German-Romanian relations: the sacrifice of the Alushta Det.

[Victor]

German-Romanian relations: the sacrifice of the Alushta Detachment

I decided to present this little known episode of the fighting in Crimea in 1944, which can shed more light on the ups and downs in the German-Romanian military relations on the Eastern Front.

In April 1944, the Red Army had begun the final offensive aimed at recapturing Crimea. After braking through the defences in the Perekop Isthmus the 4th Ukrainian Front was advancing towards Sevastopol and in the same time was trying to cut off the retreat of the Axis forces in the Kerch Peninsula. Thus on 14 April, Soviet elements made contact with the 23rd Mountain Battalion (from the Alushta Detachment) at Perival. The gen. Karl Allmedinger, the CO of the 5th German Corps, ordered the 1st Mountain Division to hold the line with the Alushta Detachment at any cost so that the remaining German forces in Feodosiya could retreat. They were allowed to fall back to Alushta only at 19:15 on 15 April, from where they would be evacuated by sea.

The Alushta Detachment, commanded by col. Ionescu, was made up of the 23rd Mountain Battalion (lt. col. Aurel Vulcanescu), the 7th Mountain Battalion (lt. col. Vasile Teofanescu) and one battalion from the 4th Artillery Regiment. The 23rd Battalion was in the first line at Perival, while the 7th was further behind it north of Shumy. The artillery consisted of 75mm field guns, which were not suited for fighting in a rugged terrain.

During the night of 14/15 April, at 2:30, the Soviet forces started the attack on the 23rd Mountain Battalion’s positions. After several assaults, they managed to make a breach in the center. At 8:00, the vanatori de munte had to retreat to the line of the reserve company, 2 km south of Perival, and attempted to resist. But because the battalion was in danger of being outflanked and it lacked reserves, it was ordered at 9:45 to fall back in the second line, behind the 7th Mountain Battalion. At noon, the Romanian troops started to fall back towards Alushta and at 15:30 they were on the Alushta-Yalta highway, 8 km west of Alushta.

The 5th Corps’ motorized rearguard, which had to cover the retreat of the vanatori de munte to Alushta, left at 11:30, before carrying out its mission. Worse, the six MFPs, under the command of col. Hartung (chief of 5th Corps’ pioneers), which had to take the Romanians to Balaklava, also left when the first Soveit troops entered the city at 14:00. Col. Hartung even refused to pick up the troops directly from the beach and sailed for Sevastopol. Thus the two battalions and batteries were deserted at Alushta, after they have fought hard to allow the German troops to retreat to safety.

Only a handfull of men made it back to the Axis lines, under the leadership of cpt. Lazar Oprisor, from the 7th Mountain Battalion.

[Orok]

It is unfortunate historical facts that the Germans routinely used their allies's forces as rearguards in order to guarantee the safe retreating of German troops, and then blamed the whole debacles on that unfortunate ally. I don't think this is the best way to foster trust and fidelity.

Best regards!

[hauptmannn]

But one must remember that it was the Romanians who failed the Germans at Stalingrad.

[Orok]

But one must remember that it was the Romanians who failed the Germans at Stalingrad.

See, this is the typical German reaction! You all know what I mean in my previous post!

Thank Hauptmann for proving my points so eloquently!


Best Regards!

[Victor]

But one must remember that it was the Romanians who failed the Germans at Stalingrad.

Actually it was the Germans who failed themselves at Stalingrad.
They knew that the Romanian armies were stretched way over their possibilities, they knew that they lacked adequate AT capability, they knew that there was actually no natural obstacle upon which a solid defence could be built and they knew that the Soviets were concentrating large forces for an offensive. But they chose to ignore all these and practically invited the Soviets to attack their flanks.

Also "one must remember" that many Romanians died at Stalingrad. Not only the Germans lost a lot of men there. Given the relative size of the two armies, the Romanians lost more.

[Jay Felsberg]

Well put Viktor!

The entire tactical setup at Stalingrad was poorly done. The Romanian and Hungarian divisions were poorly equipped and stretched way too thinly to hold against any major Russian attack, let alone one of the magnitude that Zhukov unleashed. Hitker himself even commented on the weakness of the flank defenses.