Romania and the Vienna Award (continuation)

[Cezarprimo]

I fail to see why The Vienna Award was a necesity, with this award, Germany brought herself only trouble. It was not satisfactory to the romanians and it was not satisfactory to the hungarians.

Germany, instead of ending up with a certain ally, as it would have been if it would have given whole Transylvania to the hungarians all allow the romanians to further keep it, ended up with two uncertain allies that were displeased with Germany (thus ready to abandon hers' side when they would have seen fit) and hated each other, thus uncapable to efficiently conduct military operations side by side.

Germany had an interes in controlling romanian oil, this could have been done by giving Hungary Transylvania and military occupying Romania (in which case it should have consider some time for reconstructing the refineries and the need of leaving some occupation troops in Romania, and also a possible implication of the russians in the whole story, following the polish example) or they could have guaranteed Romanias' borders after the Ribbentrop-Molotov treaty, under the condition that german troops are allowed into the country (for Brabarossa) and eventually Romania contributes to the war against SU, a condition that the romanians would have more than welcomed, as the SU had already occupied Bessarabia.

In the first case Germany wold have get Hungarys' gratitude and Hungary as a sure ally, but, it would have had to pospone a large scale military operation against SU, as the romanian refineries should have first be reconstructed and in top of this, Romania should have been military occupied.
In the second case, Germany would have get Romanias' gratitude and Romania as a sure ally, and it could have started operation against SU as soon as german troops could have been massed along the SU border, without having to use extra troops to occupy Romania.
In both cases Germany would have controlled the romanian oil.

Thus, in my opinion at least, The Vienna Award, was an unnecessary complication of the situation. Germany should have choosen to support Romania, as, I belive, it would have been the best choice (for Germany).

In the light of what I've just wrote, I look forward to oppinions to why did Germany go along with The Vienna Award.

Regards

[Maresal-06]

Hello everyone! Salut camarazilor Români!

I will answer your questions on this Bulgaro-Sovieto-Hungarian "alliance" if we can call it like this; it was more a coalition. There are very few sources on this topic, because it was a conspiracy against Romania, and even nowadays such plans are kept secret. This information can be found in the archives of the "Siguranta" and the "Securitate". But for the Romanian reader, I can propose an excellent book: Ordinea Interna si Apararea Romaniei in anii 1939-1941 by Stan Stangaciu, Octavian Burciu, Ovidiu Miron and Adrian Balan - Memorii - Arhive - Marturii. Contributia Jandarmeriei romane la apararea institutiilor de stat. Editura ALL, 1999.

For the probability of a Soviet invasion, I have an extract from the book:

Anexa nr. 40
Raport informativ nr. 4405 din 24 ianuarie 1941
al Sectiei a 2-a din M.St.M.

La inceputul lunii ianuarie 1941 au venit in zona Cernauti alte trupe sovietice, in locul celor plecate in Galitia. Si acestea au fost dirijate tot spre Galitia. De la 12 ianuarie sosesc alte trupe la Cernauti din acre parte merg spre Storojinet. In zona Cernauti s-ar gasi 5-600 care de lupta (iar pe aeroport 50-60 avioane).

La 21 ianuarie (during the legionnary coup d'etat) s-au deplasat de la Cernauti la Storojinet: 1 R I pe schiuri, 2-3 Esc. Cv., 2 Bt. grele hipo, 1 Dn A camp, 30 mitraliere cu tragere lunga.

La Cernauti s-a depozitat munitii, alimente echipament.

De circa 10 zile a inceput o foarte intensa propaganda contra noastra: SE SPUNE CA IN ROMANIA ESTE REVOLUTIE DIN CAUZA PREZENTEI TRUPELOR GERMANE SI CA ARMATA SOVIETICA ESTE DATOARE A OCUPA ROMANIA PENTRU A PROTEJA MUNCITORII.(!!!)

Se observa o ENERVARE la sovietici din cauza prezentei trupelor germane in Romania. Soselele din Bucovina de Nord au fost dezapezite si facute practicabile pentru autovehicule.

Din diversele discursuri ale agitatorilor sovietici SE DEDUCE CA RUSII STIAU CU O SAPTAMANA INAINTE DESPRE MISCAREA DE LA 21 IANUARIE 1941 DE LA NOI.* S-au facut unele deplasari de trupe din Galitia in Bucovina. Continua evacuarea populatiei civile de la frontiera.
(Arh. M.Ap.N., fond 948, dosar 1066, f. 91)

*The legionnary coup d'etat was a Soviet creation in order to create disorder and anarchy, to favorize an entry without resistance of the Red Army in Romania. And all this was happening during the German-Soviet "friendship"!!! Kaput!


And what said the "Romanian" communists during this time? This extract is before January 1941.

Anexa nr. 46
1940 septembrie. Fragment de manifest comunist prin care se indeamna
la lupta pentru un guvern "popular", amnistie, demoralizare totala si imediata.

Proletari din toate tarile, uniti-va!
Muncitori din fabrici si de pe ogoare, varstnici si tineri, soldati! Femei de concentrati! Cetateni, tovarasi!

Lovitura gardista n-a reusit inca sa instaleze un guvern stabil. O parte din armata refuza ascultarea lui Antonescu. O duzina de generali au fost dati afara. Garda de Fier cauta sa acapareze in graba toate posturile de conducere, in special in armata si politie. De ce? Pentru ca simte propria ei slabiciune in fata valului de nemultumire populara.[...] SA INDREPTAM MANIA POPORULUI IMPOTRIVA ADEVARATILOR VINOVATI.[...] FORMATI GARZI DE AUTOAPARARE POPULARA CONTRA TEORIEI GARDISTE SI POLITIENESTI[...] FORMATI COMITETE DE SOLDATI CONTRA BATAII SI A VIETII DE CAINE DIN CAZARMI, PENTRU DEMOBILIZAREA IMEDIATA[...]
Iesiti in strada si demonstrati contra dictaturii gardiste, pentru un guvern popular de amicitie cu Uniunea Sovietica contra provocarilor de razboiu, pentru DEMOBILIZAREA TOTALA SI IMEDIATA si pentru amnistierea luptatorilor adevarati ai poporului din inchisori si lagare de concentrare.

Comitetul local al Partidului Comunist din Romania

After reading all this, we can imagine who were the real war provocators and imperialists. This disgusting propaganda, insinuous and perfidious is found only in the communist "paradize". I would say now "Heil Hitler" but I'm not German.

Other interesting quotes from the book (page 109):

"During all the summer of 1940, the leaders of the USSR refused to delimitate officialy the new boundary with Romania (after the occupation of Basarabia and N. Bucovina). Instead, they bringed new forces in Bessarabia and N. Bucovina. They concluded some secret agreements with Bulgaria, for the annexion of Dobrogea and they encouraged the Hungarian pretentions over Transylvania, in August. The frontier skirmishes and incidents multiplied, like the troop movements and the provocations onm Romania"[...]

"Hungarian terrorist organizations were found at Sighet, Valea lui Mihai, Andrid, Oradea, etc... And also, members of the "Rongyos Garda" organization, with faked passports were arrested."

"Bulgarian 'Comitange' organizations were found; terrorists like Marin Arnondof and Nicola Petrof were attacking with some other dobrogean and macedonian groups, the Romanian population of the 'Cadrilater'(Southern Dobrogea)[...]

As we can see, Romania was the pray of very great terrotorial disputes, and the Reich was not able to destroy Hungary, Bulgaria or the Reds. They were all allies. The Vienna award was solved in peace, with sacrifices fir sure, but all was just temporary. The treacherous Romanian government, at the Turnu Severin discuusions proposed to cede 14,000 sq. km. The Hungarian delegation was claiming 69,000 sq. km. Hitler did the following operation: (14,000+69,000)/2= Vienna Award... You can do it too, it will give youn aproximately the chunk of Transylvania given to Hungary. It's unfortunately like this when you don't have an army, and a serious government... You must always seek for "peace"... AND YOU SUFFER!

[Victor]

Cezarprimo, it's been a while since I have seen you posting around here. Great to have you back!

I agree with you that the Diktate wasn't in Germany's favor. In fact it wasn't in anyone's favor. It would have been better for Germany (IMHO) if it would have guaranteed the Romanian status-quo after the occupation of Bessarabia. They could have pressed the government for extended rights for the Hungarian minority, even autonomy, in order to keep Hungary happier.

Maresal-06, you failed to convince me that there was a "coalition" between the 3 states. I need solid proof for such a statement.

[Maresal-06]

Victor, for a Romanian, you are very weard, in attitude...

"They could have pressed the government for extended rights for the Hungarian minority, even autonomy, in order to keep Hungary happier. "
-> You are talking about autonomy, but I want to remind you that Romania was NEVER a federation, and will never be. Giving extended rights to a minority, in Romania's case, would be madness. Don't forget that when you give a finger to someone, this person takes you the hand. We are in 1940, and not in 2002. It's a major war, were the ideas of PATRIOTISM, NATIONALISM, and LOVE OF COUNTRY are victorious. The Magyar government, or the Bulgarian government would be crazy to leave these disputed territories just with "rights". If we think about your idea, we understand that Romania should never have entered WWI, for our national territories, but insteed, should have remained neutral and conclude some garbage treaties with Austro-Hungary too make the Magyar yoke on Romanians sweater!!!!!!!!!!!!!! That would be your idea?! Think a little while!
If the "glorious" USSR wanted absolutely to liberate our Bessarabia, why didn't the Romanian government give extended rights to the Ukrainian and Russian citizens? If the Romanian government would have done so, do you thonk that Stalin would be "more happier"?!

Think a little bit!!! This kind of pressure CANNOT be solved by little rights and liberties; this is WAR! Germany disliked the Romanian government, and also, wasn't able to help Romania in case of an armed conflict with the "good" neighbours (Germany had nearly all his forces in the West, fighting against France). So all this was done diplomatically, with satisfying the much as possible all camps, but also, to protect German interests in Romania.

Mait, you are absolutely right...


Exposing Stalin's Plan to Conquer Europe
How the Soviet Union 'Lost' the Second World War


Poslednyaya Respublika ("The Last Republic"), by Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun). Moscow: TKO ACT, 1996. 470 pages. Hardcover. Photographs.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reviewed by Daniel W. Michaels

For several years now, a former Soviet military intelligence officer named Vladimir Rezun has provoked heated discussion in Russia for his startling view that Hitler attacked Soviet Russia in June 1941 just as Stalin was preparing to overwhelm Germany and western Europe as part of a well-planned operation to "liberate" all of Europe by bringing it under Communist rule.

Writing under the pen name of Viktor Suvorov, Rezun has developed this thesis in three books. Icebreaker (which has been published in an English-language edition) and Dni M ("M Day") were reviewed in the Nov.-Dec. 1997 Journal. The third book, reviewed here, is a 470-page work, "The Last Republic: Why the Soviet Union Lost the Second World War," published in Russian in Moscow in 1996.

Suvorov presents a mass of evidence to show that when Hitler launched his "Operation Barbarossa" attack against Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941, German forces were able to inflict enormous losses against the Soviets precisely because the Red troops were much better prepared for war -- but for an aggressive war that was scheduled for early July -- not the defensive war forced on them by Hitler's preemptive strike.

In Icebreaker, Suvorov details the deployment of Soviet forces in June 1941, describing just how Stalin amassed vast numbers of troops and stores of weapons along the European frontier, not to defend the Soviet homeland but in preparation for a westward attack and decisive battles on enemy territory.

Thus, when German forces struck, the bulk of Red ground and air forces were concentrated along the Soviet western borders facing contiguous European countries, especially the German Reich and Romania, in final readiness for an assault on Europe.

In his second book on the origins of the war, "M Day" (for "Mobilization Day"), Suvorov details how, between late 1939 and the summer of 1941, Stalin methodically and systematically built up the best armed, most powerful military force in the world -- actually the world's first superpower -- for his planned conquest of Europe. Suvorov explains how Stalin's drastic conversion of the country's economy for war actually made war inevitable. [Image: By mid-June 1941, enormous Red Army forces were concentrated on the western Soviet border, poised for a devastating attack against Europe. This diagram appeared in the English-language edition of the German wartime illustrated magazine Signal.]

A Global Soviet Union

In "The Last Republic," Suvorov adds to the evidence presented in his two earlier books to strengthen his argument that Stalin was preparing for an aggressive war, in particular emphasizing the ideological motivation for the Soviet leader's actions. The title refers to the unlucky country that would be incorporated as the "final republic" into the globe-encompassing "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," thereby completing the world proletarian revolution.

As Suvorov explains, this plan was entirely consistent with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, as well as with Lenin's policies in the earlier years of the Soviet regime. The Russian historian argues convincingly that it was not Leon Trotsky (Bronstein), but rather Stalin, his less flamboyant rival, who was really the faithful disciple of Lenin in promoting world Communist revolution. Trotsky insisted on his doctrine of "permanent revolution," whereby the young Soviet state would help foment home-grown workers' uprisings and revolution in the capitalist countries.

Stalin instead wanted the Soviet regime to take advantage of occasional "armistices" in the global struggle to consolidate Red military strength for the right moment when larger and better armed Soviet forces would strike into central and western Europe, adding new Soviet republics as this overwhelming force rolled across the continent. After the successful consolidation and Sovietization of all of Europe, the expanded USSR would be poised to impose Soviet power over the entire globe.

As Suvorov shows, Stalin realized quite well that, given a free choice, the people of the advanced Western countries would never voluntarily choose Communism. It would therefore have to be imposed by force. His bold plan, Stalin further decided, could be realized only through a world war.

A critical piece of evidence in this regard is his speech of August 19, 1939, recently uncovered in Soviet archives (quoted in part in the Nov.-Dec. 1997 Journal, pp. 32-33). In it, Lenin's heir states:

The experience of the last 20 years has shown that in peacetime the Communist movement is never strong enough to seize power. The dictatorship of such a party will only become possible as the result of a major war ...
Later on, all the countries who had accepted protection from resurgent Germany would also become our allies. We shall have a wide field to develop the world revolution.

Furthermore, and as Soviet theoreticians had always insisted, Communism could never peacefully coexist over the long run with other socio-political systems. Accordingly, Communist rule inevitably would have to be imposed throughout the world. So integral was this goal of "world revolution" to the nature and development of the "first workers' state" that it was a cardinal feature of the Soviet agenda even before Hitler and his National Socialist movement came to power in Germany in 1933.
Stalin elected to strike at a time and place of his choosing. To this end, Soviet development of the most advanced offensive weapons systems, primarily tanks, aircraft, and airborne forces, had already begun in the early 1930s. To ensure the success of his bold undertaking, in late 1939 Stalin ordered the build up a powerful war machine that would be superior in quantity and quality to all possible opposing forces. His first secret order for the total military-industrial mobilization of the country was issued in August 1939. A second total mobilization order, this one for military mobilization, would be issued on the day the war was to begin.

Disappointment

The German "Barbarossa" attack shattered Stalin's well-laid plan to "liberate" all of Europe. In this sense, Suvorov contends, Stalin "lost" the Second World War. The Soviet premier could regard "merely" defeating Germany and conquering eastern and central Europe only as a disappointment.

According to Suvorov, Stalin revealed his disappointment over the war's outcome in several ways. First, he had Marshal Georgi Zhukov, not himself, the supreme commander, lead the victory parade in 1945. Second, no official May 9 victory parade was even authorized until after Stalin's death. Third, Stalin never wore any of the medals he was awarded after the end of the Second World War. Fourth, once, in a depressed mood, he expressed to members of his close circle his desire to retire now that the war was over. Fifth, and perhaps most telling, Stalin abandoned work on the long-planned Palace of Soviets.

An Unfinished Monument

The enormous Palace of Soviets, approved by the Soviet government in the early 1930s, was to be 1,250 feet tall, surmounted with a statue of Lenin 300 feet in height -- taller than New York's Empire State Building. It was to be built on the site of the former Cathedral of Christ the Savior. On Stalin's order, this magnificent symbol of old Russia was blown up in 1931 -- an act whereby the nation's Communist rulers symbolically erased the soul of old Russia to make room for the centerpiece of the world USSR.

All the world's "socialist republics," including the "last republic," would ultimately be represented in the Palace. The main hall of this secular shrine was to be inscribed with the oath that Stalin had delivered in quasi-religious cadences at Lenin's burial. It included the words: "When he left us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the responsibility to strengthen and expand the Union of Socialist Republics. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we shall honorably carry out this, your sacred commandment."

However, only the bowl-shaped foundation for this grandiose monument was ever completed, and during the 1990s, after the collapse the USSR, the Christ the Savior Cathedral was painstakingly rebuilt on the site.

The Official View

For decades the official version of the 1941-1945 German-Soviet conflict, supported by establishment historians in both Russia and the West, has been something like this:

Hitler launched a surprise "Blitzkrieg" attack against the woefully unprepared Soviet Union, fooling its leader, the unsuspecting and trusting Stalin. The German Führer was driven by lust for "living space" and natural resources in the primitive East, and by his long-simmering determination to smash "Jewish Communism" once and for all. In this treacherous attack, which was an important part of Hitler's mad drive for "world conquest," the "Nazi" or "fascist" aggressors initially overwhelmed all resistance with their preponderance of modern tanks and aircraft.
This view, which was affirmed by the Allied judges at the postwar Nuremberg Tribunal, is still widely accepted in both Russia and the United States. In Russia today, most of the general public (and not merely those who are nostalgic for the old Soviet regime), accepts this "politically correct" line. For one thing, it "explains" the Soviet Union's enormous World War II losses in men and materiel.
Doomed from the Start

Contrary to the official view that the Soviet Union was not prepared for war in June 1941, in fact, Suvorov stresses, it was the Germans who were not really prepared. Germany's hastily drawn up "Operation Barbarossa" plan, which called for a "Blitzkrieg" victory in four or five months by numerically inferior forces advancing in three broad military thrusts, was doomed from the outset.

Moreover, Suvorov goes on to note, Germany lacked the raw materials (including petroleum) essential in sustaining a drawn out war of such dimensions.

Another reason for Germany's lack of preparedness, Suvorov contends, was that her military leaders seriously under-estimated the performance of Soviet forces in the Winter War against Finland, 1939-40. They fought, it must be stressed, under extremely severe winter conditions -- temperatures of minus 40 degrees Celsius and snow depths of several feet -- against the well-designed reinforced concrete fortifications and underground facilities of Finland's "Mannerheim Line." In spite of that, it is often forgotten, the Red Army did, after all, force the Finns into a humiliating armistice.

It is always a mistake, Suvorov emphasizes, to underestimate your enemy. But Hitler made this critical miscalculation. In 1943, after the tide of war had shifted against Germany, he admitted his mistaken evaluation of Soviet forces two years earlier.

Tank Disparity Compared

To prove that it was Stalin, and not Hitler, who was really prepared for war, Suvorov compares German and Soviet weaponry in mid-1941, especially with respect to the all-important offensive weapons systems -- tanks and airborne forces. It is a generally accepted axiom in military science that attacking forces should have a numerical superiority of three to one over the defenders. Yet, as Suvorov explains, when the Germans struck on the morning of June 22, 1941, they attacked with a total of 3,350 tanks, while the Soviet defenders had a total of 24,000 tanks -- that is, Stalin had seven times more tanks than Hitler, or 21 times more tanks than would have been considered sufficient for an adequate defense. Moreover, Suvorov stresses, the Soviet tanks were superior in all technical respects, including firepower, range, and armor plating.

As it was, Soviet development of heavy tank production had already begun in the early 1930s. For example, as early as 1933 the Soviets were already turning out in series production, and distributing to their forces, the T-35 model, a 45-ton heavy tank with three cannons, six machine guns, and 30-mm armor plating. By contrast, the Germans began development and production of a comparable 45-ton tank only after the war had begun in mid-1941.

By 1939 the Soviets had already added three heavy tank models to their inventory. Moreover, the Soviets designed their tanks with wider tracks, and to operate with diesel engines (which were less flammable than those using conventional carburetor mix fuels). Furthermore, Soviet tanks were built with both the engine and the drive in the rear, thereby improving general efficiency and operator viewing. German tanks had a less efficient arrangement, with the engine in the rear and the drive in the forward area.

When the conflict began in June 1941, Suvorov shows, Germany had no heavy tanks at all, only 309 medium tanks, and just 2,668 light, inferior tanks. For their part, the Soviets at the outbreak of the war had at their disposal tanks that were not only heavier but of higher quality.

In this regard, Suvorov cites the recollection of German tank general Heinz Guderian, who wrote in his memoir Panzer Leader (1952/1996, p. 143):

In the spring of 1941, Hitler had specifically ordered that a Russian military commission be shown over our tank schools and factories; in this order he had insisted that nothing be concealed from them. The Russian officers in question firmly refused to believe that the Panzer IV was in fact our heaviest tank. They said repeatedly that we must be hiding our newest models from them, and complained that we were not carrying out Hitler's order to show them everything. The military commission was so insistent on this point that eventually our manufacturers and Ordnance Office officials concluded: "It seems that the Russians must already possess better and heavier tanks than we do." It was at the end of July 1941 that the T34 tank appeared on the front and the riddle of the new Russian model was solved.
Suvorov cites another revealing fact from Robert Goralski's World War II Almanac (1982, p. 164). On June 24, 1941 -- just two days after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war:
The Russians introduced their giant Klim Voroshilov tanks into action near Raseiniai [Lithuania]. Models weighing 43 and 52 tons surprised the Germans, who found the KVs nearly unstoppable. One of these Russian tanks took 70 direct hits, but none penetrated its armor.
In short, Germany took on the Soviet colossus with tanks that were too light, too few in number, and inferior in performance and fire power. And this disparity continued as the war progressed. In 1942 alone, Soviet factories produced 2,553 heavy tanks, while the Germans produced just 89. Even at the end of the war, the best-quality tank in combat was the Soviet IS ("Iosef Stalin") model.
Suvorov sarcastically urges establishment military historians to study a book on Soviet tanks by Igor P. Shmelev, published in 1993 by, of all things, the Hobby Book Publishing Company in Moscow. The work of an honest amateur military analyst such as Shmelev, one who is sincerely interested in and loves his hobby and the truth, says Suvorov, is often superior to that of a paid government employee.

Airborne Forces Disparity

Even more lopsided was the Soviet superiority in airborne forces. Before the war, Soviet DB-3f and SB bombers as well as the TB-1 and TB-3 bombers (of which Stalin had about a thousand had been modified to carry airborne troops as well as bomb loads. By mid-1941 the Soviet military had trained hundreds of thousands of paratroopers (Suvorov says almost a million) for the planned attack against Germany and the West. These airborne troops were to be deployed and dropped behind enemy lines in several waves, each wave consisting of five airborne assault corps (VDKs), each corps consisting of 10,419 men, staff and service personnel, an artillery division, and a separate tank battalion (50 tanks). Suvorov lists the commanding officers and home bases of the first two waves or ten corps. The second and third wave corps included troops who spoke French and Spanish.

Because the German attack prevented these highly trained troops from being used as originally planned, Stalin converted them to "guards divisions," which he used as reserves and "fire brigades" in emergency situations, much as Hitler often deployed Waffen SS forces.

Maps and Phrase Books

In support of his main thesis, Suvorov cites additional data that were not mentioned in his two earlier works on this subject. First, on the eve of the outbreak of the 1941 war Soviet forces had been provided topographical maps only of frontier and European areas; they were not issued maps to defend Soviet territory or cities, because the war was not to be fought in the homeland. The head of the Military Topographic Service at the time, and therefore responsible for military map distribution, Major General M. K. Kudryavtsev, was not punished or even dismissed for failing to provide maps of the homeland, but went on to enjoy a lengthy and successful military career. Likewise, the chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov, was never held responsible for the debacle of the first months of the war. None of the top military commanders could be held accountable, Suvorov points out, because they had all followed Stalin's orders to the letter.

Second, in early June 1941 the Soviet armed forces began receiving thousands of copies of a Russian-German phrase book, with sections dedicated to such offensive military operations as seizing railroad stations, orienting parachutists, and so forth, and such useful expressions as "Stop transmitting or I'll shoot." This phrase book was produced in great numbers by the military printing houses in both Leningrad and Moscow. However, they never reached the troops on the front lines, and are said to have been destroyed in the opening phase of the war.

Aid from the 'Neutral' United States

As Suvorov notes, the United States had been supplying Soviet Russia with military hardware since the late 1930s. He cites Antony C. Sutton's study, National Suicide (Arlington House, 1973), which reports that in 1938 President Roosevelt entered into a secret agreement with the USSR to exchange military information. For American public consumption, though, Roosevelt announced the imposition of a "moral embargo" on Soviet Russia.

In the months prior to America's formal entry into war (December 1941), Atlantic naval vessels of the ostensibly neutral United States were already at war against German naval forces. (See Mr. Roosevelt's Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942 by Patrick Abbazia [Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975]). And two days after the "Barbarossa" strike, Roosevelt announced US aid to Soviet Russia in its war for survival against the Axis. Thus, at the outbreak of the "Barbarossa" attack, Hitler wrote in a letter to Mussolini: "At this point it makes no difference whether America officially enters the war or not, it is already supporting our enemies in full measure with mass deliveries of war materials."

Similarly, Winston Churchill was doing everything in his power during the months prior to June 1941 -- when British forces were suffering one military defeat after another -- to bring both the United States and the Soviet Union into the war on Britain's side. In truth, the "Big Three" anti-Hitler coalition (Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill) was effectively in place even before Germany attacked Russia, and was a major reason why Hitler felt compelled to strike against Soviet Russia, and to declare war on the United States five months later. (See Hitler's speech of December 11, 1941, published in the Winter 1988-89 Journal, pp. 394-396, 402-412.)

The reasons for Franklin Roosevelt's support for Stalin are difficult to pin down. President Roosevelt himself once explained to William Bullitt, his first ambassador to Soviet Russia: "I think that if I give him [Stalin] everything I possibly can, and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything, and will work with me for a world of peace and democracy." (Cited in: Robert Nisbet, Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship [1989], p. 6.) Perhaps the most accurate (and kindest) explanation for Roosevelt's attitude is a profound ignorance, self-deception or naiveté. In the considered view of George Kennan, historian and former high-ranking US diplomat, in foreign policy Roosevelt was "a very superficial man, ignorant, dilettantish, with a severely limited intellectual horizon."

A Desperate Gamble

Suvorov admits to being fascinated with Stalin, calling him "an animal, a wild, bloody monster, but a genius of all times and peoples." He commanded the greatest military power in the Second World War, the force that more than any other defeated Germany. Especially in the final years of the conflict, he dominated the Allied military alliance. He must have regarded Roosevelt and Churchill contemptuously as useful idiots.

In early 1941 everyone assumed that because Germany was still militarily engaged against Britain in north Africa, in the Mediterranean, and in the Atlantic, Hitler would never permit entanglement in a second front in the East. (Mindful of the disastrous experience of the First World War, he had warned in Mein Kampf of the mortal danger of a two front war.) It was precisely because he was confident that Stalin assumed Hitler would not open a second front, contends Suvorov, that the German leader felt free to launch "Barbarossa." This attack, insists Suvorov, was an enormous and desperate gamble. But threatened by superior Soviet forces poised to overwhelm Germany and Europe, Hitler had little choice but to launch this preventive strike.



Soviet troops hoist the red hammer-and-sickle flag over the Reichstag in Berlin, an act that symbolized the Soviet subjugation of eastern and central Europe. The Battle of Berlin climaxed the titanic struggle of German and Soviet forces that began on June 22, 1941. On the afternoon of April 30, 1945, as Soviet troops were storming the Reichstag building, Hitler committed suicide in his nearby bunker headquarters.
But it was too little, too late. In spite of the advantage of striking first, it was the Soviets who finally prevailed. In the spring of 1945, Red army troops succeeded in raising the red banner over the Reichstag building in Berlin. It was due only to the immense sacrifices of German and other Axis forces that Soviet troops did not similarly succeed in raising the Red flag over Paris, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Rome, Stockholm, and, perhaps, London.
The Debate Sharpens

In spite of resistance from "establishment" historians (who in Russia are often former Communists), support for Suvorov's "preventive strike" thesis has been growing both in Russia and in western Europe. Among those who sympathize with Suvorov's views are younger Russian historians such as Yuri L. Dyakov, Tatyana S. Bushuyeva, and I. V. Pavlova. (See the Nov.-Dec. 1997 Journal, pp. 32-34.)

With regard to 20th-century history, American historians are generally more close-minded than their counterparts in Europe or Russia. But even in the United States there have been a few voices of support for the "preventive war" thesis -- which is all the more noteworthy considering that Suvorov's books on World War II, with the exception of Icebreaker, have not been available in English. (One such voice is that of historian Russell Stolfi, a professor of Modern European History at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. See the review of his book Hitler's Panzers East in the Nov.-Dec. 1995 Journal.) Not all the response to Suvorov's work has been positive, though. It has also prompted criticism and renewed affirmations of the decades-old orthodox view. Among the most prominent new defenders of the orthodox "line" are historians Gabriel Gorodetsky of Tel Aviv University, and John Ericson of Edinburgh University.

Rejecting all arguments that might justify Germany's attack, Gorodetsky in particular castigates and ridicules Suvorov's works, most notably in a book titled, appropriately, "The Icebreaker Myth." In effect, Gorodetsky (and Ericson) attribute Soviet war losses to the supposed unpreparedness of the Red Army for war. "It is absurd," Gorodetsky writes, "to claim that Stalin would ever entertain any idea of attacking Germany, as some German historians now like to suggest, in order, by means of a surprise attack, to upset Germany's planned preventive strike."

Not surprisingly, Gorodetsky has been praised by Kremlin authorities and Russian military leaders. Germany's "establishment" similarly embraces the Israeli historian. At German taxpayers expense, he has worked and taught at Germany's semi-official Military History Research Office (MGFA), which in April 1991 published Gorodetsky's Zwei Wege nach Moskau ("Two Paths to Moscow").

In the "Last Republic," Suvorov responds to Gorodetsky and other critics of his first two books on Second World War history. He is particularly scathing in his criticisms of Gorodetsky's work, especially "The Icebreaker Myth."

Some Criticisms

Suvorov writes caustically, sarcastically, and with great bitterness. But if he is essentially correct, as this reviewer believes, he -- and we -- have a perfect right to be bitter for having been misled and misinformed for decades.

Although Suvorov deserves our gratitude for his important dissection of historical legend, his work is not without defects. For one thing, his praise of the achievements of the Soviet military industrial complex, and the quality of Soviet weaponry and military equipment, is exaggerated, perhaps even panegyric. He fails to acknowledge the Western origins of much of Soviet weaponry and hardware. Soviet engineers developed a knack for successfully modifying, simplifying and, often, improving, Western models and designs. For example, the rugged diesel engine used in Soviet tanks was based on a German BMW aircraft diesel.

One criticism that cannot in fairness be made of Suvorov is a lack of patriotism. Mindful that the first victims of Communism were the Russians, he rightly draws a sharp distinction between the Russian people and the Communist regime that ruled them. He writes not only with the skill of an able historian, but with reverence for the millions of Russians whose lives were wasted in the insane plans of Lenin and Stalin for "world revolution."

[Ovidius]

"They could have pressed the government for extended rights for the Hungarian minority, even autonomy, in order to keep Hungary happier. "
-> You are talking about autonomy,

Yeah right, Victor and IAR80 had chosen two rather "weird" approaches: the former claims that a political/economic convention to the USSR, initiated by Titulescu, would have been respected by the Soviets(who are just soooo well known for how much their keep their word ), while the latter looses precious time and energy on inventing scenarios on how should we fight the Germans in 1940(without saying why should we have fought them at all )

but I want to remind you that Romania was NEVER a federation, and will never be.

Psst! Don't tell this to Marko Bela, you may just ruin his day!

Giving extended rights to a minority, in Romania's case, would be madness.

With idiot leaders, madness happens....

If we think about your idea, we understand that Romania should never have entered WWI, for our national territories, but insteed, should have remained neutral and conclude some garbage treaties with Austro-Hungary too make the Magyar yoke on Romanians sweater!!!!!!!!!!!!!! That would be your idea?!

No, it was the idea of some guys in WWI and thereafter. Some of them served prison terms for it.

Exposing Stalin's Plan to Conquer Europe
How the Soviet Union 'Lost' the Second World War


Poslednyaya Respublika ("The Last Republic"), by Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun). Moscow: TKO ACT, 1996. 470 pages. Hardcover. Photographs.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reviewed by Daniel W. Michaels

For several years now, a former Soviet military intelligence officer named Vladimir Rezun has provoked heated discussion in Russia for his startling view that Hitler attacked Soviet Russia in June 1941 just as Stalin was preparing to overwhelm Germany and western Europe as part of a well-planned operation to "liberate" all of Europe by bringing it under Communist rule.

1. I don't doubt that Stalin and other Soviet leaders planned scenarios against Europe, while the Soviet-Magyar-Bulgarian scenario seems believable due to the quid pro quo involved: Magyars get Transylvania, Bulgarians get Cadrilater, Soviets get denial of German rights over Romanian oil.

2. However this Suvorov/Rezun guy seems the least reliable source to ask. And I pretty much doubt his mere existence. A guy that claims the GRU burnt alive the traitors, but left him alive! He may be a "straw man"/decoy just as well. Pretty trusty guy, right?

In his second book on the origins of the war, "M Day" (for "Mobilization Day"), Suvorov details how, between late 1939 and the summer of 1941, Stalin methodically and systematically built up the best armed, most powerful military force in the world -- actually the world's first superpower -- for his planned conquest of Europe. Suvorov explains how Stalin's drastic conversion of the country's economy for war actually made war inevitable. [Image: By mid-June 1941, enormous Red Army forces were concentrated on the western Soviet border, poised for a devastating attack against Europe. This diagram appeared in the English-language edition of the German wartime illustrated magazine Signal.

With one correction: that Stalin had built it from 1929 to 1941, and not alone, but together with the Americans, who had sent not only tools, machinery, other products, but also thousands of pages of technical literature to the USSR, to whom they were secretly allied. Plenty of Soviet war machines were based on American technology: BT-series tanks, GAZ engines, T-34 transmission, Christie tank suspensions etc.

Actually the captured Soviet machinery could be used with almost no problems by Romanians and Germans because most of their engines were licensed copies of American engines that had been sold to the Axis countries prior to war, and the parts in storage fitted them. For example, T-60s engine type GAZ-202 was a direct copy of the American Dodge-Derretto-Fargo F80.

Furthermore, and as Soviet theoreticians had always insisted, Communism could never peacefully coexist over the long run with other socio-political systems.

It could pretty damn coexist since they simulated the Cold War so well that we all believed them

As it was, Soviet development of heavy tank production had already begun in the early 1930s. For example, as early as 1933 the Soviets were already turning out in series production, and distributing to their forces, the T-35 model, a 45-ton heavy tank with three cannons, six machine guns, and 30-mm armor plating.

A design which sucked, as combat has proved

Aid from the 'Neutral' United States

As Suvorov notes, the United States had been supplying Soviet Russia with military hardware since the late 1930s. He cites Antony C. Sutton's study, National Suicide (Arlington House, 1973), which reports that in 1938 President Roosevelt entered into a secret agreement with the USSR to exchange military information. For American public consumption, though, Roosevelt announced the imposition of a "moral embargo" on Soviet Russia.

In the months prior to America's formal entry into war (December 1941), Atlantic naval vessels of the ostensibly neutral United States were already at war against German naval forces. (See Mr. Roosevelt's Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942 by Patrick Abbazia [Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975]). And two days after the "Barbarossa" strike, Roosevelt announced US aid to Soviet Russia in its war for survival against the Axis. Thus, at the outbreak of the "Barbarossa" attack, Hitler wrote in a letter to Mussolini: "At this point it makes no difference whether America officially enters the war or not, it is already supporting our enemies in full measure with mass deliveries of war materials."

Similarly, Winston Churchill was doing everything in his power during the months prior to June 1941 -- when British forces were suffering one military defeat after another -- to bring both the United States and the Soviet Union into the war on Britain's side. In truth, the "Big Three" anti-Hitler coalition (Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill) was effectively in place even before Germany attacked Russia, and was a major reason why Hitler felt compelled to strike against Soviet Russia, and to declare war on the United States five months later. (See Hitler's speech of December 11, 1941, published in the Winter 1988-89 Journal, pp. 394-396, 402-412.)

See above

Although Suvorov deserves our gratitude for his important dissection of historical legend, his work is not without defects. For one thing, his praise of the achievements of the Soviet military industrial complex, and the quality of Soviet weaponry and military equipment, is exaggerated, perhaps even panegyric. He fails to acknowledge the Western origins of much of Soviet weaponry and hardware. Soviet engineers developed a knack for successfully modifying, simplifying and, often, improving, Western models and designs. For example, the rugged diesel engine used in Soviet tanks was based on a German BMW aircraft diesel.

Yeah right.

Did at least for a moment pass through your mind the idea that maybe Viktor Suvorov isn't what he claims to be, and did you judge, at least for a second, at the intention and motives of the man who uses this pen-name, whoever he may be?

Or did you just swallow it?

Be subtle. Think with the fineness a man formerly educated to survive in Communism must have:

The following conclusions can be drawn from Suvorov's writings:

1. He asks us to believe blindly that:

- Soviet economy and technology allowed them to build a military giant from scratch, to take over Europe(why didn't they do it in 1945?)

- American/British supply was dictated by unrealistic reasons(do we believe Roosevelt and his counselors were stupid? and if they were, how did they take power? politics is not for stupid idealists)

2. He praises endlessly the Soviet economic power, military talent and technological genius, pretty much in the style of the 1950s authors.

What may be his intention?

Apparently to exploit the Western loathing of Hitler and the Third Reich(in Communist countries mostly the war had been publicized, not the Holocaust as in West) and the hatred of the modern Westerner for Hitlerism and to gain the following:

- convince the Westerners that the Soviets were better -> solve the inferiority complex of the Russians;

- convince the same Westerners that the Soviet Power was real and threatening("we were stronger, could've taken you anytime") -> same result;

- divert the possible research from the American support of Stalinism, by portraying Roosevelt as an idiot;

- divert the possible conclusion that the real warmonger, during all the turbulent period, was not Hitler, but Roosevelt, who had fueled the German-Soviet rivalry to gain what he wanted -> destruction of the Reich;

People can be easily drawn to think that the "Evil Russkies" were a danger, and the USA was the saviour of Europe and of the world -> just what they(Suvorov and others like him) want. And even better, they shoot two rabbits with one bullet: while people think the Soviets were a lethal danger, they also had thought previously that Hitler was a lethal danger.... "Hitler bad, Stalin bad - what's to do?" and the conclusion comes from itself - support the USA, they were the good boys and your saviours.

So that author, who apparently sympathizes with Hitler, has actually done propaganda against the last bits of sympathy for Communism the modern people have, and in favor of the USA!

Pretty good at his job, that guy, wasn't he?

~Best regards,

Ovidius

[Victor]

You are talking about autonomy, but I want to remind you that Romania was NEVER a federation, and will never be. Giving extended rights to a minority, in Romania's case, would be madness

No, it's not a war of patriotism, but a war based on resources and how well you can use them. The age of glorious charges was long gone. You must get these fairy tales out of your head, if you want to understand WWII.
A larger Romania would have been an advantage for Hitler: more troops and resources available for the Eastern Front. However, in order to gain Hungary's cooperation in the coming war, he could have pressed for special rights for the Hungarian minority, even autonomy. I for one would prefer to give some special rights to a minority than give away NW Transylvania! Here I can say that you have a “weird” attitude for a Romanian.

The Magyar government, or the Bulgarian government would be crazy to leave these disputed territories just with "rights".

They would if the Germans would tell them to. They could be quite convincing. I believe the destruction of the "world’s finest army" in 1940 was a good argument to listen to them.

If we think about your idea, we understand that Romania should never have entered WWI, for our national territories, but insteed, should have remained neutral and conclude some garbage treaties with Austro-Hungary too make the Magyar yoke on Romanians sweater!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

I think you should stop and take a long breath and try to use tour head instead of your stomach. What does one thing have to do with the other?

If the "glorious" USSR wanted absolutely to liberate our Bessarabia, why didn't the Romanian government give extended rights to the Ukrainian and Russian citizens? If the Romanian government would have done so, do you thonk that Stalin would be "more happier"?!

Oh boy! You are a passionate one aren't you?
Again what do Hungary and the SU have to do with each other? Hungary was small state, the Su was a giant. The SU could take what it wanted, Hungary needed Germany's approval. If Germany chose not to give it to them, but wanted to keep them content it could have pressed the Romanian government.

Think a little bit!!! This kind of pressure CANNOT be solved by little rights and liberties; this is WAR! Germany disliked the Romanian government, and also, wasn't able to help Romania in case of an armed conflict with the "good" neighbours (Germany had nearly all his forces in the West, fighting against France). So all this was done diplomatically, with satisfying the much as possible all camps, but also, to protect German interests in Romania.

I did think about it, but it looks like you didn't. You grossly underestimate Germany's influence. The Russians already gotten what it had been given to them in the Molotov-Ribentropp protocol. Hungary and Bulgaria wouldn't have made a single move without Berlin's approval. Btw, the battle in France was finished for some time in August 1940.

The Last Republic, by Viktor Suvorov

That's your source?

[Victor]

Yeah right, Victor and IAR80 had chosen two rather "weird" approaches: the former claims that a political/economic convention to the USSR, initiated by Titulescu, would have been respected by the Soviets(who are just soooo well known for how much their keep their word

Oh boy! I will try to explain this to you for the n-th time! Who knows, maybe you will get it this time.
The idea to make a convention with the Soviets was to have an alternative. That's why the Romanian government had to accept all the territorial raptures. They had only the German option and had to submit to its will. If Romania had a convention with the Soviets, the Germans would have been more "polite" and wouldn't have supported the Bulgarian and Hungarian claims, in order to secure Romania's cooperation. You always have to have options, if you do not want to be at the disposal of the stronger one. The convention with the SU could have been the ace in a discussion with Germany which would have been forced to negotiate, instead of simply dictating its terms.
The Soviets would keep their word as long it is their interest to do so. Just as the Germans did. This is how an alliance works. Each country follows its own interest. If it happens to coincide with another's, the result is an alliance.

[Mait]

I ´ll try to answer and comment some remarks in Your post.

"With one correction: that Stalin had built it from 1929 to 1941, and not alone, but together with the Americans, who had sent not only tools, machinery, other products, but also thousands of pages of technical literature to the USSR, to whom they were secretly allied. Plenty of Soviet war machines were based on American technology: BT-series tanks, GAZ engines, T-34 transmission, Christie tank suspensions etc. "

The real build-up program started in 1938-39 and reached really maniac speed in 1941. Of course the americans had sent tools and knowledge, so had germans - the real trick of the russians was to take the best parts of foreign technology and develope it. In 1941 and 1942 the T-34 tank was the best and Germans had no comparable tanks.

"He asks us to believe blindly that: - Soviet economy and technology allowed them to build a military giant from scratch, to take over Europe(why didn't they do it in 1945?)"

Because Stalin was well aware of Atomic bomb and its devastating effect. Thats why the airborne assault to Alaska never took place. Plus in 1945 the Soviet Union had lost approximately 30 million people. And the new territories and some border areas were rebellious (armed conflicts and guerilla wars in Baltic states, Ukraine, etc).

Best Regards,

Mait.

[Reigo]

Ovidius wrote:

With one correction: that Stalin had built it from 1929 to 1941, and not alone, but together with the Americans, who had sent not only tools, machinery, other products, but also thousands of pages of technical literature to the USSR, to whom they were secretly allied. Plenty of Soviet war machines were based on American technology: BT-series tanks, GAZ engines, T-34 transmission, Christie tank suspensions etc.

I know this isn't the original topic of the thread, but since the Soviet-US collaboration is one of my favourite topics.... I just can't hold myself back.

A certain author, Antony C. Sutton (died 17. 06. 2002), wrote several books on 70'ies and 80'ies about US-SU economical collaboration. Sutton was and is still widely ignored as a "conspiracy author." But actually he wasn't such author in the 70'ies. Anyway for his books he was kicked out from the Hoover Institute.

Now here's a certain article in Russian about Soviet industrialization:
http://www.historia.ru/2002/03/shpotov.htm

The author is B. Shpotov - a history doctor and presents latest conclusions.

A quote from there:

... all important for the Soviet economy facilities in the 30'ies were constructed on Western projects, were put into work with the help of Western specialists and were equipied mostly with Western machinery. This is completely supported not only by Western archival documents (the author refers here Sutton - Reigo) but also by Soviet archival documents. During the first phase [of industrialization] the importance of recieving the Western technology was crucial.

Besides that Soviet specialists were trained abroad.

Technological and constructional part of the Stalingrad Tractor Works (the largest in Europe) were accomplished by American companies International Harvester and Albert Kahn, Inc. and 90% of it's machinery were from over 100 US companies.

Albert Kahn's company engineered few hundred industrial objects in Soviet Union. Standart Oil of New York participated in building oil-industry in the area Baku - Groznyi - Batumi - Tuapse


American master teaches a komsomolka in Stalingrad Tractor Works 1931.

And in conclusion an interesting picture develops:

*US built Soviet Union and her businesses made money on that
*US then fought Soviet Union (Cold War) and her businesses made money on that
*US still supplied (or allowed to supply by her allies) SU with technology during Cold war and made money on that.

The question of the XX century is: was this done only because of money?