:
- Dr. jur. Werner Kaltenbrunner (born 26.07.1905 in Ried, still living as of 25.03.1977). He became an attorney in Vöcklabruck and was also an SS member (SS-Nr. 487 762 (V), holding the rank of SS-Untersturmführer with the SS-Hauptamt.
- Dr. jur. Roland Kaltenbrunner (born 02.01.1910 in Raab) rose to become Secretary of Commerce for Gau Oberdonau of the NSDAP in Linz, as well as an SS-Obersturmführer with the Hauptamt SS-Gericht (SS-Nr. 309 461; Commissioned SS-Untersturmführer on 09.11.1938).
* Religion: Catholic; left church with his wife, and they subsequently declared themselves “gottgläubig”.
* Married on 14.01.1934 to Elisabeth ("Lisl") Eder (born 20.10.1908 in Linz; NSDAP-Nr. 301 490; Member of the NS-Frauenschaft), daughter of a grocery store owner. With his wife he fathered one son (born 28.02.1935) and two daughters (born 25.07.1937 and ca. 1944). In 1943, he became acquainted with his eventual mistress Gisela Gräfin von Westarp (born 27.06.1920 in Wittenberg an der Elbe, Died 02.06.1983 in Munchen), who was then working in Himmler’s Berlin headquarters. A widow, she had been married on 16.11.1940 to Paul Wolf (born 25.02.1912 in Etterbeek, Belgium; died 07.04.1943 as an Oberfähnrich in Tunis). With his mistress, he had a son (Wolfgang) and a daughter (Ursula), twins, born on 12.03.1945. In his postwar recollections of the capture of Kaltenbrunner, “The Last Days of Ernst Kaltenbrunner”, former U.S. Army officer Robert Eliot Matteson writes of von Westarp (whom he met and interrogated in Alt Aussee on 09.05.1945): “On March 12, 1945, she bore [the] twins…, in a cowshed in Alt Aussee. I still have a letter she wrote to her mother describing the event, declaring that she ‘almost deserved the Mother Cross,’ and pointing out that Mrs. Kaltenbrunner had taken twelve years to produce only three children. One of the twins' godfathers, Gisela told me proudly, was Hitler's personal physician, Dr. Karl Brandt.” All of Kaltenbrunner’s children survived the war.
* Foreign language proficiency: English.
* His face was badly scarred as the result of an auto accident.
* Film & television portrayals: Edward Underdown (“The Two-Headed Spy”, 1958 British film); Branko Plesa (“Nirberski epilog”, 1971 Yugoslav television production; Alain Nobis (“La Tragédie de Vérone”, 1972 French television production; Mikhail Zharkovsy (“Semnadtsat mgnoveniy vesny”, 1973 Russian television miniseries; Hans Meyer (“Holocaust”, U.S. TV miniseries; John Moffatt (“Private Schulz”, 1981 British TV series; Hans Meyer (“Inside the Third Reich”, 1982 U.S. TV production; Christopher Heyerdahl (“Nuremberg”, 2000 US/Canadian TV production).
* The following is excerpted from the Final Interrogation Report (dated 11.07.1945 and conducted at Headquarters US Forces European Theater Interrogation Center) of former SS-Obersturmbannführer Arthur Scheidler, Kaltenbrunner’s administrative aide from 1943-1945:
“SCHEIDLER claims that his purely administrative position gave him only a sketchy knowledge of KALTENBRUNNER’s confidential affairs, but that he is familiar with K’s personal life as well as his official and private contacts. He never participated in conferences but learned of confidential matters from dinner-table conversations and occasional remarks by K[altenbrunner] and his guests. SCHEIDLER’s long association with RSHA makes him familiar with the names of many persons prominent in the organization….
c. KALTENBRUNNER’s Private Life
S[cheidler] describes K as a retiring individual who does not readily make friends, hesitant about confiding in people and reluctant to express his innermost thoughts. He was often criticized by HIMMLER for being too easy-going.
S recalls a letter from HIMMLER in 1943 telling K to forget his Austrian softness and to be more firm in his decisions.
K spent most of his time in BERLIN, where he attended few social gatherings. He saw his family for a day or two in STROBL during his frequent trips to Austria. Occasionallly he spent an evening at the home of an editor named ANDERMANN in BERLIN, or with H/Stuf JOEBSTL, a medical officer with a Waffen SS unit n[ea]r ORANIENBURG. His closest friends were in VIENNA, among them Dr NEUBACHER whome he saw frequently either in VIENNA or BERLIN; others were WALDSHOC, owner of the Stadtkrug Wirtshaus; Frau NEUBACHER, a cousin of Dr NEUBACHER; and Frau SCHULTZ. His mistress was a 24-year-old countess, Gisela von WESTARP, whom he had known for about a year and a half. She left for ALT AUSSEE in Jan 45 and gave birth to twins there in March.
According to S, K had no personal fortune and owned no real estate. When he came to BERLIN in 1943 his debts amounted to RM 12,000; when he last left the city he had a bank balance of RM 17,000.
d. KALTENBRUNNER’s Routine as Chief of RSHA
After Jan or Feb 45, K’s living quarters and officers were located at Am Kleinen Wannsee 16, BERLIN-WANNSEE and he seldom used his apartment at Giesebrechtstr 12, BERLIN-CHARLOTTENBURG. His working day started at 1030 hrs. Lunch with his department heads was a daily institution and was usually followed by conferences with individuals. K invariably went to the Reichs Kanzlei at 1600 hrs, often staying there until late into the night.
(1) Daily Conferences.
Lunch time discussions centered on personnel and appointments. OHLENDORF usually reported on civilian morale, the extent and effect of bombing and evacuation problems. There was frequent criticism of the Party and its personalities, especially of BORMANN….
(3) Meetings at the Reichs Kanzlei.
[After Dec 44] K attended the two military situation conferences held at the Reichs Kanzlei daily at 1600 and 2300 hrs. Among those usually present were KEITEL, MODEL, DOENITZ, GOERING, KOLLER, HIMMLER, and FEGELEIN. K frequently conferred with Brigf RATTENHUBER of the RS, Gruf BAUER of the Luftwaffe [sic! BAUR, Hitler’s personal pilor], [Julius] SCHAUB; [Walter] HEWEL, the liason officer from the Foreign Office to the Reichs Kanzlei; and with SUNDERMANN, Chief of Staff of the Reich Press Chief….
f. KALTENBRUNNER’s Relations with HIMMLER and BORMANN
K reported to HIMMLER at the Reichs Kanzlei or occasionally at the Fuehrer Haupt Quartier in RASTENBURG every two weeks after Dec 44. O/Stubaf Dr MALZ, who was familiar with the subjects to be discussed, accompanied K in place of S.
K disliked BORMANN intensely. When the Gestapo once arrested a certain Kreis Leiter VILLECHNER, BORMANN was angered to the point of trying to persuade HITLER to have the Sipo dissolved. Nothing came of this attempt, but K and BORMANN were on bad terms with one another for months afterward….
h. Foreign Personalities
K seems to have taken a personal interest in prominent foreigners interened in Germany. He went to see King LEOPOLD of the Belgians, but S does not know the purpose of this trip. K visited CIANO in Sep 43 and saw Francois PONCET late the same year, probably on the subject of the latter’s children….
i. The Austrian Project
‘Herzog’ was the code name used for K’s Austrian Independent Government project. S first heard of it in Mar 45, and thinks it received added impetus in April with the Allies’ failure to recognize the Russian-sponsored VIENNA government. The following persons were to take part in the government: KALTENBRUNNER, Dr NEUBACHER, [Edmund] GLAISE-HORSTENAU, [Franz] HAYLER, and [Oberfuhrer Dr. Kajetan] MUEHLMANN. [RSHA officers] [Wilhelm] WANECK, [Werner] GOETTSCH, and [Wilhelm] HOETTL were also active in promoting the project… S heard that a friend of GOETTSCH (DOPLER or WESTEN), a 33d-degree Mason, was to go to the United States to negotiate with President ROOSEVELT. He believes that HITLER and HIMMLER were ignorant of K’s efforts. K once implied that HIMMLER and SCHELLENBERG had their own channels to the Allies, perhaps meaning Count BERNADOTTE of the Swedish Red Cross.
The following is “ANNEX NO. I – KALTENBRUNNER’s Conferences”, from the above report:
“Before MID APRIL 45 SCHEIDLER remembers the following trips or conferences attended by KALTENBRUNNER. IN many instances listed below, he is uncertain as to dates and place names. An asterisk indicates that the confences was held on HIMMLER’s special train [Sonderzug “Heinrich”].
DATE PLACE PERSONS CONFERRED WITH
1943 PARIS [Fernand] de BRINON
Summer 44 unknown Gauleiters RAINER and UIBERREITHER
PRAGUE O/Gruf Karl [Hermann] FRANK
DRESDEN King LEOPOLD of the Belgians
Jul 44 unknown Several conferences with Gen R[E]INECKE of OKW (member of the
Volksgerichtshof)
BIESENTHAL nr BERLIN Gen [Alfred] WUENNENBERG, Chief of Orpo
20 Jul 44 RASTENBURG K flew to HIMMLER to discuss the 20 July affair
Aug 44 BERLIN Two confences with Gen/Feldm KEITEL
Sep 44 VIENNA and LINZ [Baldur] Von SCHIRACH and NEUBACHER
Local Sipo agencies.
VIENNA Attended dinner with Minister of Slovakia. [SA-]O/Gruf [Hanns Elard] LUDIN, HSSPF for Hungary WINKELMANN, BdS O/Fuehrer [Oberführer] GESCHKE, HUBER, WANECK, O/Gruf QUERNER, Dr HOETTL. Also spoke with von SCHIRACH
Sep-Dec 44 BERLIN O/Gruf BERGER; [Reichsminister Walter] FUNK; Gauleiter
FORSTER; Gruf [Prof. Dr. Karl] GEBHARDT; GOEBBELS; Gruf HAYLER, twice; O/Gruf [Maximilian von] HERFF, Chef personal Amt SS; Staats Rat Gruf [Hans] HINKEL; O/Gruf JUETTNER, twice; Robert LEY; Reichsbischof MUELLER; NEUBACHER several times; O/Gruf [Hans Adolf PRUETZ]MANN, once or twice; Gruf [Rudolf] QUERNER; von RIBBENTROP; SEYSS-INQUART; Staats Sekr STEENGRACHT, once or twice; O/Gruf WINKELMANN; O/Gruf WOYRSCH, formerly HSSPF DRESDEN. O/Gruf OBERG
HAMELN HIMMLER
INNSBRUCK Gauleiter [Franz] HOFER
KARINHALL GOERING
KLAGENFURT Attended marriage of Gruf GLOBOCZNICK [sic, GLOBOCNIK]
SALZBURG GOERING
SALZBURG and STROBL BODOTZKI, HOETTL, WANECK and [Gauleiter and O/Gruf Dr. Gustav Adolf] SCHEEL
STETTIN Gauleiter SCHWEDE-COBURG and O/Gruf [Emil] MATZOW [sic, MAZUW], HSSPF STETTIN
VIENNA NEUBACHER
VIENNA HIMMLER
WESTERN FRONT HIMMLER
WUERTTEMBERG HIMMLER
(10 Nov 44) BERLIN RSHA party
Dec 44 VIENNA (6 or 7 day trip)
BRATISLAVA von SCHIRACH, SCHIMANA, WANECK, HOETTL and NEUNTEUFFEL [HSSPF O/Gruf Hermann] HOEFLE, O/Gruf LUDIN, KdS [Dr. Josef] WITISKA, WINKELMANN
OEDENBURG/HUNGARY WANECK, HOETTL, WINKELMANN
Hungary BdS O/Fuehrer GESCHKE
ESTERHAZY Castle/
Hungary Gen WOEHLER, CG of an Army Gp [sic, OB 8.Armee]
Jan 45
SALZBURG SCHEEL (?)
LINZ Gauleiter [August] EIGRUBER
STETTIN The Gauleiter [Franz Schwede] and HSSPF [Emil Mazuw] STETTIN
Feb 45 DRESDEN King Leopold of the Belgians
WUERZBURG Leiters of all Kripo Stellen, called together by PANZINGER
POMMERN * HIMMLER
FELDKIRCH BURCKHARDT Discussed exchange of French, Belgian and other nationals in German concentration camps for German civilians interned in France. Arranged the release of [General Charles] de GAULLE’s daughter.
BERLIN RIBBENTROP
Feb –Apr 45 Various conferences with NEUBACHER, HOETTL, WANECK and
GOETTSCH, occurred before the FELDKIRCH meeting with BURCKHARDT
BERLIN O/Gruf FRANK
HOHENLYCHEN HIMMLER and O/Gruf [sic, Gruf] GEBHARDT
PFAUENINSEL nr SCHELLENBERG and Danish (?) Minister
POTSDAM
RUDOLSTEIN Conference concerning the discussions with John Foster DULLES; present were O/Gruf [Karl] WOLFF & Gruf HARSTER, both of BdS Italy [sic, WOLFF was HöSSPF Italien, with Harster- the BdS- under his command], SCHELLENERG, STEIMLE, and PAEFFGEN
STARGARD * HIMMLER
Unknown Gen [Reinhard] GEHLEN; Staatsekr NAGEL; O/Fuehrer MUEHLMANN; Gen VLASOW; and SEYSS-INQUART
In mid April 1945, K was given authority by HIMMLER to act in his behalf. K was to coordinate his actions with the
Gauleiters and the HSSPF in Austria in stemming the disorganized retreat before the advancing Russian armies. S
believes that K decided at this time to establish an independent Austria. About 16 Apr 45, K returned to BERLIN for
the last time to attend several conferences at the Reichskanzlei. K remained three days, but before he left, HIMMLER
gave him a wider power of authority in writing.
DATE PLACE PERSONS CONFERRED WITH
Apr 45
10-15 LINZ/Donau K called a meeting to discuss the problem. Personalities present were: BdS
Hungary KNOCHEN [?]; O/Gruf WINKELMANN, HSSPF Niederdonau [sic]; O/Fuehrer PIFFRADER; O/Stubaf SPANN, KdS LINZ; Standf ZIEREIS, OC Concentration Camp MAUTHAUSEN; Staf GAHRMANN, OC SD-Abschnitt LINZ; O/Fuehrer PLACKHOLM, Polizei Praesdient LINZ; WANECK; SKORZENY and two unnamed majors, OC Orpo LINZ and OC Gendarmerie LINZ
WALSEE (?) WINKELMANN and EIGRUBER
SALZBURG Conference in office of O/Stubaf Dr HUEBER with BERLIN RSHA people.
Gauleiter SCHEEL, Gen GLAISE[-]HORSTENAU…
INNSBRUCK Dr BACHMANN of the Red Cross concerning topics discussed with BURCKHARDT Feb 45 [Gauleiters] SCHEEL and HOFER
ALT-AUSSEE Countess WESTARP; WANECK, HOETTL and GOETTSCH (K received a
telegram at this time to report to HIMMLER in BERLIN)
16 BERLIN HIMMLER. Also attended conferences at Reichskanzlei
19 K left BERLIN for LINZ via DRESDEN-PRAGUE
20 LINZ O/Fuehrer PIFFRADER, KdS LINZ
KREMSMUENSTER WANECK
21 ALT-AUSSEE WANECK and GOETTSCH
STROBL unknown
22 SALZBURG SCHEEL and O/Fuehrer MUEHLMANN
23 BERCHTESGADEN Meeting at Berghof concerning GOERING affair
24 SALZBURG RODE
25-26 ALT-AUSSEE unknown
Late in Apr, K received a telegram from HIMMLER: ‘You have been given missions by BORMANN. What are they?”
27 ENNS Discussed supply problems with Gen[eraloberst Dr. Lothar] RENDULIC
28 EFERDING (?) WINKELMANN and GESCHKE, in farm house. Telephone conversation with
nr LINZ EIGRUBER
ATTERSEE MUEHLMANN
May 1 ALT AUSSEE NEUBACHER arrived
2 Gruf HAYLER arrived: Left same day for KOENIGSSEE with NEUBACHER
2 KOENIGSSEE Gen WINTER, NEUBACHER, HAYLER and MUEHLMANN to discuss new
Austrian government (?)
3 STROBL Visited Gauleiter RAINER; Also conference with Gen GLAISE-] HORSTENAU,
NEUBACHER, MUEHLMANN, WANECK, HOETTL, Possibly SKORZENY
4 ALT-AUSSEE Until arrest [on 12.05.1945]”
(Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records: Scheidler, Arthur; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238)
* The following are xcerpts from an Interrogation Report on Kaltenbrunner’s close friend Dr. Ing. Hermann Neubacher (born 24.06.1893 in Wels / Oberösterreich, died 01.07.1960 in Wien) by 1st Lieutenant George Wenzel (United States Forces European Theater – Military Intelligence Service Center, dated 29.01.1946):
“Neubacher’s associations with Kaltenbrunner were on a personal basis. Both men came from Upper Austria and shared the same political outlook. Neubacher was interested in Kaltenbrunner’s political activities, but did not concern himself with the latter’s functions as chief of the RSHA…
While he made no attempt to interfere with Kaltenbrunner’s handling of matters of purely intelligence interest, he admits having influenced the RSHA chief in questions of politics.
[…]
Kaltenbrunner’s unexpected appointment as Heydrich’s successor was in strict accordance with Himmler’s slogan, ‘Nie mehr ein Heydrich!’ (‘Never again a Heydrich!’). Neubacher believes that aside from this general background, the following causes were decisive in determining Kaltenbrunner’s appointment:
(a) Kaltenbrunner had been on poor terms with Heydrich and had opposed Bormann and his Party clique. Himmler wished to prevent at all costs a revival of an alliance between Bormann and the chief of the RSHA. Bormann was Himmler’s only rival while Hitler was Fuehrer, and the only man to contest Himmler’s aspirations to succeed Hitler.
(b) Kaltenrunner had neither lofty ambitions nor desire for power. Himmler therefore had no fear that the old Heydrich machine would be used in the same manner by Kaltenbrunner. In Himmler’s opinion, the offices which had been under Heydrich required a drastic reorganization. With Kaltenbrunner as the head of the RSHA, Himmler could carry out these plans at will. As a matter of fact, Himmler’s orders by-passed Kaltenbrunner more than once. As a result, Kaltenbrunner was never really master of his huge office. It was common knowledge that [Heinrich] Mueller, for instance, received his orders directly from Himmler and ruled his Gestapo men without much interference from Kaltenbrunner. It seemed to Neubacher that Schellenberg also did as he pleased, except in dealings with Waneck’s VI-E.
(c) Kaltenbrunner was considered a loyal and fair co-worker. Himmler, then, was certain to be safe from foul play. Kaltenbrunner never complained about the awkwardness of his position, and he seemed to dislike speaking to Neubacher about internal RSHA problems. He did, however, mention many times that he had resolved to retire from his post as soon as the war was over. Neubacher believes that Kaltenbrunner was none too fond of his chief and that there were undoubtedly misunderstandings between them. However, Kaltenbrunner never criticized Himmler openly.
(d) According to Neubacher, Kaltenbrunner had little interest in the Gestapo. Himmler was convinced that Kaltenbrunner would never attempt to rule the Gestapo in the Heydrich manner. Mueller was in the habit of contacting Himmler directly, and this was in absolute conformity with the latter’s intentions. Kaltenbrunner showed little skill or interest in his job as HSSPF of Wien. At that time he offered his services to Neubacher. He asked to be taken along to the Caucasus when Neubacher was supposed to become the ‘special envoy for oil’ in that district.
(e) Because he came from Upper Austria, Kaltenbrunner was rather liked by Hitler. However, in view of the afore-mentioned factors, this did not constitute any potential threat to Himmler.
Kaltenbrunner’s rather humiliating position in the RSHA may have been one of the causes for his growing interest in foreign affairs. This, coupled with his ever stronger Austrian leanings, resulted in his one-sided interest in Waneck’s section of the RSHA. It seems that Waneck’s office was the only one in which the chief of the RSHA was in reality the ruler.
For a long time Himmler did not interfere with either of Kaltenbrunner’s hobbies: Austria and foreign affairs. Later, however, Himmler ordered Kaltenbrunner to rid himself of all his Swiss connections. Neubacher knows nothing of those connections…
(7) Amt VI
Late in Autumn 1943 Kaltenbrunner offered Neubacher the services of Amt VI in obtaining information on SE Europe. Such an alliance would have been very much against Ribbentrop’s wishes, but Neubacher decided to disregard his chief’s personal wishes and the order which forbade any agency of the Auswaertige Amt to contact any other organization without previously obtaining permission. He knew very well that Kaltenbrunner and his men also were interested in keeping such an association secret. Acceptance of Kaltenbrunner’s offer was prompted by two considerations.
(a) Under the rules of the Auswaertige Amt Neubacher was not supposed to collect information concerning countries outside his sphere of interest.
(b) Through contact with the appropriate offices of RSHA he could influence intelligence reports to highest headquarters insofar as they concerned his own sphere of operations and could thereby indirectly guide RSHA policies in such a way that they did not counteract his own.
… The further [Neubacher] drifted away from Ribbentrop’s favor, the closer he became allied with Kaltenbrunner, who placed all his services at Neubacher’s disposal. The RSHA chief even authorized him to give orders to men of Amt VI whenever their activities overlapped with those of the Plenipotentiary for SE Europe. Neubacher succeeded in having Gruf Meyssner [ SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei August Edler von Meyszner], HSSPF Serbia.., who did not cooperate in his pro-Serbian policy, removed and replaced by the more cooperative Gruf [Hermann] Behrends…
[…]
Neubacher met Kaltenbrunner for the first time in connection with the so-called ‘Action Rheinthaler’ [in 1934]. This was the time after the failure of… Habicht’s putsch which had threatened an imminent breakdown of the Nazi Party in Austria. This crisis called for a change of Party policy and consequently now men who were willing to compromise were sought. Neubacher does not remember what Kaltenbrunner’s exact functions were during that period. At any rate Kaltenbrunner was always present at the office of the ‘Aktion Rheinthaller’, Radetzky Str, 3rd District, Wien.
Their relations became more intimate after the Anschluss when Kaltenbrunner, then a power in the Party supported Neubacher, then Mayor of Wien, in his struggle with Gauleiter Buerckel. Both Neubacher and Kaltenbrunner held Buerckel responsible for the revival of Austrian separatism, this time within the Party. This aim was in sharp contrast to the supposed aspirations of Buerckel’s mission of amalgamation (Wiedervereinigung).
Neubacher regards Kaltenbrunner as a typical, sturdy, kind-hearted Austrian who had no flair for what Neubacher terms ‘police work’. He was interested in politics with the usual Austrian leaning toward the traditional Austrian sphere of interest in SE Europe. In this respect Neubacher and Kaltenbrunner concurred. Both of them came from Upper Austria, according to Neubacher the most ‘Austrian-conscious’ part of the nation. Although they envisaged an Austria within a greater Germany, both considered themselves to be ardent Austrian patriots. Consequently they had a traditional hatred for ‘Prussian, (i.e. N German) overbearing arrogance.’ They agreed on the principle that no Prussian or any N German was fit to deal with Balkan questions because of the difference in their mentalities and the N German’s lack of understanding for the peoples concerned… Although Neubacher does not say so, it seems apparent that Neubacher did not consider Kaltenbrunner a very clever politician, but rather a man who relied mostly on Neubacher’s political ideas and suggestions…”
[…]
Kaltenbrunner’s Intended Contacts with the Allies
Neubacher thinks that Kaltenbrunner’s intentions to win over the Western Allies for a common fight against the USSR existed as early as 1943. It is possible that Kaltenbrunner’s Swiss contacts originated because of these intentions. Later these contacts also had to serve other purposes (‘saving of Austria’) but were discontinued by order of Himmler… Neubacher gathered from his talks with Kaltenbrunner that the latter hoped to use Schellenberg for the purpose of strengthening the contacts in Switzerland. He understood that Kaltenbrunner put out some feelers in Sweden. He remembers only that there were hints and even a faint hope that an indirect contact with US presidential candidate [Thomas] Dewey might be effected. He knows no further details.
Neubacher thinks that Kaltenbrunner regarded him as the most suitable man to establish better Allied-German relations for the purpose of a common fight against the USSR. Kaltenbrunner based his belief on Neubacher’s good relations with pro-Western Allies groups in the Balkans. Neubacher had already established some contact with the British and Americans in the Balkans even though it was poor and indirect. There were no tangible results...
Neubacher remembers one instance of Kaltenbrunner’s endeavors to get in touch with the Western Allies. The Polish count, Potocki who was on his way to Switzerland together with his mother had been approached by Kaltenbrunner in March or April 1945. Potocki came from Lancut and may be the brother of the former Polish Ambassador in Washington. (It is possible that he, himself, was the ambassador, but this is considered improbable.) Kaltenbrunner discussed with him the necessity of persuading the Western Allies that there was a danger of a sovietization of W Europe and spoke of its consequences and possible remedies. Neubacher met Potocki and Kaltenbrunner in the Oesterreichischer Hof in Salzburg but he does not remember many details. He does recall that he told Potocki to contact immediately the British ambassador in Bern, who was known to Neubacher as a convinced anti-Communist.
(c) ‘Save Austria’ Activities
Neubacher decided to start convincing Kaltenbrunner of Germany’s inevitable fate as soon as the results of the Yalta conference became known. At first he was afraid of speaking too freely to Kaltenbrunner since the latter was still under Hitler’s influence and still believed that Hitler’s career would parallel that of Frederick the Great and end in eventual triumph. However, Kaltenbrunner’s realistic outlook, common sense, and affection for Austria made the task of convincing him rather easy, Neubacher states. He agreed with Neubacher that everything should be done to save Austria from utter destruction, and moreover from sovietization. Since Himmler had appointed Kaltenbrunner Ueber Reichsverteidigungs Kommissar for Austria, it was much easier to executed the plans upon which he and Neubacher agreed.
... Neubacher suggested that Kaltenbrunner order Gen Obst Loehr, CG of Heeresgruppe E, to move with his army from Croatia to Carinthia and as far into Austria as possible. This was to be done in order to forestall any Communist uprising and in order to surrender to the Western Allies as an ‘Austrian’ army. The army might then be permitted to remain temporarily armed, Neubacher thought, so that it could keep ‘order’ in the country under Western Allied rule.
Neubacher suggested to Kaltenbrunner that Volkssturm members of Austrian origin be recalled to Austrian territory. He further suggested that any policy which might exist for demolitions within Austrian territory should be abandoned. In other words, all necessary steps were to be taken to prevent interior subversive elements from utilizing the transition phase to their own advantage. Neubacher held also that neither the Volkssturm nor Loehr’s units should under any circumstances oppose any occupation armies, not even the Russians. Kaltenbrunner entirely agreed with Neubacher and as far as Neubacher knows issued the appropriate orders. However, Neubacher heard that Loehr had been captured by Tito. (Later he apparently reached Austria and was arrested near Ludwigsburg). Neubacher regards Loehr as one of the most efficient and able German generals of Austrian origin. Loehr had succeeded von Weichs in the ‘Suedslavischer Restraum’. When Neubacher met Loehr for the last time Salonika, Summer 1944, the latter was sufficiently sobered to regard the situation as hopeless.
Some time after Easter (Neubacher thinks it was appr[oximately] 15 Apr 45) Kaltenbrunner summoned Neubacher to attend a meeting at Feursteinstr 16 in Gmunden. Present at the meeting in addition to Kaltenbrunner were Waneck, Goltsch, [ SS-Oberführer Dr. Kajetan] Muehlmann, and an Austrian who was unknown to Neubacher…
Contrary to Kaltenbrunner’s wish, Neubacher at first refrained from speaking frankly of the general and particularly the Austrian situation because of the presence of the strange Austrian. However, he did so as soon as Kaltenbrunner assured him of the stranger’s trustworthiness. This was the first time that Neubacher told a larger gathering of his opinion on the imminent downfall of the 3rd Reich. The meeting settled no conclusive issues or any issues worth mentioning. As Neubacher stresses, it should be kept in mind that a certain uneasiness prevailed over all minds at that time. The non-stop bombings and the rapid course of developments rendered any sober and mature workings of the mind impossible. Neubacher claims that this is the reason why he is unable to remember exact dates and facts of that period.
A second meeting took place some days later… in Alt-Aussee. Kaltenbrunner, Neubacher, Waneck, Goltsch, Muehlmann and perhaps the aforementioned unknown Austrian were present. Again much was said and no conclusive settlement of issues was achieved…”
[…]
(e) Kaltenbrunner-Ribbentrop-Himmler Relations
Kaltenbrunner was far more interested in foreign politics than in his RSHA position. He realized Ribbentrop’s unfitness for the post of Foreign Minister and the resulting inefficiency of the Foreign Office, and the ineptitude of German foreign policy. Kaltenbrunner had a flair for foreign politics and was in permanent opposition to Ribbentrop.
Kaltenbrunner had some definite political ideas although they were mainly influenced by Neubacher, the latter states… [He] regarded Kaltenbrunner as the malefactor of the 3rd Reich, and Neubacher thinks that Kaltenbrunner did all in his power to unsaddle Ribbentrop.” (Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records: Neubacher, Hermann; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238)
Sources:
Bernadotte, Count Folke:
The Curtain Falls: Last Days of the Third Reich (translated by Eric Lewenhaupt). Alfred A. Knopf, 1945.
Black, Peter R.:
- Ernst Kaltenbrunner: Ideological Soldier of the Third Reich. Princeton University Press, 1984.
- “Ernst Kaltenbrunner and the Final Solution,” Chapter 8 of Randolph L. Braham, Contemporary Views of the Holocaust. Springer, 1983.
Favez, Jean-Claude:
The Red Cross and the Holocaust. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Hilberg, Raul:
The Destruction of the European Jews (Revised and Definitive Edition). Holmes & Meier, 1985.
Höhne, Heinz:
The Order of the Death’s Head. Martin Secker & Warburg, 1969.
Houston, Wendell Robert:
“Ernst Kaltenbrunner: A Study of an Austrian SS and Police Leader” Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, 1972.
Katz, Robert:
Fatal Silence. The Pope, the Resistance and the German Occupation of Rome. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003.
Mattheson, Robert Eliot:
“The Last Days of Ernst Kaltenbrunner” (Approved for release – CIA Historical Review Program 1993)
Moseley, Ray:
Mussolini: The Last 600 Days of Il Duce. Taylor Trade Publications, 2004.
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland:
- SS-Personalakte of Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Microfilm document collection A3343SS.
- Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuernberg, 1945-1947/OCCPAC Interrogation Transcripts And Related Records; Publication Number M1270, Record Group RG238; Records of Kaltenbrunner, Ernst; Neubacher, Hermann; Ohlendorf, Otto; Scheidler, Arthur; Skorzeny, Otto; Wisliceny, Dieter; and Wolff, Karl).
Nix, Philip:
Biographical Notes from the archives of Mr. Nix, Birmingham, England.
Schellenberg, Walter:
The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg. Harper & Brothers, 1956.
Schulz, Andreas & Zinke, Dr. Dieter:
Die Generale der Waffen-SS und der Polizei 1933-1945, Band 2 (Hachtel-Kutschera). Biblio-Verlag, 2005.
SS-Personalkanzlei and SS-Personalhauptamt:
Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, Stand vom 1. Oktober 1934.
Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, Stand vom 1. Juli 1935.
Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, Stand vom 1. Dezember 1936.
Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, Stand vom 1. Dezember 1937.
Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, Stand vom 1. Dezember 1938.
Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, Stand vom 30. Januar 1942.
Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, Stand vom 20. April 1942.
Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, Stand vom 9. November 1944.
Steiner, John Michael:
Power Politics and Social Change in National Socialist Germany: A Process of Escalation into Mass Destruction. Walter de Gruyter, 1976.
Yerger, Mark C.:
- Allgemeine-SS: The Commands, Units, and Leaders of the General SS. Schiffer Military History, 1997.
- German Cross in Silver Holders of the SS and Police. R. J. Bender Publishing, 2002.
- Attachments
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Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Thank you Michael. Big fan of your work. Waiting for my copy of vol 2 to get in mail actually! Loved vol 1 and happy to finally get the second.
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Michael Miller
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Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Thank you for the kind words.
Much of that copy and paste fluff from National Archives records was removed before the final draft, and I probably had to correct some things in the main text. It's from an early version of the manuscript.
It's mostly reliable, though, I think.
~ Mike
Much of that copy and paste fluff from National Archives records was removed before the final draft, and I probably had to correct some things in the main text. It's from an early version of the manuscript.
It's mostly reliable, though, I think.
~ Mike
Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
.Notes:
* Parents:
- Dr. jur. Hugo Kaltenbrunner (an attorney, born 22.08.1875 in Grieskirchen, died 00.00.1938; he was himself the son of the attorney Dr. Karl Kaltenbrunner and his wife Maria Josefa Augustin).
- Theresia Elisabeth, née Utwardy (born 07.11.1875 in Eferding / Oberösterreich, died 00.03.1943 in Linz), daughter of Ferdinand Josef Udwardy and his wife Barbara Listner (from Böhmen).
for those interested:
Sohn des Rechtsanwalts Dr. jur. Hugo Kaltenbrunner (geb. 22.08.1875 in Grieskirchen. Gest.05.09.1938 Linz) und seiner Ehefrau Theresia Elisabeth geb. Utwardy (geb. 07.11.1875 Eferding. Gest. 22.03.1943 in Linz);
HM.
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Michael Miller
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Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Thanks for the information, HM. Much appreciated.
Best wishes,
~ Mike
Best wishes,
~ Mike
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Halfdan S.
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Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Nice pic, MikeMichael Miller wrote: ↑07 Jan 2016, 16:5928 April Sent Fegelein’s adjutant Mueller to Hitler with report about Austrian situation.
Wonder who this adjudant Mueller would be? Thought that Fegelein's Adjudant was Hannes Göhler?! Did Müller come into Berlin?
Best
Halfdan S.
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VanillaNuns
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Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Has anyone read the book by Arthur Birago "K for Kaltenbrunner" which was finally released last month in English?
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/B098G94YDY/
Any thoughts would be appreciated.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/B098G94YDY/
Any thoughts would be appreciated.
Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Thanks for bringing this to our attention. It sounds interesting based upon discovered letter he wrote to his children. Might be worth checking out as it’s not too expensive. I doubt it will supplant Peter Black’s scholarly effort but will perhaps provide a more entertaining narrative.I’ll probably order a copy.
PS - Since writing above, I was able to preview some of it and it seems like it’s written in the style of a novel. I’ll get it out of curiosity but I suspect it’s not going to say anything other than “Nazi =Evil”
Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
After tracing down the author, his blog, and reading some posts I’ll pass on this book. It’s basically a novel based on historical “facts” with threads from other accounts like Burton C. Andrus
and John Dolibois , Gilbert, and others. I don’t particularly like this style of writing about historical subjects . This type of book is written for mass consumption. I also think it suffers from a hasty and poor translator. I’ll just stick with Black’s book as a Kaltenbrunner biography.
and John Dolibois , Gilbert, and others. I don’t particularly like this style of writing about historical subjects . This type of book is written for mass consumption. I also think it suffers from a hasty and poor translator. I’ll just stick with Black’s book as a Kaltenbrunner biography.
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Halfdan S.
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- Location: Copenhagen
Adjudant Müller
PushHalfdan S. wrote: ↑19 Nov 2020, 22:57Wonder who this adjudant Mueller would be? Thought that Fegelein's Adjudant was Hannes Göhler?! Did Müller come into Berlin?Michael Miller wrote: ↑07 Jan 2016, 16:5928 April Sent Fegelein’s adjutant Mueller to Hitler with report about Austrian situation.
Best
Halfdan S.
Re: Ernst Kaltenbrunner book
Dissertation on Kaltenbrunner . More source material on the RSHA chief:
https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/ ... sAllowed=y
https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/ ... sAllowed=y